Debench the judge.

[In California, there is a mechanism, which is an alternative to impeachment or recall, in the Constitution of the State of California (article VI, Section 18(d)(2).) to remove judges from the bench. I believe it is essentially an action in the nature of quo warranto tried by The Commission on Judicial Performance.]

Article VI of the Constitution of the State of California established The Commission on Judicial Qualifications, later superseded by The Commission on Judicial Performance.

CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION (1999)
ARTICLE 6, JUDICIAL
SEC. 18. (a) A judge is disqualified from acting as a judge, without loss of salary, while there is pending (1) an indictment or an information charging the judge in the United States with a crime punishable as a felony under California or federal law, or (2) a petition to the Supreme Court to review a determination by the Commission on Judicial Performance to remove or retire a judge.
(b) The Commission on Judicial Performance may disqualify a judge from acting as a judge, without loss of salary, upon notice of formal proceedings by the commission charging the judge with judicial misconduct or disability.
(c) The Commission on Judicial Performance shall suspend a judge from office without salary when in the United States the judge pleads guilty or no contest or is found guilty of a crime punishable as a felony under California or federal law or of any other crime that involves moral turpitude under that law. If the conviction is reversed, suspension terminates, and the judge shall be paid the salary for the judicial office held by the judge for the period of suspension. If the judge is suspended and the conviction becomes final, the Commission on Judicial Performance shall remove the judge from office.
(d) Except as provided in subdivision (f), the Commission on Judicial Performance may (1) retire a judge for disability that seriously interferes with the performance of the judge's duties and is or is likely to become permanent, or (2) censure a judge or former judge or remove a judge for action occurring not more than 6 years prior to the commencement of the judge's current term or of the former judge's last term that constitutes willful misconduct in office, persistent failure or inability to perform the judge's duties, habitual intemperance in the use of intoxicants or drugs, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, or (3) publicly or privately admonish a judge or former judge found to have engaged in an improper action or dereliction of duty. The commission may also bar a former judge who has been censured from receiving an assignment, appointment, or reference of work from any California state court. Upon petition by the judge or former judge, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant review of a determination by the commission to retire, remove, censure, admonish, or disqualify pursuant to subdivision (b) a judge or former judge. When the Supreme Court reviews a determination of the commission, it may make an independent review of the record. If the Supreme Court has not acted within 120 days after granting the petition, the decision of the commission shall be final....
(emphasis added).

Here I have transcribed some of the California Supreme Court Cases which have defined and explained what kinds of behavior have gotten one or more judges removed from his/her office ['debenched', for shorthand].

In summary, a judge who commits legal error which, in addition, clearly and convincingly reflects bad faith (Broadman v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1079, 1091-1092), bias (Kennick v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1990) 50 Cal.3d 297, 327-331 [267 Cal.Rptr. 293, 787 P.2d 591, 87 A.L.R.4th 679]), abuse of authority (Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 13 Cal.3d 778, 786-795 [119 Cal.Rptr. 841, 532 P.2d 1209]), disregard for fundamental rights (Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 49 Cal.3d 826, 849-854), intentional disregard of the law (Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 45 Cal.3d 518, 545-546 [247 Cal.Rptr. 378, 754 P.2d 724, 76 A.L.R.4th 951]), is subject to investigation. (See generally, Shaman et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics, supra, section 2.02, pp. 32-37.) Mere legal error, without more, however, is insufficient to support a finding that a judge has violated the Code of Judicial Ethics and thus should be disciplined.
(emphasis added.) Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1999), 20 Cal.4th 371, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 975 P.2d 663.

Geiler's bad faith interference with the attorney-client relationship in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 284 constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and wilful misconduct in office.
. . .
We agree with the Commission that the conduct charged in count six was not only unjudicial but unlawful as well (Cf. Smith v. Superior Court (1968), 68 Cal.2d 547 [68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65].) We also are in accord with the Commission in concluding, contrary to the special masters, that petitioner acted in "bad faith." However, we feel this last conclusion requires elucidation.
By "bad faith," we do not mean to imply that petitioner sought to harm the interests of the defendants involved. Rather, we mean that in indulging his petty animosity toward deputy public defenders, and in culmination of a pervasive course of conduct of overreaching his authority over subordinates, petitioner intentionally committed acts which he knew or should have known were beyond his lawful power. The resulting misconduct entailed the most insidious kind of official lawlessness--disregard for the statutory and constitutional rules by which a society of millions and a heritage of centuries have sought to preserve fundamental fairness within a legal system which cannot escape the inherent imperfections of mankind.
No more fragile rights exist under our law that the rights of the indigent accused; consequently these rights are deserving of the greatest judicial solicitude. The ideal of our legal system is that the judicial should be equated with the just. Such an ideal cannot be achieved if one man clothed with judicial power may ignore with impunity such a basic institutional mandate as the sancity of the attorney-client relationship merely because the attorneys are young deputy public defenders and their clients are indigent.
It is immaterial whether petioner's abuse of power resulted in just or unjust treatment for any given defendant. It is undisputed that petitioner bore no ill will towards the individual defendants enumerated in count six. Petioner's bad faith was directed towards our legal system itself; his arbitrary substitutions of counsel because of his personal beliefs as to the defendants' guilt and his personal hostility to their counsel smacks of an inquisitorial intent to serve imagined truth at the expense of justice. Our adversarial system of justice and our elaborate procedure for the prosecution of alleged criminals represents an institutional recognition of the fallibility of the individual. Much as our political system apportions power among jealous branches of government, so within the judicial branch we have striven to disperse the functions of the judicial process among many adverse participants in the hope that the institutions of our legal system will bear a collective capacity for justice and righteousness which no single mortal can achieve. It is this commitment to institutional justice which petitioner's individual conduct threatens to corrupt. Risk of recurrence of such conduct cannot be tolerated.
(emphasis added.) Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1973), 10 Cal.3d 270, 285-286, 110 Cal.Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d. 1.

A judge must not, as previously noted, place the defense of his own character above his obligation to promote respect for the law in adjudicating contempts of court (e.g., Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488 [41 L.Ed.2d 897, 94 S.Ct. 2697], strongly criticizing a district judge for trying a contempt when he exhibited "marked personal feelings" of hostility toward the contemptuous lawyer). If petitioner thus could not vent his personal animosity in the face of contemptuous conduct, he certainly could not do so in the face of any disrespect attendant to the public defender's affidavit of prejudice policy. No matter how provocative are the personal attacks or innuendos by lawyers against a judge, the judge simply "should not himself give vent to personal spleen or respond to a personal grievance" because "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." (Mr. Frankfurter writing for the court in Offutt v. United States (1954) 348 U.S. 11, 14 [99 L.Ed 11, 16, 75 S.Ct. 11]; see also Cooke v. U.S. (1925) 267 U.S. 517, 539 [69 L.Ed 767, 775, 45 S.Ct. 390], admonishing judges to "banish the slightest personal impulse to reprisal" in protecting the authority of the court.)
. . .
Even more salutary, however, was petitioner's unusual care in attempting to "do justice" in the cases before him. In advising criminal defendants of their constitutional rights at arraignment, he took extraordinary measures to insure that defendants understood the procedural protections accorded them. He prepared a detailed arraignment statement, had it translated into other languages when defendants did not speak English, and added a simple primer of trial procedure for defendants who appeared at trial in pro per.
(emphasis added.) McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974), 12 Cal.3d 512, 539, 116 Cal.Rptr. 260, 526 P.2d 268.

We find that petitioner acted in bad faith in exceeding the bounds of his lawful powers for the purpose of benefiting his friends and political supporters. His appointments clearly conflicted with the standards established by the California Code of Judicial Conduct. Therefore, we find petitioner's conduct to have been wilful misconduct.
We come now to our most important responsibility, [footnote 18. Under the controlling principles of Geiler, it is our findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which we make our determination of the ultimate action to be taken. Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 276.) Although we give great weight to the master's findings of fact (id., at pp. 275-276), the conclusions of law and the ultimate sanction are solely within our province and domain; we do not defer to either the masters or the Commission in deciding these matters. Language to the contrary in McCarthy v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 12 Cal. 3d at page 540 is no longer to be regarded as controlling.] The decision of the ultimate question whether a judge, whose conduct has been found to be either wilful misconduct or prejudicial conduct, [footnote 19. As we noted in Geiler, "[i]t should be emphasized that our characterization of one ground for imposing discipline as more or less serious than the other does not imply that in a given case we would regard the ultimate sanction of removal as unjustified solely for 'conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute.'" (Geiler v. Commission on Juducial Qualifications, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 284, fn. 11.) should be censured or removed from the bench (See fn. 1, supra.).
... Petitioner does not contend nor can we conceive that there are circumstances in which bad faith itself can be excluded by extraneous circumstances. There can be no mitigation for maliciously motivated unjudicial conduct. Since we have found petitioner to have acted in bad faith on numerous occasions, we obviously have given no credit to petitioner's asservations of mitigating circumstances.
(footnotes reproduced interlinearly and emphasis added.) Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975), 13 Cal.3d 778, 799-800, 119 Cal.Rptr. 841, 532 P.2d 1209.

We turn now to the merits of Judge Gonzalez's case and begin by summarizing the duties and standards governing our review. Initially it is our duty independently to review the evidence adduced by the masters. The standard of proof we must apply is well established: the allegations must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence sufficient to sustain a charge to a reasonable certainty." (Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1973) 10 C.3d 270, 275 [110 Cal.Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d 1].) We have also defined standards of judicial performance to guide our review of the Commission's disciplinary recommendation: "The ultimate standard for judicial conduct must be conduct which constantly reaffirms fitness for the high responsibilities of judicial office." (Id. at p. 281.)
The charge of wilful misconduct connotes "unjudicial conduct which a judge acting in his judicial capacity commits in bad faith,..." (Id at p. 284.) "Bad faith" is equivalent to actual malice and encompasses the intentinal commission of acts which the judge knew or reasonably should have known were beyond his lawful power, as well as acts which though within the ambit of lawful judicial authority are committed for purposes other than the faithful discharge of judicial duties. (Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 13 Cal.3d 778, 796 [119 Cal.Rptr. 841, 523 P.2d 1209].)
The lesser included charge of conduct prejudicial connotes "conduct which a judge undertakes in good faith but which nevertheless would appear to an objective observer to be not only unjudicial conduct but conduct prejudicial to public esteem for the judicial office," as well as wilful misconduct out of office, "i.e., unjudicial conduct committed in bad faith by a judge not then acting in a judicial capacity." (Geiler, supra< 10 Cal.3d at p. 284 and fn. 11.) A judge may be censured or removed from the bench only for wilful misconduct or conduct prejudicial. Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1983), 33 Cal.3d. 359, 365.
Gonzalez fails to grasp the heart of the matter. He has not been charged with committing reversible error by his actions, nor is this the standard for determining whether his misconduct is sanctionable. Rather, petitioner was charged with having "conducted ... court business in a manner demonstrating ignorance of and indifference to procedures required by law which are essential to the fair, orderly, and decorous administration of justice." It is of course well established that "private communication between court and jury are improper, and that all communications should be made in open court." (People v. Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d 177, 189 [148 P.2d 627]; see also Paulson v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 1, 7 [22 Cal.Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d. 641].) Although informal communications between judge and jury may not result in reversible error if an appeal is in fact taken, for our purposes it is important to stress that such communications do interfere with the parties' right to the assistance of counsel and do undermine public esteem for the integrity and impartiality of the judicial office. The evidence in this case clearly establishes Judge Gonzalez's patent indifference and disrespect for the settled judicial practices. He certainly should have known his jury room visits were beyond his lawful powers. (Geiler, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 286.) We, therefore, find these actions constitute wilful misconduct.
(emphasis added) Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1983), 33 Cal.3d. 359, 375, 188 Cal.Rptr. 880, 657 P.2d 372.

Judge Ryan is charged with three instances of prejudicial conduct for failing to provide a court reporter in criminal hearings. The pertinent facts surrounding these matters can be summarized briefly. The court administrator for Placer County advised all members of the court, including Judge Ryan, of the Case of In re Armstrong (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 565 [178 Cal.Rptr. 902], which held that it is a violation of due process and equal protection to deny a verbatim record upon request in all municipal court criminal proceedings. Funds were appropriated in January 1983, for reporters to serve the Municipal Court of Placer County on a daily basis. Judge Ryan took the position that reporters were not required and directed the clerk of his court to discharge the reporters assigned to his courtroom unless a timely request was made for their presence. To ensure that a court reporter would be present in Judge Ryan's courtroom, the district attorney's office began stamping a request for a court reporter on every pleading or motion filed. However, individuals appearing without counsel were not advised of their right to have a reporter, and hence did not know they had to request one....
...As a separate count of improper conduct, it was alleged that the judge failed to provide a court reporter upon return of the bench warrant and that he also sentenced Burgess without a reporter present....
The judge correctly interprets Armstrong as requiring a court reporter upon request. However he misperceives the significance of his failure to instruct defendants appearing in propria persona that they have a right to a verbatim record. The judge's stubborn and obstructionist attitude effectively denied these defendants their constitutional right to have a reporter present.
(emphasis added.) Ryan v. Commmission on Judicial Performance(1988), 45 Cal.3d 518, 541-542, 247 Cal.Rptr. 378, 754 P.2d 724.

Under former subdivision (c) of section 18 of article VI of the California Constitution, we may remove a judge from office only for certain specified kinds of misconduct: (1) "wilful misconduct in office"; (2) "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute": (3) "persistent failure or inability to perform the judge's duties"; and (4) "habitual intemperance in the use of intoxicants or drugs."
. . .
The question of misconduct obviously implicates the standard of conduct to which judges are held. That standard is manifested, in part, in the California Code of Judicial Conduct and its canons. (Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 8 Cal.4th at 661.) Adopted by California judges themselves,[10] the code does "not have the force of law or regulation ...." (Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 8 Cal.4th at 661.) Nevertheless, its canons "reflect a judicial consensus regarding appropriate behavior, and are helpful in giving content to" former subdivision (c) of section 18 of article VI of the California Constitution. (Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1989) 49 Cal.3d 826, 838, fn 6 [264 Cal.Rptr. 100, 782 P.2d 239, 89 A.L.R.4th 235] accord, Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 8 Cal.4th at 661-662.)
. . .
In determining the issues that underlie the removal of a judge from office under former subdivision (c) of section 18 of article VI of the California Constitution, we also proceed independently. (See Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 799, fn 18.) As stated, we may remove a judge only for certain specified kinds of misconduct. We may find such misconduct only if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence, with the burden resting on the examiners of the Commission. (E.g., Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 275; see e.g., Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 784-785.)[11. The misconduct in question, of course, must first be charged. (See Kennick v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1990) 50 Cal.3d 297, 315 [267 Cal.Rptr. 293, 787 P.2d 591]; see also Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 365 [holding that it is "the allegations" that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence]; Roberts v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1983) 33 Cal.3d 739, 746 [190 Cal.Rptr. 910, 661 P.2d 1064][to similar effect].)]
Doan v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1995), 11 Cal.4th 294, 311-313, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 902 P.2d 272.

On the habeas corpus petition of Antonio Francois Armstrong we consider the constitutionality of a practice of some municipal courts not to record verbatim, although requested by the defendant, the testimony and other oral proceedings of criminal misdemeanor cases by a phonographic reporter, or electronic recording device, or otherwise....
The right of "equal access" to the courts rests upon the "'constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection....'" (March v. Municipal Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d 422, 427, italics added; and see Preston v. Municipal Court (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 76, 83-84 [10 Cal.Rptr. 301]; Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 17-18 [100 L.Ed 891, 898, 76 S.Ct. 585, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055].)
"The courts have been particularly careful to inspect classifications relating to the criminal process,..." (United States v. Thompson (D.C.Cir. 1971) 452 F.2d 1333, 1340 [cert.den. 405 U.S. 998 (31 L.Ed.2d 467, 92 S.Ct. 1251)].) And where one's "personal liberty is at stake," a statutory scheme "requires application of the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis. Accordingly, the state must establish both that it has a "compelling interest" which justifies the challenged procedure and that the distinctions drawn by the procedure are necessary to further that interest." (In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 465 [149 Cal Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097].)
"Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem. People have never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that goal. This hope, at least in part, brought about in 1215 the royal concessions of Magna Charta: 'To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse, or delay, right or justice.... No free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or desseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or anywise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.' ... Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system--all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court'" Griffin v. Illinois, supra, 351 U.S. 12, 16-17 [100 L.Ed 891, 897-898; fn. omitted.)
Today, the former distinction between felonies and misdemeanors has been abandoned. Insofar as the right of a convicted defendant to an adequate record on appeal is concerned, a "distinction between felony and nonfelony offenses" will no longer "satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment...." (Mayer v. City of Chicago (1971) 404 U.S. 189, 195-196 [30 L.Ed.2d 372, 378-379, 92 S.Ct. 410].)...
For these several reasons we hold that the complained of practice of the municipal courts of Alameda County is violative of the "due process" and "equal protection of the laws" provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of this state's Constitution, article I, section 7....
We have, by our instant decision, held that, upon request therefore, there is a constitutional right that a verbatim record be provided at public expense for all defendants in misdemeanor matters. ...
...We hold only that a misdemeanor defendant, upon his request, is constitutionally entitled to a verbatim "record of sufficient completeness" permitting proper consideration of an appeal which might thereafter be taken....
...we declare that, except as to Armstrong, the holding we have made shall operate prospectively only, and as to misdemeanor trials and proceedings commenced after this opinion shall become final.
(emphasis added) In Re Armstrong (1981), 126 Cal.App.3d 565, 178 Cal.Rptr. 902.