Thomas Murrell Thornhill III
c/o Box 1755 U.S.P.S.
Nevada City, California,
United States of America
No telephone service maintained.
In my own right, without the assistance of counsel.
[date]

THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA

(a corporation)

d.b.a.

THE NEVADA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

(a fictitious business)

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA	)	Notice of Demurrer
AND DOES 1-100	)	and Demurrer for
	)	lack of Jurisdiction.
versus	)
	)	Case number [?]
THOMAS M. THORNHILL, III	)
(a fictitious entity)	)	Place: 201 Church Street
	)	Nevada City, California
	)	Date:

Declarant, ___________________________________________ a natural born, Adult white Man, one of the People of the United States of America and one of the People of The State of California; is here by Special Visitation only without benefit of the assistance of counsel; for the sole purpose of Demurring to the jurisdiction of this purported court.

Declarant, with all due Respect and in full Good Faith, Declares and Affirms:

1.a. I respectfully Demand the immediate presence and services of a certified stenographic reporter to transcribe a complete true and accurate Record of the current proceedings in this court of record, as is required by these court cases: In re Armstrong (1981), 126 Cal.App.3d 565; California Court Reporters Assn. v. Judicial Council of California (1997), 59 Cal.App.4th 959, 964; California Court Reporters Assn. v. Judicial Council of California (1995), 39 Cal.App.4th 15, 18; Doan v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1995), 11 Cal.4th 294, 311-312; Kennick v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1990), 50 Cal.3d 297, 313-314; Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1989), 49 Cal.3d 826, 842-843, 865-866; Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1988), 45 Cal.3d 518, 541-542.

1.b. From this time forward, this Notice is, and shall be, legally sufficient five-day-in-advance Notice of Declarant's Demand for the presence and services of a certified stenographic reporter who will transcribe a True and Accurate Record of the proceedings at this and any subsequent visit.

2. Whether or not this court chooses to believe it, I do not proceed from malice, from discourtesy, or from an intent to annoy or harass the court. I proceed from curiosity and a need to understand the nature of these proceedings. If that inconveniences or upsets the court, I sincerely apologize in advance.

3.a. I am NOT a California-licensed Attorney; I am acting in my own right from my God-given Right to self-defense at all times and places whatsoever, as generally guaranteed by The Constitution of the United States and by The Constitution of the State of California, and as specifically recognized in West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code, §§ 43 and 50; and in West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code, §§ 692, 693, and 694.

3.b. I am NOT an Attorney, nor an accountant, nor a withholding agent, nor am I knowingly any fiduciary, trustee, guardian, conservator, of any kind representing the fictitious entity THOMAS M. THORNHILL, III.

3.c. I am not, cannot be, and will not attempt to be, Surety for the fictitious entity THOMAS M. THORNHILL, III.

4. I hereby formally Object to the purported jurisdiction of this court.
a.

"One of the hoariest precepts in our federal judicial system is that a claim going to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point in the litigation by any party." Dissent, Justice Scalia, Peretz v. U. S., 501 U. S. 923, 953 (1991);
"See also: "It is true, of course, that a litigant's prior agreement to a judge's expressed intention to disregard a structural limitation upon his power cannot have any legitimating effect -- i.e., cannot render that disregard lawful. Even if both litigants not only agree to, but themselves propose, such a course, the judge must tell them no. ... Such an error may be raised by a party, and indeed must be noticed sua sponte by a court at all points in the litigation (citations)... . Since a jurisdictional defect deprives not only the initial court but also the appellate court of its power over the case or controversy, to permit the appellate court to ignore it because of waiver would be to give the waiver legitimating, as opposed to merely remedial, effect, i.e., the effect of approving, ex ante, unlawful action by the appellate court itself." (Concurrence, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter); Freytag v. Comm. Of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 896.

"Jurisdiction of the subject matter is derived from the law. It can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. Objection that the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter may be made at any stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such objection is never waived. Citing: 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law §379 (1965)."
Morgan v. Alaska (1981), 635 P.2d 472.

Where a court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which occurs in the cause; whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court. But, if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all parties concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered in law as trespassers.
This distinction runs through all the cases on the subject; and it proves that the jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over a subject may be inquired into in every court when the proceedings of the former are relied on and brought before the latter by the party claiming the benefit of such proceedings.
Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol (1828), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340, 7 L.Ed 164, 339.

5.b. There is no Evidence in the Record to support the position that this court has any lawful existence as such a summary, a special, or a general court-martial/tribunal/commission in this county or in this state.

5.c. The United States Supreme Court has held:

"The controlling question in the case is this: Upon the facts stated in Milligan's petition, and the exhibits filed, had the Military Commission mentioned in it jurisdiction, legally, to try and sentence him? ...
"Every trial involves the exercise of judicial power; and from what source did the Miliary Commission that tried him derive their authority? Certainly no part of the judicial power of the country was conferred on them; because the Constitution expressly vests it "in one Supreme court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," and it is not pretended that the commission was a court ordained and established by Congress. They cannot justify on the mandate of the President; because he is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the laws; and there is "no unwritten criminal code to which resort can be had as a source of jurisdiction."
One of the plainest constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not ordained and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed during good behavior.
(emphasis added) Ex Parte Milligan (1866), 71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281, 295, 296.

5.e. In the alternative, this 'court' is openly and notoriously sitting in the form of a court of Admiralty. (See 5.a. above.)
But the California courts have addressed that issue thus:

"1. Admiralty Jurisdiction
"(1) Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has developed two tests to determine whether a particular action is governed by admiralty law. Under the first test, known as the "locality" test, :[e]very species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." (The Plymouth (1866) 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 [18 L.Ed. 125, 128].)
"Dissatisfied with the all-encompassing approach of the locality test, the United States Supreme Court set forth an additional test which must be met in order to invoke admiralty jurisdiction. Under this test, known as the "nexus" test, "the wrong [complained of must] bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." (Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland (1972) 409 U.S. 249, 268 [L.Ed. 454, 467, 93 S.Ct. 493].)"
Lewinter v. Genmar Industries, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1218, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 305.

5.g.

"Lawful. The principal distinction between the terms "lawful" and "legal" is that the former contemplates the substance of law, the latter the form of law. To say of an act that it is "lawful" implies that it is authorized, sanctioned, or at any rate not forbidden, by law. To say that it is "legal" implies that it is done or performed in accordance with the forms and usages of law, or in a technical manner. In this sense "illegal" approaches the meaning of "invalid." For example, a contract or will, executed without the required formalities, might be said to be invalid or illegal, but could not be described as unlawful. Further, the word "lawful" more clearly implies an ethical content than does "legal." The latter goes no further than to denote compliance, with positive, technical, or formal rules; while the former usually imports a moral substance or ethical permissibility. A further distinction is that the word "legal" is used as the synonym of "constructive," which "lawful" is not. Thus "legal fraud" is fraud implied or inferred by law, or made out by construction. "Lawful fraud" would be a contradiction of terms. Again, "legal" is used as the antithesis of "equitable," thus, we speak of "legal assets," "legal estate," etc., but not of "lawful assets," or "lawful estate." But there are some connections in which the two words are used as exact equivalents. Thus, a "lawful" writ, warrant, or process is the same as a "legal" writ, warrant, or process."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, Revised 4th Edition (1968), p. 1032.

07502308
NOTICE TO
INTERESTED PARTIES

RE: $760.00 CASH

Dear Interested Parties:

You are hereby informed that on November 18, 1999 at 10267 Streeter Road, Auburn, County of Nevada, California, the above described property was seized by officers of the Nevada County Sheriff's Department and Placer Law Enforcement Special Investigation Officers in connection with a violation of Section 11379, Health and Safety Code.

Non-judicial forfeiture proceedings have been commenced in the Superior Court of the County of Nevada.

If you claim an interest in this property, you must, within thirty (30) days of the first publication of this notice, file a verified claim stating your interest with the Clerk of the Superior Court. You must also provide a verified copy of the claim to the Office of the District Attorney, County of Nevada, California.

Case No NCSO # N2000-0476 & P99-266-OC has been assigned to this case. Use this number to identify the property in any correspondence with the Office of the District Attorney or the Court.

If your claim is not timely filed, the District Attorney will seek to have the Court declare the property described in this notice to be forfeited to the State and it will be disposed of as provided in Health and Safety Code 4 section 11489.

MICHAEL W. FERGUSON
District Attorney

/s/ KENNETH M. TRIBBEY
Deputy District Attorney

Publication dates: April 6, 13, & 20, 2000.

"It is a well-recognized rule that for purposes of statutory construction the codes are to be regarded as blending into each other and constituting but a single statute. (Proctor v. Justice's Court (1940), 209 Cal. 39, 43 [285 P. 213]; County of Butte v. Merrill (1903), 141 Cal. 396, 399 [74 P. 1036]; Clarke v. Mead (1894), 102 Cal. 516, 520 [39 P. 862].)"
In re Porterfield (1946), 28 Cal.2d 91, 168 P.2d 706.

6.d. I would then have reasonable cause to believe that the court was sitting as a "non-judicial" court in this instance and that the judge was a "non-judicial" actor in this instance.

6.e. There is no Evidence in the Record to support any such purported authority.

7. I personally have been previously told in open session before the-then-styled NEVADA COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT that The Constitution of the State of California and The Constitution of the United States "have no place in this court", that I should not bring up either document under pain of sanction for Contempt, and that I did not have any Constitutional rights in that court. {No, there is no written Record of that incident because the court did not have a certified stenographic reporter at my Arraignment.)
Since this violates every reasonable expectation and understanding that I have about the nature of the law in my country and about the nature of the courts of the State of California, I must Demand that this court explain said position IN THE RECORD to my complete satisfaction before we proceed further.

8.a. If this court, of its own knowledge, is not a lawful court of the State of California, I must respectfully Demand that this court sua sponte (by its own motion) immediately disclose to me where such a court physically is, its full lawful name, and its lawful address.
8.b. I Reserve the Right to remove this action to that lawful court should it exist.

9. I have probable cause to believe that THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, while doing business as THE NEVADA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT and as both THE NEVADA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE and THE NEVADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, expects to benefit (profit, derive financial gain) from my potential Conviction, and/or from a court-created Judgment from the pending Proceeding in this court, [See West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2000), Section 1464]. I must Demand that this court explain to my complete satisfaction IN THE RECORD how, in the face of this obvious Conflict of Interest, I can have any reasonable expectation of receiving a fair, impartial, unbiased, or unprejudiced hearing in this court.

10. I specifically reserve the Right to enforce any and all applicable sanctions against any licensed Attorney who may choose to appear in this matter, for having knowingly submitted an invalid and frivolous claim before this court, with the intent to deceive both the court and myself. (See West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2000), § 96.5, which reads:

"Section 96.5. Perversion or obstruction of justice by judicial officer, court commissioner or referee.
(a) Every judicial officer, court commissioner, or referee who commits any act that he or she knows perverts or obstructs justice is guilty of a public offense punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year.
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits prosecution under paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 182 of the Penal Code or any other law." (Amended by Stats. 1999, c. 853 (S.B. 832, sec. 7.) effective January 1, 2000.)

12. I reserve the Right of Cross-complaint should that remedy become necessary.

13. While I honestly wish the situation were otherwise, on the strength of the information cited above and of my own prior experience with a purported STATE OF CALIFORNIA court under the-then-style of NEVADA COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT, I have probable cause to believe the court has Forfeited any lawful claim to my Respect or the Respect due the judicial system, by its own documented knowing, deliberate, and willful actions in a course and custom of blatant disregard of the laws and statutes of California which amounts to the willful derogation and deprivation of my fundamental rights as protected by The Constitution of the United States and by The Constitution of the State of California [See: NEVADA COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT, Case M96-1292 (1996), incorporated in full herein by reference.].

I Certify, under the laws of California that the foregoing is true, complete, and accurate.

Thomas Murrell Thornhill III

Signed: ___________________________________________

At: _______________________________________________

Date: _____________________________________________