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| THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA | (a corporation) | doing business as | THE NEVADA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT | (a fictitious business) |
| THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA | | | Notice of Demurrer | AND DOE(S) PRESENTLY UNKNOWN | | | and Demurrer | | | (pursuant to 430.10 C.C.P.) | versus | | | | | Case number [?] | THOMAS M. THORNHILL, III | | | (a legal fiction) | | | at: 201 Church Street | | | Nevada City, California | _______________________________ | / | Date: [] |
Declarant, ___________________________________________, is a competent witness and does Solemnly state that:
1.a. I am a natural born, adult white Man, one of the people of the united states of America and one of the people of California.
1.b. I am not a trained or licensed Attorney; so, of necessity, I am acting at all times within my right to defend my life, liberty, and property as set out in The California Constitution (2001), Art. 1, Sec. 1 (from http://www.leginfo.ca.gov./.const/.article_1 [as of May 9, 2001]):
All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.2. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P., section 430.40 reads:
(a) A person against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may, within 30 days after service of the complaint or cross-complaint, demur to the complaint or cross-complaint.3.a. "The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading." (430.10(a) C.C.P.)
(b) A party who has filed a complaint or cross-complaint may, within 10 days after service of the answeer to his pleading, demur to the answer.
3.b. It is an undisputed fact that Declarant is a private civilian and is not an official, officer or employee of the United States.
3.c. It is an undisputed fact that Declarant is a private civilian and is not an official, officer, or employee of The State of California.
3.d. Declarant has reasonable cause to believe that the court is openly and notoriously purporting to be a summary, a special, or a general court-martial of The United States and of The State of California. See EXHIBIT 1: Army Regulation 840-10. Heraldic Activities: Flags, Guidons, Streamers, Tabards, and Automobile and Aircraft Plates (Revised 1 June 1998) incorporated herein in full.
3.e. The United States Supreme Court has held:
"The controlling question in the case is this: Upon the facts stated in Milligan's petition, and the exhibits filed, had the Military Commission mentioned in it jurisdiction, legally, to try and sentence him? ...3.f.1. In the alternative, Declarant has reasonable cause to believe that the court is sitting in the form of a court of Admiralty because of the open and notorious display of military or quasi-military ensigns in the courtroom.
"Every trial involves the exercise of judicial power; and from what source did the Miliary Commission that tried him derive their authority? Certainly no part of the judicial power of the country was conferred on them; because the Constitution expressly vests it "in one Supreme court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," and it is not pretended that the commission was a court ordained and established by Congress. They cannot justify on the mandate of the President; because he is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the laws; and there is "no unwritten criminal code to which resort can be had as a source of jurisdiction."
One of the plainest constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not ordained and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed during good behavior.(emphasis added) Ex Parte Milligan (1866), 71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281, 295, 296.
"1. Admiralty Jurisdiction3.f.3. The opposing attorney has, to date, filed no pleading to support the contention that this court is lawfully sitting as a court of Admiralty; or, if it is, that it has any lawful subject matter jurisdiction under either prong of the tests described in Lewinter above.
"(1) Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has developed two tests to determine whether a particular action is governed by admiralty law. Under the first test, known as the "locality" test, :[e]very species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." (The Plymouth (1866) 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 [18 L.Ed. 125, 128].)
"Dissatisfied with the all-encompassing approach of the locality test, the United States Supreme Court set forth an additional test which must be met in order to invoke admiralty jurisdiction. Under this test, known as the "nexus" test, "the wrong [complained of must] bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." (Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland (1972) 409 U.S. 249, 268 [L.Ed. 454, 467, 93 S.Ct. 493].)" Lewinter v. Genmar Industries, Inc. (1994), 26 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1218, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 305.
3.g. Various courts have held:
(1) Jurisdiction of the subject matter is derived from the law. It can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. Objection that the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter may be made at any stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such objection is never waived. Citing: 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law §379 (1965). Morgan v. Alaska (1981), 635 P.2d 472.4. "The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue." (430.10(b) C.C.P.) [by Special Demurrer].(2) Where a court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which occurs in the cause; whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court. But, if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all parties concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered in law as trespassers.
This distinction runs through all the cases on the subject; and it proves that the jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over a subject may be inquired into in every court when the proceedings of the former are relied on and brought before the latter by the party claiming the benefit of such proceedings. Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol (1828), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340, 7 L.Ed 164, 339.(3) "One of the hoariest precepts in our federal judicial system is that a claim going to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point in the litigation by any party." Dissent, Justice Scalia, Peretz v. U. S., 501 U. S. 923, 953 (1991);
See also: "It is true, of course, that a litigant's prior agreement to a judge's expressed intention to disregard a structural limitation upon his power cannot have any legitimating effect -- i.e., cannot render that disregard lawful. Even if both litigants not only agree to, but themselves propose, such a course, the judge must tell them no. ... Such an error may be raised by a party, and indeed must be noticed sua sponte by a court at all points in the litigation (citations)... . Since a jurisdictional defect deprives not only the initial court but also the appellate court of its power over the case or controversy, to permit the appellate court to ignore it because of waiver would be to give the waiver legitimating, as opposed to merely remedial, effect, i.e., the effect of approving, ex ante, unlawful action by the appellate court itself." (Concurrence, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter); Freytag v. Comm. Of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 896.
4.a. It is an undisputed fact that no pleading has been filed to date.
5. "There is a defect or misjoinder of parties." (430.10(d) C.C.P.)
5.a. "The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." (430.10(e) C.C.P.)
5.b. It is an undisputed fact that the opposing attorney has not, to date, filed a valid pleading in this matter.
5.c. It is an undisputed fact that the opposing attorney has not, to date, filed a Proof of Service for said pleading in this matter.
6. "The pleading is uncertain.... ambiguous and unintelligible." (430.10 (f) C.C.P.)
7. "In an action founded on a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct." (430.10 (g) C.C.P.)
8.a. A Public Notice which I read in The Union, of Grass Valley, California, dated April 6, 2000, p. C5, reads (emphasis added):
075023088.b. The California Supreme Court has held:
NOTICE TO
INTERESTED PARTIESRE: $760.00 CASH
Dear Interested Parties:
You are hereby informed that on November 18, 1999 at 10267 Streeter Road, Auburn, County of Nevada, California, the above described property was seized by officers of the Nevada County Sheriff's Department and Placer Law Enforcement Special Investigation Officers in connection with a violation of Section 11379, Health and Safety Code.
Non-judicial forfeiture proceedings have been commenced in the Superior Court of the County of Nevada.
If you claim an interest in this property, you must, within thirty (30) days of the first publication of this notice, file a verified claim stating your interest with the Clerk of the Superior Court. You must also provide a verified copy of the claim to the Office of the District Attorney, County of Nevada, California.
Case No NCSO # N2000-0476 & P99-266-OC has been assigned to this case. Use this number to identify the property in any correspondence with the Office of the District Attorney or the Court.
If your claim is not timely filed, the District Attorney will seek to have the Court declare the property described in this notice to be forfeited to the State and it will be disposed of as provided in Health and Safety Code 4 section 11489.
MICHAEL W. FERGUSON
District Attorney/s/ KENNETH M. TRIBBEY
Deputy District AttorneyPublication dates: April 6, 13, & 20, 2000.
"It is a well-recognized rule that for purposes of statutory construction the codes are to be regarded as blending into each other and constituting but a single statute. (Proctor v. Justice's Court (1940), 209 Cal. 39, 43 [285 P. 213]; County of Butte v. Merrill (1903), 141 Cal. 396, 399 [74 P. 1036]; Clarke v. Mead (1894), 102 Cal. 516, 520 [39 P. 862].)" In re Porterfield (1946), 28 Cal.2d 91, 168 P.2d 706.8.c. My reasonable inference from the above information, when read together, is that if the court can purport to have authority to make "non-judicial forfeiture" in a "non-judicial proceeding" under West's Ann.Cal.Health and Safety Code, it could just as easily claim to have authority to conduct "non-judicial proceedings" under any, or all, other part(s) of West's Annotated California Codes in any action whatsoever.
8.d. I do not understand how any forum, while purporting to be a "court", can conduct or pretend-to-conduct such a thing as a "non-judicial proceeding without automatically forfeiting its standing as a "court".
9. I formally Notice the court that should I ever appear, or be compelled to appear, against my will in this, or any other, matter in this forum, said forum, by its own actions, agrees under an adhesion agreement/contract to pay me the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) per each said appearance for the fair value of my services to be rendered to the court. Said sum is due and shall be payable upon each said appearance.
I certify under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and accurate.
Executed this Day, the ______________ day of___________________ in the year of Our Lord, two thousand and one, in ____________________________city, ________________________county, ____________________________State, united States of America.
________________________________________________________
Thomas Murrell Thornhill III
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