From: Thomas Murrell Thornhill III
c/o Box 1755, U.S.P.S.
Nevada City, California, united States of America.
No telephone service maintained.
October 27, 2000

To: THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
P.O. BOX 1673
Attn: 343:CNI MS: D-712
SACRAMENTO CA 95812-1673

RE: FTB case number 2580119270088816.

Dear Miss/Ms./Mrs. Iwuchukwu:

A. The United States Supreme Court has considered Due Process of law in many cases. I present some of those cases here:

1.

"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 US 385, 394, 58 L Ed 1363, 1369, 34 S Ct 779 (1914). The hearing must be "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v Manzo, 380 US 545, 552, 14 L Ed 2d 62, 66, 85 S Ct 1187 (1965). ...these principles require ... timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons ... and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally. These rights are important ... where recipients have challenged proposed ... as resting on incorrect or misleading factual premises or on misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of particular cases. [fnt 15. This case presents no question requiring our determination whether due process requires only an opportunity for written submission, or an opportunity both for written submission and oral argument, where there are no factual issues in dispute or where the application of the rule of law is not intertwined with factual issues.] ... The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard. It is not enough that a [person] may present his position to the decision maker in writing or secondhand through his [representative]... (footnote reproduced interlinearly; bracketed information added.) Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), 397 U.S. 254, 267-269, 25 L.Ed.2d. 287, 299, 90 S.Ct. 1011.

A fundamental requirement of due process is "the opportunity to be heard." Grannis v Ordean, 234 US 385, 394, 58 L ed 1363, 1369, 34 S Ct 779. It is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Armstrong v. Manzo (1965), 380 U.S. 545, 552, 14 L.Ed.2d. 62, 66, 85 S.Ct. 1187.

The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 236, 44 L. ed. 747, 750, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620: Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 436, 45 L. ed. 1165, 1170, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 836. And it is to this end, of course, that summons or equivalent notice is employed. Grannis v. Ordean (1914), 234 U.S. 385, 394, 58 L.Ed. 1363, 1369, 34 S.Ct. 779.

The [Interstate Commerce] Commission is an administrative body and, even where it acts in a quasi judicial capacity, is not limited by the strict rules, as to the admissibility of evidence, which prevail in suits between private parties. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 48 L. ed. 860, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563. But the more liberal the practice in admitting testimony, the more imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules of evidence by which rights are asserted or defended. In such cases the Commissioners cannot act upon their own information, as could jurors in primitive days. All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered, and must be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer evidence in explanation or rebutal. In no other way can a party maintain its rights or make its defense. In no other way can it test the sufficiency of the facts to support the finding; for otherwise, even though it appeared that the order was without evidence, the manifest deficiency could always be explained on the theory that the Commission had before it extraneous, unknown, but presumptively sufficient information to support the finding. United States v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. 226 U. S. 14, ante, 104, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 5. (bracketed information and emphasis added) Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (1913), 227 U.S. 88, 93-94, 57 L.Ed. 431, 434, 33 S.Ct. 185.

The [Public Utilities] Commission had given notice that the value of the property would be fixed as of a date certain. ... Without warning or even the hint of warning that the case would be considered upon any other basis that the evidence submitted, the Commission [changed its decision] upon the strength of information secretly collected and never yet disclosed. The company protested. It asked disclosure of the documents indicative ... and an opportunity to examine them, to analyze them. The response was a curt refusal. Upon the strength of these unknown documents ... the Commission reporting its conclusion, but not the underlying proofs. The putative debtor does not know the proofs today. This is not the fair hearing essential to due process. It is condemnation without trial. (bracketed information added) Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (1937), 301 U.S. 292, 300, 81 L.Ed. 1093, 1099, 57 S.Ct. 724.

Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art 6, cl 3, "to support this Constitution." Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court in 1859, said that this requirement reflected the framers' "anxiety to preserve it [the Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State. . . ." Ableman v Booth (US) 21 How 506, 524, 16 L ed 169, 176.
No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. (emphasis added)Cooper v. Aaron (1958), 358 U.S. 1, 18, 3 L.Ed.2d. 5, 17, 78 S.Ct. 1401.

The foregoing cases support the obvious rule that plaintiffs, as public servants, have the implied duty to support the form of government lawfully chosen by the people whom they are employed to represent, to act as representatives of the people and not to advocate destruction of the government by force or violence. By accepting public employment they forego any privilege they may have had as private citizens to advocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence. It is inconceivable that they should be permitted to represent the people, be supported by the people, and at the same time have the privilege of advocating the overthrow of the very government by which they are employed and obtain their livelihood. ...
...If they desire to advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States, the State of California, or the county of Los Angeles, they may do so by any and all lawful means after first resigning from their public employment. ... A servant employed by the people is held to an even higher standard, and his employer, the people, not only may, but it is their duty through their authorized representatives to make proper inquiry as to his fitness for the position which he occupies and as to his intentions and acts relative to his loyalty to the people." (emphasis added ) Steiner v. Darby (1948), 88 Cal.App.2d 481, 199 P.2d 429; appeal dismissed (1949), 338 U.S. 327, 94 L.Ed. 144, 70 S.Ct. 161.

In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the public commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in this State exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created. (emphasis added) WEST'S CALIFORNIA CODES, GOVERNMENT CODE (1999), section 54950.

Section 96.5. Perversion or obstruction of justice by judicial officer, court commissioner or referee.
(a) Every judicial officer, court commissioner, or referee who commits any act that he or she knows perverts or obstructs justice is guilty of a public offense punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year.
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits prosecution under paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 182 of the Penal Code or any other law. WEST'S CALIFORNIA CODES, PENAL CODE (1999), section 96.5

The right of a citizen to inspect public writings has its origin in the common law. In State v. McGrath, 104 Mont. [67 P.2d 838, 841], the common law rule is stated thusly: "At common law every person was entitled to the inspection, either personally or by his agent, of public records, including legislative, executive, and judicial records, provided he had an interest therin such as to enable him to maintain or defend an action for which the documents or records sought could furnish evidence or necessary information." (See also North v. Foley, 238 App. Div. 731 [265 N.Y.S. 780]; Palacios v. Corbett (Tex. Civ. App.) 172 S.W. 777, 781; 76 C.J.S., Records, sec. 35, p. 133; 45 Am.Jur., pp. 426-427.) Craemer v. Superior Court (1968), 265 Cal.App.2d 216, 220, fnt. 3.

Signature: _______________________________________

Thomas Murrell Thornhill III