4. Individual Access to Records Containing Personal Information Under Information Practices Act (Civ. Code §§ 1798-1798.78)
Except as otherwise provided, each agency must permit any individual on request and proper identification to inspect all the personal information in any record containing personal information and maintained by reference to any identifying particular assigned to such individual within 30 days of the request for active records, and within 60 days of the request for geographically dispersed or inactive records that are in central storage. Failure to respond within these time limits is deemed denial. In addition, the individual must be permitted to inspect any personal information about himself or herself if it is maintained by reference to an identifying particular other than that of the individual, if the agency knows or should know that the information exists. The individual must also be permitted to inspect the accounting made pursuant to Civ. Code §§ 1798.25-1798.28 (accounting of disclosures) [Civ. Code § 1798.34(a)]. The agency must present the information in the record in a form reasonably comprehensible to the general public [Civ. Code §1798.34(c)]. When an individual is entitled under the Information Practices Act (Civ. Code §§ 1798-1798.78) to gain access to information in a record containing personal information, such information or a true copy thereof must be made available to the individual near the residence of the individual or by mail, whenever reasonable [Civ. Code § 1798.34(e)
The state agency must permit the individual and, on the individual's request, another person of the individual's own choosing to inspect all the personal information in the record and to have an exact copy made of all or any portion thereof within 15 days of such inspection. It may require the individual to furnish a written statement authorizing disclosure of such individual's record to another person of the individual's choosing [Civ. Code § 1798.34(b)].

Right to Inquire as to Existence of Personal Records
Each individual has the right to inquire and to be notified as to whether or not the agency maintains a record about himself or herself. Inquires shall specify the name or title of the system of records as filed under Civ. Code § 1798.9 (discussed under Collection of Personal Information by Government Agencies--Public Notice regarding Record Systems, above)....
Whenever an agency is unable to access a record by reference to name only, or when access by name only would impose an unreasonable administrative burden, it may require the individual to submit such other identifying information as will facilitate access to the record [Civ. Code § 1798.34(d)].

Remedies for Refusal of Access
An individual may bring a civil action against an agency whenever the agency refuses to comply with an individual's lawful request to inspect pursuant to Civ. Code § 1798.34(a) [Civ. Code § 1798.45(a)]. In any suit brought under Civ. Code § 1798.45(a) the court may enjoin the agency from withholding the records and order the production to the complainant of any records improperly withheld from the complainant. The court is to determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of any agency records in camera to determine whether the records or any portion thereof may be withheld as being exempt from the individual's right of access. The burden is on the agency to sustain its action [Civ. Code § 1798.46(a)].
For a full discussion of remedies and penalties established under California's Information Practices Act (Civ. Code §§ 1798-1798.78), see Remedies, above.

In this state the terms "public records" and "public writings" are used synonymously. (See Hiberia Sav. & Loan Soc v. Boyd, 155 Cal. 193, 200 [100 P. 239]; People v. Howard, 72 Cal.App. 561, 563-564 [237 P. 780].) ... In California the right to inspect public writings has been codified in two statutes [fn 3. The right of a citizen to inspect public writings has its origin in the common law. In State v. McGrath, 104 Mont. 490 [67 P.2d 838, 841], the common law rule is stated thusly; "At common law every person was entitled to the inspection, either personally or by his agent, of public records, including legislative, executive, and judicial records, provided he had an interest therein such as to enable him to maintain or defend an action for which the documents or records sought could furnish evidence or necessary information." (See also North v. Foley, 238 App.Div. 731 [265 N.Y.S. 780]; Palacios v. Corbett (Tex. Civ. App.) 172 S.W. 777, 781; 76 C.J.S., Records, sec. 35, p. 133; 45 Am.Jur., pp 426-427.)] (Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal.2d 666, 673 [56 Cal.Rptr. 265, 423 P.2d 193].) Section 1227 of the Government Code [nt: currently Government Code §§ 6250 et seq.]... Code of Civil Procedure section 1892 [nt: currently Evidence Code §§ 1400 et seq.] ...
In the light of the foregoing we apprehend that the applicable rule may be stated thusly: where there is no contrary statute or countervailing public policy, the right to inspect public records must be freely allowed. In this regard the term "public policy" means anything which tends to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, which any citizen ought to feel has a tendency to be injurious to the public or the public good. (Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks etc. Assn., 41 Cal.2d 567, 575 [261 P.2d 721]; Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 188 [344 P.2d 25].) The public policy of a state is found in its constitution, acts of the Legislature, and decisions of its courts.(Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks etc. Assn.,supra; Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, supra. By the same token, where the federal Constitution and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are made applicable to the states, the public policy there embodied becomes that of the states. (See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-660 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1089-1093, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 84 A.L.R.2d 933]; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 803, 83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733]; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 [12 L.Ed.2d 653, 658, 84 S.Ct. 1489]; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613, 615 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 109,110, 85 S.Ct. 1229].)" (notes in brackets and emphasis added) Craemer v. Superior Court (1968), 265 Cal.App.2d 216, 220-221.

a. Public policy requires public records and documents to be available for public inspection to prevent secrecy in public affairs (Craemer v. Superior Court (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 216, 222 [71 Cal.Rptr. 193].) "[W]here there is no contrary statute or countervailing public policy, the right to inspect public records must be freely allowed." (Ibid..)
"[I]t is a first principle that the people have the right to know what is done in their courts." (In re Shortridge (1893) 99 Cal. 526, 530 [34 P. 227].) The public has a legitimate interest in access to court documents because "[i]f public court business is conducted in private, it becomes impossible to expose corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice, and favoritism." (Estate of Hearst (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 777, 784 [136 Cal.Rptr. 821].)
Although there is no specific statutory requirement for access to court documents, both the federal (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.) and the state (Cal. Const., art I, sec. 2, subd. (a)) Constitutions provide broad access rights to judicial records in criminal and civil cases. (Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 106, 111 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 841].) "A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property. ... There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire [in] proceedings before it." (Craig v. Harney (1947) 331 U.S. 367, 374 [67 S.Ct. 1249, 1254, 91 L.Ed 1546].)
Court records are available to the public in general, including news reporters, unless a specific exemption makes specific records nonpublic. (Estate of Hearst, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d 777, 782.) Statutory exemptions to disclosure of court records exist,[fn 9. See Government Code secton 6254 for exemptions.] as do judicially created exceptions, generally temporary in nature. (Id. at p. 783)....
The burden rests on the party seeking to deny public access to court records to establish compelling reasons why and to what extent the records should be made private. (Estate of Hearst, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d 777, 785.) Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998), 63 Cal.App.4th 367, 373-374, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 69.

b. The fundamental notion of public access to court proceedings is grounded in the common law of England and the United States. (Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980) 448 U.S. 555, 569 [100 S.Ct. 2814, 2823, 65 L.Ed.2d 973] ["at the time our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open"].) Based on this history of openness, the public's right of access to such court proceedings is now recognized as an integral part of the freedoms of speech and press guaranteed under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at pp. 575-581 [100 .Ct. at pp. 2826-2829].) Similarly, the California Constitution, article I, section 2, subdivision (a), and section 15 provide for a right of access to judicial proceedings. (See also Pen. Code, section 686.)
Records from judicial proceedings, including evidence introduced at such proceedings, are also subject to a public right of access. However, this right exists not by virtue of the First Amendment (Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. (1978) 435 U.S. 589, 608-610 [98 S.Ct. 1306, 1317-1318, 55 L.Ed.2d 570]; cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975) 420 U.S. 469, 495 [95 S.Ct. 1029, 1046, 43 L.Ed2d 328]), but rather as a continuation of the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records. (See In re Nat. Broadcasting Co., Inc. (D.C. Cir. 1981) 653 F.2d 609, 612 [209 App.D.C. 354].) The right of access "serves the important functions of ensuring the integrity of judicial proceedings in particular and of the law enforcement process more generally." (United States v. Hubbard (D.C. Cir. 1980) 650 F.2d 293, 315 [208 App.D.C. 399], fn. omitted.)
The common law right of access to judicial records is not absolute, but "must be reconciled with legitimate countervailing public or private interests...." (In re Nat. Broadcasting Co., Inc., supra, 653 F.2d at p. 613.) However, the fundamental nature of the right gives rise to a "presumption" in favor of public access. (Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 569 [100 S.Ct. at p. 2823].)[fn. 2. Despite the universal agreement that a presumption of accessibility exists, the federal courts have described the level of discretion that a trial court has to deny such access in differing ways. (See United States v. Criden (3rd. Cir. 1981) 648 F.2d 814, 823 ["strong presumption" in favor of accessibility, such that the trial court must state articulatable facts, rather than conjecture, to support denial of access]; Application of National Broadcasting Co. Inc. (2d Cir. 1980) 635 F.2d 945, 952 [compelling circumstances required to overcome the presumption]; In re Nat. Broadcasting Co., Inc., supra, 653 F.2d at p. 613 [access may be denied only where the court concludes that "justice so requires"]; Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark (5th Cir. 1981) 654 F.2d 423, 430 [no strong presumption; court entitled to deference in determining whether to deny access]; United States v. Webb (8th Cir. 1986) 791 F.2d 103, 106 [same].)]...
Further, once the evidence is presented in open court before the jury, the public's interest in access to that evidence is particularly clear. (See Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court (1977) 430 U.S. 308, 310 [97 S.Ct. 1045, 1046, 51 L.Ed.2d 355]] "...the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a state court to prohibit the publication of widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings which at in fact open to the public"], and cases cited therein.) KNSD Channels 7/39 v. Superior Court (1998), 63 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1202-1204, 74 Cal Rptr.2d 595.