Declarant, ___________________________________________, is a competent witness and does Solemnly state that:

1.a. I am a natural born, adult white Man, over the age of 18 years of age.

1.b. I am not a trained or licensed Attorney; of necessity, I am acting at all times within my right to defend my life, liberty, and property as set out in CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION (2001), Art. 1, Sec. 1 (from http://www.leginfo.ca.gov./.const/.article_1 [as of May 9, 2001]):

SECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.

2. The California Supreme Court has held in relation to the Public Records Act:

In the spirit of this declaration, judicial decisions interpreting the [Public Records] Act seek to balance the public rights to access to information, the government's need, or lack of need, to preserve confidentiality, and the individual's right to privacy. (See Black Panther Party v. Kehoe (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 651-652 [117 Cal.Rptr. 106]; American Federation of State, etc. Employees v. Regents of University of California (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 913, 915-916 [146 Cal.Rptr. 42].)
The Act was modeled on the 1967 Freedom of Information Act (81 Stat. 54), and the judicial construction and legislative history of the federal act serve to illuminate the interpretation of its California counterpart. (See Northern Cal. Police Practices Project v. (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 116, 120 [153 Cal.Rptr. 173]; Cook v. Craig (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 773, 781 [127 Cal.Rptr. 712]; Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, supra 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 652.)
(information added in square brackets) American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Deukmejian (1982), 32 Cal.3d 440, 447, 186 Cal.Rptr. 235, 651 P.2d 822.

(a) The Act eliminates the "properly concerned" test of access, stating repeatedly that official information shall be made available "to the public," "for public inspection." Subsection (b) of the Act creates nine exemptions from compelled disclosures. These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, 5 USC section 552(c) ..., and are plainly intended to set up concrete, workable standards for determining whether particular material may be withheld or must be disclosed.
Aggrieved citizens are given a speedy remedy in district courts, where "the court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action." 5 USC section 552(a)(3) .... Noncompliance with court orders may be punished by contempt. Ibid.
Without question, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create a judicially enforcable public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands. ... As the Senate Committee explained, it was not "an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not an impossible one either. ... Success lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure." S Rep No. 813, p. 3.
(emphasis added) Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink (1973), 410 U.S. 73; 35 L.Ed.2d 119, 128; 93 S.Ct. 827.

(b) The Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC section 552 ... empowers federal courts to order an "agency" to produce "agency records improperly withheld" from an individual requesting access. Section 552(a)(4)(B).
Forsham v. Harris (1979), 445 U.S. 169; 63 L.Ed.2d 293, 298; 100 S.Ct. 978.

(c) As detailed in the dissenting opinion below, Forsham v. Califano, 190 US App DC 231, 244-245, 587 F.2d 1128, 1141-1142 (1978) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), FOIA is a broad enactment meant to open the processes of Government to public inspection. It reflects a a finding that if left to themselves agencies would operate in near secrecy. [fnt 4. FOIA was enacted because agencies had turned the predecessor statute on its head, transforming a public information statute into a secrecy statute. HR Rep No. 1497, 89th Cong, 2d Sess (1966), reprinted in Freedom of Information Act Source Book, S Doc No. 93-82, pp 22, 25-27 (Comm Print 1974).]
(footnote added interlinearly) Brennan, J. dissenting, Forsham v. Harris (1979), 445 U.S. 169; 63 L.Ed.2d 293, 308-309; 100 S.Ct. 978.

(d) In enacting the FOIA ... Congress sought " 'to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.' " Department of Justice v Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 489 US 749, 772, 103 L Ed 2d 774, 109 S Ct 1468 (1989) quoting Department of Air Force v Rose, 425 US 352, 372, 48 L Ed 2d 11, 96 S Ct 1592 (1976). Congress did so by requiring agencies to adhere to " 'a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.' " Id. at 360, 48 L Ed 2d 11, 96 S Ct 1592, quoting S Rep No. 813, 89th Cong, 1st Sess, 3 (1965). Congress believed that this philosophy, put into practice, would held "ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society." NLRB v Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. 437 US 214, 242, 57 L Ed 2d 159, 98 S Ct 2311 (1978).
The FOIA confers jurisdiction on the district courts "to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld." Section 552(a)(4)(B). Under this provision, "federal jurisdiction is dependent on showing that an agency has (1) 'improperly' (2) 'withheld' (3) 'agency records.' " Kissinger v Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 445 U S 136, 150, 63 L Ed 2d 267, 100 S Ct 960 (1980).
Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts (1989), 492 U.S. 136, 106 L.Ed.2d 112, 123-124, 109 S.Ct. 2841.

(c) The burden of proof is on the agency claiming exemptions from the statutorily-imposed duty to disclose information, and the court must apply that burden with an awareness that the plaintiff is at a distinct disadvantage in attempting to controvert the agency's claims. See generally, Cuneo v Schlesinger, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 373, 484 F.2d 1086, 1091 (1973) cert. denied sub nom. Rosen v. Vaughn, 415 U.S. 977, 94 S.Ct. 1564, 39 L.Ed.2d 873 (1974). It would be difficult for the district court to have evaluated the merits of defendant's claims of exemptions in this case because they have not yet submitted an index of withheld documents or detailed justifications for their nondisclosure.
Therefore, we remand appellant's FOIA action to the district court for further proceedngs. That court may require the defendants to prepare an index with detailed justifications for withholding documents so that an in camera inspection can be made, or it may require more detailed affidavits or testimony justifying continued retention of the requested documents. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119. (1973).
Ollestad v. Kelley (1978), 573 F.2d. 1109, 1110.

5. The Federal appellate courts have spoken on the various procedural mechanics of FOIA:

(a) The Vaughn index here submitted is, in a word, inadequate--wholly lacking in that specificity of description we have repeatedly warned is necessary to ensure a meaningful review of an agency's claim to withhold information subject to a FOIA request. A withholding agency must describe each document or portion thereof withheld, and for each withholding it must discuss the consequences of disclosing the sought-after information. This requirement, if indeed not explicit in Vaughn is unmistakably implicit in the principles supporting our decision in that case, as our subsequent decisions have made very clear. When, in Vaughn, we first insisted that agencies tender an index and affidavits as a precondition to review of exemptions claims, we emphasized the necessity of identifying which exemption was relied upon for each item withheld. In Mead Data Central v. United States Department of the Air Force, we elaborated on Vaughn's requirements, explaining that the withholding agency must supply "a relatively detailed justification, specifically identifying the reasons why a particular exemption is relevant and correlating those claims with the particular part of a withheld document to which they apply. [fnt 104. 184 U.S.App.D.C. at 359, 566 F.2d at 251.] As we subsequently reiterated in Delums v. Powell, [fnt 105. ...206 U.S.App.D.C. at 387, 642 F.2d at 1335...] Vaughn's call for specificity imposes on the agency the burden of demonstrating applicability of the exemptions invoked as to each document or segment withheld. Elsewhere we have defined the Vaughn index as "consist[ing] of one document that adequately describes each withheld record or deletion and sets forth the exemption claimed and why that exemption is relevant." [fnt 107. Paisley v. C.I.A., ...229 U.S.App.D.C. at 376, n. 12, 712 F.2d at 690, n. 12.] Categorical description of redacted material coupled with categorical indication of anticipated consequences of disclosure is clearly inadequate.
...The availibity of categorization does not, however, supplant the demand for particularity. ... To be avoided at all costs is "an exercise in the jurisprudence of labels...offer[ing] conclusory assertions regarding [documents] that are not susceptible to such simplistic classification." [fnt 118. See Paisley v. C.I.A., ... 229 U.S.App.D.C. at 386, 712 F.2d at 700...]
We conclude that the Vaughn index tendered in this case provides an insufficient basis for the de novo review that FOIA mandates for Exemption 1 claims. ... The District Court may, in its discretion order production of the excised material or some sample thereof for in camera inspection. ...Whether the District Court proceeds by ordering supplemental affidavits or by in camera inspection of documents or samplings, it must ensure that it has an adequate foundation for review ...
(footnote citations added interlinearly; emphasis and editing in original) King v. Dept. of Justice (D.C.Cir. 1987), 830 F.2d 210, 223-225.

(b) The complaint includes allegations that the DOJ improperly withheld records notwithstanding Carney's valid requests under the FOIA; improperly denied his request to be furnished documents without a fee, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 552(a)(4)(A)(iii); and wrongfully collected fees from him. Along with his complaint, Carney served interrogatories, document requests and a demand for inspection. ...
In order to justify discovery once the agency has satisfied its burden, the plaintiff must make a showing of bad faith on the part of the agency sufficient to impugn the agency's affidavits or declarations, Goland, 607 F.2d at 355, or provide some tangible evidence taht an exemption claimed by the agency should not apply or summary judgment is otherwise inappropriate, see, e.g., Washington Post Co,. v. United States Dep't of State, 840 F.2d (D.C.Cir. 1988)(nonmoving party produced hard evidence in the form of books and press accounts suggesting privacy exemption did not apply)...
Carney v U.S. Dept. of Justice, (2nd Cir. 1994), 19 F.3d 807, 811-812, cert. den. 513 U.S. 823, 130 L.Ed.2d 38, 115 S.Ct. 86 (1994).

6.

(a) In two definite ways the present [1973] method of resolving FOIA disputes actually encourages the Government to contend that large masses of information are exempt, when in fact part of the information should be disclosed.
First, there are no inherent incentives that would affirmatively spur government agencies to disclose information. Under current procedures government agencies lose very little by refusing to disclose documents. At most they will be put to a court test stacked in their favor, the burden of which can be easily shifted to another by simply averring that the information falls under one of several unfortunately imprecise exemptions. Conversely, there is little to be gained by making the disclosure. Indeed, from a bureaucratic standpoint, a general policy of revelation could cause positive harm, since it could bring to light information detrimental to the agency and set a precedent for future demands for disclosure.
Secondly, since the burden of determining the justifiability of a government claim of exemption currently falls on the court system there is an innate impetus that encourages agencies automatically to claim the broadest possible grounds for exemption for the greatest amount of information. Let the court decide! And the tactical ploy is, to the extent that the number of facts in dispute are increased, the efficiency of the court system involved in that dispute resolution will be decreased. If the morass of material is so great that court review becomes impossible, there is a possibility that an agency could simply point to selected, clearly exempt portions, ignore the disclosable sections, and persuade the court that the entire mass is exempt. Thus, as a tactical matter, it is conceivable that an agency could gain an advantage by claiming overbroad exemptions.
The simple fact is that existing customary procedures foster inefficiency and create a situation in which the Government need only carry its burden of proof against a party that is effectively helpless and a court system that is never designed to act in an adversary capacity. It is vital that some process be formulated that will (1) assure that a party's right to information is not submerged beneath government obfuscation and mischaracterization, and (2) permit the court system effectively and efficiently to evaluate the factual nature of disputed information.
... It may be corrected by assuring government agencies that courts will simply no longer accept conclusory and generalized allegations of exemptions, such as the trial court was treated to in this case, but will require a relatively detailed analysis in manageable segments. ... This could be achieved by formulating a system of itemizing and indexing that would correlate statements made in the Government's refusal justification with the actual portions of the document.... After the issues are focused, the District Judge may examine and rule on each element of the itemized list...
Given more adequate, or rather less conclusory, justification in the Government's legal claims, and more specificity by seperating and indexing the assertedly exempt documents themselves, a more adequate adversary testing will be produced....
The procedural requirements we have spelled out herein may impose a substantial burden on an agency seeking to avoid disclosure. Yet the current approach places the burden on the party seeking disclosure, in clear contravention of the statutory mandate. Our decision here may sharply stimulate what must be, in the final analysis, the simplest and most effective solution--for agencies voluntarily to disclose as much information as possible and to create internal procedures that will assure that disclosable information can be easily separated from that which is exempt. A sincere policy of maximum disclosure would truncate many of the disputes that are considered by this court. And if the remaining burden is mostly thrust on the Government, administrative ingenuity will be devoted to lightening the load.
(italic emphasis in original, emphasis added in boldface, bracketed information added) Vaughn v. Rosen (D.C.Cir.1973), 484 F.2d 820, 826-828, cert. den. (1974) 415 U.S. 977, 39 L.Ed.2d 873, 94 S.Ct. 1564.

(b) Placing the burden upon the FOIA plaintiff to establish the existence of specific records before requiring an agency search for records would seriously undermine the statute's "overwhelming emphasis upon disclosure."
Vaughn v. Rosen (D.C.Cir.1973), 484 F.2d 820, 823, cert. den. (1974) 415 U.S. 977, 39 L.Ed.2d 873, 94 S.Ct. 1564.

(c) The FOIA is designed to promote the disclosure of information. The Act is therefore to be construed with a view to disclosure, not secrecy, and exemptions from it are not to be read broadly. One who seeks to prevent disclosure of material must prove that the material is within one of the FOIA exemptions.
Sharyland Water Supply Co. v. Block (1985), 755 F.2d 397, 398; cert. den. 471 U.S. 1137, 86 L.Ed.2d 697, 105 S.Ct. 2678.

(d) "It is well established that information which either creates or provides a way of determining the extent of substantive rights and liabilities constitutes a form of law which cannot be withheld from the public. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 237, 450 F.2d 698 (1971); American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 382, 411 F.2d 696 (1968). The FOIA by its explicit terms condemns 'secret law' and requires that it be made public:..." Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 484 F.2d 1086, footnote 13 at p. 1091 (1973)....
"...The ordinary meaning of the language of Exemption (3) is that the statute therein referred to must itself specify the documents or categories of documents it authorizes to be withheld from public scrutiny." Robertson v. Butterfield, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 298, 498 F.2d 1031 (1974).
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. I.R.S. (1974), 505 F.2d 350, 353-354.

(e) In a FOIA case, an individual seeks to compel release of documents in the government's possession ... A litigant seeking release of government information under FOIA, therefore, relies upon a statutory entitlement--as narrowed by statutory exceptions--and not upon his constitutional right to free expression.
McGehee v. Casey (1983), 718 F.2d 1137, 1147.

7. The standard method for treating a FOIA suit seems to be for one party to be granted summary judgment at the trial court level and the other to take an appeal.

(a) Ordinarily, summary judgments are reviewed de novo. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1556 (9th Cir.1991) However,

[i]n reviewing a district court's judgment under the FOIA, we "must determine whether the district judge had an adequate factual basis for his or her decision" and, if so, we "must determine whether the decision below was clearly erroneous." Church of Scientology v. Department of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.1979)

National Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Service, 861 F.2d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir.1988) (review of summary judgment). See also Van Boourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger v. NLRB, 751 F.2d 982, 984 (9th Cir.1985)(on review of summary judgment in a FOIA case, "this court will reverse the district court's findings that a particular document is exempt from mandatory disclosure only if the finding is clearly erroneous").
At first glance this standard seems anomalous. It can best be explained by reflecting upon the task confronting the district court in a FOIA case. It must examine the requested document (usually in camera, to avoid the risk of premature disclosure) to determine whether it falls within any of FOIA's statutory exemptions from disclosure. Because there will rarely be any genuine issues of material fact--the document says whatever it says--the case may usually be decided on summary judgment. Even so, the proceeding might better be described as a trial on a hidden record, where the district court's characterization of the requested document more closely resembles a finding of fact than a conclusion of law.
Assembly of State of California v. U. S. Dept of Commerce (9th Cir. 1992), 968 F.2d 916, 919.

(b) As with any motion for summary judgment, the Court views the underlying facts, and the inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, here the plaintiff. Miller v. Department of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1382 (8th Cir. 1985)....
Pully v. I.R.S. (E.D. Va. 1996), 939 F.Supp. 429, 433.