Vehicle Registration in California. (revised 5/06)

[My focus is on how a vested common Right of personal Liberty (usually called exercising the right of free passage upon the public Right of Way in a "horseless carriage"), protected by the Constitution for the United States and by the Constitution of California, supposedly became transformed into a grantable/revokable commercial "privilege" (usually called "driving" a "motor vehicle" on a "route of transportation") and on how my "horseless carriage"/"car"/"automobile" may have became someone else's "motor vehicle".

[The specific statutes and cases I have cited apply ONLY in California, but the pattern seems to apply in every State in these United States of America. Research your home State's laws/statutes to discover the specifics of the statutory scheme in your own State.

[I use the form THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA not for emphasis, but to indicate an entity which I believe are doing business in California as a fictitious entity (an incorporated or un-incorporated Corporation).]

[This article documents my informed belief that THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES (CALIFORNIA D.M.V.) [a purported California public "agency"], acting with THE DEPARTMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL (formerly The California Highway Patrol; formerly The Enforcement Division of D.M.V.) [another purported California public "agency"], has successfully Converted, Embezzled, and/or Extorted legal ownership of billions of automobiles from the People of California since approximately 1935 to maintain its revenue stream and its control over the People of this State. It may well be perfectly "legal" within the letter of the statutes, but I believe it is, and has been since its inception, unlawful within the spirit of the Law.

[I have used square brackets [] to separate my comments from cited material and boldface for emphasis.

[Attorneys and attorneys-acting-as-judges love 'Statutory' law [THE CALIFORNIA CODES]. They claim that, in 'Statutory' law, words do not mean what words usually mean in normal, ordinary, plain, common English. Words in 'Statutory' law are legal 'terms-of-art' which mean exactly and only what they are specifically defined to mean by each individual statute. And, the attorneys further claim, there does NOT have to be any consistency between the definition of a term in one CODE Section and the definition of the same word in another CODE Section.
[This is a particularly sneaky form of sleight-of-mind or psychological warfare involving deliberately misinterpreting and continually changing the law.
[Fortunately, they are wrong about, at least, the second part:]

In the case of Stillwell v. State Bar (1946), 29 Cal.2d 119, at 123 [173 P.2d 313], the California Supreme Court expressed the rule of interpretation applicable hereto as follows: 'It may be presumed that the Legislature, in passing the amendatory legislation, had in mind the original act (see Robbins v. Omnibus Ry. Co., 32 Cal. 472, 474; 1 Sutherland on Statutory Construction (3rd ed.) Section 1933), and it is a well-established rule of construction that when a word or phrase has been given a particular scope or meaning in one part or portion of a law it shall be given the same scope or meaning in other parts or portions of the law. (Coleman v. City of Oakland, 110 Cal.App. 715 [295 P. 59]; Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Woodhams, 29 Cal.App. 356 [156P. 62].)'
(emphasis added) Sogawa v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1950), 100 Cal.App.2d 181, 187; 223 P.2d 269.

[The acts of the Legislature as published in the form, "An act to ..." in The Statutes of California and Amendments to the Codes ARE the law. Both West's ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES and Deering's CALIFORNIA CODES are privately-published commercial products created by taking the law-as-written and 'codifying' it into various volumes according to the private-publisher's editors' whim or the Legislature's direction and by adding annotations to case law. West's ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES is not "the law" in California; it is prima facie (at first look) evidence of the law and is just a reference book to help us locate and understand the intent of the actual statutes, which are the law.

[We also should remember that words-of-art and terms-of-art (whether spoken or written) and their use and mis-use are the stock-in-trade and the weapons-in-hand of attorneys.]

[Here is a partial result of what THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA has accomplished by slowly and gradually changing THE VEHICLE CODE in California:]

� 10751. Levy; trailer coaches; vehicles of banks; application of Vehicle Code and provisions on vehicle license fee
A license fee is hereby imposed for the privilege of operating upon the public highways in this state any vehicle of a type which is subject to registration under the Vehicle Code, or any trailer coach which is required to be moved under permit as authorized in Section 35790 of the Vehicle Code and which is not subject to local property taxation pursuant to Part 13 (commencing with Secton 5800) of Division 1. ...
West's Ann.Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code (2003), � 10751 (emphasis added).

� 10702. Vehicle
"Vehicle" means every vehicle subject to registration under the Vehicle Code.
West's Ann.Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code (2003), � 10702 (emphasis added).

[THE VEHICLE CODE, � 4000(a)(1) claims that you MUST "Register" a motor vehicle. This section is the kingpin of the statutory scheme which I believe has been perpetrated upon most of us. DMV may be legally justified in its application of "registration" to commercially-used "motor vehicles"; however, many automobiles used in California are not properly "motor vehicles", they are just "household goods and effects" used to carry their owners and their property from place to place along the public right-of-way.]

� 4000. Registration required; offstreet parking facility; compliance with vehicle air pollution control provisions; exceptions; driver's license as rebuttable presumption of ownership
(a)(1). No person shall drive, move, or leave standing upon a highway, or in an offstreet public parking facility, any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly, or logging dolly unless it is registered and the apppropriate fees have been paid under this code or registered under the permanent trailer identification program, except that an off-highway motor vehicle which displays an identification plate or device issued by the department pursuant to Section 38010 may be driven, moved, or left standing in an offstreet parking facility without being registered or paying registration fees.
. . .
(g). For the purposes of this section, possession of a California driver's license by the registered owner of a vehicle shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the owner is a resident of California.
West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 4000 (emphasis added).

[If we could establish clearly once-and-for-all that a "person" [whether 'individual', 'partnership', 'association', or 'corporation'] was always a fictitious entity, then the concept would be easier to comprehend. So far, I cannot prove that; but I can strongly suspect it.]

Currently, THE VEHICLE CODE defines "person" as:

� 470. Person
"Person" includes a natural person, firm, copartnership, association, limited liability company, or corporation.
West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 470.

[When someone else wishes to presume to label me as an "anything", my experience indicates that the presumption almost always benefits that someone else to my detriment and that I likely do not want to be labled as whatever that presumption represents.]

I researched "rebuttable presumption":

rebuttable presumption. See PRESUMPTION.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, SEVENTH ED. (1999), p. 1274.

presumption. A legal inference or assumption that a fact exists, based on the known or proven existence of some other fact or group of facts. Most presumptions are rules of evidence calling for a certain result in a given case unless the adversely affected party overcomes it with other evidence. A presumption shifts the burden of production or persuasion to the opposing party, who can then attempt to overcome the presumption. ...
rebuttable presumption. An inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case, which may be overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence. -- Also termed prima facie presumption; disputable presumption; conditional presumption; presumptio juris. Cf. conclusive presumption.
Ibid., pp. 1203-1205.

presume, vb. To assume beforehand; to suppose to be true in the absence of proof.
Id., p. 1203.

Assume. To pretend. To undertake; engage; promise. To take upon oneself. Also taking up, receiving, adopting, taking to oneself, or to put on deceitfully, take appearance of, affect, or outwardly seem. To take on, become bound as another is bound, or put oneself in place of another as to an obligation or liability. [citation omitted] See also Assumption.
(emphasis added) BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, SIXTH ED. (13th Reprint, 1999), p. 122.

� 516. Resident
"Resident" means any person who manifests an intent to live or be located in this state on more than a temporary or transient basis. Presence in the state for six months or more in any 12-month period gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of residency.
The following are evidence of residency for purposes of vehicle registration:
(a) Address where registered to vote.
(b) Location of employment or place of business.
(c) Payment of resident tuition at a public institution of higher education.
(d) Attendance of dependents at a primary or secondary school.
(e) Filing a homeowner's property tax exemption.
(f) Renting or leasing a home for use as a residence.
(g) Declaration of residency to obtain a license or any other privilege or benefit not ordinarily extended to a nonresident.
(h) Possession of a California driver's license.
(i) Other acts, occurrences, or events that indicate presence in the state is more than temporary or transient.
West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 516.

ALIENS
Resident aliens,
Drivers licenses, applications, Veh 12801
West's Ann.Cal.Codes, 2003 GENERAL INDEX, A to C, p. 330.

� 12801. Applications; driver's license; social security numbers; display not allowed
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the department shall require every application for a driver's license to contain the applicant's social security number and any other number or identifier determined to be appropriate by the department.
Notwithstanding any other law, the social security number collected on a driver's license application shall not be displayed on the driver's license, including, but not limited to, inclusion on any magnetic tape or strip used to store data on the license.
West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 12801.

� 13407. Resident or resident decedent
"Resident" or "resident decedent" means a decedent who was domiciled in California at his or her death.
West's Ann.Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code (2004), � 13407.

Administrative Code References
[Domicile, defined, see 2 Cal. Code of Regs. � 1138.25.]
West's Ann.Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code (2004), � 13407, note.

� 1138.25. Domicile
(a) "Domicile" is the one location with which for legal purposes a person is considered to have the most settled and permanent connection, the place where he intends to remain, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning, but which the law may also assign to him constructively. Domicile is acquired by: (1) birth, (2) operation of law, (3) choice.
(in part) 2 Barclays California Code of Regulations, Chapter 2, State Controller, Subchapter 6.5, Rules and Regulations Relating to California Estate Tax, Article 2, � 1138.25 (1996).

[Note: 'the several States' mentioned in several sections is the Union of these united States of America.
[Since I could not determine for myself from West's United States Code Annotated which 'UNITED STATES' I was claiming to be a CITIZEN of, I cancelled my 'VOTER REGISTRATION AFFIDAVIT' because I didn't want to be lying on my Voter Registration card. I stopped claiming to be a 'U.S. CITIZEN' (whatever that term means). I determined that I probably wasn't, and didn't want to be considered as, a 'RESIDENT' of anywhere.]

[The problem here is that many of the people of California probably did not intentionally purchase a "motor vehicle" (a automobile knowingly purchased with the intention that it be used for commercial purposes in the transportation of persons or property for hire). I thought I bought a vehicle (or an automobile) for my own private household and pleasure use; do not regularly use it as a 'motor vehicle'; and have been mis-informed by D.M.V. and the vehicle dealers into "registering" it as a "motor vehicle". Generally, someone knowingly purchasing and using his/her vehicle for business purposes is likely to know that.]

1. There are at least six non-identical definitions of "motor vehicle" in THE CALIFORNIA CODES:

[a] � 415. Motor vehicle
(a) A "motor vehicle" is a vehicle that is self-propelled.
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include a self-propelled wheelchair, invalid tricycle, or motorized quadricycle when operated by a person who, by reason of physical disability, is otherwise unable to move about as a pedestrian.
West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 415.

[b] � 2981. Definitions
As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
. . .
(k) "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle required to be registered under the Vehicle Code which is bought for the use primarily for personal or family purposes, and does not mean any vehicle which is bought for use primarily for business or commercial purposes or a mobilehome, as defined in Section 18008 of the Health and Safety Code which is sold on or after July 1, 1981. "Motor vehicle" does not include any trailer which is sold in conjunction with a vessel and which comes within the definition of "goods" under Section 1802.1.
West's Ann.Cal.Civ. Code (2003), � 2981 (emphasis added).

[c] � 2985.7. Definitions
(a) "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle required to be registered under the Vehicle Code. Motor vehicle does not include any trailer which is sold in conjunction with a vessel.
West's Ann.Cal.Civ. Code (2003), � 2985.7 (emphasis added).

[d] � 7325. Motor vehicle
"Motor vehicle" includes every self propelled vehicle operated or suitable for operation on the highway, except a vehicle used exclusively on stationary rails or tracks.
West's Ann.Cal.Rev.& Tax. Code (2003), � 7325 (emphasis added).

[e] � 8603. Motor vehicle
As used in this part "motor vehicle" includes every self-propelled vehicle operated or suitable for operation on the highway, except a vehicle used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
West's Ann.Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code (2003), � 8603 (emphasis added).

[f] � 383.6. Scope of phrase "motor vehicle" or "motor vehicles"
The phrase "motor vehicle" or "motor vehicles" as used in section 383.5 includes, but is not limited to:
(a) Trailers, house trailers, mobilehomes, campers and all other wheeled vehicles or nonwheeled structures so made as to be capable of being moved as a compatible portion thereof, or trailed behind, any motor vehicle as that term is defined in the Vehicle Code, whether in immobile position or not.
(b) Motorcycles, motorbikes and motor scooters, except powered bicycles not manufactured for inclusion of a motor.
West's Ann.Cal.Ins. Code (2003), � 383.6.

2. To the extent that Federal law supersedes state law, here is the Federal position:

The accompanying definitional provision, 18 U.S.C. section 31, defines "motor vehicle" as a:

carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo[.]

Section 31 also defines "used for commercial purposes" as the:

carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge, or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.

(emphasis added) United States v. Lowe (1995), 65 F.3d. 1137, 1142; cert. den. 136 L.Ed.2d 13, 117 S.Ct. 49 (1996).

� 31132. Definitions
In this subchapter [Title 49, U.S.C.A., Ch. 311, subch. III]--
(1) "commercial motor vehicle" means a self-propelled or towed vehicle used on the highways in interstate commerce to transport passengers or property, if the vehicle--
(A) has a gross vehicle weight rating or gross vehicle weight of at least 10,001 pounds, whichever is greater;
(B) is designed or used to transport more than 8 passengers (including the driver) for compensation;
(C) is designed or used to transport more than 15 passengers, including the driver, and is not used to transport passengers for compensation; or
(D) is used in transporting material found by the Secretary of Transportation to be hazardous under section 5103 of this title and transported in a quantity requiring placarding under regulations prescribed by the Secretary under section 5103.
. . .
49 U.S.C.A., � 31132

� 31141. Review and preemption of State laws and regulations
(a) Preemption after decision.-- A State may not enforce a State law or regulation on commercial motor vehicle safety that the Secretary of Transportation decides under this section may not be enforced.
(b) Submission of regulation. -- A State receiving funds made available under section 31104 that enacts a State law or issues a regulation on commercial motor vehicle safety shall submit a copy of the law or regulation to the Secretary immediately after the enactment or issuance.
. . .
49 U.S.C.A., � 31141

[This portion is informed speculation and presumes that 'the government' has done something similar to 'bundling' and 'securitizing' the Titles to the various "motor vehicles" which have been "registered" with it.]

The Uniform Commercial Code, current successor to the former Negotiable Instruments Act and portions of the Civil Code, defines "document of title":

� 1201. General definitions
. . .
(15) "Document of title" includes a bill of lading, dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse receipt, gin ticket, or compress receipt, and any other document that, in the regular course of business or financing, is treated as adequately evidencing that the person entitled under the document (Section 7403(4)) has the right to receive, hold, and dispose of the document and the goods it covers. To be a document of title, a document must purport to be issued by a bailee and purport to cover goods in the bailee's possession that either are identified as or are fungible portions of an identified mass.
West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code, � 1201(15).

There are no property rights innate in objects themselves. Such rights as there are are in certain persons as against others with respect to the particular objects in question. Since property or title is a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and immunities, the pruning away of some or a great many of these elements does not entirely destroy the title as pointed out by Professor Hohfeld in "Fundamental Legal Conceptions", 23 Yale Law Journal, 16; 11 Cal. Law Review, 369. Also in 11 Cal. Law Review, at page et seq. 369, is found a very fine discussion of the rights of a possessor in contraband property, and the conclusion is there reached that sufficient attributes of ownership are found in the article to constitute something real and tangible.
(emphasis added) People v. Walker (1939), 33 Cal.App.2d 18, 20.

[This is a piece of paper containing a physical description of the vehicle and the identifying number(s) of the new vehicle, together with a statement to the effect that the manufacturer has assembled this vehicle from new parts; that the vehicle never existed before and so is new; and that the manufacturer has assigned a identification number to it.

[The following section was the last mention in THE VEHICLE CODE of a Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin for trailer coaches and has since been repealed. But it was there once; so THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA cannot claim it did not recognize Manufacturer's Certificates of Origin at one time.]

� 5350.3. No trailer coach manufactured on or after the effective date of this section, shall be sold or offered for sale in this state, unless such trailer coach has been issued, upon completion of the manufacturing process, a certificate of origin, on a form approved by the department, which contains the following:
(a) The name and address of the manufacturer.
(b) The trade name of the unit.
(c) The series or model name of the unit.
(d) The shipping weight of the unit.
(e) The width and height of the unit.
(f) The serial number of the unit.
(g) The date that the ownership was transferred from the manufacturer and to whom the ownership was transferred.
(h) A certification of facts signed by a responsible agent of the manufacturer.
Stats. 1972, ch. 672, p. 1255, � 1; repealed Stats. 1985, ch. 426, p. 1690, � 1.

� 671. Vehicle identification number
A "vehicle identification number" is the motor number, serial number, or other distinguishing number, letter, mark, character, or datum, or any combination thereof, required or employed by the manufacturer or the department for the purpose of uniquely identifying a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part or for the purpose of registration.
(Added by Stats. 1993, ch. 386, Sec. 2.)
West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 671.

[This is a piece of paper which transfers legal possession (and ownership when the invoice is marked on its face "Paid in Full") of the vehicle from the manufacturer to the New Car Dealer (vendor or retailer). The invoice contains a physical description of the vehicle and the unique identifying number assigned to the vehicle by the manufacturer; the price at which the manufacturer is billing the dealer, and the designation of the person who is entitled to receive the vehicle. You may have seen it or something purporting to be it on the window of a new vehicle. Probably the real invoice or Bill of Lading is in the dealer's files for that vehicle or is held by the dealer's bank or other creditor.
[There is at least the possibility that the dealer never really owned the vehicle he is "selling" to you; it may be owned by the manufacturer, a bank, or other lender; and merely consigned onto the dealer's lot and displayed or offered for sale there.]

[This is a piece of paper which legally transfers the vehicle into the temporary possession of a common carrier (onto, and off of, either a truck transport or a railway transport) to transport (physically move in commerce) it from the manufacturer's plant to the initial dealer's place of business.]

(6) "Bill of lading" means a document evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of transporting or forwarding goods, and that, by its terms, evidences the intention of the issuer that the person entitled under the document (Section 7403(4)) has the right to receive, hold, and dispose of the document and the goods it covers. Designation of a document by the issuer as a "bill of lading" is conclusive evidence of that intention. "Bill of lading" includes an airbill. "Airbill" means a document serving for air transportation as a bill of lading does for marine or rail transportation, and includes an air consignment note or air waybill.
West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2003), � 1201(6).

"It has been stated that a bill of lading performs 3 functions, serving as (1) a receipt for the goods, (2) a contract for carriage of goods and (3) evidence of title to the goods. In the matter of Bills of Lading 52, I.C.C. 671 (1919)."
West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2002), � 7301, California Code Comment 1.

It is well settled that a bill of lading represents the property for which it has been given, and by its endorsement or by delivery without indorsement the property in the goods may be transfered, when such is the intent with which the indorsement of delivery is made. It was so determined in Lickbarrow v. Mason, [an English case] decided by the House of Lords in 1793. (See 1 Smith's Lead. Cas., 1058; see also Merchants' Bank v. Union R. R. and Transportation Co., 69 N. Y. 376; City Bank v. Rome, etc. R. Co. 44 id., 136; Holmes v. German Security Bank, 87 P. St. 525: Emery's Sons v. Irving National Bank, 25 Ohio St., 366; Civil Code, sections 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132.)
In the last case cited the law is thus stated: "By the rules of commercial law, bills of lading are regarded as symbols of the property therein described, and the delivery of such bill by one having an interest in or a right to control the property is equivalent to a delivery of the property itself. A consignor who has reserved the jus disponendi may effectuate a sale or pledge of the property consigned by delivery of the bill of sale to the purchaser or pledgee, as completely as if the property were in fact delivered." (25 Ohio St. 366.) [The words "bill of sale" in the above sentence should, maybe, be "bill of lading." The context suggests this.]
In the case cited from 69 N. Y. it is said: "Bills of lading are choses in action, and no rule is better established than that instruments of this character may be transfered for a valuable consideration by delivery only." (69 N. Y. 379.)...
The indorsee for value of a bill of lading which has been delivered to him may bring an action in his own name for the goods, though he can not generally bring an action on that instrument in his own name. (Thompson v. Dominy, 14 M. & W. 402; Dows v. Cobb, 12 Barb. 316; Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray, 298.)
Dodge v. Meyer (1882), 61 Cal. 405, 416-417.

[This is a piece of paper which would legally transfer the vehicle into the possession of different common carriers, a ship or a cargo airplane respectively, to physically move it from the manufacturer to the dealer. (Both seem to have been replaced with a Bill of Lading.)]

[I haven't found any reference to these documents on the state level, so do not know that they exist. Theoretically, these are pieces of paper which combined together should constitute Evidence of the Legal Entry and Legal Presence of the vehicle from a foreign country into the United States of America.]

[This piece of paper legally transfers possession of the vehicle from a warehouseman to the next party in the chain of custody. A warehouseman provides secure (bonded) storage for a fee to an owner(s) of property that the warehouseman stores but does not actually own.

(44) "Warehouse receipt" means a document evidencing the receipt of goods for storage issued by a warehouseman (Section 7102), and that, by its terms, evidences the intention of the issuer that the person entitled under the document (Section 7403(4)) has the right to receive, hold, and dispose of the document and the goods it covers. Designation of a document by the issuer as a "warehouse receipt" is conclusive evidence of that intention.
West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2003), � 1201(44).

(h) "Warehouseman" is a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire.
West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2003), � 7102(1)(h).

[Theoretically, the bill of sale should be the highest evidence of the ownership of a vehicle. This is a piece of paper which lawfully transfers Possession, Ownership, and Title of the vehicle from the seller (vendor) to the buyer (vendee) upon payment of money or transfer of a "valuable consideration".]

� 1880.1. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
. . .
(f) "Bill of sale" means a written instrument, conforming to the requirements of this chapter, which evidences a transfer of grain.
(emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Civ. Code (2003), � 1880.1.(f).

� 7893. Sale procedure; bill of sale or deed; disposition of unsold portion, risk
At the sale the Controller or his or her authorized agent shall sell the property in accordance with law and the notice and shall deliver to the purchaser a bill of sale for the personal property and a deed for any real property sold. The bill of sale or deed vests title in the purchaser. ...
West's Ann.Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code (2003), � 7893.

[This is a piece of paper which legally transfers possession of the vehicle to the original buyer, and ownership and Title to the Legal Owner (the bank or other person providing the money) until such time as the original buyer fully discharges the obligation of payment to the Legal Owner. Then possession, ownership, and Title should pass to the buyer.]

[D.M.V. claims that vehicle ownership is not controlled by the Uniform Commercial Code, but under the "more-specific" Automobile Sales Finance Act (West's Ann.Cal.Civ. Code, �� 2891 et seq.) See: Creditors Bureau v. De La Torre (1971), 16 Cal.App.3d 558, 94 Cal.Rptr. 145. That may be true for financed sales, but probably isn't for cash sales.

[In the simplest example, if we were to buy an vehicle for cash-in-hand from a dealer, we should reasonably expect to travel away from the dealer with physical possession of the vehicle and with lawful and physical possession of the documents constituting the Title, too.]

[Presuming that the dealer ever actually received the Documents of Title to the vehicle he/she sold you, where did they go?
[It is very much in my interest to have possession of that Title, so let's examine where it may have gone:]

According to THE CALIFORNIA ROSTER (1994 edition, compiled by THE SECRETARY OF STATE), p. 33, both THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES (D.M.V.) and THE DEPARTMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL are sub-agencies of THE BUSINESS, TRANSPORTATION, AND HOUSING AGENCY, part of the EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT of THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.

Under West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 11700 (in part), every new vehicle Dealer must be a licensee of the D.M.V.

No person shall act as a dealer, remanufacturer, manufacturer, or transporter, or as a manufacturer branch, remanufacturer branch, distributer, or distributer branch, without having first been issued a license as required in Section 11701 or temporary permit issued by the department,...

It shall be unlawful for any person to act as a vehicle salesperson without having first procured a license or temporary permit issued by the department...

[In order to "register" my motor vehicle (for presumed commercial operation upon the highways) with D.M.V., I supposedly have to "surrender" the lawful Title for the vehicle to D.M.V. in return for a CERTIFICATE of TITLE (the document that says that Title exists somewhere and that D.M.V. claims to know where that somewhere is, and MAY be acting in a fiduciary capacity in relation to the current "registered owner" and the prospective next buyer).

[When I pay the Dealer a "transfer fee" on my brand-new automobile, he magically for a while ceases to be a licensee of the D.M.V. and becomes my Agent. (Court case coming.)]

[As my Agent, he "Transfers" my vehicle by presumably delivering all the Documents of Title in his possession to D.M.V., which supposedly holds them on my behalf in Trust for the purported protection of the next purchaser.
[The D.M.V., now apparently claiming a de facto Fiduciary relationship to me, issues three pieces of paper: (1) the CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION to the "Owner", (2) the CERTIFICATE OF TITLE to the "Registered Owner", and (3) the CERTIFICATE OF OWNERSHIP to the "Legal Owner"; two metal "license plates", one "registration tab"; and the vehicle is "transferred" from my Legal Ownership to that of The D.M.V., for "a valuable consideration".
[Reread Dodge v. Meyer (1882), 61 Cal. 405, 416-417.

[If I bought a vehicle and knowingly intended to place it into commercial operation upon the highways as a motor vehicle, and actually did so, knowing I was in business and was using the motor vehicle in the course of my business, this process should be legitimate.

� 4450. Certificate of ownership and registration card
The department upon registering a vehicle shall issue a certificate of ownership to the legal owner and a registration card to the owner, or both to the owner if there is no legal owner of the vehicle.
(emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 4450.

[By analogy to the Insurance Code:]

� 384. Certificate or verification of insurance of insurance; statement
(a) A certificate of insurance or verification of insurance provided as evidence of insurance in lieu of an actual copy of the insurance policy shall contain the following statements or words to the effect of:
This certificate of verification of insurance is not an insurance policy and does not amend, extend or alter the coverage afforded by the policies listed herein.
(emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Ins. Code (2003), � 384.

"Certificate of title" is defined in the West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2003):

� 9102. Definitions and index of definitions
(a) In this division:
. . .
(10) "Certificate of title" means a certificate of title with respect to which a statute provides for the security interest in question to be indicated on the certificate as a condition or result of the security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral.
West's Ann.Cal.Com. Code (2003), � 9102(a)(10).

� 1201. General definitions
(14)"Delivery", with respect to instruments, documents of title, chattel paper, or certified securities, means the voluntary transfer of possession.
West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2003), � 1201(14).

If one applies for and gets a CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, one seems to come under provisions of the Commercial Code, � 9303:

� 9303. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in goods covered by a certificate of title

(a) This section applies to goods covered by a certificate of title, even if there is no other relationship between the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are covered and the goods or the debtor.
(b) Goods become covered by a certificate of title when a valid application for the certificate of title and the applicable fee are delivered to the appropriate authority. Goods cease to be covered by a certificate of title at the earlier of the time the certificate of title ceases to be effective under the law of the issuing jurisdiction or the time the goods become covered subsequently by a certificate of title issued by another jurisdiction.
(c) The local law of the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are covered governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title from the time the goods become covered by the certificate of title until the goods cease to be covered by the certificate of title.
West's Ann.Cal.Comm. Code (2003), � 9303.

� 6303. Method is exclusive.

Except as provided in Sections 5905, 5907 and 5908, the method provided in this chapter for perfecting a security interest on a vehicle registered under this code is exclusive, but the effect of such perfection, and the creation, attachment, priority and validity of such security interest shall be governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
(emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 6303.

� 6301. Perfection of security interest.

When the secured party, his or her successor, or his or her assignee, has deposited, either physically or by electronic transmission pursuant to Section 1801.1, with the department a properly endorsed certificate of ownership showing the secured party as legal owner or an application in usual form for an original registration, together with an application for registration of the secured party as legal owner, the deposit constitutes perfection of the security interest and the rights of all persons in the Vehicle shall be subject to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, but the vehicle subject to the security interest shall be subject to a lien for services and materials as provided in Chapter 6.5 (commencing with Section 3068) of Title 14 of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code.
(emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 6301.

As this Court has observed, "The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law. ..." Kent v Dulles, supra, 357 US, at 125, 2 L ed 2d at 1201. See Aptheker v Secretary of State, 378 US 500, 517, 12 L ed 2d 992, 1003, 84 S Ct 1659 (1964); Zemel v Rush, 381 US 1, 14 L ed 2d 179, 85 S Ct 1271 (1965). ...
...Ordinarily, citizens may not be punished for actions taken in good faith reliance upon authoritative assurance that punishment will not attach. As this Court said in Raley v Ohio, 360 US 423, 438, 3 L ed 2d 1344, 1355, 79 S Ct 1257, we may not convict "a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State clearly had told him was available to him." As Raley emphasized, criminal sanctions are not supportable if they are to be imposed under "vague and undefined" commands (citing Lanzetta v New Jersey, 306 US 451, 83 L ed 888, 59 S Ct 618 (1939); or if they are "inexplicably contradictory" (citing United States v Cardiff, 344 US 174, 97 L ed 200, 73 S Ct 189 (1952)); and certainly not if the Government's conduct constitutes "active misleading" (citing Johnson v United States, 318 US 189, 197, 87 L ed 704, 711, 63 S Ct 549 (1943)).
United States v. Laub (1967), 385 U.S. 475, 481, 17 L.Ed.2d. 526, 530-534, 87 S.Ct. 574.

There is no question that the state, in the exercise of its lawful authority, may require vehicles to be properly licensed and registered. (People v. Kirby, 38 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768 [99 P. 603].)
This requirement of registration of vehicles is designed for the protection of owners and prospective purchasers and other persons who might have reason to deal with or be affected by the operation of the vehicle in question. (Stoddart v. Peirce, 53 Cal.2d 105, 119 [346 P.2d 774].)...
(emphasis added) People v. Galceran (1960), 178 Cal.App.2d 312, 316.

Besides, the certificate of registration does not conclusively establish true ownership of the vehicle. (Davis v. Joseph, 148 Cal.App.2d 899 [307 P.2d 958].) The registration requirements protect innocent purchasers and afford identification of vehicles and persons responsible for accidents and injuries. (Henry v. General Forming, Ltd., 33 Cal.2d 223, [200 P.2d 785]; Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal.2d 350 [240 P.2d 604.])...
(emphasis added) Kipp v. Cozens (1974), 40 Cal.App.3d 709, 717, 115 Cal.Rptr. 423.

[This statement below is starting to sound more than a little lame:]

"The legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger, their registration and the licensing of their operators have been required almost from their first appearance. The right to operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privelege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare." (Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles (1931), 212 Cal. 279, 283 [298 P. 481].)"
(emphasis added) People v. Kimbley (1961), 189 Cal.App.2d 300, 306.

[When I went to the actual print copy of the imbedded quote from Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279, at p. 283, I found that it really reads:]

[2] The legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger, their registration and the licensing of their operators have been required almost from their first appearance. The right to operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare. (Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 622 [59 L. Ed. 385, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140].)

[622] K. & T. R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642, 648, 58 L. ed. 1135, 1137, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678, and cases cited.
The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and serious dangers to the public, and is also ab-normally destructive to the ways themselves. Their success depends on good roads, the construction and maintenance of which are exceedingly expensive; and in recent years insistent demands have been made upon the states for better facilities, especially by the ever-increasing number of those who own such vehicles. As is well known, in order to meet this demand and accomodate the growing traffic the state of Maryland has built and is maintaining a system of improved roadways. Primarily for the enforcement of good order and the protection of those within its own jurisdiction the state put into effect the above-described regulations, including requirements for registration and licenses. A further evident purpose was to secure some compensation for the use of facilities provided at great cost from the class for whose needs they are essential, and whose operations over them are peculiarly injurious.
In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for the public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles, --those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers, charging therefor reasonable fees graduated according to the horse-power of the engines, --a practical measure of size, speed, and difficulty of control. This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens; and it does not constitute a direct and material burden on interstate commerce. The reasonable-ness of the state's action is always subject to [623]
Hendrick v. Maryland (1914), 235 U.S. 610, 622, 59 L.Ed. 385, 35 Sup.Ct. 140.

[The "danger" versus "safety" and "police power" position in Hendrick seems to have been built upon The Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Co. v. Beckwith (1888), 129 U.S. 29, 32 L.Ed. 585, 586, 95 S.Ct. 207:

The State can now, as before, prescribe regulations for the health, good order and safety of society, and adopt such measures as will advance its interests and prosperity. And to accomplish this end special legislation must be resorted to in numerous cases, providing against accidents, disease and danger in the varied forms in which they may come. The nature and extent of such legislation will necessarily depend upon the judgment of the Legislature as to the security needed by society. When the calling, profession or business of parties is unattended with danger to others, little legislation will be necessary respecting it. Thus, in the purchase and sale of most articles of general use, persons may be left to exercise their own good sense and judgment, but when the calling or profession or business is attended with danger, or requires a certain degree of scientific knowledge upon which others must rely, then legislation properly steps in to impose conditions upon its exercise.

[Here is second example of lying-by-judge which I found:]

It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen of the state, subject to legislative control or such reasonable regulations as to the traffic thereon or the manner of using them as the legislature of the state may deem wise or proper to adopt and impose. (Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 639 [21 A. L. R. 1172, 192 Pac. 442].)...
Whyte v. City of Sacramento (1924), 65 Cal.App. 534, 547.

The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and every citizen of the state has a right to the use thereof, subject to legislative control. (People v. County of Marin, 103 Cal. 223, 232, [26 L. R. A. 659, 37 Pac. 203]; Elliot on Roads and Streets, 3d ed., secs. 25, 505, 543, 544, 1112, 1115; 3 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., sec. 1122.)
Ex parte Daniels (1920), 183 Cal. 636, 639.

In strictness all public highways belong to the state, which holds them for the public use, subject to legislative control. In this commonwealth, their custody and control outside of municipalities is confided to the supervisors of the several counties in which they are located.
People v. County of Marin (1894), 103 Cal. 223, 232.

[I believe such subjugation to be unconstitutional in application because of the information on this page:

The earliest mention of 'automobile' that I have found is:

An act to authorize counties, cities and counties, and incorporated towns, and chartered or incorporated cities, to license bicycles, tricycles, and similar vehicles, and to collect a fee therefor, for the purpose of devoting such fee to the construction of paths along county roads for the use of pedestrians, and the wheeling thereon of such vehicles.

Section 1. Counties, cities and counties, chartered or incorporated cities and towns in the State of California, are hereby, through the governing bodies thereof, authorized and permitted to license the use of bicycles, tricycles, automobile carriages and carts, and similar wheeled vehicles propelled by the power of the rider, or by motor under control of the rider, owned, rented, and used within the several jurisdictions above named; provided that such license shall be granted and issued only on payment of a fee not to exceed one dollar a year for each of such vehicles; and further provided, that the money so collected shall be appropriated and used only for the purpose of constructing and maintaining paths and walkways for the use of pedestrians, and the wheeling of the above-named vehicles; and provided also, that the sum of the taxes paid to the state, county, town, or municipality, upon any vehicle the use of which is hereby authorized to be licensed, shall be deducted from the amount of the license fee hereby authorized, and credited to the license; it being the intention that any license fee hereby authorized shall be collected in such less sum as is represented by the subtraction of the personal property tax from the sum of the license fee fixed by such ordinance.
(emphasis added) Statutes and Amendments to the Codes 1901, Ch. CXLIX [149], p. 324.

In an act, an automobile was held to be a carriage. It is a vehicle which can carry passengers or inanimate matter and so is such a carriage as the legislature had in view in the use of that word in the statute. 187 Mass. 53. But in a later case it was held that only in a broad sense is a automobile a carriage. It is more properly a machine than a carriage, its features as a piece of machinery being far more striking than those which it possesses as a carriage. 197 Mass. 245.
An "automobile" is a eminently dangerous article within the meaning of the rule of law holding manufacturers liable for defects in such articles. 145 Ky. 617, 140 S. W. 1047.
"Automobiles" will be classed as stage coaches where they are used by a stage coach line in the place of stage coaches. 109 S. W. 319.
One Invited to Ride in Private Automobile Is a Licensee. A person invited to ride in the private automobile of another is a licensee, and the duty of the person giving invitation is to refrain from doing any negligent acts by which the danger of riding in the automobile is increased, or a new danger created. The duty of the owner to his guest is to use ordinary care not to increase the danger of the guest, or create any new danger. Such licensee can recover for only the active negligence of the licensor. 158 Ky. 154, 184 S. W. 319.
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY, Baldwin's Students Ed. (1946), p. 103.

...In Webster's International Dictionary, second edition, an automobile is defined as a self-propelled vehicle suitable for use on a street or roadway, and in Words and Phrases, permanent edition, 4, it is said that "Automobile is general name adopted by popular approval of all forms of self-propelling vehicles for use on highways and streets,... Life & Cas Ins Co. of Tennessee v. Metcalf, 240 Ky. 628 [42 S.W.2d 909, 910]."
Williams v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. (1958), 158 Cal.App.2d 506, 510; 322 P.2d 1026.

An act to regulate the operation of motor vehicles on public highways, and making an appropriation for the purpose of carrying out the objects of this act.

Section 1(1). "motor vehicle" shall include all vehicles propelled by any power other than muscular power, provided that nothing herein contained shall, except the provisions of subdivisions three, four and five of section three and subdivision one of section four of this act, apply to motor cycles, motor bicycles, traction engines or road rollers;

motor vehicle act (1905),

Section 1(5). "chauffeur" shall mean any person operating a motor vehicle as mechanic, employe [sic] or for hire.

motor vehicle act (1905),

Section 2, Subdivision 1. Every person hereafter acquiring a motor vehicle shall, for every vehicle owned by him, file in the office of the secretary of state a statement of his name and address, with a brief description of the vehicle to be registered including the name of the maker, factory number, style of vehicle and motor power on a blank to be prepared and furnished by such secretary of state for that purpose; the filing fee shall be two dollars.

[It is quite probable that the use of vehicles (or non-commercial automobiles) by the public to exercise their Right to Travel in common with those travelling by horse or horse-and-wagon upon the public highways cannot ever be lawfully or legally restricted by the state at all, as being a blatant infringement of Rights reserved to themselves by the People under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Unfortunately, the current courts appear to refuse to acknowledge these privileges and immunities.]

An act to regulate the use and operation of vehicles upon the public highways and elsewhere; to provide for the registration and identification of motor vehicles and for the payment of registration fees therefor; to provide for the licensing of persons operating motor vehicles; to prohibit certain persons from operating vehicles upon the public highways; to prohibit the possession or use of a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner thereof, and to prohibit the offer to or acceptance by certain persons of any bonus or discount or other consideration for the purchase of supplies or parts for motor vehicles, or for work or repair done thereon; to provide penalties for violations of provisions of this act, and to provide for the disposition of fines and forfeitures imposed thereon; to provide for the disposition of registration and license fees, fines and forfeitures collected hereunder; to provide for carrying out the objects of this act and to make an apppropriation and to create a revolving fund therefor; and to repeal all acts or parts of acts either in conformity or in conflict with this act.

The motor vehicle act, as amended (1913):

Section 1(2). "automobile" shall include all motor vehicles excepting motorcycles;

The motor vehicle act, as amended (1913):

Section 1(1). "motor vehicle" shall include all vehicles propelled otherwise than by muscular power, except such vehicles as run upon rails or tracks;

The motor vehicle act, as amended (1913):

Section 1(8). "chauffeur" shall mean any person who operates a motor vehicle, and who directly or indirectly receives pay or any compensation whatsoever for such operation, or for any work or service in connection with motor vehicles, excepting only manufacturers, agents, proprietors of garages, and dealers who do not operate for hire; provided however, that an employee of a manufacturer or of a dealer whose principal occupation is that of a salesman shall be exempted from this definition and shall be designated an operator; provided, further, that a person operating a motorcycle shall not be considered a chauffeur unless such motorcycle is of greater weight than four hundred pounds unladen;

...The latter case [In the Matter of Application of Stork (1914), 167 Cal. 294, 295], upholding the validity of a statute requiring chauffeurs to pay a license fee but exempting all other drivers from payment, states in respect to the differences between the two classes of drivers (p. 296): ...
(information in brackets and emphasis added.) Beamon v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1960), 180 Cal.App.2d 200, 4 Cal.Rptr. 396.

That the occupation of a chauffeur is of this character may not be questioned and has been decided. (State v. Swagerty, 203 Mo. 517, [120 Am. St. Rep. 671, 11 Ann. Cas. 725, 10 L. R. A. (N.S.) 601, 102 S. W. 483]; Christy v. Elliot, 216 Ill. 31, [108 Am. St. Rep. 196, 3 Ann. Cas. 487, 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 215, 74 N. E. 1035].) There are unquestionable elements of similarity, even of identity, between the driving of an automobile by a professional chauffeur and the driving of a like vehicle by a private owner, designated in this act as an "operator." ... All these matters may be conceded, and yet there are others of equal significance where the differences between the two classes of drivers are radical. Of first importance in this is the fact that the chauffeur offers his services to the public and is frequently a carrier of the general public. These circumstances put professional chauffeurs in a class by themselves and entitle the public to receive the protection which the legislature may accord in making provision for the competency and carefulness of such drivers. The chauffeur, generally speaking, is not driving his own car. He is intrusted with the property of others. In the nature of things a different amount of care will be exercised by such a driver than will be exercised by the man driving his own car and risking his own property. ... The argument of the peril attending the public at the hands of the unlicensed operator driving his own car is not without force, but it can only successfully be presented to the legislative department and not to the courts.
(emphasis added.) In the Matter of Application of Stork (1914), 167 Cal. 294, 295-296, 139 P. 684.

"His [Stork's] sole contention in this regard is that the legislature without reason and warrant has made an arbitrary classification whereby chauffeurs or drivers of motor vehicles for hire are required to pay a license, while all other drivers of vehicles are classed as "operators" and are not required to secure a license or pay a license fee.
"Conceding his construction of the law in this respect to be sound, is the division by the legislature of drivers of motor vehicles into the two classes indicated and the exaction of a license fee from the one and not from the other class so unwarranted and arbitrary as to compel a declaration from this court that it is unconstitutional legislation? [This question is not answered in the decision.]
"That the occupation of a chauffeur is one calling for regulation and therefore permitting a regulatory license fee is beyond question. "When the calling or profession or business is attended with danger or requires a certain degree of scientific knowledge upon which others must rely, then legislation properly steps in and imposes conditions upon its exercise." The Minneapolis, etc. Railroad Co. v. Beckwith (1888), 129 U.S. 29, [32 L.Ed. 585, 9 Sup.Ct.Rep. 207]."
It is not the type of vehicle, but the peculiar nature of the business conducted upon and over the public highways, that justifies the classification of the statute for licensing purposes.
(emphasis added.) In Re Schmolke (1926), 199 Cal. 42, 47.

"operator" shall mean any person other than a chauffeur, who operates a motor vehicle;

The motor vehicle act, as amended (1913), Section 1(11):

"owner" shall also include any person, firm, association, or corporation renting a motor vehicle or having exclusive use thereof under a lease or otherwise;

"person" shall include any corporation, association, copartnership, company, firm, or other aggregation of individuals which owns or controls any motor vehicle as owner, or for the purpose of sale, or for renting as agent, salesman or otherwise.

...the rule of ejusdem generis which has been defined as follows:
...where, in a statute, general words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only things or persons of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated. The general words are deemed to have been used not to the wide extent which they might bear if standing alone, but as related to words of more definite and particular meaning with which they are associated. (50 Am.Jur., (1944) Statutes, sec. 249, pp. 244, 246.)
Market Basket v. Jacobsen (1955), 134 Cal.App.2d 73, 82.]

In the case of Matter of Application of Schuler, supra, (1914) 167 C. 282, 294} there was involved the interpretation of the 1913 Motor vehicle Act providing for the charging of a fee for the registration of vehicles, based on horse-power. In holding that the charge there involved was a charge for the privilege of using the highways, the court relied upon and quoted with approval the following language from the leading case of Kane v. State, supra (p. 290).
The character of the imposition is not determined by the mode adopted in fixing its amount. (Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217 [12 Sup. Ct. 121, 163, 35 L. Ed. 994].)" See also, the advisory opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Opinion of the Justices, 250 Mass. 591 [148 N. E. 889].
When the act is read as a whole, we are of the opinion that it must be denominated an excise tax, for revenue purposes, imposed upon the privilege of using the highways for the purpose of operating thereon registered motor vehicles. ...
In Storaasli v. State of Minnesota, 283 U. S. 57 [51 Sup. Ct. 354, 75 L. Ed. 839], the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting a statute almost identical with the one here involved, emphasized the fact that the legislature had denominated the charge a privilege tax.
(emphasis added) Ingels v. Riley (1936), 5 Cal.2d 154, 160-161.

[In 1915 the Legislature amended the act of 1913 by:]

An act to regulate the use and operation of vehicles upon the public highways and elsewhere; to provide for the registration and identification of motor vehicles and for the payment of registration fees therefor; to provide for the licensing of persons operating motor vehicles; to prohibit certain persons from operating motor vehicles upon the public highways; to prohibit the possession or use of a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner thereof, and to prohibit the offer to or acceptance by certain persons of any bonus or discount or other consideration for the purchase of supplies or parts for motor vehicles, or for work or repair done thereon; to provide penalties for violations of provisions of this act, and to provide for the disposition of fines and forfeitures imposed thereon; to limit the power of local authorities to enact or enforce ordinances, rules or regulations in regard to matters embraced within the provisions of this act; to provide for the disposition of registration and license fees, fines and forfeitures collected hereunder; to create a motor vehicle department and to provide for the organization and conduct thereof; to provide for carrying out the objects of this act, and to make apppropriation therefor; and to repeal all acts or parts of acts in conflict with this act.

Section 1(1). "motor vehicle" shall include all vehicles propelled otherwise than by muscular power, except such vehicles as run along rails or tracks;

The Motor Vehicle Act (1915), Section 1(18):

"vehicle" shall include every wagon, hack, coach, carriage, omnibus, push cart, bicycle, tricycle, automobile, cycle-car, motorcycle, sleigh, traction engine, tractor, or other conveyance, in whatever manner and by whatever force or power the same may be ridden, driven, or propelled, which is or may be operated, ridden, driven or propelled upon the highway, and implements of husbandry temporarily drawn or driven or otherwise propelled on the highway, excepting only conveyances designed to be propelled by pedestrians, and railroad, street, and interurban railway cars;

The Motor Vehicle Act (1915), Section 1(2):

"automobile" shall include all motor vehicles excepting motorcycles;

[If you can, try to follow this tautology:
[By substituting Section 1(2) above into Section 1(18) above, we get: " "vehicle" shall include every wagon, hack, coach, carriage, omnibus, push cart, bicycle, tricycle, all motor vehicles excepting motorcycles, cycle-car, motorcycle, sleigh, traction engine, tractor, or other conveyance, in whatever manner and by whatever force or power the same may be ridden, driven, or propelled, which is or may be operated, ridden, driven or propelled upon the highway, and implements of husbandry temporarily drawn or driven or otherwise propelled on the highway, excepting only conveyances designed to be propelled by pedestrians, and railroad, street, and interurban railway cars;"

[Now substituting this definition of "vehicle" back into Section 1(1) above, we get:

" "motor vehicle" shall include every wagon, hack, coach, carriage, omnibus, push cart, bicycle, tricycle, all motor vehicles excepting motorcycles, cycle-car, motorcycle, sleigh, traction engine, tractor, or other conveyance, in whatever manner and by whatever force or power the same may be ridden, driven, or propelled, which is or may be operated, ridden, driven or propelled upon the highway, and implements of husbandry temporarily drawn or driven or otherwise propelled on the highway, excepting only conveyances designed to be propelled by pedestrians, and railroad, street, and interurban railway cars;"

[Now reducing this definition by the elimination of conveyances propelled by muscular power, we get: " "motor vehicle" shall include every omnibus, all motor vehicles excepting motorcycles, cycle-car, motorcycle, traction engine, tractor, or other conveyance, in whatever manner and by whatever force or power the same may be ridden, driven, or propelled, which is or may be operated, ridden, driven or propelled upon the highway, and implements of husbandry temporarily drawn or driven or otherwise propelled on the highway, and railroad, street, and interurban railway cars;"

[Eliminating "railroad, street, and interurban railway cars", we get:

"motor vehicle" shall include omnibus, all motor vehicles excepting motorcycles, cycle-car, motorcycle, tractor, or other conveyance, in whatever manner and by whatever force or power the same may be ridden, driven, or propelled, which is or may be operated, ridden, driven or propelled upon the highway, and implements of husbandry temporarily drawn or driven or otherwise propelled on the highway."

[Pretty quickly we discover that "motor vehicle" shall include all motor vehicles and other conveyances not powered by muscular power nor running on rails or tracks.]

[The logical error is that "vehicle" is inherently a much larger class than "motor vehicle". So the class or set "all motor vehicles" does not and cannot include the class or set "all vehicles".
[This definition of "motor vehicle" should actually be the definition of "vehicle".
[Unfortunately, this ignorant or deliberate mis-definition of "motor vehicle" is still the one used in the current VEHICLE CODE.]

The Motor Vehicle Act (1915), Section 1(8):

"chauffeur" shall mean any person who operates an automobile in the transportation of persons and who receives any compensation for such service in wages, commission or otherwise, paid directly or indirectly, or who as owner or employee operates an automobile carrying passengers for hire; provided, however, that this definition shall not include manufacturers' agents, proprietors of garages and dealers, salesmen, mechanics, or demonstrators of automobiles in the ordinary course of their business;

"person" shall include any corporation, association, co-partnership, company, firm, or other aggregation of individuals; and where the term "person" is used in connection with the registration of a vehicle, it shall include any corporation, association, co-partnership, company, firm, or other aggregation of individuals which owns or controls such vehicle as actual owner, or for the purpose of sale, or for renting, whether as agent, salesman, or otherwise;

The Motor Vehicle Act (1915), Section 1(15):

"operator" shall mean any person other that a chauffeur who operates a motor vehicle and any person who operates, rides, drives or propels any vehicle other that a motor vehicle;

A 1926 California Supreme Court decision reads:

An instance of a similar classification is noted in the exemption from payment of registration fees under the California Vehicle Act of vehicles owned by the state or by any political subdivision thereof (sec. 78, Stats. 1923, p. 538). There would, therefore, seem to be no objection to the classification of motor vehicles so operated at public expense apart from those operated for hire by private individuals, associations, and corporations.
The next exemption applies to those who use said public highways for the transportation of their own property or employees or both and to those who transport no persons or property for hire or compensation. It is obvious that those who operate motor vehicles for the transportation of persons or property for hire enjoy a different and more extensive use of the public highways. They are thereby enabled to engage in business on the public highways and to provide themselves a livelihood, particularly because of the existence of the public highways and the facilities thereby afforded. Such extraordinary use constitutes a natural distinction and a full justification for their separate classification and for relieving from the burden of the license tax those who merely employ the public highways for the transportation of their own property or employees.
(emphasis added) Bacon Service Corporation v. Huss (1926), 199 Cal. 218.

An act to impose a license fee for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensaton upon public streets, roads and highways in the State of California by motor vehicle; to provide for certain exemptions; to provide for the enforcement of the provisions hereof and for the disposition of the amounts collected on account of such license; to make an appropriation for the purpose of this act; and to repeal all acts or parts of acts in conflict herewith.

Section 1. The words and phrases used in this act shall for the purposes of this act, unless the same be contrary to or inconsistent with the context, be construed as follows:
". . .
"(b) The word "operator" shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in this state and thereby engage in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, but shall not include any person, firm, association or corporation who solely transports by motor vehicle persons to and from or to and from attendance upon any public school or who solely transports his or its own property, or employees, or both, and who transports no persons or property for hire or compensation, but all persons operating freight carrying vehicles so exempted shall be required to obtain from the state board of equalization and to display exempt emblems in the manner hereinafter provided.
Section 2. Each operator of a motor vehicle within this state who transports or desires to transport for compensation or hire persons or property upon or over any public highway within this state shall apply to and secure from the board of equalization of the State of California a license to operate each and all of the motor vehicles which such operator desires to operate or which such operator from time to time may operate.

Section 36 of the Motor Vehicle Act [of 1927, not 1925], subdivision a, defines what vehicles are to be registered under the Motor Vehicle Act, and reads as follows: "Every owner of a motor vehicle ...which shall be operated upon the public highways of this state shall for each vehicle owned, except as herein otherwise provided, apply to the division for the registration thereof." (Stats. 1927, p. 1423.)[note: ch. 752.]
It appears from the said section that no registration of new automobiles is required under the terms of said act except those which are to be operated upon the public highways of this state. ...
It therefore appears that the only automobiles required to be registered under the California Motor Vehicle Act (Stats. 1927, p. 1424), are the vehicles to be used upon the public highway.
California Standard Finance Corp. v. Riverside Finance Co. (1931), 111 Cal.App. 151, 162-163.

First. It is well established law that the highways of the state are public property; that their primary and preferred use is for private purposes; and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, which generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit. Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 144, 68 L. ed. 596, 607, 44 S. Ct. 257, and cases cited; Frost & F. Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 592, 70 L. ed. 1101, 1104, 1105, 47 A. L. R. 457, 46 S. Ct. 605; Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U. S. 335, 337, 76 L. ed. 323, 326, 52 S. Ct. 144; Johnson Transfer & Freight Lines v. Perry (D.C.) 47 F.(2d) 900, 902; Southern Motorways v. Perry (D.C.) 39 F.(2d) 145, 147; People's Transit Co. v. Henshaw (C. C. A. 8th) 20 F.(2d) 87, 89; Weksler v. Collins, 317 Ill. 132, 138,139, 147 N.E. 797; Maine Motor Coaches v. Public Utilities Commission, 125 Me. 63, 65, 130 Atl. 866.
(emphasis added) Stephenson v. Binford (1932), 287 U.S. 251, 264, 53 S.Ct. 181, 77 L.Ed. 288, 87 A.L.R. 721.

The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and business. It is not a mere privilege, like the privilege of moving a house in the street, operating a business stand in the street, or transporting persons or property for hire along the street, which a city may permit or prohibit at will.
(emphasis added) Thompson v. Smith (1930), 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 71 A.L.R. [Annotated Lawyers' Reports] 604, 610.

An act imposing a license fee or tax for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation upon the public streets, roads and highways in the State of California by motor vehicle and providing that this act shall take effect immediately.
Section 1. ...
(a) the word "operator" shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in this State and thereby engage in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, either directly or indirectly.
. . .
(c) The term "motor vehicle" shall include all vehicles, automobiles, trucks, or trailers, not exempt from registration fees under the laws of this State, whether the same be propelled or operated by steam or electricity, or propelled or operated by combustion of gasoline, distillate or other volitile and inflammable liquid fuels.
. . .
Sec. 2. Each operator of a motor vehicle within this State who transports or desires to transport for compensation or hire persons or property upon or over any public highway within this State shall make application to the State Board of Equalization, on such forms as said board may prescribe, for a license to operate motor vehicles for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation over public highways in this State."
. . .
Sec. 3. After obtaining the license provided for in the preceding section, the operator of any motor vehicle or motor vehicles shall obtain from the Department of Motor Vehicles number plates or emblems for each motor vehicle operated by said operator indicating, in such manner as said department may determine that the license herein provided for has been obtained. Such number plates or emblems shall be attached to and conspicuously displayed upon each of the motor vehicles authorized to be operated by said license in such manner as may be required and prescribed by the Department of Motor Vehicles. ...

The question thus presented is: Does the License Tax Act of 1933 [Stats.1933, p. 928] apply solely and exclusively to common carriers and private contract carriers in the business of transporting persons and property upon the public highways for hire or compensation? ...[p. 48]
Section 1 of said act provides that: "the word 'operator' shall include all persons, firms, associations and corporations who operate motor vehicles upon any public highway in this state and thereby engage in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation, either directly or indirectly. ...
...and the fact that the act expressly defines an operator as one who operates a motor vehicle for compensation, either directly or indirectly, supports the conclusion that the act was intended to have a wider application than to carriers alone....
The fact that subsequent acts enacted in 1935 which are not tax acts but regulatory acts (Stats. 1935, chaps. 223, 312 and 664) deal with the transportation of property for compensation or hire as a business and contatin many terms employing the words "carrier" and "in the business" or "as a business" is not persuasive that the License Tax Act of 1933 was intended to deal solely with transportation operations as a business....
...the act was not intended to be limited to carrier service but was intended to include in addition other transportation upon the public highways for compensation.
...The history of such legislation discloses two distinct lines of statutes. One line was enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of transportation by motor vehicles of persons or property for hire or compensation upon the public highways. (Stats. 1917, p. 330, and amendments; Stats. 1935, chaps. 223, 312 and 664.) The following cases are pertinent to the subject of the regulation of such transportation operators: Western Assn. of Short Line Railroads v. Railroad Com., 173 Cal. 802 [162 Pac. 391, 1 A.L.R. 1455]; Frost v. Railroad Com., 197 Cal. 230 [240 Pac. 26]; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Com., 271 U.S. 583 [46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101, 47 A.L.R. 457]; Holmes v. Railroad Com., 197 Cl. 627, [242 Pac. 486]; Haynes v. MacFarland, 207 Cal. 529 [279 Pac. 436]; Forsyth v. San Joaquin Light etc. Corp., 208 Cal. 397 [281 Pac. 620]; Landis v. Railroad Com., 220 Cal. 470 [31 Pac. (2d) 345]. The License Tax Act of 1933 was enacted as a step in the second line, that of certain acts and constitutional provisions which were primarily revenue measures, designed to secure for the state a fair return for the use of the public highways of the state in transporting persons or property for compensation. (Stats. 1923, p. 706; Stats. 1925, p. 833; Stats. 1927, p. 1708; Stats. 1927, p. 1742; California Const., art. XIII, sec. 15; Pol. Code, sec. 3664aa; Stats. 1933, p. 928.) These enactments have been before the courts of this state in the following cases: Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal. 21 [248 Pac. 235]; In re Schmolke, 199 Cal. 42 [248 Pac. 244]; Los Angeles etc. Transp. Co. v. Suprerior Court, 211 Cal. 411 [295 Pac. 837]; Alward v. Johnson, 208 Cal. 359 [281 Pac. 389]; People v. Duntley, 217 Cal. 150 [17 Pac. (2d) 715]; People v. Lang Transp. Co., 217 Cal. 166 [17 Pac. (2d) 721]. An analysis of the legislative history discloses the fact that all the statutes dealing with the regulation of transportation agencies refer to persons in the business of transportation of persons or property upon the public highways for hire or compensation....
We are satisfied that the purpose of the enactment of the License Tax Act of 1933 was to secure a fair return to the state for the use of its public highways not only from carriers, both common carriers and private contract carriers, but also from the larger class of persons who fairly answer to the description of "operator" therein defined as taxable and who receive compensation, either directly or indirectly, from the use of the public highways. Although it is true that the legislature might legally have limited the application of such taxes to carriers, it evidently seemed more just and fair to the legislature, as it does to us, that all those who receive compensation directly or indirectly from the use of the public highways should bear a proportionate share of the burden of its maintenance.
(italics in original, bracketed information and emphasis added.) In Re Bush (1936), 6 Cal.2d 43, 48-53.

Finally, we get to the first Vehicle Code:

The Vehicle Code of 1935.
(Stats. 1935, Ch.27, p. 93, in effect September 15, 1935.)

An act to establish a Vehicle Code, thereby consolidating and revising the law relating to vehicles and vehicular traffic, and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts specified herein.

Pending Proceedings and Accrued Rights. No action or proceeding commenced before this code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by the provisions of this code, but all procedure thereafter taken therein shall conform to the provisions of this code so far as possible.

Vehicle Code (1935), Section 32:

"Motor vehicle." A "motor vehicle" is a vehicle which is self-propelled.

"Vehicle." A "vehicle" is a device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be propelled, moved or drawn upon a highway, excepting a device moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks."

[Here's a new definition:]
Vehicle Code (1935), Section 34 (emphasis added):

"Commercial Vehicle." A "commercial vehicle" is a vehicle of a type required to be registered hereunder designed, used or maintained for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation or profit or designed, used or maintained primarily for the transportation of property.

["Transportation" is not defined in the Vehicle Code (1935).]

Vehicle Code (1935), Section 71:

"Chauffeur." "Chauffeur" is a person who is employed by another for the principal purpose of driving a motor vehicle on the highways and receives compensation therefor.

"Operator." "Operator" is a person, other than a chauffeur, who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway.

[Here is another new definition:]
Vehicle Code (1935), Section 69:

"Driver." "Driver" is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.

Vehicle Code (1935), Section 65"

"Person." "Person" includes a natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation.

[Curiously, we now have three Statutory "Owners" of a vehicle:]

Vehicle Code (1935), Section 66:

"Owner." "Owner" is a person having the lawful use or control or the right to the use or control of a vehicle under a lease or otherwise for a period of ten or more successive days.

"Legal Owner." "Legal owner" is the person who holds the legal title to a vehicle or a mortgage thereon.

"Registered Owner." "Registered owner" is a person registered by the department as the owner of a vehicle.

Vehicle Code (1935), Section 81 clearly states:

"Street" or "Highway." "Street" or "highway" is a way or place of whatever nature open to the use of the public as a matter of right for purposes of vehicular travel.

"Fundamentally it must be recognized that in this country "Highways are for the use of the traveling public, and all have ... the right to use them in a reasonable and proper manner, and subject to proper regulations as to the manner of use." (13 Cal.Jur. 371, sec. 59) "The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen, subject to legislative control or such reasonable regulations as to the traffic thereon or the manner of using them as the legislature may deem wise or proper to adopt and impose." (19 Cal.Jur. 54, sec. 407) "Streets and highways are established and maintained primarily for purposes of travel and transportation by the public, and uses incidental thereto. Such travel may be for either business or pleasure ... The use of highways for purposes of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental right, of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived ...[A]ll persons have an equal right to use them for purposes of travel by proper means, and with due regard for the corresponding rights of others." (25 Am.Jur. 456-457, sec. 163; see, also, 40 C.J.S. 244-247, sec. 233.)
(emphasis added) Escobedo v. State of California (1950), 35 Cal.2d 870, 875-876.

[So, on one hand, the California Supreme Court tells me that I have a Right to use the roads to travel by vehicle, and the lower courts simultaneously purport to tell me that engaging in such travel is a Privilege. Is something not quite right here?]

Vehicle Code (1935), Section 141:

What Vehicles Shall Be Registered.
Subject to the exemptions stated in section 142 hereof, registration of the following vehicles is required when driven or moved upon a highway: Any motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly.

Vehicle Code (1935), Section 142:

Exemptions from Registration. The registration provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any of the following vehicles:
(a) any vehicle of a type otherwise subject to registration hereunder which is driven or moved upon a highway in conformance with the provisions of this code relating to dealers, transporters or nonresidents or under a temporary registration permit issued by the department as authorized by section 147 hereof.
(b) Any vehicle of a type otherwise subject to registration hereunder which is driven or moved upon a highway only for the purpose of crossing such highway from one property to another in accordance with a permit issued by the Department of Public Works.
(c) Any implement of husbandry, whether of a type otherwise subject to registration hereunder or not, which is only incidentially operated or moved over a highway.
(d) Special mobile equipment.

Vehicle Code (1935), Section 250:

Unlawful to Drive Unless Licensed.
(a) It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive a motor vehicle upon a highway unless he then holds a valid operator's or chauffeur's license issued hereunder, except such persons as are expressly exempted under this code.
(b) It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive a motor vehicle upon a highway as a chauffeur unless he then holds a chauffeur's license duly issued hereunder, except such persons as are expressly exempted under this code.

An act to amend section 1, 2, 3, 4, and 11 of an act entitled "An act imposing a license fee or tax for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation upon the public streets, roads, and highways in the State of California by motor vehicle and providing that this act shall take effect immediately," approved May 15, 1933; to add sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, and 21 to said act; to renumber and amend section 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 16, and 17 of said act; to repeal sections 10 and 15 of said act; relating to the taxing of operators engaged in the transportation of persons or property upon the public highways by motor vehicle and providing that this act shall take effect immediately.

Section 1. ...(a) The term "operator" shall include all persons engaged in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation by or upon motor vehicles upon any public highway in this State, either directly or indirectly, but shall not mean or include the following:
(1) Any person transporting his own property in his own motor vehicle; provided, however, that any person making a specific charge for such transportation shall be deemed to be an "operator" hereunder;
. . .
(b) The term "person" shall include any individual, firm, copartnership, joint adventure, association, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate, or any other group or combination acting as a unit and the plural as well as the singular number.
(c) The term "motor vehicle" shall include all automobiles, trucks, tractors, or other self-propelled vehicles used for the transportation of persons or property upon the public highways, otherwise than upon fixed rails or tracks, and any trailer, semitrailer, dolly, or other vehicle drawn thereby, not exempt from registration under the laws of this State. ...
Sec. 2. Each operator of a motor vehicle within this State who transports or desires to transport for compensation or hire persons or property upon any public highway within this State shall apply to the board, on such forms as the board may prescribe, for a license to operate motor vehicles for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation upon the public highways in this State. ...
Sec. 3. After obtaining the license provided for in the preceding section, the operator of any motor vehicle or motor vehicles shall obtain from the Department of Motor Vehicles number plates or emblems for each motor vehicle operated by said operator indicating, in such manner as said department may determine, that the license herein provided for has been obtained. ...
. . .
Section 19. Any person who uses any public highway in this State for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation without first obtaining the license for which provision is herein made, or without carrying upon each motor vehicle so used the number plates or emblems for which provision is herein made, ...

[More cases and authorities:]

The motor vehicle license or registration fee is a privilege tax levied in exercise of the police power to control and regulate travel on the public highways. It is not considered as a tax on the motor vehicle itself, but for the privilege of using the highways. Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law, Permanent Edition, Sec. 212, Vol. 1, p. 158. A license to operate a motor vehicle is granted under the inherent right of the state or municipality to regulate its use on the public highways or streets. Ibid., Sec. 211, p. 157. The only automobiles required to be registered under the California Motor Vehicle Act are vehicles used upon the public highway (Cal. Stats. 1927, p. 1424, Sec. 11; California Standard Finance Corp. v. Riverside Finance Co., 111 Cal. App. 151, 163, 295 P. 555); if the vehicles were not used, no registration fee would have fallen due under the law of California. But, in carrying on the business of Richmaid, the motor vehicles were operated upon the public highways of the state of California and license fees attached. ... California Vehicle Code, Secs. 370 et seq., St. 1935, p. 147 et seq., California Vehicle License Fee Act, Sec. 6, as amended.
The motor vehicles in question could not be operated in 1937 without incurring the license and registration fees. Necessarily, therefore, the fees were an expense of doing business and were chargeable against the estate.
(emphasis added) Ingels v. Boteler (C.C.A. 1939), 100 F.2d 919, 919; affm'd 308 U.S. 57, 84 L.Ed. 78, 60 S.Ct. 29.

A claim that action is being taken under the police power of the state cannot justify disregard of constitutional inhibitions. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 240, 70 L. ed. 557, 564, 46 S. Ct. 260, 43 A. L. R. 1224; Georgia Power Co. v. Decatur, 281 U. S. 505. 508, 74 L. Ed. 999, 1003, 50 S. Ct. 383; Southern R. Co. v. Virginia, supra (290 U. S. 196, 78 L. ed. 265, 54 S. Ct. 148). ...
The police power of a state, while not susceptible of definition with circumstantial precision, must be exercised within a limited ambit and is subordinate to constitutional limitations. It springs from the obligation of the state to protect its citizens and provide for the safety and good order of society. Under it there is no unrestricted authority to accomplish whatever the public may presently desire. It is the governmental power of self-protection and permits reasonable regulation of rights and property in particulars essential to the preservation of the community from injury. New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. ed. 269, 14 S. Ct. 437.
(emphasis added) Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm. (1934), 294 U.S. 613, 619, 622, 79 L.Ed. 1090, 55 S.Ct. 563.

Section 465.4 Classification as Pleasure Cars or Commercial Vehicles
"A classification of motor vehicles, based on whether they are used for business or commercial purposes, or merely kept for pleasure or family use, a license being imposed in one case and not in the other, is a proper one. [27. La.--Gulf States Utilities v. Traigle, 1975, 310 So.2d. 78. Ohio.--Fisher Bros. Co. v. Brown, 146 N.E. 100, 111 Ohio St. 602. Or.--Kellaher v. City of Portland, 110 P. 492, 112 P. 1076, 57 Or. 575. Tenn.--Ogilvie v. Hailey, 210 S.W. 645, 141 Tenn. 392. Vt.--State v. Caplan, 135 A. 705, 100 Vt. 140.]
"Thus a county ordinance levying a tax for the privilege of using the county roads, and fixing no license tax on an automobile used by the owner or his family for other than commercial purposes is not unreasonable and arbitrary in the imposition of the tax on vehicles used for commercial purposes. [28 Ala.--Hill v. Moody, 93 So. 422, 207 Ala. 325.]
Blashfield, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE 3d Ed (1998), Ch. 465, CLASSIFICATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES (emphasis added).

An act to add Part 4, comprising Sections 9601 to 10501, inclusive, to Division 2 of, and to add Section 50010 to, the Revenue and Taxation Code, thereby consolidating and revising the law relating to taxation and the raising of revenue, including the provisions of "An act imposing a license fee or tax for the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation upon the public streets, roads and highways in the State of California by motor vehicle and providing that this act shall take effect immediately," approved May 15, 1933, as amended, and repealing acts and parts of acts specified herein.

Section 1. Part 4, comprising Sections 9601 to 10501, inclusive, is hereby added to Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, to read as follows:
. . .
9601. This part is known and may be cited as the "Motor Vehicle Transportation License Tax Law".
. . .
9603. "Operator" includes:
(a) Any person engaging in the transportation of persons or property for hire or compensation by or upon a motor vehicle upon any public highway in this State, either directly or indirectly.
(b) Any person who furnishes any motor vehicle for the transportation of persons or property under a lease or rental agreement when pursuant to the terms thereof the person operates the motor vehicle furnished or exercises any control of, or assumes any responsibility for, or engages either in whole or in part in, the transportation of persons or property in the motor vehicle furnished.
"Operator" does not include any of the following:
(a) Any person transporting his own property in a motor vehicle owned or operated by him unless he makes a specific charge for the transportation. This subdivision does not in any way limit any other exemption granted by this section.

First, and foremost in considering the cases before us, it needs to be recalled that the state owns its highways and consequently may impose reasonable fees for their use by vehicles moving interstate and intrastate. It may classify the traffic, among other things, according to the character of the traffic, or the purpose fro which the highways are used, as for instance whether it be for private gain or not. (Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Com., 306 U.S. 72 [59 S. Ct. 435, 83 L.Ed. 495]; Aero Mayflower T. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Com., 295 U. S. 285 [55 S. Ct. 709, 79 L.Ed. 1439].)...
As the state may prohibit all traffic for gain on its highways--intrastate or interstate--so it may condition the privilege of the use of its highways by such traffic at a price that is not excessive or discriminatory to traffic of like character. (Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 [70 S.Ct. 806, 94 L.Ed. 1053]; Packard v. Branton, 264 U.S. 140 [44 S.Ct. 257, 68 L.Ed. 596].)
In Packard v. Branton, 264 U.S. 140 [44 S.Ct. 257, 68 L.Ed. 596], the court said: "The contention most pressed is that the act unreasonably and arbitrarily discriminates against those engaged in operating motor vehicles for hire in favor of persons operating such vehicles for their private ends, and in favor of street cars and motor omnibuses. If the state determines that the use of streets for private purposes in the usual and ordinary manner shall be preferred over their use by common carriers for hire there is nothing in the 14th Amendment to prevent. The streets belong to the public, and are primarily for the use of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, and generally, at least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper...."
(emphasis added) Lord v. Henderson (1951), 105 C.A.2d. 426, 436-437; 234 P.2d 197.

May public funds be used to improve a road over which the public has acquired a right to travel by user for a period of over forty years?
. . .
If the public has acquired a right to travel the road by adverse user, county funds may be expended on maintenance or improvements. ...
As we understand the problem the right of the public to travel the road is unquestioned, having been established by adverse user. Such being the case it is a public road. There is a recognized distinction between public roads and county highways. A county highway is a road that has been adopted into the county road network pursuant to law, while a public road is one over which the public has acquired the right to travel, but which has not been incorporated into the county road system (see 4 Ops. Cal. Atty Gen. 112).
The court [Union Transportation Co. v. Sacramento County, 42 Cal.2d 235] declared that while public use for any length of time will not constitute a road a county highway, nonetheless the adverse use by the public over a long period of time constituted a conclusive presumption of dedication to the public, and that all that is required to bring the road into the county system is acceptance by the county....
(note in brackets and emphasis added) 25 Ops.Cal.A.G. 81 (1955)

VEHICLE CODE (1959), Section 1:
"The Vehicle Code is repealed."

VEHICLE CODE (1959), Section 2:
"The Vehicle Code is enacted to read:
"GENERAL PROVISIONS
"1. This act shall be known as the Vehicle Code.
"2. The provisions of this code, insofar as they are substantially the same as the existing provisions relating to the same subject matter, shall be construed as restatements and continuations thereof and not as new enactments.
"3. All persons who, at the time this code goes into effect, hold office under the code repealed by this code, which offices are continued by this code, continue to hold them according to their former tenure.
"4. No action or proceeding, commenced before this code takes effect, and no right accrued, is affected by the provisions of this code, but all procedure thereafter taken shall conform to the provisions of this code so far as possible."

[That translates: "No Right accrued before this code takes effect (pre-1959) is affected by this CODE."]
[Since we all had and have The Right to Travel and The Right to Own Property and they both had accrued to all Citizens long before 1959, THE VEHICLE CODE cannot affect those Rights in any way, according to both the spirit and the letter of the law.]

California courts have held prior to 1959 (emphasis added):

"This rule extends to streets and highways; they are the public property of the state. While for purposes of travel and common use they are open to the citizens of every state alike, and no state can by its legislation deprive the citizens of another state of such common use, ..." St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92, [13 Sup. Ct. 485, 37 L. Ed. 380]
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hopkins (1911), 160 Cal. 106, 115-116.

It is well settled that the easement or right which the public acquires by the establishment of a highway is the right to travel thereover, and that the only control over it which the board of supervisors, as trustees for the public, can exercise, is such as is necessary to maintain the highway in a proper and convenient manner for the exercise of the use by the public. ...All that the public acquires under the easement is declared by section 2631 of the Political Code, as follows: "By taking or accepting land for a highway, the public acquire only the right of way, and the incidents necessary to enjoying and maintaining the same, subject to the regulations in this and the Civil Code provided."
Gurnsey v. Great Northern Cal Power Co. (1911), 160 Cal. 699, 705.

The street is for the use of the public, although the [street]car, which can be operated only on the track, has a better right to that part of the thoroughfare, to which pedestrians must yield when necessary.... Lawyer v. Los Angeles Pacific Co. (1911), 161 Cal. 53, 56, 118 P. 237.

...Public streets and highways are made for travel and the convenience and enjoyment of the citizens. The petitioner [a taxicab driver] has the same rights to their use as others, but he is demanding a privilege which might greatly inconvenience the general public and impair its safety. ... As was said in Holmes v. Railroad Commission, 197 Cal. 627 [242 Pac. 486]: "The reason for the rule which authorizes the state to prohibit the private use of the public highways by such carriers is not that they are common carriers. It is that they are making a private use of the highways, which are owned and paid for by the public and are open alike to all persons.
In Re Graham (1928), 93 Cal.App. 88, 92.

Streets and highways are for the use of the traveling public, and, as members of the public, all persons in like situation have equal rights to use the streets and highways in a reasonable manner in the customary way. (13 Cal.Jur. 317.) However, the common right to use streets in the ordinary way is quite different from the right to use them as a place of business for private gain. Ordinary usage is the right of all, but there is no vested or constitutional right to subject a street to the conduct of private business. Such use, when authorized, is a special or extraordinary privilege.
People v. Galena (1937), 24 Cal.App.2d 770, 775.

[We should know enough by now to infer that a "driver" drives a "motor vehicle" and everyone else "travels" or uses the public right-of-way in their private vehicles. Simply because one is stuck in the flow of "traffic" does nto make one also "traffic".]

VEHICLE CODE (1959), Section 310:
""Driver's license" includes both an operator's and a chauffeur's license."

[From 1959, and apparently currently, a "driver" is still hiddenly presumed to be only either a "chauffeur" (Transporting Passengers or Property (cargo) for hire) or an "operator" (the corporate owner of a Commercial Carrier).]

A California appellate court held:

There is a statute in this state to the effect that a guest passenger in an automobile can recover damages from the driver or owner of the car for injuries suffered only because of his intoxication, wilfull misconduct, or gross negligence. Suppose a passenger in a car brings suit against the driver for damages suffered in a collision and the testimony shows beyond dispute that the driver was guilty only of ordinary negligence and that the passenger, instead of having paid for his ride, was but a guest of the driver. A motion for nonsuit is made and is, of course, granted. This is for the reason that the court determined that plaintiff cannot recover because of the statute as to guest passengers.
Hayward v. Superior Court (1933), 130 Cal.App. 607, 610. [Originally the people Travelling with you in your vehicle were "guests", not "passengers", until The State of California repealed the Guest Law.
[So passengers are people who are paying to be transported in your motor vehicle.
[Taxicab drivers,limousine drivers, and bus drivers actually do have passengers.]

Vehicle Code (1935), Section 403:
"No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such a ride, nor any other person, has any right of action for civil damages against a driver of such vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of such driver on account of personal injury to or the death of such guest during such ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that such injury or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or wilful misconduct of said driver."

[Normal Travelers would probably have passengers only if the people traveling with them were literally paying to do so, or maybe were buying gas or food during the trip.]

[Here is a curious little anomaly which has just appeared in THE VEHICLE CODE:]

VEHICLE CODE (1959), Section 325:
"A "foreign jurisdiction" is any other state, the District of Columbia, territories or possessions of the United States, and foreign states, provinces, or countries."

[Did THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA somehow leave the Constitutional Union of the united States of America in 1959?]

VEHICLE CODE (1959), Section 360:
""Highway" is a way or place of whatever nature, publicly maintained and open to the use of the public [...] for purposes of vehicular travel. Highway includes street."

[You will notice that here someone just deleted "as a matter of right" from the 1935 Vehicle Code with the stroke of a pen. Fortunately that is Legally Impossible; if something ever was a "matter of right" and was protected by the Constitution of the United States of America and/or by the Constitution of the State of California, it will always be a "matter of right".

The regulation of public highways by the state not only falls within the ambit of the police power, but the state has a substantial state and public interest in its highways to protect. Highways are constructed and maintained for the benefit of members of the public, who have an inalienable right to use them in a reasonable manner without obstruction and interruption. (Escobedo v. State of California (1950) 35 Cal.2d 870, 875-876 [222 P.2d 1]: Arques v. City of Sausalito (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 403, 407 [272 P.2d 58].) ...
...there is authority to the effect that the state's inherent power to enact statutes pertaining to the public's right to travel on highways without obstruction or interference is limited to the promotion of that use and cannot extend beyond what is necessary to facilitate travel. (See 25 Cal.Jur.2d (1955) Highways and Streets, section 238, p. 125.)
"We also are mindful of the general rule that a judicial body cannot read anything into a statute in order to save it from an unconstitutional defect. (See 13 Cal.Jur.3d (1974) Constitutional Law, section 74, pp. 138-139.)
(emphasis added) Findley v. Justice Court (1976), 62 Cal.App.3d 566, 572-573, 133 Cal.Rptr. 241.

[Even if THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA could show some legitimate or compelling public interest in the Trespass upon that right by "the Government", its action would still be actionable Trespass.
[The "Government" certainly cannot claim "Public Policy" as their excuse:]
Public Policy judicially defined]

VEHICLE CODE (1959) and (1998), Section 4851:
"Every license plate shall have displayed upon it the registration number assigned to the vehicle for which it is issued, together with the word "California" or the abbreviation "Cal." and the year number for which it is issued or a suitable device issued by the department for validation purposes, which device shall contain the year number for which issued."

VEHICLE CODE (1959) and (1998), Section 4853:
"The department may issue one or more stickers, tabs, or other suitable devices in lieu of the license plates provided for under this code. Except where the physical differences between the stickers, tabs, or devices and license plates by their nature render the provisions of this code inapplicable, all provisions of this code relating to license plates may apply to stickers, tabs, or devices."

[In People v. Kirby (1940), 38 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 770, the court said:

The license plates so required by the code are described in section 156(b) [Note: now section 4851] as follows: "Every license plate shall have displayed upon it the registration number assigned to the vehicle for which it is issued, together with the word 'California' or the abbreviation 'Cal.' and the year number for which it is issued." There is nothing in the slightest degree uncertain or ambiguous in the foregoing language prescribing what shall be shown on the license plates. That language is obviously both inclusive and exclusive and it applies to every license plate. ... It was clearly the duty of the department to furnish defendant with license plates "as required by this code" and he could not be compelled to display unauthorized plates. To hold otherwise would be to authorize the taking of his property without due process of law and would countenance an unwarranted invasion of his personal liberty.

[The point here is that when The Vehicle Code was repealed and readopted in 1959, this section was not substantially changed. Nor has it been substantially changed to date.
[I believe that ALL the Gold-on-Blue series plates and ALL the Blue-on-White series plates which have been issued since 1940 which show "CALIFORNIA" or "CA EXEMPT" on them are unauthorized plates issued by the D.M.V. in blatant violation of section 4851 and of People v. Kirby.]
[That probably means that every vehicle to which these plates were issued was never properly "Registered" as a result of deliberate and knowing misconduct on the part of the D.M.V.]

The statutes involving registration of vehicles, somewhat like the statutes concerning the recording of real property transfers, are designed, among other reasons, for the protection of purchasers and injured parties, principally by affording identification of the vehicle and the person in order to prevent fraudulent practices ...
"[3] Strict compliance with Vehicle Code, section 178, and its allied sections relating to the transfer of title or interest is required before the transferring owner may escape the liability imposed. (Stoddart v. Peirce, 53 Cal.2d 105 [346 P.2d 774].)
Helton v. Stewart (1961), 198 Cal.App. 2d 114, 120.

Finally, after that journey into the past, we get to the current VEHICLE CODE as transcribed from West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003).

[THE VEHICLE CODE (2003), as such, does not exist. What exists is still THE VEHICLE CODE of 1959, as amended to date.]
[The problem here is that, removed from their just-examined historical context and taken individually, each of these statutes appears reasonable.]

West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 250:

� 250. Chop Shop
. . .
Historical and Statutory Notes
Former � 250, enacted by Stats.1959, c. 3, p. 1530, � 250, ... which defined chauffeur, was repealed by Stats.1961, c. 1615, � 1.

West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 305:

� 305. Driver
A "driver" is a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. The term "driver" does not include the tillerman or other person who, in an auxiliary capacity, assists the driver in the steering or operation of any articulated firefighting apparatus.

[This section for consistency should probably read "person who drives a motor vehicle".]

West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 310:

� 310. Driver's license
"Driver's license" is a valid license to drive the type of motor vehicle or combination of vehicles for which a person is licensed under this code or by a foreign jurisdiction.

[Another example of the expansion of the Trespass by our supposed employees. Now THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA apparently presumes that everyone, even in foreign jurisdictions (out of the STATE's jurisdiction), is a commercial driver?]
[If one needs a valid driver's license to drive a motor vehicle, what document does one need to Travel in a private automobole for which one apparently, by definition, still does not need a license?]

West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 670:

� 670. Vehicle
A "vehicle" is a device by which any person or property may be propelled, moved, or drawn upon a highway, excepting a device moved exclusively by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.

West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 415:

� 415. Motor vehicle
(a) A "motor vehicle" is a vehicle that is self-propelled.
(b) "Motor vehicle" does not include a self-propelled wheelchair, invalid tricycle, or motorized quadricycle when operated by a person who, by reason of physical disability, is otherwise unable to move about as a pedestrian.

West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 325:

� 325.foreign jurisdiction
A "foreign jurisdiction" is any other state, the District of Columbia, territories or possessions of the United States, and foreign states, provinces, or countries.

West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 360:

� 360. Highway
"Highway" is a way or place of whatever nature, publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. Highway includes street.

West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 370:

� 370. Legal owner
A "legal owner" is a person holding a security interest in a vehicle which is subject to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, or the lessor of a vehicle to the State or to any county, city, district, or political subdivision of the State, or to the United States, under a lease, lease-sale, or rental-purchase agreement which grants possession of the vehicle to the lessee for a period of 30 consecutive days or more.

West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 505:

� 505. Registered owner
A "registered owner" is a person registered by the department as the owner of a vehicle.

West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 460:

� 460. Owner
An "owner" is a person having all the incidentals of ownership, including the legal title of a vehicle whether or not such person lends, rents, or creates a security interest in the vehicle; the person entitled to the possession of a vehicle as the purchaser under a security agreement; or the State, or any county, city, district, or political subdivision of the State, or the United States, when entitled to the possession and use of a vehicle under a lease, lease-sale, or rental-purchase agreement for a period of 30 consecutive days or more.

[For consistency, these statutes should read "owner" of a motor vehicle", since D.M.V. should only have jurisdiction over motor vehicles.]

West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 12500:

� 12500. Unlawful to drive without valid license
"(a) No person shall drive a motor vehicle upon a highway, unless the person then holds a valid driver's license issued under this code, except those persons who are expressly exempted under this code.

West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 21052:

� 21052. Public officers and employees
The provisions of this code applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways apply to the drivers of all vehicles while engaged in the course of employment by this State, any political subdivision thereof, any municipal corporation, or any district, including authorized emergency vehicles subject to those exemptions granted such authorized emergency vehicles in this code.

[Notice this section does not say, "The provisions of this code... shall also apply to the drivers of all vehicles engaged in the course of employment by this State..."
[This implies that the provisions of this code only apply to THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA employees.
[See also 17 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 121.]

What California appellate courts have said about the Right to Travel is:

White's contention that there is a constitutional right to intrastate travel is valid. The Attorney General is correct that the rational[e] behind Shipiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 629-630 [22 L.Ed.2d 600, 612, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329], is that interstate travel is a necessary element of a federal union. [fnt. 3 The United States Supreme Court has not yet specifically considered whether there is any constitutional distinction between interstate and intrastate travel (see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974) 415 U.S. 250, 256-257 [39 L.Ed.2d 306, 313-314, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1081).]
We conclude that the right to intrastate travel (which includes intramunicipal travel) is a basic human right protected by the United States and California Constitutions as a whole. Such a right is implicit in the concept of a democratic society and is one of the attributes of personal liberty under common law. (See 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 134; U.S. Constitution., art. IV, section 2 and the 5th, 9th and 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, section 7, subd. (a) and art. I, section 24, which provides:
Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. This declaration of rights may not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the People.")
As the court stated in King v. New Rochell Municipal Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1971) 442 F.2d 646, 648: "It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state." [fnt 4. In spite of totalitarian member states not following this democratic concept in practice the right is even recognized at the international level. See article 13, section 1, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state." (Expressing more a hope than existing reality.)]

(Blackstone (loc. cit.) called this a personal liberty and stated: "This personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation or moving one's person to whatever place one's inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law. ...it is a right strictly natural; that the laws of England have never abridged it without sufficient cause; and, that in this kingdom, it cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion of the magistrate, without the explicit permission of the laws.")(Italics added.)
The court in United States v. Wheeler (1920) 254 U.S. 281, 293 [65 L.Ed. 270, 41 S.Ct. 133, 134] (an interstate travel case) said: "In all the states, from the beginning down to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, the citizens thereof possessed the fundamental right, inherent in citizens of all free governments, to move at will from place to place therein, and to have free ingress thereto and egress therefrom with a consequent authority in the states to forbid and punish violations of this fundamental right." [ftn 5. Of course, historically it did not apply to incarcerated criminals or slaves and until recently was limited by laws relating to indigents, vagrants, beggars and the like. On freedom of movement generally and its history see Chaffee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787 (1956) page 162 et seq.]
Many other fundamental rights such as free speech, free assembly, and free association are often tied with the right to travel. It is simply elementary in a free society. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values. (Kent v. Dulles (1958) 357 U.S. 116, 126 [2 L.Ed.2d 1204, 1210, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 1118])."
In re White (1979), 97 Cal.App.3d 141, 148-149, 158 Cal.Rptr 562.

A citizen has a basic constitutional right to intrastate as well as interstate travel. (In re White, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d 141, 148.) Many other fundamental rights such as free speech, free assembly and free association are often tied in with the right to travel. (See Kent v. Dulles (1959) 357 U.S. 116, 126 [2 L.Ed.2d 1204, 1210, 78 S.Ct. 1113].) The right to acquire, own, enjoy and dispose of property is also a basic fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (See 5 Witkin Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed 1974) Constitutional Law, section 273, p. 3563.) Intrinsic and integral to this right is the basic ability to possess one's own property. Could it be rationally argued that the enjoyment of the fruits of property ownership does not directly depend upon the owner's free and unimpared access to, and possession of, said property?...
Constitutional intrusions have been upheld to the extent that they are required by legitimate governmental demands. (See People v. Arvanites (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1052, 1063 [95 Cal.Rptr. 493][upholding a probation condition prohibiting engaging in demonstrations]; see also United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 1975) 521 F.2d 259, 263-265; In re Mannino (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 953, 966-967 [92 Cal.Rptr. 880, 45 A.L.R.3d 996].)
People v. Beach (1983), 147 Cal.App.3d 612, 622, 195 Cal.Rptr. 381.

[I could almost infer that, if I routinely travel the public highways in my own private vehicle, that D.M.V. (under the guise of the "police power") is attempting to "grant" me a "privilege" to conduct my affairs (as a private or public carrier) which it simply does not have the authority to grant.
[And that the D.C.H.P. is attempting to "enforce" an "obligation" which simply does not exist.
[Have we started to wonder yet just exactly why or how any of this "registration" is D.M.V.'s legitimate business at all?]

So what can I do about this revolting situation?

The only solution I can see is to scratch-build a vehicle from brand-new parts for which I paid cash and did all the assembly thereof myself and then NEVER register the vehicle. That way it would, at least, by mine.

[Since THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA seems to take the position that D.M.V. is one of its agencies and that D.M.V. employees are immune from civil penalties, I started researching possible remedies.

[The following information is transcribed from CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE, Third Edition (Revised).
(I omitted the superscripts and footnotes as too cumbersome to reproduce. Read the originals if you need the footnotes.)]

� 1. In general
Conversion has been defined as the exercise of dominion over the personal property of another in exclusion or defiance of the latter's right, as any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's property in denial or inconsistent with his rights thereto, and as unwarranted interference, by the defendant, with dominion over personal property of the plaintiff. Conversion involves actual interference with the plaintiff's dominion or ownership rights. And any wrongful assumption of authority over a chattel, inconsistent with another's right of possession or subversive of his vested interest therein, amounts to a conversion. Some definitions include injury as an element of the tort.
Conversion is a continuing tort. It does not necessarily end when the original wrongdoer transfers physical possession to another, but continues as long as the person entitled to the use and possession of the property is deprived thereof.
An action in trover or conversion is one for damages, and must, therefor, be distinguished from an action for recovery of possession of converted personal property. However, conversion, and claim and delivery, may be alternative remedies.

Section 2. Conversion and "trover"
The present-day conversion action is the successor to the common-law action of "trover." This action was primarily based on the wrongful conversion of the plaintiff's personal property, and thus, distinguished from trespass, the gist of which is injury to the plaintiff or to real or personal property in his possession, and from replivin, which lay for the wrongful taking or detention of the plaintiff's personal property. These forms of action overlapped, however, so that trover and trespass were concurrent remedies for most illegal or tortuous takings. Strictly speaking, "trover" is the name of the action and "conversion" the name of the tort involved. In modern usage, however, the terms are used interchangeably as designations of the tort, as well as of the action for damages based on that tort.

Section 3. Intent or mental state
Conversion consists of the breach of what may be called an absolute duty. The act itself is unlawful and is redressable as a tort. It is an instance of strict liability in which care, good faith, and lack of knowledge will not save the defendant. Negligence is not an element. And the motive for the defendant's act is ordinarily immaterial. The foundation for the action of conversion rests neither in the knowledge nor in the intent of the defendant, and conversion does not require proof of wrongful intent. Though the defendant may have acted in good faith or under a mistake, he is not exonerated from liability for conversion "where the law charges him with the duty to know before he intrudes." Although some opinions declare that an intention or purpose to convert must be shown, and although conversion is sometimes defined as an intentional exercise of dominiion over a chattel which interferes with the right of another to control it, or as an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification, by which any person entitled thereto is deprived of use and possession, ordinarily the good faith of the person charged with conversion, his innocent mistake resulting from ignorance of the true facts, his lack of negligence, and his innocent motive are irrelevant in determining whether he committed the conversion charged. Thus, the intent required to constitute conversion is not necessarily a matter of conscious wrongdoing; it is rather an intent to exercise a dominion over the goods which is, in fact, inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights.
14 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 3d. Ed. (Rev), CONVERSION, � 1 et seq., p. 770.

� 1149. In general; definition and nature
The crime of embezzlement, now prosecuted as "theft," is defined by the Penal Code as the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been entrusted. And it has been more specifically defined judicially as the fraudulent appropriation of property to some use or purpose not in the due and lawful execution of his trust by one into whose possession it has come by reason of some relation of trust or confidence mentioned by statute, and existing between him and another. The code defines a number of specific relations of trust and confidence whose violation may constitute the offense, [Penal Code 504 et seq.]
The essential elements of theft by embezzlement are (1) that the property belong to the alleged principal, the prosecuting witness; (2) that it be lawfully in the possession of the accused at the time of the embezzlement; (3) that the accused act as agent, bailee, servant, or employee of the prosecuting witness in holding the property; (4) that the accused be guilty of the conversion or appropriation that the statute denounces; and (5) that he appropriate it with the intent unlawfully to deprive the prosecuting witness of his property. Some decisions group the latter of these two elements as one. More briefly, it is said that the gist of the offense is the appropriation to own's own use of property delivered to him for devotion to a specific purpose other than his own enjoyment of it. It has also been said that the essential elements of the offense are the fiduciary relation that arises when one entrusts property to another person and its fraudulent appropriation by that person, Again it has been stated that the gist of embezzlement is in the breach of the trust imposed on an agent, employee, or bailee by his principal, employer, or bailor. In any event, it seems that the offense necessarily includes a fraud against the person from whom the property is embezzled, and that in most embezzlements there is an element of false representation.
18 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 3d Ed.(Rev), CRIMINAL LAW, � 1149.

� 1150. -As statutory offense
Embezzlement is purely a statutory offense, unknown to the common law. It has been said that in the common-law definition of larcency there were two gaps through which, in the expansion and complication of business practices, many criminals escaped. The first of these was caused by the rule that in larcency it was necessary that the stolen goods should have been at some time in the possession of the prosecuting witness. The second lay in the assumption that, when possession of goods was acquired by a bailee, no subsequent conversion constituted larcency while the bailment lasted, save in a few excepted cases. It was to meet these defects in the common law that statutes have been passed in most, if not all, of the states, providing for the offense of embezzlement.
18 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 3d Ed.(Rev), CRIMINAL LAW, � 1150.

� 1151. Ownership in another
For property to be embezzled, title thereto must, as a rule, be in one other than the embezzler, for it is clear that one cannot be guilty of embezzling his own property. Though fraud in the transaction may render him guilty of another offense, an accused cannot be guilty of embezzling the property title to which he acquired by contract or sale. Nor is it embezzlement where an accused takes property in good faith, under an open and bona fide claim of title, though his claim is untenable.
18 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 3d Ed.(Rev), CRIMINAL LAW, � 1151.

B. Conversion of Personal Property.
1. In general.
(a) [Sec. 610] Nature of Tort.
Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over personal property of another. (See Poggi v. Scott (1914) 167 C. 372, 375, 139 P. 815; Gruber v. Pacific States Savings & Loan Co. (1939) 13 C.2d 144, 148, 88 P.2d 137; Kee v. Becker (1942) 54 C.A.2d 466, 470, 129 P.2d 159; Steele v. Marsicano (1894) 102 C. 666, 669, 36 P. 920; Fresno Air Service v. Wood (1965) 232 C.A.2d 801, 806, 43 C.R. 276, quoting the text; Rest.2d [note: Restatement of the Law, Second Edition], Torts, Sec. 222A; Prosser & Keeton Sec. 15; 1 Harper, James & Gray, Sec. 2.7 et seq.; 18 Am.Jur.2d, Conversion, Sec. 1 et seq.) The property need not be appropriated to the use of the defendant; it may be destroyed, or merely damaged. (See Staley v. McClurken (1939) 35 C.A. 2d 622, 628, 96 P.2d 805; Rest.2d, Torts, Secs. 223, 226; see infra, Sec. 621.)
The action for conversion properly lies only where there is some substantial interference with possession or the right thereto, and the plaintiff in a conversion suit recovers the full value of the property, in effect forcing the defendant to buy it. Where the act does not amount to a dispossession, but consists of intermeddling with or use of or damage to the property, the normal action will be for trespass, in which the plaintiff recovers only the actual damages suffered by impairment of the property or loss of its use. (See Zaslow v. Krenert (1946) 29 C.2d 541, 551, 176 P.2d 1...; Rest.2d, Torts, Secs. 217, 218, 219; see infra, Sec. 1449 et seq.)
5 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, 9th Ed.; Torts, � 610.

It is settled that the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance may be tested by [writ of] prohibition; the validity of legislation goes to the jurisdiction of the court to proceed to try the case (Whitney v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. 114 [187 P.12]; Broady v. Jennings, 70 Cal.App. 647 [234 P. 120])...." Chavez v. Municipal Court (1967), 256 C.A. 2d 149, 151, 64 Cal. Rptr. 76.
...We do not agree with respondents' contention that prohibition is not available to appellant in this case. In Hunter v. Justice Court (1950) 36 Cal.2d 315 [223 P.2d 465], the petitioner was charged with a misdemeanor violation in a justice court. Although his petition was denied (for other reasons) the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that prohibition was proper to test the constitutionality of the statute without indicating or suggesting that there were other special facts or circumstances to warrant the relief requested. Chavez v. Municipal Court (1967), 256 C.A.2d 149, 152, 64 Cal.Rptr. 76.

The department of motor vehicles, which is a quasi-judicial department for the purpose of passing upon facts in granting or revoking operators' licenses, was not authorized to revoke the defendant's license to drive without notice and without a hearing. ...
With due appreciation of the dangers attending the driving of motor vehicles, in this progressive age [1935!] when the necessary use of automobiles is so indespensible and inseparatable from legitimate business, it would be unjust and extremely harmful to grant any individual or body the arbitrary right to revoke an operator's license to drive a machine on mere rumor or hearsay evidence without notice and without a hearing.
People v. Noggle (1935), 7 Cal.App.2d. 14, 17-18 (emphasis added).

[It appears that I may have valid grounds for a civil Remedy against D.M.V. for the Tort of Conversion.]

[Another possible Remedy could be an Action for the Tort of Trespass against the actual physical Title, based on the logic articulated by this article:

Trespass upon the Title.]

[Another Remedy that the People of California each individually still have is that of Arrest.
[Maybe I should start applying the California Criminal laws appropriately and upon the appropriate individuals.
[There are no "public citizens" or "public persons" in California.]

� 837. Private persons; authority to arrest.
ARRESTS BY PRIVATE PERSONS. A private person may arrest another:
1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2. When the person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
3. When a felony has been in fact committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
(emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), � 837.

[All "public offenses" are crimes.]

� 10851. Theft and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle
(a) Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner therof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, or any person who is a party or an accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty of a public offense and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment.
(b) . . .
(in part, emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Veh. Code (2003), � 10851.

[This would seem to apply to both every purported peace officer and to every tow truck operator who tows my Automobile without my explicit direction and permission.]

� 487. Grand theft defined
Grand theft is theft committed in any of the following cases:
...
(c) When the property is taken from the person of another.
(d) When the property taken is any of the following:
(1) An automobile, [or various livestock].
(in part, emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), � 487.

Theft is the unlawful taking of property of another, including the crimes of larcency, embezzlement, larcency by trick and device, and obtaining property by false pretenses. People v. Creath (App. 2 Dist. 1995) 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 336, 31 Cal.App.4th 312, rehearing denied, review denied.

To support conviction for grand theft by false pretense, accused must have made misrepresentation upon which victim relied, but misrepresentation need not be explicitly made. People v. Gentry (App. 4 Dist. 1991) 285 Cal.Rptr. 591, 234 Cal.App.3d 131, review denied.
West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (1999), � 487, Notes of Decisions, 3. Elements.

Theft conviction on theory of false pretense requires proof that defendant made false pretense or representation to the owner of property; he did so with intent to defraud owner of that property; and owner transferred property to defendant in reliance on representation. People v. Wooten (App. 2 Dist. 1996) 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, review denied.
Ibid., � 487, Notes of Decisions, 11. False pretenses-In general.

Requirement that owner's transfer of property be in "reliance" on false representation, as element of theft by false pretense, means that false representation materially influenced owner's decision to part with his property; it need not be the sole factor motivating transfer. People v. Wooten (App. 2 Dist. 1996) 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, review denied.

Reliance on false representation, as element of theft by false pretense, may be inferred from all the circumstances. People v. Wooten (App. 2 Dist. 1996) 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 44 Cal.App.4th 1834, review denied.
Id., � 487, Notes of Decisions, 12. Reliance, false pretenses.

[In other words, every time I go to the D.M.V. and they tell me something which eventually turns out to be untrue and I rely on it and give them my money or other property, they have committed or attempted to commit the crime defined above.]

� 211. ...Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.
West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), � 211.

[In other words, in reference to a "peace officer", he/she is carrying a gun (force); he/she wants to take my car (felonious taking) against my will; I am afraid (fear); I may have to defend myself. [Duhh.]]

� 484.
(a) Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft. In determining the value of the property obtained, for the purposes of this section, the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test, and in determining the value of services received the contract price shall be the test. If there be no contract price, the reasonable and going wage for the service rendered shall govern. For the purposes of this section, any false or fraudulent representation or pretense made shall be treated as continuing, so as to cover any money, property or service received as a result thereof, and the complaint, information or indictment may charge that the crime was committed on any date during the particular period in question. ...
(in part, emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), � 484.

� 496. Receiving stolen property; punishment; swap meet vendors and others dealing in or collecting merchandise or personal property; damages and costs; attempted offenses; penalties
(a) Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year. ...
A principal in the actual theft of the property may be convicted pursuant to this section. However, no person may be convicted both pursuant to this section and of the theft of the same property. ...
(c) Any person who has been injured by a violation of subdivision (a) or (b) may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney's fees. ...
(emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), � 496.

� 503. Definition
Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been entrusted.
West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), � 503.

� 504.
Every officer of this state, or of any county, city, city and county, or other municipal corporation or subdivision thereof, and every deputy, clerk, or servant of that officer, and every officer, director, trustee, clerk, servant, or agent of any association, society, or corporation (public or private), who fraudulently appropriates to any use or purpose not in the due and lawful execution of that person's trust, any property in his or her possession or under his or her control by virtue of that trust, or secretes it with a fraudulent intent to appropriate it to that use or purpose, is guilty of embezzlement.
(emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (2003), � 504.

� 518. Definition
Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.
(emphasis added) West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code (1998), � 518 .

[Let me see if I understand this:
[A purported "peace officer" directs a tow truck driver [conspiracy (a felony) and grand theft under color of authority (a felony)] to steal my car [grand theft auto ( a felony)], from my immediate presence, without my consent. While the peace officer might have an interest in my car through D.M.V., where did he get an interest in my private property within the car?
[When I go to the tow company's storage yard or lot [he is in open and blatant possession of my stolen car (a misdemeanor) and my private property within it (a felony)], he wants my money for performing a "service" I did not request [commits extortion (a felony)] before he will return my car and my private property within it. If I don't pay him, he gets a lien [embezzlement (?), more extortion (?)] upon my car for the value of the "service" he provided in initially stealing my car.

[Maybe the new program should be:
The tow truck driver, in conspiracy with the "peace officer", just stole my car; now he wants my money to return my car; now I arrest the tow truck driver [for grand theft auto, conspiracy, and possession of stolen property] and his boss/business owner [for possession of stolen property]; now they go to jail [and maybe out-of-business]; now I get in my car and go home! Bet they won't touch my car again...]

[Maybe I should start a grass-roots program which would apply to all uninvited tow truck drivers AND all their company owners:]

Proposed Bumper Sticker:

TOUCH MY CAR WITHOUT MY PERMISSION?

GO TO JAIL!

FIRST TIME, EVERY TIME!

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END

Your reward for making it this far:
Skrew the California D.M.V.

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Appropriate websites:

Supposedly a private organization based upon a repealed treaty regulating commerical carriers engaged in cross-border transportation between the United States and Canada:
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators:

Supposedly a plan to regulate the registration of Motor Vehicles used as commerical carriers engaged in transportation between the United States and Canada:
International Registration Plan:

Supposed to regulate only Commercial Drivers:
National Driver Register:

Wonder what the implications/complications are if "I" or "my" vehicle somehow ended up in the records of these organizations "by accident"?

Could this be why cops tell us to not buck "the System"? What if "the System" is based upon international treaty and does not legitimately apply to me at all?

California DMV uses the phrase "Master File update" when checking the validity of transfers of title and registrations. What if this is the same Master File IRS or FTB uses?

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If you are not tired of reading, here is more background material:

Who owns your car?:

An Oregon Law Review article on the distinction between Licensing and Rights:

The Right to Travel:

The Right to Travel as a Constitutionally-protected Fundamental Right:

Why some people DO need a Driver License:

A non-California brief on the Right to Travel:

Another non-California brief on the right to travel:

Sovereign Citizen Travel Notice:

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If you have really read this far AND understand what you read, you may find a use for these articles:

Administrative Notice to a Purported "C.H.P. Officer."

Administrative Notice to a City or County "Traffic Officer".

Bonus Homework assignment:

Submitted for your further consideration under the category "enquiring minds want to know":

49 U.S.C.A. 30301 -- authorizes the National Driver Register [Supposed to be for actively-employed commercial 'drivers' only]

49 U.S.C.A. 30501 -- authorizes the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System [supposed to be a title confirmation plan for U.S.-Canada cross-border 'commercial' vehicles only]

49 U.S.C.A. 31701 -- authorizes the International Registration Plan [supposed to be for registration of 'commercial' "motor vehicles" used in cross-border transportation under a U.S.-Canada treaty]

Anybody want to follow-up on this?

END

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