A legal notice concerning the statutory protection
for case-related work product of those acting In Pro Per.

Declarant is a competent witness over the age of 18 years of age, has personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and does Solemnly state that:

1.a. I am a natural born, adult, white Man, living within the territorial boundaries of California.

1.b. I am not a trained or licensed Attorney; of necessity, I am acting within my right to defend my life, liberty, and property as set out in CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION (2004), Article 1, Section 1 [from http://www.leginfo.ca.gov./.const/.article_1 (as of June 14, 2004)]:

All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.

3.a. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. (2002), § 2018 reads (in part, emphasis added):

(a) It is the policy of the state to: (1) preserve the rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial with that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable but the unfavorable aspects of those cases; and (2) to prevent attorneys from taking undue advantage of their adversary's industry and efforts.
(b) Subject to subdivision (c), the work product of an attorney is not discoverable unless the court determines that denial of discovery will unfairly prejudice the party seeking discovery in preparing that party's claim or defense or will result in an injustice.
(c) Any writing that reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories shall not be discoverable under any circumstances.
(d) This section is intended to be a restatement of existing law relating to protection of work product. It is not intended to expand or reduce the extent to which work product is discoverable under existing law in any action.
. . .

Section 2018's stated purpose and the underlying reasons for its creation emphasize the need to "limit[] discovery so that 'the stupid or lazy practitioner may not take undue advantage of his adversary's efforts . . . .'" (Pruitt, Lawyers' Work Product, supra, 37 State Bar J. at pp. 240-241.) Such a policy is important not only for attorneys, but also for litigants acting in propria persona. A litigant needs the same opportunity to research relevant law and to prepare his or her case without then having to give that research to an adversary making a discovery request.
. . .
Without determining whether the diary is in fact work product, we hold that in propria persona litigants may assert section 2018's work product privilege. Since the trial court's ruling was based on the conclusion that petitioner was not entitled to assert the work product privilege, we remand the matter to that court to conduct an in camera review of the diary to determine whether it contains matter which is priveleged under section 2018. (See procedure outlined in National Steel Products Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 476, 489-490 [210 Cal.Rptr. 535], and Fellows v. Superior Court, supra 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 68.) Our stay order is vacated and, the alternative writ is discharged.
Dowden v. Superior Court, (1999), 73 Cal.App.4th. 126, 133, 136, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 180.

3.d. California Practice Guide, Civil Practice Before Trial, The Rutter Group (2001), Chapter 8, reads (in part):

[8:266.2] In pro pers: A litigant in pro per may also assert work product protection. [Dowden v. Sup.Ct. (Dowden) (1999) 73 CA4th 126, 136, 86 CR2d 180, 187; see [para.]8:215]

[8:215] Protection limited to work product of attorneys or pro pers: The Discovery Act refers only to the "work product" of attorneys acting on a client's behalf. [CCP §2018(a)] However, in pro per litigants may also assert work product protection. [Dowden v. Sup.Ct. (Dowden) (1999) 73 CA4th 126, 136, 86 CR2d 180, 187--result supported by policy of promoting diligence by each party in preparing its own case rather than relying on adversary's efforts]

We do not overlook those constitutional limitations which, for the protection of personal rights, must necessarily attend all investigations conducted under the authority of Congress. Neither branch of the legislative department, still less any merely administrative body, established by Congress, possesses, or can be invested with, a general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 196 [26: 377, 386]. We said in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 [29: 746, 751]--and it cannot be too often repeated--that the principles that embody the essence of constitutional liberty and security forbid all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sancity of a man's home, and the privacies of his life. As said by Mr. Justice Field in Re Pacific R. Commission, 32 Fed. Rep. 241, 250, "of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves, not merely protection of his person from assault, but exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all others would lose half their value."
... It is scarcely necessary to say that the power given to Congress to regulate interstate commerce does not carry with it any power to destroy or impair those guarantees. This court has already spoken fully on that general subject in Counselman v. Hitchock, 142 U. S. 547 [35: 1110], 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 816. ... Suffice it in the present case to say that as the Interstate Commerce Commission, by petition in a circuit court of the United States seeks, upon grounds distinctly set forth, an order to compel appellees to answer particular questions and to produce certain books, papers, etc., in their possession, it was open to each of them to contend before that court that he was protected by the Constitution from making answer to the questions propounded to him; or that he was not legally bound to produce the books, papers, etc., ordered to be produced; or that neither the questions propounded nor the books, papers, etc., called for relate to the particular matter under investigation, nor to any matter which the Commission is entitled under the Constitution or laws to investigate. These issues being determined in their favor by the court, the petition of the Commission could have been dismissed upon its merits.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson (1894), 154 U.S. 447, 38 L.Ed 1047, 1058, 14 S.Ct. 1125.

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". The Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. McCarthy vs. Arndstein, 266 US 34, 40, 69 L Ed 158, 45 S Ct 16 (1924) squarely held that

"[t]he privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. The privilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also a party defendant."

Lefkowitz v. Turley (1973), 414 U.S. 70, 38 L.Ed.2d 274, 281, 94 S. Ct. 316.

Dated: _______________________________________

At: __________________________________________

Signed: _______________________________________________