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Strozer, Judith R. 1994. Language Acquisition after Puberty. Washington, DC:Georgetown University Press.
Synopsis and Critique: Timothy M. Nall
Copyright © Tim Nall 2004.
All Rights reserved.
Do not copy without permission.How is language acquired? Backing up a step, what form of knowledge constitutes what we refer to as language? Studies done with apes and chimps have shown that they are able to process symbols in an intelligent manner. Apes in particular can “read” a question on one line, and find its answer on another (p. 35). However, profound differences remain between the cognitive and communicative abilities of men and apes. Teasing apart these differences leads us to the conclusion that there are at least two spheres of ability involved in the communication and expression we call human language: a CONCEPTUAL system, and a COMPUTATIONAL one. It appears that apes are able to conceive of labels that mark objects and actions, and perhaps intentions (p. 35). However, this simple semiotic system seems to be a particularly one-dimensional one, rooted in the immediate phenomena experienced by the creature, and unable to grasp the recursive layers of complexity in speech that we as humans are capable of both generating and comprehending. This innate complexity of human speech springs from the computational system our brains have for processing and describing semantic relationships. According to Strozer, it is this which separates us linguistically from the apes.
Is the computational system learned through "nurture", or acquired biologically through "nature"? Certain aspects of human languages (in particular, lexicon) are purely arbitrary, and hence learned from exposure to input. This Saussurean arbitrariness might lead one to conclude that all language is learned as a response to environmental input. However, it is extremely significant to note two things: that many of the more fundamental structural aspects of language are far from arbitrary, and that the input we receive as children is scarcely linguistically rich enough to explain all that is learned at that time. As an example of the first point, in every known language and culture, "near the house" means outside and never inside the house, and "a brown house" means its exterior is brown, and not necessarily its interior. This is an example of the underlying structural parallels between human languages. Moreover, children from every culture learn to master with relative ease such abstract conceptual categories as EVENT, STATE, THING, PLACE and PATH (p. 49), and in time learn to parse complex semantic relationships with a facility that seems incongruent with the scarce, inconsistent input one receives incidentally throughout life. The subtle but profound congruencies between all human languages, together with the transcendence of L1 acquisition over the poverty of input, lead one to conclude that much of what we employ in our language is hard-wired within the human brain: "....the conceptual system with which lexical items are connected is already substantially in place [at birth]" (p. 45). Both language and language acquisition have innately determined properties, referred to as UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR (UG) and the LANGUAGE ACQUISITION DEVICE (LAD) respectively. Again according to Chomsky (1981), the UG is made up of innate PRINCIPLES and PARAMETERS. It is postulated that some principles are invariant across languages, but others may be set equal to one of a small number of possible values as received via linguistic input (158,170 note 66).
The existence and form of these genetically programmed initial constraints are Chomsky’s (and hence Strozer’s) answers to the two fundamental questions about language that opened this paper (p. 87-88). The assumption that much of language is innate is also the starting point for answering a third and central question of her book. Following Lenneberg (1967), she wonders why it is that “…all normal children are totally successful at acquiring the language or languages of their community, while most adults who try do not succeed in developing a native mastery of a single foreign language” (pp. 130, 157).
Lenneberg (1967) wrote that "...the capacities for speech production… and … language acquisition [experience a biologically determined] critical period [extending] from age two to about age twelve.." (Lenneberg 1969:114, as cited in Strozer 1994:135). This idea is known as the CRITICAL PERIOD HYPOTHESIS (CPH) of language acquisition. To Strozer, this stems from the fact that the parameters of the variant principles of UG cannot be reset in adulthood (p. 156).
In my opinion, the greatest shortcoming of this book is Strozer’s lack of evidence for supporting that final assertion. Her defense of the hypothesis consists mainly of numerous quotes of Chomsky (e.g. pp. 136-7), and appeals to anecdotal evidence (143). She does say that “[r]ecent work suggests that the hypothesis is true” (p. 143), but for a book that seems in large part to be intended as a defense of the CPH, her decision (as far as I can discern) not to elaborate on that work is insupportable. As for the superabundance of Chomsky quotes, at times the notes at the end of Strozer’s chapters seemed to me like a study guide to Chomsky’s writings. That would not be a fatal flaw, if it were not for the fact that those notes in turn seemed to me to consist of plausible but unsupported assertions. She also briefly appeals to reason, drawing parallels between the biologically determined onset of puberty and a biologically determined loss of access to UG (133). This approach is very persuasive if taken as an argument that CPH is possible, but not as a defense of its existence in fact. In spite of her poorly supported arguments, Strozer does not seem to feel that the CPH is unprovable: “It seems a fair guess that stronger evidence is obtainable…” (p. 143).
Speaking from a student’s point of view, there are parts of this book that present a terribly difficult nut to crack. The initial chapters should not be beyond the grasp of the average grad student, but are written in a meandering, example-rich, summary-poor style that can be confusing. For this reason, reading it can at times be comparable to a needlessly arduous data sifting expedition, or perhaps to “herding cats”. In my humble opinion, some deft editing would have worked wonders. Chapter 6 and some parts of 7 involve x-bar analysis, which will be inaccessible to anyone who has not been exposed to a few courses in Linguistics. Having said all that, my feelings about the book are ambivalent rather than categorically negative. I suspect that much useful (if inconclusive) ground was covered here, and rejecting the book entirely might be an example of “throwing the baby out with the bath water”. Selective samples of the book will be very useful for those who wish to gain somewhat more than a casual familiarity with the CPH. Again in my opinion, Strozer should re-write the book with three goals in mind: tightening the earlier chapters, presenting more evidence to support her claims, and making some later chapters more accessible via judicious explanations and elaborations.
As for my evaluation of Strozer’s central assertion (the CPH), my starting point as an intelligent but uninformed layman was from the assumption that the CPH is not true. As I noted above, she did not present enough evidence supporting her claims to dissuade me from that view. In particular, my “gut feeling” is that one innate, essential quality of humanity is that we are: “…driven by a continuous underlying process-the proximity seeking that is the hallmark of the child's attachment bond to the caregiver” (Courage and Howe 2002). I suspect this drive to engage in PHATIC COMMUNION is pre-verbal, present from the most primitive stages of cognition or awareness (Altmann 2001):
Babies appear to learn the prosodic characteristics of 'material' they hear in utero… (DeCasper et al 1994) demonstrated that newborns recognize [and] … prefer…the prosodic characteristics of the maternal voice…during the last weeks of pregnancy.
It seems reasonable this persistent, powerful, genetically-driven survival-need lends a nearly self-starting aspect to L1 acquisition, plus a level of motivation that would be exceedingly difficult for the conscious intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of L2 learners to match. Standing Descartes on his head, so to speak, I would characterize this need as “I am, therefore I want language”.
I also do not doubt that there are neurophysiological forces at play (Greenleaf 2002):
In early childhood, the brain records things in multiple places
or repetitively, forming duplicate or redundant synaptic
connections…The result is a density of synapses that are double
the number found in more mature adult brains…[also] glucose
consumption (i.e., energy use due to activity) is much higher
during early years.
Strozer herself notes that brain lateralization also seems to “…[play] a crucial role” (203). None of those facts, however, preclude the possibility that exceptional individuals who have a strong and enduring drive to acquire a second language plus some unusually strong aptitude in that direction may succeed. The CPH may be true, but I do not feel its existence has yet been adequately argued.
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Copyright (c) 2004 Timothy
M. Nall. All rights reserved.
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