 U.S. Army/Air Force Aviation Journal
|
|
Vol. 1 Nos. 9/10 |
October-November 2003 |
www.combatreform.com/usarmyaviationjournaloctobernovember2003.htm
www.oocities.org/usarmyaviationdigest/octobernovember2003.htm
|
Table of Contents
EDITORIAL
4GW: COIN AFAC and GFACs NOW
LETTERS
British COIN victor Templer encounter
GEOSTRATEGIC
Only the U.S. Army can win 4GWs
The guerrila air war over Iraq: MANPADS 0; Aircraft 1
OPERATIONAL
U.S. Army AFACs in O-2 Skymaster COIN aircraft NOW
TECHNOTACTICAL
Army
DoD HOT LINKS
Carlton Meyer's www.G2mil.com
September 2003 Articles
Letters - comments from G2mil readers
G2mil Library
Previous G2mil - August 2003 issue
Library Tour
Visit G2mil's library
PME HOT LINK
Colonial Air Control: recipe for failure in major wars?
E-mail U.S. Army Aviation Journal Staff
ON THE RADIO
General David Grange's Veterans Radio Hour
Return to U.S. Army/Air Force Aviation Journal home page,
click here
|
EDITORIAL
4GW COIN: U.S. Army AFACs and GFACs There is growing unrest in the Army over the mishandling of Close Air Support (CAS) issues by the U.S. Air Force. It began with the USAF not deploying A-10 Warthog CAS aircraft to Afghanistan such that they were not available for the Operation Anaconda air assaults to encircle and destroy fleeing Al Queda terrorists. It continued with USAF aircraft dropping from medium altitudes (15,000 or higher) so-called "precision" bombs without the delivery aircraft in a safe low-altitude orientation or positive terminal guidance from either an Airborne or Ground Forward Air Controller (AFAC or GFAC) on the heads of friendly troops, killing and wounding them. The CAS crisis abated when Army Generals insisted on over 60 x A-10s for the conquest of Iraq, gaining much battle success to the chagrin of the "lawn dart" USAF mafia. Then a few weeks ago these fighter-bomber jocks tried to retire the entire A-10 fleet, results be damned. Reports are that the Army SF community which enjoys support from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is trying to break the "Air Controller Monopoly" of the USAF to insure it gets CAS and not more incidents of fratricide. U.S. Army Special Forces are trying to expand their A-Teams from 12 to 14 men. The two new positions would specialize in sniping and controlling air strikes. Both jobs require the use of long-range sensors (day/night sights). But there's a problem, in that the U.S. Air Force only wants its own personnel to call in air strikes. The Air Force also does not want to expand its air controller force to provide as many controllers as the Special Forces (and the rest of the U.S. Army) wants. AVJ's contributing authors wrote about this crisis in the December 2002 issue of Armed Forces Journal--basically the USAF doesn't want Combat Control to be a career field with officers looking out for its enlistedmen, either--someday a Combat Control officer could become AF Chief of Staff! Return of the Air Commandos The Special Operations Command will probably have to go right to the top (Secretary of Defense or President) to get the Air Force to loosen up their air controller monopoly. Carlton Meyer suggests we create a “Joint Universal Spotter” (JUS) force for all the services. READ: Joint Universal Spotter
Actually, SF Teams need one other man--a "18H" who will be a GROUND VEHICLE SERGEANT (expert) who can spur these units to use air-transportable M113 Gavin-type tracked armored vehicles for missions not just sexy-looking unarmored, rubber-tired jeeps that are easily shot up and set on fire (see photo above). Frankly, the U.S. Army is getting clobbered in Iraq riding around in unarmored, under-armed trucks and its time it faces the need for tracked, armored mobility for non-linear 21st century warfare. Retired Army LTC Greg Wilcox has also put 2 and 2 together and in his letter to new Army Chief of Staff proposes the Army stands up immediately Cessna type fixed-wing observation aircraft to get long-term COIN surveillance/attack over the skies of Iraq to help prevent vehicle convoy ambushes. We reprint his letter from last month's AVJ in this issue. I add that the AF has stored at Davis-Monthan AFB lots of Cessna O-2 Skymaster aircraft that were highly successful in Vietnam and can fire 2.75" rockets and other weaponry to mark and hit targets immediately in the Chuck Myers' Maneuver Air Support (MAS) concept. Phil West's "Buzzard" concept makes great use of the O-2 as an attack/surveillance platform and is included in this issue as an enhanced article. The current USAF turboprop trainer, the T-6A Texan II has an observation/attack variant coming out next year that could fulfill this need, too. We should do this immediately for Iraqi COIN operations. Its time EVERY AVJ member to contact the two Representatives who sponsored the recent GAO report on CAS failings:
Vic Snyder-Arkansas, 2nd District
Washington, D.C. Office
Office in Arkansas
Solomon Ortiz-Texas 27th District
2470 Rayburn Building Note: He's a former U.S. Army MP Right now there should be 27 x O-2s sitting unused in storage at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. Write your representatives and Snyder/Ortiz and request that these 27 x O-2s be restored to flying status and transferred over to the U.S. Army. www.skymaster.org.uk/davism.asp
O-2 still at AMARC, Davis Monthan USAF Serial Date Arrived Park Code
67-21313 05/11/79 HV120 Air Assault!
Mike Sparks LETTERS NOTICE: you write it, we will publish it. This is YOUR e-magazine. Unless its helping the red chinese communists or vulgar, we are going to publish it. The Journal comes out every 30 days and you can sign the guestbook 24/7/365 at our web site: http://www.oocities.org/usarmyaviationdigest A USAF Special Operator writes: "Where did that info come from? That is old news and I thought OBE. SWC just stood a new course up called the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course. There are two levels. Level 1 is taught during the Q course and level 2 is taught to new SF Warrants during the technician course and also as an in-resident 14 day course. SWC designated the MC LNO as the SME for CAS (not the AF guys). I am trying to get more info on this course. Currently, only 3 DoD courses certify you to serve as a TAC. JFCC, MC TACP and NWS Controller Courses. There is a short article in the current issue of Special Warfare for anyone on Bragg." Philip West -bit of trivia my father commanded the armoured car that drove Templer up to see the spot where his predecesor was murdered. If you have a copy of Montgomery's "History of Warfare" page 555 makes very interesting reading -he describes why Malaya was a sucess, and Vietnam was not for the French -he also notes that the U.S. appeared to be making all the mistakes that the French did, and were destined to fail -he was writing in 1967!"
Retired Army Colonel Greg Wilcox forwarded the below e-mail to the new Army CSA yesterday re the missing Cessnas..
Subject: Personal Request
"GEN Schoomaker:
My name is Greg Wilcox. I am a retired Army LTC with Vietnam
experience. I have a son in Iraq. I work for SRI International as a
Senior Systems Analyst.
I would like to brief you on a topic which I think will add considerably
to force protection in Iraq, namely, bring back the "Cessnas" (O-1, O-2,
or OV-10-like aircraft).
In this new low intensity environment in Iraq, there is a need for
overwatch that only these long loiter cheap aircraft with pilot and
observer can provide. They were very effective in the early years of
Vietnam before it became a medium intensity war and too hot for slow
movers in some areas. The small observation aircraft can be effective
again in Iraq today. We need the overhead traffic cop who can spot two
men on a bridge before a convoy passes under it. We need the eyes of
the fixed-wing guy who can call in artillery and/or air support, either
helicopter or fixed-wing as we need it or redirect convoys, or simply
provide better observation and reporting - and even some radio relay.
The UAV cameras look through soda straws. The helicopters don't have
the loiter time and cost a lot to operate. They have other missions as
well. The fixed-wing A-10s move too fast and cost a lot more than the
Cessnas. They are, however, great back-up support, as are the attack
helos. We need to use the tools suited for the environment, and in my
humble opinion, it is time to buy some Cessnas (or Pipers, or whatever
brand).
We can rent Cessnas cheaply. We can train pilots cheaply to fly these
things. We could use one in support of every line battalion. That
might cost the equivalent of one M-1 tank.
I have a short 5 minute briefing on this subject, but you get the gest
of it. Please act on this if you believe it has merit.
Sincerely,
Greg Wilcox
Repected USAF combat fighter-bomber pilot, LTC Walter Bjorneby writes:
"Mike - real problem with using ex-SEA aircraft is airframe strength
remaining. They all took a beating over there and the O2s are basically
built to civilian general aircraft design, not military. Since I lost a
good friend due to a wing failure in an ex-SEA F-4 on a stateside training
mission I've been hyper-sensitive to this.
I agree we need a good low-intensity CAS bird.
Money is the problem.
a) Few civilian (if any) designs are built to meet the strength demanded of a
combat mission. Civilian general aircraft are usually designed for a
maximum 4 G working load, with a civilian load aboard. By the time you
heave aboard 2 LAU7 [2.75" rocket] pods, a couple M60s with 500/1000rds each, and two hulking GIs with all their survival gear plus military radios - the working load is way over what the thing was designed for in the first place.
b) tracked suspension was explored about forty years ago. So was air
cushion. They worked. Big problem with any air cushion is you better
land exactly into the wind or yu're ging to be drifting with the wind worse
and worse as you slow down and the escaping air frags the world around you
with stones. We used to see a Bell air cushion vehicle up at Greenland
running along the ice cap with a massive drift correction (30*+) set in. I
should think 'tundra' tires would work as well. They're commonly used on bush
aircraft in Alaska and Canada.
c) Armor - at least against .50 cal. Thinking of operating 'in the
weeds' and slow without armor is flat dumb. I know. By the grace of God I was
never hit but I've been under 50 feet AGL delivering napalm when 25
foot accuracy was needed (Charlie in the wire). Dumb luck. The F-4 had NO
armor. BTW Army helo losses in VN ought to be a clue for anyone in this
matter. 11,000? All the above means weight! An airplane has to be designed from the git-go to carry that weight or you have a sorry airplane.
d) Re the A-37. I've flown it - in the USA. Nice airplane but - not enough
armor, no self-sealing tanks (I think, piss poor gun, lousy vision out of its
cockpit. Side-by-side is nice when you're on a date but it makes for a
lousy trainer and a lousy combat aircraft unless you need someone to
hold your hand (B-52). My position is if the student is so sorry a side-by-
side is needed to get he/she/it through flight training, dump the SOB and
get someone teachable.
e) The new turboprop trainers around the world warrant a good look.
Cheers - Walt BJ"
Army Major Al Huber writes about a fixed-wing CAS/observation aircraft:
"This assumes you can get past the USAF and roles and missions.
I do not want to be tied to infrastructure (i.e., runways) I want to be able to operate off of parking garages or from a field in the middle of the brigade perimeter, not someplace that I have to tie more folks to for security.
I want SSTOL minimum and prefer VTOL.
I do want speed, but not Harrier.
Finally I will need a congressional plus up in personnel end strength to cover this new requirement.
I'll take (Rutan] ARES, not some hagged-out old T-37. Restarting a line is just as expensive as new start most of the time.
Regards,
MAJ Al Huber
www.kaman.com or http://mypage.bluewin.ch/aviationworld/kmax
Hovers at 29,000 ft without ground effect, carries a 2.7 tonne (6,000
lb) load, is small (single and similar in width to the Cobra), lightweight,
reliable, quiet and efficient.
29,000 feet is higher than Everest, so places like Afghanistan are no
challenge. Thought you might be interested.
Alan Erskine
GEOSTRATEGIC
COIN AIR WAR OVER IRAQ: ONLY THE U.S. ARMY CAN FIGHT/WIN 4TH GENERATION WARS
Legendary military reformer William S. Lind has courageously concluded that "only the U.S. Army can fight and win 4th Generation Wars" (4GWs).
The Men Who Would Not Be King
By William S. Lind
3 Jun 2003
Normally, the position of Chief of Staff of the Army is the ultimate
brass ring an Army officer can hope to grab. There is no higher Army
job, and merely holding it guarantees a man at least a small place in
the history books -- though not necessarily a favorable one. In fact,
the last Army Chief of Staff to merit Clio's praise was General "Shy"
Meyer, who held the post twenty years ago. Since he left, the Army has
been stuck in a Brezhnevite "era of stagnation."
It is therefore surprising that at present, no one seems willing to take
the job, nor the position of Vice Chief. Both current incumbents leave
this summer, and instead of the usual line of hopefuls standing hat in
hand, the eligibles have headed for the hills. Rumor has it they may
have to recruit the hall porter and the charwoman.
The interesting question is why. Part of the answer is Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. To put it plainly, Rumsfeld treats people
like crap. Working for him is like working for Leona Helmsley, except
that Leona is less self-centered. Unless you are one of his sycophants,
equipped with a good set of knee-pads and plenty of lip balm, you can
expect to be booted down the stairs on a regular basis.
Truth be told, some senior officers deserve to be treated that way,
because that is how they always treated their subordinates. But Rummy
does not discriminate between perfumed princes and the real thinkers and
leaders. He has driven more than one of the latter to hang up his hat in
disgust, to his service's and the nation's loss.
But that is not the whole story. Part of the reason no one wants the
Army's top job are two fundamental contradictions in the
Administration's policy toward the Army. Unless they are resolved, any
Army Chief of Staff will find himself in a difficult position.
The first contradiction is that the Administration puts the Army last in
line among the services at the same time that it is getting us into wars
only the Army can fight. We are already fighting one Fourth Generation
war in Afghanistan, we are becoming enmired up to our necks in another
Fourth Generation war in Iraq, and we are sticking our noses into still
more in the Philippines, maybe Indonesia, and possibly Iran.
Only the Army can fight Fourth Generation war, to the degree anyone can
(and no one really knows how). The Navy is irrelevant, the Air Force
almost irrelevant, and the marines want to get in and get out, fast,
while Fourth Generation war plays itself out with agonizing slowness.
Volens nolens, the Army is left holding the bag.
Logically, that should make the Army the Administration's focus, its
Schwerpunkt. Instead, OSD is in love with the Air Force, to the point
where it wants to make the Army into a second Air Force, waging the
high-tech, video-game warfare that exists only in the minds of children
and Pentagon planners.
That leads to the second contradiction. The Army needs and has long
needed genuine military reform. Reform means such basic changes as
adopting Third Generation, maneuver warfare doctrine and the culture of
decentralization and initiative that goes with it; instituting a
radically different personnel system that creates cohesive units,
eliminates the bloat in the officer corps above the company grades and
suppresses rather than mandates careerism; making free play training the
norm rather than a rare exception; and getting rid of dual standards for
men and women.
Secretary Rumsfeld also preaches reform, but what he means by reform is
just more of the high-tech illusion. Again, the Air Force is the model:
the more a system costs and the more complex it is, the better it must
be. The result is absurdities such as the Stryker, where Light Armored
Vehicles, which are wonderful for operational maneuver, are instead to
be used for urban combat where they will be instant coffins for their
crews, and the Future Combat System, a conglomeration of robots, tanks,
drones and kitchen sinks that surpasses anything envisioned by Rube
Goldberg. Meanwhile, the real reforms so badly needed go unaddressed.
In the face of all this, becoming Chief of Staff of the Army is somewhat
less enticing than becoming mayor of Baghdad. But at the same time, it
leaves the troops desperately in need of not just a Chief of Staff, but
of a highly talented and morally courageous Chief of Staff, someone who
can defend his men against the follies emanating from the civilian side
of the Pentagon. Those who know him believe the current Vice Chief,
General John M. "Jack" Keane, is such a man. Some think he could be the
Army's Al Gray, the reforming Commandant of the marine corps of the
early 1990s who left an enduring and powerful legacy. So far, General
Keane is refusing the job, on the legitimate grounds of his wife's
health problems. Many are praying he will reconsider. If the job goes
instead to one of Rummy's lickspittles, God help our soldiers.
Willam S. Lind is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at
the Free Congress Foundation.
Lind's reasoning is that only the U.S. Army has the staying power to change peoples, governments and ideas for the better. He is correct. Remember it was the U.S. Army that won our freedom from the seapower/amphibious superior British Army in the first place. But most leaders in the U.S. Army don't act like they are the most important service to defend our nation's pre-eminence among nations and our survival. They are content to "stay-in-their-lanes" and gadgetize ground vehicles to hog up their budget share in the fashion that the AF, Navy and marines do bowing to the false god of "transformation". This is dishonest and out of synch with battlefield realities. Of all the services, the U.S. Army has to get RESULTS, not "spin" and "studies" but RESULTS. The best way to defend America from an Islamofascist ICBM or backpack nuke is not a multi-billion dollar anti-missile missile system but pre-emptive strikes on terrorists, overthrowing abusive governments and instituting peaceful civilian governments that are friendly and co-exist peacefully with western nations. Only the U.S. Army can do this job. However much of the futurist thinking in DoD is being done by USAF and others, when it should be lead by Army thinkers/visionaries. That Army leaders are not visionary is an indictment on the Army's blind obedience and egotistical existentialist culture itself. The solution is for the Army to get together decide what good values are and live up to them.
Details:
www.oocities.org/equipmentshop/usarmyethos.htm
WHO CONTROLS THE LOW-LEVEL AIR SPACE? MANPADS: 0, AIRCRAFT 1
One of the "boogie men" the USAF dominated RAND think tank futurists like to employ to iconoclast Airborne/Air Assault operations is the MAN Portable Air Defense Sysytem (MANPADS). As civilian wonks, often with good ideas they are frustrated with narrow-minded military men, and one of their favorite government-sponsored pastimes is trash the military icon/procedure.
They like to bash the heavy tank's immobility ignoring light tanks superior ground mobility and Army aircraft's slow speed/altitude parameters. RAND has currently polluted an entire generation of senior Army leaders into thinking 3D battle maneuver by Airborne/Air Assaults are too difficult and dangerous, resulting in an embrace of linear nudging up to the enemy behind imaginary forward lines of troops (FLOTs) created by massive firepower bombardments.
Fortunately for America and her Army, Afghanistan and Iraq required non-linear operations throughout the depth of the battlespace in 3 dimensions even if executed poorly by 2D minds.
However, for America's Army to fulfil her duty to the American people it needs to get a firm handle on 4GW start living up to the challenges to include fighting for MORE RESPONSIBILITY and "turf" from the other services who are neglecting these areas ie; USAF and CAS, marines and amphibious power projection.
In the following excerpt from Walt Shiel's "Cessna Warbirds" book. Please go to his web site and order his excellent book!
We find how the early MANPADS was inadequately countered by pilots having to manually deploy flares:
www.cessnawarbirds.com/book/excerpts/chapter10.shtml
INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES
About 1970, the NVA introduced the shoulder-fired, heat-seeking SA-7 Grail surface-to-air missiles into the war within South Vietnam. This significantly changed the nature of the close air support missions and necessitated some aircraft adaptations. The VNAF and USAF A-37B aircraft were modified with an infrared countermeasures (IRCM) system that allowed the pilot to dispense an MJU-3/B countermeasure flare from an underwing dispenser. To use the system, the Dragonfly had to use one or two of its external weapons stations (one could be hung on each wing), thus reducing the ordnance that could be delivered on a single sortie. The pilot had to select, via a cockpit switch, the dispenser on either the left or right wing and then press a button to release a flare once he had sighted an SA-7 launch. To preclude having to relinquish an external stores station for the IRCM system, an improved IRCM system was retrofitted into the aircraft in 1972, allowing release of up to 16 ALA-17 decoy flares from an ALE-20 flare dispenser mounted on the underside of the fuselage just aft of the trailing edge of the wing, replacing the KB-18 strike camera. The new system also provided the pilot with a "flares remaining" display.
Despite the implementation of the IRCM system in VNAF A-37B aircraft, the VNAF was unable to satisfactorily counter the SA-7 threat. A-37s continued flying ground attack sorties again tank and troop concentrations, but their effectiveness was dramatically decreased as the pilots raised their attack altitudes to ever higher altitudes.
Notice that today's IRCMs are automatic and very effective. The missiles themselves have a limited shelf-life before going “stale”. Adam Geibel of Strategypage.com reports:
July 19, 2003: A surface-to-air missile was fired at a C-130 landing at
Baghdad International Airport last week. The aircraft was not hit and was able to land safely, while troops are searching the area where the missile was believed to have been launched. Meanwhile, in southern Iraq the 1st marine expeditionary force discovered and destroyed eight SA-7 missileslocated in the Muhawil ammunition supply point. SA-7 'Strelas' have been found all over Iraq, so it's no wonder they haven't been used more. On June 21, an SA-7 was fired at a C-17 cargo plane as it was landing at Baghdad airport but detonated before it hit the plane. That same month, 70 to 80 missiles were discovered during a Coalition raid 150 kms northwest of Baghdad and in April, 50 more were discovered in a western cache.
The problem of terrorists wielding MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defense
Systems) is global. The Russians also reported on July 15th that at least eight 'Strela' shoulder-fired missile launchers were stolen from the Bolshiye Izhory naval arsenal, outside St. Petersburg. The exact figure will be announced after an investigation is completed, while the initial report didn't say when the theft took place or how thieves may have gained access to the weapons. Earlier reports said that only four of the missile launchers had been stolen.
In November 2002, two 'Strela' missiles just missed an Israeli charter
plane after it took off from Mombasa, Kenya, with 271 people on board. U.S. officials believe Al Qaeda launched the attack. Shoulder-fired missiles have been successfully used by Chechen rebels to shoot down Russian helicopters, including three that were shot down in 2002 around the main military air base near Grozny.
Israeli aviation officials are frustrated, since nothing has been done to decrease their planes' vulnerability since Prime Minister Ariel Sharon held a December 25, 2002 cabinet meeting on civil aviation security. A technological solution already exists, since the Israeli firm Elta Electronic Systems had developed and installed a system in a Boeing passenger plane. Israeli experts estimate that 1,000-2,000 passenger planes will have to be outfitted with such a protection system and the potential international market could involve 6,000-7,000 planes, including private jets. The system cost ranges from $500,000 to $3 million, meaning that the market could be worth $12 billion.
In Sri Lanka, three MI-17 helicopters carrying 90 Soldiers and 12 crew
members survived a missile attack on 12 November 1997. These missiles had been neutralized by an Elta anti-missile automatic system (AMAS) that had been installed in the helicopters. Elta was an Israeli pioneer in the development of missile detection radar systems for helicopters and this was the first report of the existence of such a system outside of Israel.
After analyzing the types of threats posed by shoulder-fired missiles and their characteristics, Israeli defense officials estimated that terrorist organizations could currently have between 4,000-10,000 missiles in their possession. However, 'Strelas' deteriorate over time and it's been over a decade since the Soviets were passing these out like candy, so how many remain viable is probably substantially less. Actually getting the 'Strela' to hit a target, even on a good day, is an interesting challenge for a trained operator (let alone an adrenaline-fueled amateur terrorist).
However, all it takes is one lucky shot or "golden BB" on a cargo plane
full of returning troops or a passenger liner full of tourists to
completely ruin one's day.
An Iraqi ADA analysis online at:
"Iraq War Note: Iraqi Air Defenses and the Battle of Baghdad"
The RANDsters sometimes with their own agendas conveniently pick and chose from past-war data to overthrow the common good. If the U.S. Army had OA-37Ds with state-of-the-art IRCMs as described in the last issue of AVJ, they would be able to provide effective MAS/CAS as this incident in Vietnam demonstrated:
Walt Shiel reports of a precision A-37B CAS mission:
When then-Major Fred McNeill served as an O-2 FAC in the Central Highlands of II Corps during 1972, he operated out of Pleiku into Cambodia, Laos, and even extreme southern North Vietnam. In the spring of 1972, he was tasked to direct an airstrike in support of an ARVN firebase on a mountain top northwest of Kontum. The ARVN had deployed a reconnaissance patrol, composed of about 100 ARVN troops and 20 U.S. Army advisors, along an extremely rocky and absolutely barren ridgeline that stretched south from the firebase. Once well away from their base, they began taking intense fire from an entire company of NVA regulars that were scaling the sides of the ridge from both directions. When McNeill received the orders for a dawn close air support mission, the only available tactical aircraft was a pair of A-37Bs from Bien Hoa Kontum was at the limit of their combat range. The squadron commander, Colonel Weed, and his wingman agreed to fly the mission, and McNeill asked them to bring all the napalm they could carry (about four 750-pound canisters). McNeill arrived in the target area at first light and contacted the pinned-down patrol. They were completely surrounded with no way to dig in or find cover on the rocky ridge. Casualties were already running to 30 percent and they were about to be overrun completely. The rules of engagement prohibited dropping napalm within 100 meters of friendly troops unless the troops were safely dug in. However, the patrol leader insisted that McNeill direct the napalm attackthey were going to die, anyway, if he did not. To be sure there was no misunderstanding or later recriminations, McNeill recorded the approval and the patrol leader's name on the tape recorder that was standard equipment on all combat aircraft in that war.
As the A-37s reported overhead and ready for the attack, with no excess fuel for subsequent attacks, McNeill briefed them carefully and told one of them to drop on the north side of the ridge and the other on the south side of the ridge. McNeill placed one marking rocket on each side of the ridge to mark the point where he wanted them to start laying down the napalm. He gave final attack directions to Colonel Weed and his wingman and then gave them a post-attack heading for a direct route to Pleiku, the nearest suitable airfield. The Army radio operator keyed his microphone to say something just as the napalm from the A-37s began to explode. As the initial explosions died out, McNeill could hear the troops whooping and holleringthe napalm had been laid precisely on target without hitting a single ARVN or U.S. Army Soldier. The NVA immediately broke contact and pulled back after loosing up to 300 of the own troops to the napalm. The A-37s zoomed away and took up their heading for Pleiku with their fuel state dwindling. When McNeill landed back at Pleiku, he discovered that Colonel Weed's wingman had ran out of fuel on the runway and had to be towed to a parking spot for refueling. That night in the Pleiku bar, neither of those Dragonfly pilots was able to buy his own beerevery Pleiku pilot was too impressed with their performance that day!
Notice the A-37 synergism with the O-2 AFAC….
Walt Shiel notes in another superb excerpt:
www.cessnawarbirds.com/book/excerpts/chapter11.shtml
RUNAWAY: A common practice for a rocket pass was to pull the nose up 30 degrees or so, kick in full rudder to swing the nose down toward the target, and cut the power to idle. Aim. Fire. Pull-up and add power. Sometimes, the governor on one of the propellers would malfunction and the propeller would accelerate to full RPM (a "runaway" prop). Proper corrective action is to throttle that engine back and attempt to reduce the RPM so that the governor would again control the RPM. If you did not reduce power, an engine failure could result. Then-Lieutenant Darrell Lambert, a FAC with the 23rd TASS at Nakhon Phanom (NKP), tells about coming off a rocket pass, adding full power, and having the front propeller run away. In front of him soared a typically craggy Laotian mountain. A power reduction did not seem appropriate since he needed to get some altitude fast. "That was the only time I ever jettisoned both rocket pods," he says. Once clear of the mountain (but just barely!), he reduced power on that front engine and got the propeller to recover.
FIRST TIME: Although the NVA used a variety of anti-aircraft artillery along the Trail, from 23mm to 100mm, Lambert remembers clearly the first time he was fired on by an NVA 37mm gun. He was flying with the right window open to listen for small arms fire down below waiting for his next set of fighters to arrive when he heard a pop-pop-pop and a whooshing noise. When he saw the red fireball hurtle past, he realized somebody was shooting at him. He could even smell the "putrid, phosphorous smell you'll never forget it once you've smelled it!" With his heart pounding, Lambert began to jink hard and "the stall warning horn is on because I can't get any more airspeed I had to stay at altitude." He says that was his first realization that the enemy was actually willing to kill him to keep him from calling in the fighters.
IF THERE IS A WILL THERE IS A WAY…
Combat pilot and visionary aircraft/ground force integrater, Charles "Chuck" Myers writes:
"If its worth doing, its worth doing right. If the mission is essential, many
believe it is, it should be funded at the expense of less worthy Army
projects (can you think of any). Only if its a properly funded project will it gain the support needed from the industry and their Congressional sponsors.
The mission demands a two place highly agile aircraft which can fly from dirt
and carry the appropriate mix of light ordnance. It is well described in my
MAS paper. Backing away from that won't help Army leadership sell the
program.
If we need to have a demo project to illustrate the utility for the less
perceptive folks, we could use A--37s. I wouldn't want to try with anything less capable (inspite of its side-by-side seating).
Chuck"
C.E. Myers, Jr.
Now notice what combat COIN aircraft are available on the open market:
Shiel's www.cessnawarbirds.com/forsale.shtml page reports:
*Colorado: Duff Aircraft is offering an O-2 in near-original configuration, including four pylons for rocket pods. (www.jwduffaircraft.com).
*Michigan: O-2A with combat history, full modern avionics, all military panel. 2-weapons pylons, licensed 'standard- normal,' IFR certified, TT-3800, FE-1600, RE-1200, excellent condition, 4 seats, annual due June '02. $84,500 firm. Also available with FLIR UMII surveillance system for $250K.
*Cessna Skymaster (0-2A Fighting Skymaster): M337-347 (337B), N102JD, 3100TT (Est), 224/224 SMOH Props & Engines, IFR, Garmin 340 Audio Panel, GNS430 with GPSS Interface to STEC 50 with Alt/Hold, KI-209, KI-208, MAC 1700 Nav-Com, King TPX/ENC, EI Digital EGTS, All Cylinders. Completely restored by military museum in GA, added 2 seats, demiled, gunsight intact, hard points on wings, original Vietnam paint scheme, flying weekly, airshow favorite. For information, contact Darrell McCalla at dpmccalla@compuserve.com .
*Ex-Brazilian Air Force T-37C project aircraft
*Restored A-37B offered for $675,000 plus another one offered as a project aircraft. (http://www.aircraft.com/listings/forsale/detail.asp?
guid=zi12l88e&pcid=1003581&etid=1&OHID=1039261 with photo)
[Walt's Note: Again, I think this one is overpriced when you consider the competition on the market.]
So what does this all mean?
Why couldn't the U.S. Army ON THE OPEN MARKET PURCHASE A SQUADRON OF OA-37 or O-2 TYPE OBSERVATION/ATTACK AIRCRAFT?
This Experimental Observation/Attack Squadron should after preparations be immediately sent to Iraq to provide ground maneuver air support (MAS). Modern IRCMs can defeat the increasingly weak MANPADS threat in a COIN arena. Many COIN observation/attack aircraft are available that can operate inexpensively and from short fields close to the troops in contact with the enemy on the ground. If done correctly, these aircraft would also have a role to play in major theatre wars (MTWs) against nation-states, also.
Buzzard Counter Insurgency/Multi-role aircraft.
By Phil West and Mike Sparks
www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/buzzard.html
Although an important role, the mission of counter-insurgency (COIN) air support is usually relegated to a mixture of civilian and training aircraft that are often less than ideal.
Air support of such operations falls into three categories:-
Airborne strike. Because insurgents often operate close to civilian populations or in areas of value such strikes need to me made with considerable precision to minimise collateral damage.
Reconnaissance/Observation. In this role it is an advantage if the aircraft can operate from forward landing strips and work in close co-ordination with the ground units they are supporting.
Transportation. Although one usually associates aircraft such as the C-130 with this role, there is also a requirement for smaller aircraft to insert tracking, OP or investigation teams, liaison duties and Casevac. Obviously the capability to land in poorly prepared areas is an advantage for such operations.
To meet all these requirements an aircraft should have the following characteristics:-
Speed -this provides both tactical and strategic mobility. It allows an aircraft to cover more ground, reach a destination in less time and makes it harder to shoot down once it gets there.
Survivability. The aircraft should be capable of withstanding attack from ground fire by a combination of armour, countermeasure systems and reduced signature. If damaged the aircraft should be easy to repair under field conditions.
Armament. Guerrilla targets are often fleeting, so the aircraft should be capable of delivering a decisive blow IMMEDIATELY with sufficient precision to minimize damage to surrounding areas and friendly troops.
Cargo capacity. The aircraft should be capable of carrying a useful load of weapons, stores or personnel.
Ability to operate from roughly prepared airfields, forward areas and be field maintainable. Aircraft might utilize tracked undercarriage systems
Although helicopters have proved very useful in the COIN mission, they cannot shoulder all of the burden due to their high cost and maintenance requirements. This is explained in more detail.
Excellent visibility with seat for a human observer.
The aircraft type we propose we call the "Buzzard."
The Buzzard is a high-wing monoplane capable of landing on an unprepared field and with a cabin capable of carrying several passengers, stretchers or a useful cargo. A small combat team of paratroopers should be able to jump from the aircraft without worry of static-line entanglement with props or tailfins.
At each end of the cabin is mounted a piston/turboprop engine, one driving a pusher propeller, the other a tractor propeller, possibly ducted to facilitate static-line parachute jumps. The tricycle undercarriage is retractable and the tail is supported by twin boons from the wing.
The plane will look like a enlarged version of the Cessna 337 Skymaster/O-2 Milirole, but with much more powerful engines and a Wren/Robinson STOL conversion kit to land/take-off from football field-sized short fields.
http://photovault.com/Link/Military/AirForce/Aircraft/O-2.html
Cessna Skymaster Performance
http://www.skymaster.org.uk/perform.asp
Information from owners manual
Gross Weight: 4000 lbs
191 mph Cruise, 75% power at 5500 feet 1070 miles, 128 gallons, no reserve 5.6hrs
191 mph Optimum range at 10,000 feet 985 miles, 92 gallons no reserve 6.8hrs
144 mph Optimum range at 10,000 feet 1370 miles, 128 gallons, no reserve 9.5hrs
Rate of climb at sea level
Twin engine 1250 fpm
Front engine only 335 fpm
Rear engine 415 fpm
Service ceiling Twin engine 20,000 feet
Front engine only 7500 feet
Rear engine only 9500 feet
Take-off Ground Run 845 feet total distance
over 50 feet obstacle 1490 feet
Landing Landing roll 590 feet
Landing roll over 50 feet obstacle 1500 feet
Stall speed flaps down, power off 66 mph
Empty weight (approximate) 2615 lbs
Baggage allowable 365lbs
Wing loading pounds/sq. ft. 21.4
Power loading pounds/hp 10.2
Fuel capacity Standard tanks 93 gallons
With optional auxiliary tanks 131 gallons
Oil capacity total 5 gallons
Proppellers (constant speed/full feathering 76" diameter Engines Two continental fuel-injected I0-360-C/D 210 rated BHP @ 2800 rpm
Note: Single service ceiling increases 400 feet for each 30 minutes of
fuel burn
HISTORY
http://www.skymaster.org.uk/his.asp
The first prototype Skymaster was a basic 4-seat, all-metal, high wing push-pull twin aircraft. The tricycle undercarriage was fixed and had two 175hp Continental GO-300-C geared engines. The prototype was registered N34273 and was given the construction number of 633 (Cessna Experimental Series) and first flew on 28 February 1961. It wasn't until August 1962 that the first production aircraft flew and mid-1963 before deliveries began. Production models of the 336 were different from the prototype by having IO-360 engines, an enlarged cabin to take 6 people, inboard wing sections were redesigned and the vertical tail surfaces were enlarged. TOGW was 3,900lbs. 195 production 336's were built and were given construction numbers of 336-0001 to 336-0195.
On 30th March 1964 the prototype of the 337 first flew, piloted by Dick Kember. Despite it looks being similar to the 336 it was a largely redesigned aircraft. The wing incidence angle was increased, the nose cowling was redesigned, the tail boom angle increased, a new dorsal air intake for the rear engine was added and the 337 had retractable undercarriage. This was the first model called the Super Skymaster. The word Super was dropped in 1972. The prototype was registered N5422E and had the construction number of 647. Production on the 337 started in February 1965. This model has a TOGW of 4200lbs and IO-360C engines. The cost of a new 337 would be around $39,950. A new construction number series was started for the 337. These basic models had construction numbers between 337-0001 and 337-0239.
In 1965, the USAF at Eglin AFB, FL, modified a 336 with four sets of hard points on the wings, and had a one time STC approved by the FAA. The serial number on that plane is 336-0026. It was used a proof of concept to see if the idea was feasable for the 337's to be used as FAC aircraft. The Cessna model 305's (Birdogs) were getting hammered in South East Asia and North American Aviation Bronco's were late in getting into production, so the Air Force was scrambling to find a stop gap aircraft that had the range, load carrying and had multiengine reliability to supersede the birdogs. This 336 eventually became N331KW. At one time it was owned by a Belize national who is now living in the USA. He repainted the aircraft in false Belize Air Force markings and pained on a false registration of V3-1KW. Someone from the British magazine 'Airforces Monthly' saw this aircraft and it was announced in the magazine that the Belize Air Force had an ex-USAF O-2! Even today there is a mention of this aircraft under the Belize Air Force heading in 'Air Forces of the World' and other military reference guides, despite the fact that he has now sold the aircraft and it is now back carrying its true identity (ie N331KW).
In 1966 the 337A was produced. This had minor changes to the standard 337 and construction numbers in the range 337-0240 and 337-0525. There were 286 of them built.
1967 saw the 337B. TOGW was increased to 4,300lbs and there was an optional belly cargo pack. A further option on this aircraft was a turbocharged 210hp TSIO-360-A engines. The price for a T337B in 1967 was $49,500. Construction numbers for the 337B and T337B went from 337-0526 to 337-0755 and there were 230 of them built.
1967 also saw the building of a reduced scale version of the 337. This was known as the 327. Only one aircraft was built and first flew on 4 December 1967. It was registered N3769C and had a construction number of 663 (Cessna Experimental Series). This aircraft later went to NASA as a 'full scale wind tunnel research unit'.
In 1967 the USAF placed an order for Skymasters. The military designation for theses aircraft was O-2A. They had their own construction number sequence starting at M0001. The USAF also took 32 aircraft from the civil production lines. These retained their civil construction numbers and were fitted with loud-speakers and leaflet dispensers for psychological warfare duties. They were also different from the O-2A's by not having hard-points under the wings.
The main differences between the 337 and the O-2 included the removal of the cabin step and spinners on the propellers, addition of observation windows in the cabin door and roof of the cabin. Engine fire detection equipment were added together with smoke generator equipment added to the rear exhaust system. The instrument panels were also different and they had an armament switches panel installed. Four underwing pylons for rockets, flares and cluster bombs. Amour plates were installed under the seats and porous foam slabs were place in the fuel tanks during assembly to make them explosion-resister after being hit by small arms fire. This resulted in about a 5% loss in fuel capacity.
The 337C came in 1968 with a new instrument panel and 4,400lb TOGW (4,500lb on T337C)
Minor changes were made in 1969 to produce the 337D. Construction numbers in the range 337-0979 to 337-01193 with a total of 215 built.
Cambered wing tips plus other minor changes came on the 1970 337E. T337E's has a TOGW of 4,600lbs, construction numbers between 337-01194 and 337-01316 and a total of 123 built.
The 337E was the first Skymaster model to be re-built in France by Reims Aviation. Reims Aviation started life as Avions Max Holste in 1933. Due to financial stresses Cessna acquired a 49% shareholding on 16th February 1960. Reims started building Cessna aircraft from kits supplied from the USA for the European and Middle Eastern markets. Skymasters re-built by Reims have both Cessna and Reims Construction numbers.
The 1971/2 337F model had 4,630lbs TOGW for both non-turbo and Turbo models. Construction numbers of 337-01317 to 337-01462 were on these 146 aircraft.
In 1973 the 337G emerged. This had split airstair entry door, smaller rear side windows, improved flaps, larger front propeller, modified wing struts and Cont. IO-360-G engines. Production of this model continued until 1977 by which time 353 had been built with construction numbers in the range 337-01463 to 337-01815.
A Turbo charged version of the 337G was produced in 1974. This model also had a pressurised cabin and redesigned windshield. A new construction number sequence was started for these aircraft.
Between 1978 and 1980 the 337H models were produced in three forms ie 337H (normal) T337H (Turbo) and P337H (Pressurised cabin). Cost for these aircraft were $124,090 for the standard model and $140,890 for the turbo model.
Production of the Skymaster by Cessna finished in 1980. However Reims Aviation of France was assigned world-wide marketing rights to the aircraft, and as a result they built (from scratch) a further 61 aircraft, which it called the Reims FTB337 Minirole. Most of these aircraft went to military operator in Europe and Africa. The Portuguese Air Force taking the most.
Even with production of the Skymaster finished that is not the end of the story. A modification to the pressurised 337's was first undertaken by Riley. This modification consisted of adding a Riley intercooler to pump cooler air from the turbochargers into the aircraft's engines that greatly improved the aircraft's performance. STOL modifications to the wings, air conditioning, comprehensive avionics package, new paint scheme and a custom interior were also part of the deal. This 'new' aircraft was dubbed the Riley Skyrocket. Riley also tried to launch the Super Skyrocket but unfortunately, went out of business before FAA approval came forth for this new modification. However, LLC of Carlsbad, California has now obtained the necessary approval and is now modifying P337's. This modification consists on installing two turbocharged 310hp Continental TSIO 520 engines, with intercoolers.
Certain helicopter turbines have been used to power light aircraft, and these may prove appropriate for this aircraft, simplifying spare parts supply.
Body construction could be of canvas and dope, in the manner of the Hawker Hurricane, to allow for easy repairs.
The floor of the cabin would be armoured and the aircraft would mount IRCM and IR suppression systems. The exhaust from the forward engine could be ducted along the interior of the booms to cool it.
The aircraft would mount aiming systems compatible with missile systems like TOW, HOT and Hellfire. The use of such stand off guided weapons would be preferable to free fall ordinance in many cases.
The use of two engines gives redundancy against damage and also allows a heavier weapon load to be carried. Given that this configuration gives two engines with only the frontal drag of one, a speed of at least 400 mph would be not unreasonable to expect.
The same layout was used on the WWII Dornier 335 Pfeil, which with two 1800hp engines and a weight of 7,260-10,000kg could reach 474mph/763kph.
www.aeroflight.co.uk/profile/d335top.htm
This high speed potential of the design enhances both the aircraft's strategic and tactical potential. In other words, it takes less time to reach a fight and is harder to shoot down when it gets there.
The aircraft will be equipped with numerous wing and centerline hardpoints but should also have a built in gun armament. This may be constructed as a pair of packs that fit into the origin of the tail boons.
An configuration of two 20mm cannon and four 7.62mm medium machine guns (MMGs) has been suggested, giving an armament equal to the Argentine Pucara. Alternative configurations include four .50 caliber heavy MGs; two 30mm cannon and two 7.62mm MMGs; six 7.62mm MMGs or two 7.62mm Miniguns.
A flexible machinegun mount can be mounted in the cabin and this could be stabilized for precision fire at ground targets when collateral damage needs to be minimized.
Provision to fit pontoons or skis should be included, as should be the capability to fit a pod mounted radar for maritime patrol missions.
The versatility of the Buzzard offers some interesting possibilities. An aircraft could provide support fire to a ground unit with missiles, bombs, rockets and gunfire. Once the action is completed the Buzzard could land on a suitable nearby area and pick up wounded for high speed Casevac.
Other ideas.
Black Widow II
Phil's friend Ed suggests that there should also be a larger fuselaged brother to the Buzzard.
Like the Buzzard, it would incorporate built in defensive and offensive equipment and twin tail boons. Ed suggests mounting the engines at the front of the tail booms in the manner of the P-61 Black Widow - we've suggested a Pushme-pullme engine pod above the wings. In either case this allows nose mounted armament and rear cargo doors.
Another thing this allows for is a flying boat hull, making this a true amphibian without the need of a pontoon kit.
Note. since this idea was first discussed the name "Black Widow II" has been adopted for the YF-23. The concept of a bigger brother to the Buzzard is still valid, though currently unnamed!
Another possible "Bigger Buzzard" is the OV-12 modification of the C-12 proposed by co-author Mike Sparks in one of his KillerBees articles.
Nightowl.
During the Vietnam war a series of observation aircraft were developed with features that reduced their acoustic (sound) signature. These were known as the QT-1, QT-2, Q-Star and YO-3A.
While we feel the Buzzard would benefit from incorporating some of these design features, I also see a role for a dedicated night patrol aircraft. This will have many of the design features of the Buzzard, but will probably be a strike and observation aircraft and not have a transport role. It is possible this will be a four-seater aircraft (pilot, co-pilot and two sensor specialists).
http://www.thehistorynet.com/AviationHistory/articles/07962_cover.htm
A useful candidate for the NightOwl might be an adapted OV-1 Mohawk. This surveillance and attack aircraft is already noted for its quietness (Viet Cong called it the "Whispering death"). With muffled engines, longer wings and redesigned propellers this may be improved on further.
http://www.ov-1mohawk.org/
STOL transport
There is also an obvious requirement for a larger transport aircraft with rough field STOL capabilities. In certain situations there may be a requirement for an aircraft to land in hostile territory, deploy or recover personnel and quickly take off. Useful features would include:-
The ability to land using braking chutes and to take off with Rocket assistance.
The ability to transport light vehicles, a platoon of infantry or a smaller number of paratroopers.
Engines designed for low noise and low infra-red signature.
A rear ramp or door that can be opened in flight.
A night vision system for the pilot for night-time landings.
A variety of undercarriage systems to suit differing terrain types.
Flexibly mounted armament that can be used to defend the aircraft when on the ground.
An aircraft that comes close to meeting these requirements is the Israeli Arava.
http://www.oocities.org/CapeCanaveral/Hangar/2848/arava.htm
http://www.airwar.ru/enc_e/craft/iai201.html
http://www.papermodels.co.il/AravaMstr.htm
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Middle_East/Israel_Guatemala.html
The Arava's capability to mount armament has also seen it used in a Gunship role in the manner of the AC-47 Spooky. The Arava uses .50 BHMGs. Alternate armaments include 7.62mm mini-guns and Automatic Grenade launchers.
A likely aircraft to be adapted to the above configuration is the C-23 Sherpa in service with the National Guard
C-23 Sherpa
AN-2
The An-2 may also see COIN applications, at least as a transport.
http://www.samolet.co.uk/an-2.html
http://www.warbirdalley.com/an2.htm
http://www.seqair.com/Other/UnFalco/UnFalco.html
The Cessna U-27
The very large Cessna U-27 Model 209 turboprop can carry over a ton of payload, land on short fields, carry armaments and drop paratroopers.
COIN Fighter.
Although the main need for aircraft in a COIN campaigns will be for versatile air platforms such as the Buzzard, there may still be a requirement for dedicated strike aircraft. This role is often taken by attack variants of jet trainers, but many of these aircraft require a prepared field to operate from.
It is possible that a turboprop aircraft, similar to a World War 2 fighter may prove a better alternative to the requirement of a low cost, high performance close support aircraft.
We're tempted to suggest something like the P-51 Mustang, though an aircraft with the cloth and dope construction of the Hurricane may be more appropriate. Interestingly, P-51s were being used in this role by some airforces at least as recently as the mid-sixties. An updated model was the Piper PA-48 Enforcer
http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/p51_14.html
http://www.hotel.wineasy.se/ipms/stuff_eng_p51late.htm
http://www.p-51mustangs-aliveandwell.com/P51Who/123.shtml
http://www.unrealaircraft.com/hybrid/f82_mustang.php
A modern aircraft would need to add features such as modern defensive systems and ejector seats.
A likely candidate for such an attack aircraft might be based on the Raytheon T6 Texan II.
The Cessna T-37C and A-37 can operate from short, dirt fields via their ingenious inlet covers and may also be used in a COIN role.
A-37 at www.combataircraft.com
A-37 at Warbird Alley.
A-37 Association.
There is a good case for re-introducing the A-37 as a close support/observation aircraft. Co-author Phil Wests’s personal suggestion is that the nose 7.62mm Mini-gun be replaced by a vision and designation system rather like the TADS of the AH-64. For gun armament the aircraft would carry one or more pods with either Gecal .50 Gatlings or a 30x113mm cannon such as the M230 could be carried. Main armament would be 2.75” (Hydra 70mm) FFAR pods and missiles, including Starstreak missiles for a dual ground attack and self defence role.
Several people who have read this article in G2mil have suggested re-introduction of the A-1 Skyraider. We've heard of worse ideas, but would suggest that maybe a modern version of the Dornier 335 Pfeil that shares components with the Buzzard would be a good idea. Like the Pfeil this version would have an internal weapons bay. In more conventional wars such an aircraft could serve as escort to large formations of helicopters.
Ref.
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/5spr91.html
Rhodesian COIN tactics with combined force of parachute and helicopter landed infantry and fixed and rotary wing attack aircraft. The aircraft refered to as "Lynxes" are in fact Cessna 337s.
http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/fire_force__part_one.htm
http://members.tripod.com/selousscouts/fire_force__part_two.htm
Other Support Aircraft Ideas.
The Groundhog
TECHNOTACTICAL
The following HILLINT report reveals how America's stocks of missiles are getting low and its time to restock perhaps with a common missile.
--AVJ STAFF
JOINT AVIATION COMMON MODULAR MISSILE
Initial Capabilities Document
Joint Staff has issued an ICD for a replacement for HELLFIRE and
Maverick missiles.
1. Joint Functional Area
The ICD addresses current shortcomings in Joint Force Application and
Joint Future Logistics.
Maverick no longer in current production and has more urgent need of
replacement, unless USMC air anti-tank capabilities are allowed to
degrade.
Timeframe: 2008-2012 with future possible growth
2. Required Capability
The ICD addresses the capability for precision engagement of high
value,
fixed and moving targets, from Joint manned and unmanned aerial
platforms.
Capabilities required to accomplish the swift engagement and
destruction
of targets as well as the increased scope of targets include improved
firing platform survivability, increased range and accuracy, better
functionality against countermeasures, upgraded warheads, combined
LOS/BLOS lethality, active and passive engagement capabilities to
exploit countermeasures and engage targets under cover or concealments
and multi-platform capability.
Attributes required
a. Man-in-the-loop
b. Ability to strike time critical targets
c. Desired effects
* Both LOS and BLOS lethality
* Both active and passive engagement capabilities
* Small/light enough to provide sufficient stowed kills without
degrading aircraft performance
* Accommodate insertion of technology
3. Concept of Operations Summary
Alternative concept is to develop either a completely common missile,
or
a significantly smaller set of missiles that support current and future
requirements and comprised of a family of sensor, guidance, warhead and
propulsion modules.
4. Capability Gap
a. Reduce the large tooth-to-tail ratio
* Issue forms the basis for several Combatant Commanders IPL
requirements.
* Congressional direction to seek a common approach to reduce the
number of different types of tank killing systems.
* JROC direction to continue to pursue a Common Modular Missile
capability.
b. Complete commonality is the highest objective.
* Modular solutions are second-tier preference. Most desirable
concept for modularity is an in-theater support capability similar to
that now used to create mission-specific bombs aboard aircraft
carriers.
* Least desirable option is to introduce modularity on the
production line.
c. Over-riding concept that missile be "transparent" to the firing
platform - that they require no upgrades to the platform launch, sensor
or guidance mechanisms.
d. Current missiles identified for this capability are currently in a
"hot"
production base, except for Maverick which supports fixed-wing
capability on USMC and USN F-18 and A-10 and F-16 aircraft. The Army
HELLFIRE currently used on Army rotary-wing platforms and USAF/CIA
Armed Predator UAVs. HELLFIRE needs new countermeasure upgrades and has an aging stockpile, so this forms the basis for fielding a new capability between 2008 and 2012.
e. Required distance and obstacles to the program
Platform carrying capability and platforms expected usage range
(sensor
based) are the key obstacles to be overcome and are the factors that
make it most likely that this or any common missile will actually be
comprised of a series of available modules with mission-specific
packages. As a minimum, a new system should not reduce any platform's
stand-off capability below that which it now has with its current
munitions.
f. Required Scale
Shall as a minimum replace two existing missiles.
5. Threat/Operational Environment
a. Increasingly sophisticated opponents
b. Threat to be Countered
Total denial of U.S. access is unlikely.
Potential adversaries will avoid U.S. strengths and exploit U.S.
vulnerabilities; resulting in enemy avoiding massed formations, smaller
dispersed formations, operating from dispersed and decentralized
positions and using cover, concealment, camouflage, decoys, deception
and adverse weather to complicate U.S. advantages in targeting and
stand-off weapons delivery.
Threat environment will include mobile anti-aircraft artillery,
integrated gun and missile air defense systems, anti-tank guided
missile
(ATGM) platforms and armored vehicles equipped with active protection
systems, defensive aids suites and tube-fired anti-helicopter munitions
concealed and dispersed in complex urban terrain.
6. Functional Solution Analysis Summary
a. DOTMLFP Analysis
Reliance on off-board systems as an alternative to continued reliance
on
air-launched PGM's was rejected
* Organizational changes do not overcome the capability gap.
* Training and education of aircrews cannot address the targeting,
lethal effects or range shortcomings.
* Leader and education do not overcome the capability gap.
* Personnel changes do not overcome the capability gap.
* Facilities changes do not address the capability gap.
b. Ideas for material approaches
Divergent, material solutions (beyond a precision guided munition) were
not examined.
* A 6-inch diameter Common Missile: Effort to examine the
potential
conducted between May 2000 and May 2002.
This alternative was rejected.
* Product improvement to existing AGM-115 HELLFIRE. Could be
fitted
with new seeker, new warhead, new propulsion, new missile body. Would
essentially result in an entirely new missile.
* Product improvement to existing AGM-65 Maverick. Won't fit the
Comanche internal weapons bay, limited to 117 lb maximum. Maverick
weighs 462 lbs to 804 lbs depending on configuration.
c. Analysis of Material Approaches (AMA)
None of the alternative materiel approaches considered addressed all
aspects of the capability gaps.
7. Final Materiel Recommendations
a. The best materiel solution, recommended to close the capability gap
described in this ICD, is an evolutionary acquisition approach that
will
eventually significantly reduce the quantities and number of types of
anti-armor missiles in the inventory. The initial increment to be
developed is a new, precision guided missile that would support the
current requirements for HELLFIRE and Maverick platforms.
b. Unit production cost of less than $110,000 in FY03 constant dollars.
Next Stop: Analysis of Alternatives.
REPORT FROM HILLINT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
HILLINT is drawn from open sources. HILLINT may be reproduced in whole
or in part without further permission with proper credit given.
HILLINT is archived at www.egroups.com/group/hillint
GET INVOLVED!
You can sign the General Gavin petition if you haven't already done so to name the M113 after its creator:
General James M. Gavin Petition
Next, you can write your Senator/Congressmen and insist that the Army's last two Brigade combat teams are TRACKED so they are COMBAT capable and safe for our men to operate from. Particularly focus in on Senators Ted Stevens, Mary Landrieu and Inouye who seem only concerned with getting local "PORK" for their voters. Inform them they can have a IBCT in their state, but it must be composed of TRACKED COMBAT capable vehicles not rubber-tired Lav3Stryker deathtraps.
In the same or better other letter, urge Congress to mandate that the U.S. Army have a fixed-wing, manned observation/attack capability beginning with transfer of ownership of O-2s and A-37s at Davis-Monthan AFB and all technical information now stored at Hill AFB.
In light of the recent guerrilla warfare in Iraq, U.S. Army Aviation Digest suggests reading:
Issues Hamper Air
Support of Ground Forces (pdf) - May 2003 GAO report
Return to Main Page, click here
Staff, U.S. Army/Air Force Aviation Journal
|
WHAT CAN YOU DO ABOUT THE CURRENT MESS?
