In its eagerness to cause damage to Ethiopia, Eritrea has poured a substantial amount of weaponry and sent its military trainers into Somalia. This intervention is going to backfire and Eritrea will only earn itself a new set of enemies for its efforts.

Eritrea’s efforts are counterproductive because it has allied itself with the two Mogadishu warlords (Hussein Aideed Jr. and Ali Mahdi Mohammed) that are widely regarded as the main obstacles to peace in Somalia. A recent laughable article in the Eritrean government-owned paper “Eritrea Profile” quoted extensively from Aideed and gave the impression that he headed the national leadership of Somalia.

But the reality is quite different. To review, there are three main political forces in Somalia:

1. The Islamists: – The Islamists are pan-Somali. Their goal is an Islamic republic in Somalia. However, they have gradually lost their main bases in Somalia, and now control only limited areas.

2. The Mogadishu-Centered Warlords: - Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi. Both are from the Hawiye clan, but represent different subclans. Each insists that he is the president of all Somalia. They are dependent on outside finance, and ambitious to expand territory and control other clans. However, they have failed to unite even the Hawiye, and they both face rebellions from their former deputies: Osman Atto and Musa Sude Yallahow.

3. The Regionalists – These are also largely clan based, but they do not seek to expand out of their home regions - (eg. Somaliland, Puntland). None of these leaders claim to be president of all of Somalia. Although the Somaliland government has declared independence from Somalia, the remaining regions are committed to reforming the Somali state on a federalist basis.

Of course, the overriding factor in current Somali politics is clan affiliation, but the regionalist approach aims to reduce interclan rivalry. The regional administrations, although largely clan-based, are careful to provide representation for minority clans. For example, Somaliland, although largely inhabited by Isaq, derives its legitimacy from a democratic founding congress where other smaller clans such as the Gadabursi were represented, and where the elders from virtually all clans supported the creation of Somaliland.

Eritrea (with Libyan backing) has now injected itself into Somalia and chosen the primary warlord in the country (Hussein Aideed) as its ally. Its goal is simple – create as much destruction in Ethiopia via Somalia as possible and force Ethiopia to divert resources away from the main front.

But in the process of strengthening Aideed, Eritrea helps to endanger the fragile peace established by the regionalists in places such as Boosaso and Hargeisa. In addition, Eritrea has helped to crush the planned regional administration of Jubbaland, which was to be centered at Kismayu, and almost crushed the regional Rahanwein organization in the Bay and Bakool regions (centered at Baidoa).

Unfortunately for Eritrea though, the people of Somalia are fed up with war and destruction. They have already started a process of rebuilding their nation from the grassroots. The democratic deliberations of Boorama and Garowe, which gave birth to the regional administrations of Somaliland and Puntland, are an example to the rest of the country.

In fact, these constitutional conferences, which firmly place the legitimacy of the government in the hands of the people, are a revolutionary mode of state formation. There is much talk about developing indigenous African democracy, but it is only in northeast Somalia that we have witnessed this in action. Without external support and with very little media attention, these emergent regional states have achieved a level of peace and empowerment of society that is in sharp contrast to the picture in Mogadishu.

In Mogadishu, Aideed boasts that he has spent several million dollars renovating the Presidential mansion as a monument to the centralized top-down administration he intends to create with funding from Libya and Egypt. Meanwhile chaos reigns supreme; murderous killing sprees by one militia or another are commonplace. The breakdown of order is so complete that Ali Mahdi’s own bodyguards looted his residence recently.

The recurrent chaos in Mogadishu indicates that the factions of Aideed and Ali Mahdi lack the necessary principles of tolerance and cooperation, and are simply intent on re-establishing a Mogadishu-centered national administration under their personal leadership. Both Aideed and Ali Mahdi emphasize external financial support as being key to their goals. Their semblance of centralization and claims to be the national leaders of Somalia, affords them access to funds from Libya and Egypt.

Ethiopia’s allies are largely from the regionalist group. Ethiopia has very good relations with the regional administrations of Puntland and Somaliland. These are the most stable and hopeful areas in Somalia and offer a vision of a new future. In addition Ethiopia has good relations with the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) which aims to create a regional administration in Bay and Bakool areas centered on Baidoa.

Aideed’s father had occupied Baidoa in 1992 after the fall of Siad Barre. By all accounts this occupation turned into a seven year persecution of the local Rahanwein inhabitants. The recent liberation of Baidoa by the RRA may mark a positive turning point in the Somali civil war. (See Reuters article of July 7, 1999: Latest fighting in Somalia may set ground for peace)

CONCLUSION
For the sake of tying up some 3,000 Ethiopian troops, Eritrea is willing to spread chaos in Somalia. And yet its plans have backfired and the international community is realizing what a negative and cynical role Eritrea is playing in the region. Eritrea’s “more chaos for Somalia!” strategy is a failure.

Background on the Bay and Bakool Region (capital: Baidoa) and the RRA

From: BUILDING PEACE FROM BELOW? A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE DISTRICT COUNCILS IN THE BAY AND BAKOOL REGIONS OF SOUTHERN SOMALIA.