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US Commission on International Religious Freedom
Hearing on Indonesia, February 13, 2001
Testimony by Paul Gardner
I have been requested to provide an overview of where Indonesia is heading and possible United States contributions to solving its problems. Fortunately Indonesia now has a president whose commitment to religious and ethnic tolerance is unquestioned. A Moslem cleric, President Abdurrahman Wahid (known as Gus Dur) has reached out to all segments of the nation. His more recent acts include official recognition of Confucianism and permitting the Chinese population to celebrate their New Year for the first time in many decades. His attitude toward Christianity can be seen in a joke he tells of a Moslem cleric whose youngest son converted to Christianity. The cleric prays for forgiveness and guidance and God replies "relax, my only son became a Christian."
Gus Dur has not, however, received good marks in governance. Some Indonesians say he runs the government like a perpetual talk show, often repeating rumors that alienate potential supporters. He is also said to conduct the presidency's finances much as he did those of his traditionalist Moslem boarding school, personally soliciting funds for projects of his choosing. Although this practice seems not to involve personal enrichment, a large parliamentary majority considered it a violation of his oath of office and of the People's Consultative Assembly's enactments regarding corruption. It is unclear at this stage whether this could eventually lead to an impeachment effort. In any event, political emotions will likely remain high in coming months and could affect Indonesian reactions to an American response to the Maluku problem.
Gus Dur assigned Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose party contains many Christians, to explore solutions for the Maluku problem while he concentrated on the Aceh violence. Megawati has visited Maluku but has yet to advance a peace plan, admittedly not a simple task. Perhaps the government's most serious failing was its slow reaction to a plan by a Javanese extremist Moslem group to send a force of "holy warriors" to Maluku, where they reportedly inflicted a significant number of Christian casualties. While Gus Dur strongly opposed this group's plan, another high ranking official appeared to give it initial support, and a sizeable force was under way before the navy established the blockade now in effect.
Indonesia's respected former foreign minister Ali Alatas during a recent visit here noted that Indonesians believe Americans focus primarily on conflicts in which Christians are the casualties, ignoring those with predominantly Moslem victims. The latter include Aceh, where the largely Moslem army and its Moslem allies are fighting other Moslems, West Kalimantan, where Dayak Christians allied with local Malay Moslems levied huge casualties on Madurese Moslem migrant farmers, in Poso, Sulawesi, where reportedly some 300 Moslem migrants were slain by Christians, and most recently in Irian Jaya (West Papua) where predominantly Christian Irianese attacked predominantly Moslem migrants. The Suharto government's transmigration program seems to have been one of the underlying causes of these disturbances. It has been wisely abandoned by the current government. In Indonesia's past, when the economy has collapsed and central government authority has weakened, access to limited resources has aroused what Indonesia's great humanist Soedjatmoko called survival instincts in otherwise peaceful peoples. Religious and ethnic intolerance has, of course, played a central role in these events, but it has been magnified by economic fears. An American demarche which attributed this tragedy solely to religious intolerance would probably not achieve its purpose.
We must also take into account that our nation carries some historical baggage, of which few Americans but almost all Indonesians are aware. In the late 1950's our government clandestinely supported a rebellion aimed at separating islands with a substantial number of Christians from the rest of Indonesia. This intervention created what can be described as antibodies to American interference which can be aroused by the simple passage of the Seventh Fleet into the South China sea. It may seem ridiculous to us, but many Indonesians suspect we wish to see Maluku separated from Indonesia.
Finally, we should note the possibility that, in the present political uncertainty, the tone and style of our reaction to the Maluku problem could be as important as the substance. A cultural difference is involved. We are quite open in expressing criticism while Indonesians in general and the Javanese in particular are taught to be indirect when criticizing friends. There are some politicians who might choose to interpret our words not as frank and friendly criticism but as an arrogant effort to humiliate their nation. Standing up to perceived American "arrogance" can be an effective political tool in the current Indonesian political arena.
Responding to humanitarian needs is perhaps the best contribution we can make to the current crisis. We should insure a delivery method that would not appear to distinguish between faiths. Indonesia's National Commission for Human Rights recently recommended that the government form a national peacekeeping mission for Maluku composed of police and military personnel who had undergone training in mediation. Since neither the police nor the army seem to have much expertise in this area and both have a record of human right abuses, we might also suggest Indonesia seek the advice and help of a non-government, non-religious organization with proven expertise in conflict resolution such as the World Council on Religion and Peace.
Indonesia badly needs a truly professional, apolitical, impartial, disciplined, and human rights oriented internal security force. Neither the police nor the army now adequately meet these criteria and have at times been more a part of the problem than of the solution. Financial factors contribute to this state of affairs. The budget provides only about 20% of the army's needs. The army can fill this gap with its extensive informal resources but these funds tend to remain at the top. Generals and field grade officers live well while troops in the field must often support a family with only the equivalent of $5 a day. They are therefore tempted to sell their services or weapons and have done so in Maluku. We should support World Bank efforts to persuade the Indonesian armed forces to place all income sources on budget. There are reformists within the armed services, but they have not yet attained the critical mass to make a difference. We might consult with Australia and other allies having direct relations with Indonesian armed forces on ways to encourage reform within the military. The United States government has a small training program for the Indonesian police which might be expanded. Our government might also consider initiating a direct dialogue with the army tightly geared to progress on reform.
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