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        Some truths about God exceed the capacity of  our human reason. An example of this is the truth that God is three person in one. But there are some truths that reason by its very nature is also able to discover. Example of these are the truths that God exists, that there is only one God, and similar truths. In fact, these truths about God have have been proved by several philosophers who have relied completely on the light of their natural reason.
        That God exists can be proved in five ways.
        The first and clearest way is the argument from motion. It is certain and evident to our senses that some things in the world are in motion. Now is something is moved, it must be moved by something else......For nothing can change from from being potentially in motion to being in a state of actual movement unless something else that is in actual movement acts on it......So whatever is moving must be moved by something else. Now if that by which it is moved is itself moving, then it, too, must be move by something else, and that by something else again. But this cannot go on to infinity because then there would be no first mover. And if there were no first mover, then nothing would move since each subsequent mover will move to the extent that it is moved by the motion imparted by the first mover. The [other] parts of a staff, for example, will move only to the extent that the [top of the] staff is move by the hand. Therefore, there must be a first mover that is not moved. And this first unmoved mover is what we mean by God.
        The second way is based on the nature of efficient causes. In the world we see around us, there are ordered lines of efficient causes [in which each member of the line produces the next member]. But nothing can be its own efficient cause, since then it would have to exist prior to itself and this is impossible. Now it is not possible for a line of efficient causes to extend to infinity. For in any line of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediate ones, and the intermediate ones cause the last one. Now if we remove any of the causes, we remove all the remaining effects. So if there were no first cause then there would be no last cause nor any intermediate ones. But if a line of efficient causes extended back to infinity, then we would find no first cause. Consequently, if the line of causes extended back to infinity, there would be no intermediate causes nor any last causes in existence in the universe. But we know this is false. So it is necessary to admit that there is a force efficient cause. And this we call God.
        The third way is based on contingency and necessity. It proceeds as follows. We find in nature things that are contingent. These are thing that are generated and that can corrupt, and which therefore can exist or can cease to exist. Now it is impossible for such contingent things to exist forever. For if it is possible for something to cease existing, then eventually a moment will come when it will cease to exist. Therefore, if everything were contingent, then eventually everything would have cease existing. If this happened, then even now nothing would exist, because something can start to exist only through the action of something that already exists. It follows that not everything is contingent, that is, something must exist necessarily, that is, forever. Now every necessary thing is cause to exist forever either by something else or not by anything else. But as we prove above, it is impossible for a line of causes to be infinite. So there must exist something which derives its necessary existence from itself and not from something else, and which causes the existence of all other necessary beings. This is what we all mean by God.
        The forth way is based on the degree of perfection that we find in things. Among the objects in our world some are more and some less good, true, noble, and the like. But to say that a thing has more or less of a certain perfection is to say that it resembles to a greater or lesser degree something which perfectly exemplifies that perfection......So there must be something which is more perfectly true, most perfectly good, most perfectly noble, and, consequently, which most perfectly exists (since, as Aristotle shows, those things that are perfectly true also exist perfectly). Now that which most perfectly exemplifies some quality, also causes other things to have the quality to a greater or lesser degree. Fire, for example, which most perfectly exemplifies the quality of heat, is the cause of the heat in hot things. Therefore, there must be something which is the cause of the being, goodness, and every other perfection in things. And this we call God.
        The fifth way of proving God's existence is based on the order of the universe. We see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural objects, act for an end. That is, their activity is always or nearly always aimed at achieving the best result. It is clear, therefore, that their activity is not produced by chance but by design. Now things which lack knowledge cannot move unerringly toward an end unless they are directed toward that end by some being that has knowledge and intelligent much like an arrow is directed toward its target by an archer. Therefore there must exist an intelligent Being Who directs all natural things toward their respective ends. This Being we call God.
        It is impossible for a word to be applied univocally to both God and the creatures he produces. For when an effect is not equal to the power of the cause that produced it, the effect receives only an imperfect likeness of the cause: that is, the effect will be like the cause only to an imperfect degree......Thus, when the word "wise" is applied to human beings, the word in a way comprehends and include in its meaning the thing to which it refers [i.e. imperfect wisdom as we experience it and as God produced it.] But this is not so when the word is applied to God. For when the word "wise" is applied to God it refers to something [perfect wisdom] that exceeds the meaning of the word and which is not comprehended.
        Neither can we say that words that are applied to God and creatures have a purely equivocal sense, although some thinkers have held this view. If words that applied to both God and creatures were purely equivocal, then our experience of creatures would not allow us to know anything about God. For the words we used in our reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. [They would have one meaning in part of our reasoning and another meaning in another part.] Now this is contrary to the procedure of some philosophers, such as Aristotle, who managed to prove many things about God. It also contradicts scripture which says "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood from the things that He created."
        We have to conclude that these words are applied to both God and creatures in an analogous sense, that is, with a meaning that is based on a relationship......For example, the word "healthy" can be applied to medicine as well as to an animal because of the relationship the medicine has to the animal's health. In a similar way, words can be applied to both creatures and to God in an analogous and not in a purely univocal nor in a purely equivocal sense. Consider that we can apply to God only words whose meanings we draw from our experience of creatures. Consequently, when we apply a word to both God and creatures, its meaning has to be based on the relationship that creatures have to God: they are related to God as to their origin and their cause in whom all their perfections pre-exist in a way that excels their existence in creatures. Now this kind of common possession of perfections is the basis of a kind of meaning that is midway between pure invocation and pure equivocation. When a word is applied analogically in this way to two different beings its meaning does not remain completely identical as with univocal uses, nor does it have completely different meanings as in equivocal uses.
        Before any craftsman makes something, he must have in his mind an idea of what he will make. Similarly, before a ruler governs his subjects, he must have in his mind some idea of what his subjects are to do. The craftsman's idea of what he will make constitutes a plan of the objects to be made (it is also part of what we call his skill). And the ruler's idea of what his subjects are to do constitutes a kind of law......Now since God is the wise creator of the universe, He is like a craftsman who make something. And He is also like the ruler since He governs every act and motion of every single creature. Consequently, the idea in God's wise mind, according to which everything was created, can be called a plan (or an ideal model, or even a part of God's skill); and since everything is also governed according to this same idea, it can also be called a law. So the eternal law is nothing more than a plan in God's mind, in accordance with every act and motion of the universe is directed.
        It is clear from the preceding article that the eternal law is the guide and standard for everything that is subject to God's provident direction. Clearly, therefore, the activities of all creatures are equally determined by the eternal law. Their activities are determined by the natural forces and inclinations that were made part of their natures when they were created [by God]. These natural forces are inclinations cause creatures to engage in their appropriate activities and attain their appropriate ends.
        Now rational creatures [such as humans] are also subject to God's provident direction, but in a way that makes them more like God than all other creatures. For God directs rational creatures by instilling in them certain natural inclinations and [reasoning] abilities that enable them to direct themselves as well as other creatures. Thus human beings also are subject to the eternal law and they too derive from that law certain natural inclination to seek their proper ends and proper activities. These inclinations of our nature constitute what we call the "natural law" and they are effects of the eternal law imprinted in our nature.
        Thus, even scripture suggests that our natural ability to reason (by which we distinguish right from wrong) in which a natural law resides, is nothing more than the image of God's own reason imprinted on us. For Psalm Four asked,"Who will show us what is right?" and it answers,"The light of Thy Mind, O Lord, which has been imprinted upon us."
        A thing is good if it is an end that we have a natural inclination to desire; it is evil if it is destructive of what our nature is inclined to desire. Consequently, those kinds of things that our nature is inclined to desire are perceived by our reason as good for our human nature. And our reason will conclude that those kinds of things ought to be pursued in our actions. But if our reason sees a certain type of thing as destructive of what human nature is inclined to desire, it will conclude that type of thing ought to be avoided.
        We can therefore list the basic [moral] precepts of the natural law by listing the kinds of things that we naturally desire. First, like every other nature, human nature is inclined to desire its own survival. Consequently it is a natural [moral] law that we ought to preserve human life. Secondly, like other animals, human nature is inclined to desire those things that nature teaches all animals to desire by instinct. For example, all animals have an instinctive desire to come together in a union of male and female, and an instinctive desire to care for young. [So it is morally right to pursue these things.] Thirdly, human nature is inclined to desire those good and satisfy our intellects. This aspect of our nature is inclined to desire knowledge (for example, to know the truth about God) and to desire an orderly social life. Consequently, it is a natural [moral] law that we ought to dispel ignorance and avoid harming those among whom we live.
Quote from, Philosophy, A text with readings, 5th ed by Velasquez Pg.198-202
 

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