A day seldom passed without a clash between the Mujahideen and the Soviets or Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in Logar Province. In the summer of 1980, my group set an ambush to attack a supply column of Soviet and DRA forces moving from Kabul to Gardez on Highway 157. At that time, the populace had not migrated from the area and it was full of people. The Mujahideen had contacts in the government who reported on the movements of columns along this highway. This was to be our first attack on a major column on this highway following the Soviet invasion. The ambush site was located around the Pul-e Qandahari junction with the main highway. At this point the Logar River comes within 200 meters of the highway to the east, and the Kuh-e Mohammad Agha hills rise some 700 meters over the highway to the west. Ten kilometers to the south, the road runs through a steep gorge where vehicles cannot easily turn back. We had 50 Mujahideen armed with Mosin-Nagant carbines, Enfield rifles and two RPG-7s. Our leader, Commander Hayat, divided our men into three groups and put one group in the Bini Sherafghan ruins some 70 meters west of the road. He put the second group to the east of the road around the Mamur Hotel and the third group to the east in Pul-e Qandahari facing the Mohammad Agha High School. Our ambush occupied a two-kilometer stretch. At this time, I was the late Commander Hayat’s deputy commander, commanding the Pul-e Qandahari positions.
Commander Hayat ordered that the attack would start when the end of the column reached the Bini Sherafghan ruins. The DRA column came. It had about 100 vehicles carrying food, ammunition and fuel. There were quite a few Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) tankers in the column. We let it pass and, as the end of the column reached the ruins, we started to attack at the end of the column. In those days, convoy escort was very weak and air support was insufficient. There was practically no resistance or reaction to our attack from the column. Even the Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) which were escorting the column were passive. We left our positions and started moving up the column, firing as we went, and damaged or destroyed almost all the vehicles. We had no casualties. I don’t know how many DRA casualties there were, but we wounded many drivers who the government evacuated later. We left the area promptly after the ambush.
The area around the Mamur Hotel was ideal for an ambush and we, and other Mujahideen groups, used it often. In September 1981, we set an ambush at the Mamur Hotel and in Pul-e Qandahari facing the high school. The Mamur Hotel group was commanded by the noted Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (HIH) commander Doctor Abdul Wali Khayat and the Pul-e Qandahari position was commanded by my commander, the late Commander Hayat. There were some 35 Mujahideen armed with Ak-47 rifles and three RPG-7s. The ambush site occupied about one kilometer of roadway. When the column arrived, we destroyed twelve trucks and captured three intact. The three trucks were large, heavy-duty, weight- cylinder trucks and they were loaded with beans, rice and military boots. We needed all this gear. We also captured two 76mm field guns and a heavier gun that I don’t know the type or caliber. We did not have any Mujahideen casualties.
In July 1982, the late Doctor Wali Khayat set an ambush near the Mamur Hotel. A soviet column, moving supplies from Kabul to Gardez, entered the ambush kill zone. During the attack, one Mujahideen fired an RPG-7 at an escorting armored personnel carrier (APC). An officer jumped out of the damaged APC and took cover. The officer was wounded. While the fighting was going on, the column sped up and left the ambush area - and left the officer behind. Doctor Abdul Wali Khayat fired at the position where the Soviet officer was. The officer returned fire with his AK-74. Doctor Khayat fired again and wounded the Soviet officer a second time - this time in the hand. The Soviet officer dropped his AK-74 and took out his pistol. Doctor Khayat threw a hand grenade at the officer and killed him. Then he crossed the road and took his AK-74 and his Makarov pistol. He left body where it lay and the Mujahideen left the ambush site.
The next day the Soviets returned in a column from Kabul. They cordoned off the area and searched the houses around Mohammad Agha District headquarters and the town of Kotubkhel. They went house to house looking for their missing officer. HIH commander Sameh Jan was in Kotubkhel at that time. He coordinated and organized all the Mujahideen factions that were caught in the cordon. There were about 150 Mujahideen factions that were caught in the cordon. The Mujahideen began attacking the searching Soviets. They launched sudden, surprise attacks in the close streets and alleys of the villages and in the spaces between the villages. The fighting began in the morning and continued until late afternoon. Soviet casualties are unknown but we think they were heavy. The Mujahideen captured four AK-74s. Mujahideen casualties were seven killed in action (KIA) including Sameh Jan. Most of the dead Mujahideen had run out of ammunition. The Soviets captured the weapons of the dead Mujahideen including some AK-74s, a Goryunov machine gun, and RPG-7 and a few AK-74s captured from the Soviets in the past. AS the Soviets fot involved in the fighting, they stopped searching. As daylight waned, the Soviets disengaged, took their dead and withdrew back to Kabul. They did find and evacuate the body of their officer who Doctor Khayat killed the day before. It was still lying where he was killed.
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