Background
Throughout history, military planners have viewed cities as centers of gravity. As such, in war, cities are something to be either protected or taken away, depending upon one's perspective. Cities house the population centers, transportation hubs, seats of government, sources of wealth, centers for industry, information networks, and key nodes of communication within a nation. Recent forecasts based on population statistics and the worldwide migration trend from agrarian to industrialized societies predict that 85 percent of the world's population will reside in urbanized areas by the year 2025. As the world trend toward urbanization increases, the military significance of cities is likely to increase proportionally. In the words of General C. C. Krulak, "It's the only place they - our future adversaries - can take our technology and mute it...We avoid the cities, but that is where we will be taken - so we had better learn to fight and win in the city."
Urbanized areas may be significant sources of future conflict. Cities historically are where radical ideas ferment, dissenters find allies, mixtures of people cause ethnic friction, and discontented groups receive media attention. Adversaries may focus on the capture of radio and television stations in an attempt to influence public opinion and attain their political goals. Our political leaders may take action to neutralize or stabilize some extremely volatile political situations, or to provide assistance to allies in need of support, by deploying U.S. forces into urban environments. The results of geographical studies show that 60 percent of politically significant urban areas outside allied or former Warsaw Pact territory are located along or within 25 miles of a coastline. Moreover, 75 percent are within 150 miles; 87 percent are within 300 miles; 95 percent are within 600 miles; and all are within 800 miles. U.S. embassies and diplomatic facilities are located in cities where the host country's political and economic leadership is concentrated and these same cities also host a large concentration of U.S. economic interests - and of particular importance - they are the adopted or temporary home of American citizens.
Urbanized terrain is a complex and challenging environment. It possesses all of the characteristics of the natural landscape, coupled with manmade construction, resulting in an incredibly complicated and fluid environment that influences the conduct of military operations in unique ways. This manmade construction dramatically increases the complexity of warfare and creates a multitude of friction points that a military force must overcome.
The most distinguishing characteristic of Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), however, is not the buildings but the presence of noncombatants, which fundamentally alters the character of warfare. When conducting MOUT at the operational level, there will be some overlap with other types of military operations to include Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW encompasses the use of military capabilities and forces across the range of military operations short of war. Although Joint Pub 3- 07, Joint Doctrine for MOOTW, addresses many areas that will assist a Joint Force Commander (JFC) when conducting MOUT, it is not sufficient to address all the considerations for conducting a major theater war on urbanized terrain. Military forces may not always focus on destruction of the enemy but rather take steps necessary to protect noncombatants and their infrastructure from which they receive services necessary for survival. Urban areas are not analogous to jungle, desert, or mountain warfare in that there are more than just terrain considerations. MOUT requires a distinct manner of planning and employment of forces and is sufficiently complex that it justifies a separate Joint doctrinal publication addressing operational issues.
The Operational Challenge
Infrastructure and people make MOUT distinctly different from other types of military operations. The infrastructure of the urban setting complicates military operations in that it provides limitless places for opposing forces to hide, from which to strike, hinders observation and communications, and presents obstacles to fire and movement. Moreover, this infrastructure that serves as the battlefield is also the primary means to sustain the lives of those who we came to save. Damage to the power, water, and transportation grids dramatically affect the livelihood of the local inhabitants and in many cases threaten life itself. When the people of the urban environment are coupled to the “infrastructure factor” the complex rapidly becomes chaotic. Factors that compound the inherent friction and chaos of military operations on urbanized terrain include the proximity of noncombatants to combatants, the sheer number of people, the requirement to sustain life during the midst of a military conflict, and the significant risk of massive disease and famine. People and infrastructure are the two distinguishing characteristics that mark MOUT as a completely different type of warfare.
Any approach to MOUT must build on a foundation that considers the impact of these two features, people and infrastructure, on military operations. The military commander must approach MOUT with a philosophy that views the city or urban area as a living entity rather than as a battleground or piece of terrain. The military operation must be designed to maintain the viability of the city rather than using the physical characteristics as an operating area. The city is not a battlefield; it is a home, a place of business, a source of sustainment, a seat of government, a location of religious, cultural, and social significance. The joint force commander must design a campaign that will resemble a surgeon cutting away a cancerous growth while keeping the patient alive. U.S. forces do not destroy a city to save it. The response to such a challenge is to develop an operational concept and validate it through experimentation. Upon maturing the concept, a military organization can then develop doctrine designed to execute the concept.
Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, states that the JFC will make the following considerations before combat: preparing the theater; isolating the enemy; movement to obtain operational reach; special operations; protection of forces and their freedom of action; control of space; and constant assessment of physical environment. The application of each of these considerations in MOUT is significantly different from combat operations in other environments and is not sufficiently addressed in Joint Pub 3-0.
As stated earlier, the population growth within the urban areas is and will continue to be substantial. During preparing or shaping operations, determining the ethnic and religious demographics of the population will be more important when planning a campaign in the urban environment. During past campaigns, U.S. capabilities often required the physical massing of forces to neutralize enemy combat power. This included forces, weapons, and associated logistics to support a campaign that was largely sequential. As stated in Joint Vision 2010, "Instead of relying on massed forces and sequential operations, we will achieve massed effects in other ways." As we prepare the theater and isolate the enemy, the JFC will shape the battlespace leveraging the information superiority and advances in technology such as precision targeting, minimizing the need for massed forces. Additionally, the JFC must identify and control less "traditional" centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities such as subterranean systems, power grids, water supplies, and television/radio stations. Civilians within the city will be part of a focused psychological campaign in an attempt to win their "hearts and minds" and/or minimize their presence as much as possible.
The movement to obtain operational reach will be accomplished through the orchestration of Service assets organized and in support of the JFC. The theater area of operations may be partially or completely urbanized. Forces will be moved via a combination of air and sea-lift assets. Consideration must be given to force and logistic staging areas, protection of those areas, and the ability to sustain the force throughout the campaign. Although we can obtain massed effects through information superiority and precision targeting, the urban environment arguably requires more physical presence on the ground more so than any other environment.
The close terrain of urban areas compounds the requirements for manpower when compared to military operations in open terrain. Countless rooms, hallways, stairwells, streets, alleys, subterranean corridors, rooftops, and internal spaces make the task of controlling the urban area near impossible. Only a large force, even a force equipped with a variety of sensors and information technology devices, can even begin to grapple with controlling a city such as Cairo, Seoul, Monrovia, or Sarajevo. The complexities of close terrain mandate a manpower intensive approach to MOUT.
Before and during hostilities within theater, special operations forces will provide the leverage required by the JFC to obtain critical information requirements, undermine an opponent's will or capacity to wage war, and enhance the capabilities of multinational forces. Including national assets, the JFC will utilize special operations forces to bridge the information gap often present in an enclosed and quickly changing environment such as urban terrain. Considerations unique to the urban environment include the ability (or lack of ability) to blend in with the terrain and population, decreased operating areas due to the vertical structures and subterranean systems, and degraded communications due to "urban canyons." The JFC can employ special operations forces as his "directed telescope" at the operational and tactical level during a campaign on urbanized terrain.
The JFC must protect its forces and allow freedom of action throughout the campaign. This includes actions and considerations well beyond traditional force protection activities. Coordination and communication must be established with Department of State as well as multinational governments, private volunteer organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the United Nations. It will also include information warfare, identification of all forces within theater, air superiority, in-depth theater air defense, and the ability to detect, identify, locate, track, and deny enemy attacks to include asymmetrical threats.
Control of space not only addresses the actual urban environment, but also the intelligence and communication systems required to provide the JFC with an accurate and timely appraisal of the current situation. This in turn provides the JFC with the ability to rapidly respond to events and directives from higher authority. As mentioned earlier, air superiority will also add to the JFC's ability to dominate the battlespace. Asymmetrical threats will tend to negate the advantage of air superiority. Recent examples in Somalia support this premise. Nevertheless, we can develop and test procedures that can increase the effectiveness of air support. Maintaining sea-lines of communication will also be critical in sustaining the force. Sea-based logistics will allow the JFC to minimize his footprint ashore and increase his ability to protect his force. Electronic warfare will allow the JFC the ability to dominate the electronic spectrum and gain advantage through information superiority.
The physical environment within an urbanized area will require special considerations. An urban area is congested due to population, manmade obstacles, and has restricted lines of communications. Mobility of the force, synchronization of operations, and ability to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded conditions. Seasonal effects on terrain, weather, and sea conditions can significantly affect the operations of the joint force. This terrain can also become increasingly restricted due to the effects of rubble (the debris from demolished or damaged structures). Unique to the urban environment are the considerations for vertical terrain and subterranean systems. Occupation by forces within an urban area will require smaller zones or sectors. A constant assessment must be made to determine the changing nature of the environment.
A Recent Example
Many historical studies of urban combat have become dated. This is the result of the impact that technology has had on military capabilities and evolving tactics. However, certain tenets of urban combat remain constant. The battles for the city of Grozny during the Russian intervention in the Republic of Chechnya represent a recent and critically important example of large-scale operations in urban combat. A large, technologically sophisticated (relative to the Chechens) military force (Russian) engaging and ultimately being defeated by a small, relatively primitive irregular force (Chechen) characterized combat in Grozny. Grozny provides a number of fresh insights, and reinforcement of time-honored tenets of urban warfare, across the scope of activities germane to modern urban combat.
The following constitutes a quick-look at lessons learned from the battle of Grozny:
• Russian inability to isolate Chechnya/Grozny allowed a constant flow of reinforcements and supplies into the country/city. Russian control of any given area was at best, porous. The Chechens continued to receive outside support throughout the campaign.
• Both sides used commercial off-the-shelf communication assets. The information war was as vitally important as any other aspect of the campaign. The Chechens had to make do with commercially available communication equipment. They fully exploited the use of cellular telephones, Motorola radios, improvised television stations, video cameras, and the Internet. The Russians lacked sufficient military communication equipment, and had to supplement with commercial assets. Russian tactical communication was very difficult in Grozny. Urban structures in Grozny interfered with Russian military radios, severely hindering tactical communications. The Russians had to establish ground-based and aircraft-based relay stations to overcome the interference.
• Directives to minimize civilian casualties ultimately put the Russians at a disadvantage. An advantage accrues to the side with less concern for the safety of the civilian population. Initially, the Russians attempted to limit civilian casualties. The Chechen fighters took advantage of this reticence, often-using civilians, schools, and apartment buildings as a shield.
• Urban combat is extremely manpower intensive, and results in significant attrition of personnel and materiel for the attacker. The Russians discovered that a 5 to 1 manpower ratio was often not enough, due to the high casualty rates consistent with urban combat and the requirement to guard virtually every building taken.
• The Chechens negated Russian supporting fires by "hugging" Russian units. Whenever possible, Chechen fighters adopted the tactic of staying as physically close to Russian units as possible, so that the Russians could not employ supporting arms without the risk of injuring their own troops.
• The Russians made extensive use of precision-guided weapons. When the weather allowed, the Russians were able to use these weapons, such as laser-guided bombs and missiles. They had great effect against priority targets such as bridges, major road intersections, and buildings.
• Deficiencies in the Russian logistics system degraded combat effectiveness. Significant inadequacies in the Russian logistics apparatus effected virtually all combat forces and operations. Some soldiers actually entered combat in Grozny without weapons or ammunition. The Russian transportation system failed and supply officers were unprepared for the high volume demands for ammunition, hand grenades, smoke grenades, demolition charges, and one-shot antitank weapons.
• Medical support was of great importance. Russian casualty evacuation was difficult due to the lack of vehicular mobility, and the vulnerability of helicopters to Chechen fire. Many casualties were psychological, due in great part to the intense, violent nature of close quarter combat. The Russians were ill prepared for the level of mental health problems they encountered. Additionally, logistics units were often unable to provide fresh drinking water, which caused Russian troops to consume contaminated water that resulted in additional health problems.
• Fratricide was a serious and continuing problem throughout the campaign. The situation facing Russian combat forces was ripe for fratricide. Poorly trained units, operating in a confused and uncertain urban environment, often unable to tell friend from foe, and lacking quality leadership and inter-unit coordination, were often as dangerous to themselves as they were to the Chechens.
• Chechen use of ad hoc air defense systems eliminated Russian air support, particularly helicopters, in Grozny. The Chechens were able to improvise effective anti-air defenses using a mixture of anti-air and ground (i.e., heavy machineguns, rifle-propelled grenades) weapons, and ambush tactics specifically adapted to the urban environment.
These lessons learned, although not all inclusive, point to the unique problems encountered in MOUT. These were not solely tactical level problems but had operational impact as well. A JFC will encounter these same problems in the future and must be prepared to counter them. All Service component commanders must have an understanding of these challenges and operate from a common doctrine in order to be successful.
Conclusions
The Marine Corps strongly supports the development of a Joint Doctrine for MOUT. Future trends and historical studies clearly point to the doctrinal shortfall in this area and the need to take action. Although considered an environment, the complexity of the urban environment, shortfalls in current capabilities, lack of training at the operational and tactical level, and the likelihood of future conflicts occurring on urbanized terrain justify a separate "stand-alone" doctrinal publication. The joint doctrinal publication for MOUT should capture each Service's roles and capabilities as well as future capabilities envisioned in Joint Vision 2010.
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