A word of caution is in order as we enter the peacekeeping phase of the Kosovo operation. During the past 20 years, more American servicemen have been lost in peacekeeping operations than were killed in Operation Desert Storm. The injection of peacekeeping forces into Kosovo will be an extremely complicated and challenging process. It represents one of the most complex scenarios possible in what U.S. military doctrine now calls Military Operations Other than War, or MOOTW for short.

The mission will be fraught with political, economic and military danger. However, there are good and bad lessons learned to use as rough road maps. The United States and its allies have been involved in a large number of MOOTW operations since the end of the Cold War. Many of them have lessons learned that will be appropriate in Kosovo. The danger in these types of operations is to attempt to match a single historical template to any single operation. This article attempts to focus on some key considerations that may be pertinent to the Kosovo operation.

In reality there will be elements of three distinct kinds of MOOTW involved in the Kosovo operation. These are peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and nation building (or rebuilding, in this case). Each has distinct characteristics and the functions need to be addressed separately as they can be mutually exclusive and, in some cases, competitive.

The Kosovo operation will not be true peacekeeping. It is essentially peace enforcement. Pure peacekeeping under Chapter 6 of the United Nations charter calls for a truly neutral force to interpose itself between two forces that have mutually agreed to stop fighting. This is not the case in Kosovo, where the Serbs were essentially compelled to stop fighting. There is no guarantee that factions among the Serbs or their opponents in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) will not continue hostilities after the arrival of peace keepers. Such an eventuality will require firm action on the part of the peacekeeping force. General Tony Zinni, a veteran of such an operation in Somalia, made a relevant observation concerning such operations. He advises peace keepers in these situations not to make unnecessary enemies, but argues that those who decide to challenge the operation should not be treated gently. The application of overwhelming force early can set a precedent that can be very useful in avoiding problems later on. Ambiguity of intent is a recipe for disaster.

The U.S. contingent of the peacekeeping force will not be viewed as neutral, and that is not required. However, U.S. forces should be viewed as impartial and fair in their handling of all factions. Peace enforcement requires a delicate mixture of force and diplomacy. Negotiating skills and combat competence will both be required.

Humanitarian operations are another area where U.S. forces have acquired a great deal of experience in the last decade. The Marine Corps has recently published an experimental handbook on assessing humanitarian disasters. It cautions that the military is a blunt instrument with which to conduct humanitarian operations. Private, non-governmental organizations and the United Nations have more expertise and do such operations for a living; where possible, they should be the lead with the military doing what only it can do for only as long as its unique contribution is absolutely required.

Generally, the major military requirements are for transportation, water purification and security for relief workers and supplies. The end state of a successful military humanitarian relief operation is the smooth transition of the military contribution of the operation to competent civil and non-governmental authorities as rapidly as possible. This will be a challenge in Kosovo due to the fact that the Serb dominated government of Yugoslavia has proven itself hostile to the interests of the Albanian majority in Kosovo.

The line between humanitarian relief operations and nation building is a fuzzy one. The immediate humanitarian goal of saving lives and preventing undue suffering is often hard to distinguish from the long term task of rebuilding the infrastructure of a war-ravaged nation such as Kosovo. The distinction is important, however. Rebuilding the regional infrastructure of Kosovo will be an enormously expensive undertaking. It is not yet clear who will pay that bill and where the money will come from.

It is painfully obvious that the cost should not be borne by a badly stretched military budget. The term "mission creep" derives from situations where the military inadvertently drifts from a deliberate peacekeeping or humanitarian mission to nation building without a clear plan for who will pay the price. The United Nations stumbled into such a trap in Somalia in 1993. If Mohammed Aideed had not defeated United Nations forces militarily, there is good reason to believe that they would have gone bankrupt in attempting to achieve their stated goal of creating a Western-style democracy there.

Americans are a generous nation and U.S. soldiers mirror their society. The temptation to make things better is a strong one. It is also a good military principle to undertake simple civic action projects in an area where your troops are operating. As long as this does not get out of hand, it is OK. However, a commander who approves such a project must ask himself a key question: "Can I afford this?"

If the United States assigns its soldiers a nation building mission in Kosovo, there should be a corresponding budget allocated. If such a budget is not assigned, freelance nation building beyond simple civic action self help projects should be strongly discouraged.

Keeping the peace in Kosovo will be a challenge. It will require combat-ready forces who are flexible enough to negotiate when appropriate, but tough enough to fight and win if challenged by factions opposed to a peace agreement.

Gary Anderson served as a United Nations observer in Lebanon, as the operations officer for Joint Task Force Sea Angel in Bangladesh and as military advisor to the U.S. Liaison Office in Operation Continue Hope in Somalia.

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