Light/Attack Helicopter Operations in the Three Block War

Urban operations are, by their very nature, infantry-intensive operations. They are charged with friction, confusion and danger. Threat levels and rules of engagement can change quickly and the tactics of the Marine on the street must be modified to meet the ever-changing threat. Likewise, support, in the form f transportation, logistics, communications and control, or precision fires must be timely, flexible and potent. It is exactly this type of support that the Marine light/attack helicopter squadron (HMLA) brings to the Three Block War in which Marines must be prepared to face, almost simultaneously, a continuum of conflict ranging from humanitarian assistance to all-out combat.

Operating a mix of AH-1W Super Cobras and UH-1N Hueys, the HMLA is uniquely capable of sustained, forward or seabased operations to deliver attack and utility helicopter support as part of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The HMLA is present in MAGTF's of every size. It can operate effectively throughout the continuum of urban operations and has the capability to tailor weapons loads and mission payloads to meet the requirements of any supporting tasking. The HMLA is equipped and trained to operate day and night, in all light levels and in all weather conditions. The HMLA is uniquely suited to accomplishing most or all of the six functions of Marine aviation. Whether the request is for precision fires, medevac, command and control, confined area insert or extract, forward reconnaissance, or escort, HMLA assets can and will deliver.

Flexibility is the key to the HMLA role in the Three Block War. In "Block One" operations, the Huey can be he ground unit commander's best friend. Offering a full range of communications options, including SINCGARS, HAVEQUICK, and satellite communications in a single radio control station, the Huey puts the whole world at the ground commander's fingertips. Small teams can quickly be inserted by Huey onto rooftops or into landing zones too small for heavier assault aircraft, providing a rapid mobility and countermobility capability to the ground combat element. Quick reconfiguring of the Huey with modular, mission-oriented packages allows for various Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), electronic warfare, and deception tasking in support of the MAGTF force protection plan. The integrated navigation forward-looking infrared and the big, open side cargo doors allow the ground commander to conduct night and day reconnaissance of critical areas of interest. The Huey is an ideal platform for providing high situational awareness overwatches of ground forces. In the event of casualties, injured Marines can quickly be evacuated by Huey from the tightest of landing zones to the nearest aid station or back to amphibious shipping. The "utility" flexibility and responsiveness of the Huey to a wide range of MAGTF tasks makes it a true force multiplier.

In "Block Two" operations, as threat levels escalate, HMLA assets augment the MAGTF commander's full-dimensional force protection plan. Huey mission-oriented configuration packages provide a method for gauging measures of effectiveness for MAGTF PSYOPS themes, deception plans, and operations security vulnerability. With defensive armament, the Huey can provide continuous utility support while the Cobra provides responsive, measured, and precise fire support in the form of rotary-wing close air support (CAS), armed reconnaissance, and diversionary and low collateral damage strikes. Employing TOW and Hellfire precision guided munitions, Cobra crews can target vehicles in streets, specific windows in buildings, or critical nodes of civil and military infrastructure. Aerial-delivered rockets, the Cobra's 20mm cannon, and the Huey's door-mounted .50 caliber machinegun and 7.62 minigun, while not precision guided, can prove very effective against enemy forces in the open or under light cover.

In the "Third Block," limited force operations have degenerated into all-out urban combat. Even more than in Blocks One and Two, battlespace management and information operations are critical to elevating the ground commander's situational awareness. Cobra offensive strikes can augment other organic MAGTF fire support, and both Cobra and Huey crews can provide airborne forward air control of other air assets as well as airborne "eyes in the sky" command and control of ground forces. Rotary-wing delivered munitions can be particularly useful as fixed-wing bombing becomes impractical due to the closeness of an enemy employing "hugging" tactics.

The value of airborne command and control cannot be overstated, especially when one considers the extended littoral battlespace distances associated with Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS). During the TASK FORCE RANGER raid in Mogadishu, quick reaction force rescue convoys received critical threat and navigation assistance from an airborne command and control helicopter acting as battlespace manager. In a high-pitched urban firefight, an on scene commander can make quick decisions based upon real-time information, affording elements of situational awareness that cannot be provided from a remote shore based or afloat command center. Controlling the flow into and out of a contested objective area is essential to the survival of aviation assets in Block Three of this scenario.

Support Versus Survivability

There exists a line of flawed reasoning within the Marine Corps which holds that rotary-winged aircraft are not survivable on the urban battlefield. The experiences of U.S. Army's TASK FORCE RANGER in Somalia and of Russian army aviation forces in Chechnya are often put fort as examples of the vulnerability of helicopters to small arms, rocket propelled grenades, and portable surface-to-air missiles. While combat losses certainly occurred in these two operations, the facts do not necessarily support the conclusions. In Somalia, attention is often focused on the downing of two Blackhawk helicopters, but Cobras from the Army's 10th Mountain Division effectively employed TOW missiles, 2.75-inch rackets, and 20mm cannon before, during, and after the ill-fated TASK FORCE RANGER raid. In addition, AH-6 gunships, armed with rockets and miniguns, were used to relieve pressure from pinned down ground units with no further combat losses. The U.S. Army pilots involved in these missions quickly adapted to the threat and clearly demonstrated that with sound tactics, helicopters can be extremely effective CAS platforms in urban terrain.

In Chechnya, attack helicopters flew 6,287 offensive air support missions in terrible weather with very good results. Despite the presence of SA-7, SA-16, and Stinger missiles, as well as heavy antiaircraft fire, only seven MI-24 and five MI-8 helicopters were lost throughout the duration of the conflicts.. While these numbers may seem high, it must be understood that the Russian aircrews flying in this theater were poorly trained in CAS tactics – particularly at night. In fact, aviation-delivered precision guided munitions proved very effective in targeting the windows of buildings, in neutralizing rooftop threats, and in destroying Chechen armor operating on city streets. There are certainly many lessons to be learned from Somalia and Chechnya, and one of them is that tactics can quickly evolve to make armed helicopters a very effective and survivable weapon in urban terrain.

The Israelis have also had significant success employing attack helicopters in an urban environment. In southern Lebanon, both TOW-equipped Cobras and Hellfire Apaches have been used to engage buildings and vehicles with minimum collateral damage. Tactics have been developed to meet the evolving threat, and combat losses have been kept to an absolute minimum.

Supporting the Ground Scheme of Maneuver

The support provided by the HMLA is adaptable to any ground scheme of maneuver. In relatively static situations such as Block One operations, predetermined, fixed landing zones are used and helicopters can be conventionally employed to provide sustainment and force protection in an active urban defense. Hueys are particularly useful in providing quick mobility when urban rubble, mined streets, or roadblocks preclude safe ground vehicle movement. Cobras can successfully escort ground food convoys, providing security and visible proof of consequences as a psychological deterrent to anyone considering disruption of traffic.

In Block Two and Block Three operations, HMLA assets can be used for close support or as an independent maneuver element. Utility and attack helicopters can support swarm, penetration, and thrust tactics by providing rapid mobility, dominant maneuver support, focused logistics, and precision engagement to the ground combat element. Sustainment can be provided through surging operations, conserving resources until they are required.

For example, during an operation in which the MAGTF is employing swarm tactics, Hueys loaded with small rapid reaction teams and Cobras armed with a mixture of precision guided and conventional munitions could be maintained on strip alert in a secure landing zone in relatively close proximity to the objective area. Another Huey would be airborne as a battlespace close communications manager, further ensuring that close communications are kept between ground units, the strip alert aircraft, and the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC). In response to a call for assistance, the airborne battlespace manager would have the authority to launch the strip alert package based on his estimate of the situation and with concurrence from the LFOC. Once airborne, the reaction force can be directed to appropriate insertion points while the Cobras are used to isolate the team in contact and engage emerging threats.

In an urban penetration, the ground combat element relies upon rapid, multi-axis maneuver and sufficient firepower to establish control of an objective in a dispersed and noncontiguous battlefield. Again, the HMLA assets resident in the MAGTF provide the flexibility and agility required to maneuver in a third dimension married with precise, measured firepower. Since a penetration of this sort must be synchronized to be successful, the role of an airborne command and control platform is critical. Because communications in the "urban canyon" are often severely restricted, a helicopter overhead provides the essential communications link back to the LFOC. If there is a raid-like withdrawal phase to the mission, the airborne commander is the ideal authority to initiate the extract, marshal assault helicopters in and out of the objective, arrange for continuous fire support, and coordinate other force protection measures.

When employing urban thrust tactics, combat power must be maximized at the point of attack while the flanks of the axis of advance must be defended. The Cobra provides tremendous combat power and operates on a third-dimensional axis of attack. The Huey, with door-mounted, high rate-of-fire miniguns, is a tremendous platform for defending vulnerable area from massed enemy forces. As in swarm and penetration operations, helicopter gunships and attack helicopter crews, often operating at low altitudes with a high level of tactical situational awareness, are in a unique position to provide CAS to ground forces engaged in close-range fire fights – and may be the only supporting arm that can be used should the enemy resort to "hugging" tactics.

Future Capabilities of the HMLA

Technology, of course, is a driving factor in determining the capabilities of the Marine Corps in the urban environment. Developmental weapons and systems must always have the aim of simplifying life for the individual Marine rifleman and enhancing his ability to think, move, and shoot. The HMLA community has several programs in-work that are moving in this direction.

The UH1Y/AH-1Z (4BN/4BW) upgrade program greatly enhances the range, lift, and combat power of today's Huey and Cobra assets. Programmed to be fielded starting in 2003, these aircraft will feature 85 percent parts commonality, resulting in an even higher level of readiness and a much smaller maintenance footprint. Enhanced navigation displays will allow color moving maps to be overlaid with graphic friendly and enemy templates to even further increase aircrew situational awareness and identification friend-or-foe capabilities. Improved sensors and digital data transfer capabilities will allow aircrews to downlink realtime reconnaissance imagery to ground forces from significant standoff distances and will improve the sensor-to-shooter capabilities of our present helicopters. Future helicopter launched weapons, such as the Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System and the Joint Attack Weapons System, will allow even more precise targeting and mission-tailored warhead selection. Continuing advances in command and control systems, modular information packages, aircrew night vision devices, and other associated systems will allow the HMLA of tomorrow to provide the MAGTF with an even greater urban support capability.

Training for the Urban Environment

Marine Corps helicopter doctrine for urban operations has been slow to evolve. Most pilots expect to use an adaptation of desert or rural tactics, since the vast majority of training is currently done in those environments. Urban training opportunities are rare for Marine aviators. Noise complaints, airspace restrictions, and the perception problems involved with military helicopters around large population centers all add up to severely limit urban training. Targeting exercises in urban areas simply do not exist; the need to use lasers, artificial illumination, and smoke preclude active targeting around civilian areas. The small combat towns that currently exist on military installations offer limited options, but are not at the level needed to effectively train to deliver ordnance in support of ground forces on urban terrain.

Currently, urban live fire ranges do not exist for aircraft-delivered munitions, although Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 is developing an inert ordnance, urban live fire facility in the Yuma range complex. This facility will greatly enhance the HMLA community's ability to fight on the urban battlefield by allowing experimentation with various delivery profiles in built-up terrain. However, until this facility becomes a reality, Marine aviators will continue to train for a desert war and will adjust those tactics to fight in the city.

Conclusion

Today's HMLA is equipped and trained to meet any threat, in any environment in the world. The Marine Corps trains and fights as an air-ground, combined arms team, and urban operations must not force us to depart from this model. While the risks of operating helicopters within cities may seem high, with the right mix of tactics and training the benefits prevail. The utility and attack helicopters operated by Marine aviation combat elements continue to be effective, flexible support platforms that can benefit the MAGTF in many ways, and are well suited for success in operations in desert, rural, or urban terrain. It is up to the operators and mission planners to employ them creatively and wisely to ensure mission success.

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