There often seems to be more misunderstanding than understanding about Operation Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS). One common fallacy is that it was created as a result of emerging technology. In the 1930s, the Corps adopted a doctrine that later created the Higgins boat and amphibious tractor. It may appear now however, that we created OMFTS merely to justify the appropriation of the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), MV-22 tilt-rotor, and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV). This opinion is wrong! The tenets of OMFTS and the term "ship to objective movement" can be traced to Amphibious Operations: 1985 to 2000, a secret 1973 report (declassified in 1981) written by the Amphibious Warfare Board. The report clearly identified the request for equipment like the LCAC, MV-22, and AAAV to execute a powerful type of expeditionary warfare.

Navy and Marine Corps White papers ". . . From the Sea" and "Forward . . . From the Sea," describe a foundation for OMFTS. OMFTS is a warfighting philosophy that couples maneuver warfare and technological advances to create a force that can advance rapidly to an objective. Forces that use the seas as maneuver space enhance our ability to exploit an enemy weakness and attack a center of gravity. Many operations from Marine Corps history have had aspects of OMFTS. In the modern concept much of our command and control, fire support, and logistics will be at sea while practicing Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM) with maneuver forces. STOM employs the concepts of maneuver warfare to project a combined arms force by air and surface means against inland objectives. Seabasing will free Marines from the need to establish facilities ashore, and allow us to devote more effort to exploiting enemy weakness. Specifically, we will avoid a long operational pause at the beach to build combat power, improving our opportunity to achieve surprise by generating overwhelming tempo and momentum. STOM will increase the enemy's vulnerability because he will be less capable of predicting our objectives and will be forced to choose between being weak in many places or strong in a few. During our study, we conducted a series of discussions and practical exercises and then observed the Urban Warrior Exercise in California during March 1999. Summarizing all of our findings proved difficult, so we created a scenario requiring forcible entry into the fictional country of San Selva to illustrate our vision of OMFTS. Welcome to Operation Green House!

October 3, Radio Report: As the Southwest United States enters another week of record-breaking heat, the movement of a cold front from the North finally brings the possibility of rain. Unfortunately, it also threatens to bring thunderstorms and tornadoes that experts say could be even worse than last year's deadly weather. The weather is destroying crops and killing livestock, increasing food prices for Americans across the country, many of whom have just recovered from the harsh winter. Stocks are predicted to drop in value as another insurance company filed for bankruptcy yesterday, and many tourism-related businesses have reported lower-than-expected earnings.

Complicating the weather crisis is smoke from San Selva's man-made wildfires. Originally set to clear rain-forest for homes and farms in the small country at the Northeastern corner of South America, the out-of-control infernos now send massive clouds of smoke into the atmosphere. Since global warming was blamed for the drastic changes in world weather patterns, the average American is becoming less tolerant of San Selva's violations of the Global Warming Treaty. Weather-related problems impact the standard of living of Americans across the country, and it's certain to be an important issue during the next presidential election.

San Selva stubbornly refuses to accept foreign assistance to fight the fires, because they believe they need more cleared land for their economic development, and feel seasonal rains will begin soon enough. Neighboring countries in South and Central America are requesting assistance from the United States to force San Selva to conform with the treaty. After 10,000 people were killed during hurricane Mitch in 1998 and 15,000 were killed last year by hurricane Fred, San Selva's conduct is viewed as a threat to other countries' very existence. Border clashes have been particularly brutal, with hundreds of civilians killed in atrocities on both sides. Many are concerned that a war of genocide might soon consume the region. The President is under increased pressure for failing to be more proactive, and some members of Congress are calling for the military to be used to pressure San Selva to comply with the treaty. Economic sanctions have had little effect on San Selva, creating only the potential for mass starvation. Polls say 58% of Americans support using the military if it will improve environmental conditions, and the United Nation's Security Council is expected to meet later today to discuss a resolution authorizing the use of force. An anonymous, high level Pentagon source stated earlier today that a naval expeditionary force may be dispatched to the area early next week.

The technology that will make OMFTS possible is coming, but to make it a reality, the Corps needs the doctrine, training, and organization to seamlessly transition from maneuver-at-sea to maneuver ashore and vice-versa. Using our San Selva scenario, we will present our findings in five functional areas: command and control, intelligence, maneuver, fire support, and logistics. Finally, we will highlight the need to conduct OMFTS in the urban littorals and describe why we think the Marine Corps is running out of time in the areas of training and education.

Command and Control

October 23: After San Selva shot down a United Nation's aircraft dumping fire-retarding material on the burning rain forests, the decision was made to use force to make San Selva comply with the treaty. The Naval Expeditionary Force now positioned off the coast of San Selva consists of a carrier battle group and Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (MEF (FWD)) embarked on thirteen amphibious ships. The MEF(FWD) is built around a regimental landing team and includes a composite air group and service support element.

Hundreds of miles of jungle roads make the use of neighboring countries' facilities too dangerous, and the only option is a series of limited objective attacks to seize key installations. Unfortunately, San Selva's military has expected such an operation for several weeks. The commanders, many of them graduates of American military schools, used the Internet to research our latest tactics and methods. The small San Selvan Air Force is now spread across the country in groups of two or three aircraft. Helicopters or airplanes lift off just long enough to fire a Penguin or Harpoon anti-ship missile, usually from the relative safety of inland airfields hidden behind a coastal mountain range. Sophisticated surface-to-air missiles are numerous and hard to detect. The San Selvans have used them well in SAMbushes-- ambushes in which multiple man-portable SAMs are fired at a single aircraft.

The San Selvan Navy is made-up of only a few patrol craft armed with heavy machine guns. Most have already been destroyed, but several are still at large. San Selva has only 500 miles of coastline, and most of the beaches border thick jungle, preventing inland movement. The beaches that can be used to support amphibious landings are mined. The minefields are not extensive, but they are still deadly. Finally, the San Selva Army has moved into populated cities to limit America's ability to use missile and air strikes. The Army has established small, hard-to-detect strong-points near ports and airports. San Selva intends to make any invasion bloody enough to sway American public opinion.

Captain Mike Kenny sat in his AAAV thinking about all this. His rifle company, embarked in 12 AAAVs, had been idling in the well deck of the USS Kuwait City for 15 minutes. The launching of Kenny's company had been held up because the LCACs were having difficulty clearing the minefields with the shallow-water breaching systems. Kenny was already worrying that his fuel plan might fall apart. Kenny and his Marines were part of a reinforced mechanized battalion. The battalion had been task organized into several Company Landing Teams (CLT), each with a different objective deep into San Selva. Each CLT was task-organized to provide the combat power needed at an objective and also included the maximum amount of logistics, fire support, and mobility possible. The CLT would be far from the ships and, therefore, needed to be prepared to support itself in an emergency.

The Littoral Penetration Points (LPP) that the LCACs were now opening would allow each unit to come ashore in separate locations, making the landing difficult for the enemy to defend against. Once on land, the companies would focus their efforts on destroying San Selva's ability to conduct anti-air and ship operations. The CLTs would each attack a series of objectives that were believed to be occupied by small elements of the San Selvan Air Force: detachments of a few aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles and guarded by dozens of individuals with sophisticated, man-portable surface-to-air weapon systems. Three LPPs were being opened by the LCACs, and other LCACs were performing demonstrations along the coast. Two of the LPPs were temporary, but the third would be held open by Marines securing a small beachhead. The third needed to remain open so that additional forces, especially logistical support, could come ashore. Kenny's battalion commanded the LPP operation and was not expected to go ashore. The ship was the only place that the battalion could maintain the situational awareness needed to coordinate his widely dispersed forces.

Kenny checked his computer screen to make sure everyone was up and running. He hadn't used his radio yet, relying on the AAAV's computer system to check his company and pass instructions. He used the joystick to move the computer map to check on the status of the LCACs. The route they had cleared was marked on the screen, giving way-points that the AAAVs would follow to safely move through the minefield. Global Positioning Satellites (GPSs) would allow for precision navigation, and Kenny was hoping the intelligence officer was correct when he stated that San Selva did not have the capability to jam GPS. Without GPS, Kenny and his Marines would be relying on less accurate navigation systems.

Kenny switched his computer map to display an inland area. Known minefields were marked in red, but there were no symbols to represent enemy locations. Any known enemy position would have already been destroyed by air and naval gunfire. Spotting the symbol for a friendly UAV on his map, he double clicked on the icon to see what information was available. Kenny could see that the UAV was photographing what looked like a destroyed bridge along his intended route to the first objective. The loss of the bridge could pose a problem.

Seconds later, a message from the battalion intelligence officer popped up on Kenny's screen. It was an answer to one of his information requirements. It was a warning that confirmed the bridge had been destroyed, and Kenny sent back a "roger" message. The company would now be required to use the alternate route, which was longer. The longer route meant that a resupply of fuel would be needed shortly after seizing the first objective. Kenny informed his platoon commanders of the change, but he didn't send any messages to the battalion commander or logistics officer. They would receive the bad news from other sources, and Kenny didn't want to clutter their screens with redundant information.

Technology will give us the ability to mass collected intelligence with other information in a Network Centric Environment (NCE), probably best described as a well-organized Internet. Currently, we use systems that "push" and "pull" information up and down the chain of command, but in the future, we will have an information "pool." Sensors, both human and electronic, will add information to the pool. Operating forces will pull the information they need, while information managers are analyzing the data to clarify, link, and delete erroneous or outdated information. The information manager cannot be a new title for the communication officer; the information manager should be a subject-matter expert in the information he is editing.

The NCE will provide those with access enormous amounts of information that should create increased situational awareness. Reports from reconnaissance teams will be available to commanders on the ground immediately and should include digital pictures and video. Vehicles will be configured to automatically report their position, fuel level, ammunition load, and maintenance problems. Aircraft arriving to provide close-air support will report their munitions load, time on station, and holding area. All of these reports will allow Marines at every level to make decisions that generate tempo and maintain combat power. We will need to use technology to transform the data into knowledge so Marines can make an informed decision. Here is a simple example: Without human input, data from electronic thermometers and barometers, combined with reports from weather satellites, is collected by a computer system that produces an easy-to-interpret graphic of the weather report. For Marines the real challenge of the NCE will be to prevent information overload and the creation of an inaccurate picture of the battlespace.

With maneuver units ashore relying on sea based logistics and fire support, communication nodes that create the command system will be one of our critical vulnerabilities. We will have to protect the integrity of the NCE, as well as the equipment that creates it. Reliance on technology will create a large electronic signature. Our equipment will be vulnerable to radio-frequency and laser weapons that destroy the electronic components of our systems. Any anti-satellite weapon system would also hurt our ability to communicate and collect information. In OMFTS, the enemy will not need to kill our combat power if he can destroy our ability to command and support from sea bases.

Intelligence

Marine Second Lieutenant Sam Dunne walked across the dark flight-deck and onto a waiting MV-22. As a rifle platoon commander deployed on the USS Beirut, he found it hard to believe that he was leading his Marines into harm's way for an environmental issue. He had been trained to perform missions that ranged from peacekeeping to war, but he was confused about what was required on this operation. Dunne also wondered how people would react to casualties. Dunne's concern was not an uncommon experience for today's warrior: faced with a situation lacking clearly defined objectives and having the potential for tepid support.

Dunne's unit would conduct a platoon-size seizure of a seven story office building near a port in San Selva. Other platoons from the company would seize buildings to the left of Dunne's objective, while a second company seized a larger high-rise on the right. Marines needed the high buildings, or "key terrain," so the remainder of the reinforced battalion could control the port. Army Rangers jumping from Air Force aircraft would seize a nearby airport; they would be followed closely by members of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division, for the airport would quickly consume the entire Ranger Regiment. Once the airport and port were secured, more Marines and soldiers would fly in on transport planes and then helicopter to the port to meet with equipment from Army Prepositioning Positioning Float and Marine Maritime Prepositioning Force ships. The military was then responsible for protecting and supporting a multi-national fire-fighting force, as well as non-government organizations who would feed starving civilians. The plan followed the standard concept for modern urban warfare: isolate, dominate, and transition to future operations.

As the MV-22 rolled down the flight deck for its short take off, Dunne looked over his reinforced platoon. Marines, sailors, soldiers, and airmen were packed into the belly of the aircraft, most forced to sit on the floor. Safety limitations for the amount of passengers allowed in a MV-22 had been waived to allow the large load. It was a necessary step since it would be very dangerous to make more than one touchdown at each landing site. The men wore black and gray urban camouflage utilities, bulletproof vests, and plastic knee and elbow pads. They were armed with an even mix of conventional and less lethal munitions for their weapons because the threat ashore was mixed: armed enemy, unarmed but hostile mobs, and large groups of innocent civilians.

The platoon was well briefed on what was expected at its objective, but there was always uncertainty when one was facing an independent will. Much of the intelligence effort had originated at the embassy for the operation. Tension between the United States and San Selva had however, reduced the embassy's ability to provide accurate information to the Marines. An Integrated Intelligence Team (IIT) made up of military and civilian intelligence specialists had been sent ashore a week earlier. The IIT had conducted urban reconnaissance, as well as interviews with civilian relief workers from non-government organizations. Dunne checked his End User Terminal (EUT) to check on the situation at the objective. The EUT was a light-weight, hand-held computer that provided access to information in the NCE. Dunne could see that the heat-detecting sensors left at the objective by the IIT were still "cold," telling Dunne that the objective was unoccupied. The EUT also provided limited access to information gathered by other intelligence organizations, such as the NSA and CIA. A few days ago, the IIT combined information from these organizations with the information they collected during their reconnaissance to identify a terrorist threat. The early detection of the terrorist threat changed the scheme of maneuver and thereby prevented American casualties.

The altitude for the flight plan was high to avoid enemy fire. Jets from the carrier were destroying the cities' air defenses with anti-radar missiles and laser guided bombs, but there was still the threat of hostile fire from small arms, especially rocket-propelled grenades. After spending endless hours watching video from an unmanned aerial vehicle, Dunne was overcome with deja vue during the approach to the building's rooftop. The city was black, electricity temporarily cut-off by the special operation forces who now controlled the power plant. Through his night vision monocular, Dunne could see gunships buzz around the building, scanning other rooftops and the ground for potential threats. The monocular covered Dunne's non-shooting eye, leaving his shooting eye ready to use the iron sights of his weapons if necessary.

The aircraft lightly rested on the roof, unable to let its full weight burden the building. The Marines poured out of the MV-22, just as they had dozens of times during rehearsals on the flight deck of the USS Beirut. Combat engineers were first out the back, immediately slamming the stairway door with a sledgehammer. The door failed to open, so a second Marine fired "lock-buster" rounds from his shotgun into the hinges; but the second swing was still unsuccessful. Two more engineers used a gas-operated concrete circular-saw and a chain-saw to cut up the door. As it fell apart, the Marines saw that the stairwell was packed with office furniture.

"Damn! It'll take forever to clear that!", said Dunne. He told the engineer detachment to start cutting through the roof and a squad to move the furniture. Whichever breach was completed first would be exploited, but for now, his platoon needed to take up defensive positions on the roof top. Fortunately, the only higher building was being assaulted by the company on Dunne's flank.

Soldiers from the Information Warfare Element (IWE), the newest combat arm in the Marine Air Information Ground Task Force, already had their loud speakers set up and began making announcements in Spanish. Marines from the detachment were setting up the video observation unit, which was a standard camcorder with color LCD monitor and "garden hose" like lens that could be pushed around corners and into holes. The observation unit was capable of seeing through the dark with infrared and night-vision devices. IWE also came armed with a spread of "smart" sensors that were self implanting. The sensors could be activated and repositioned by remote, so Marines did not need to be endangered to move the sensors.

The men from the IWE were going to be important to Dunne. San Selva had done a good job of deceiving the American technology. Thermal sensors had been thrown off by hundreds of small fires set by civilians. Any valuable target had been moved into a hangar or building so it couldn't be seen from above. The San Selvans had even looked up the satellites' schedules on the Internet, and they used their aircraft and conducted movements only at times when no satellites were overhead. At this point, satellites and aerial reconnaissance were providing valuable information about terrain and obstacles, but nothing about important stuff like the fact that the stairs in this building had been blocked with furniture. Sensors wouldn't provide much information about the San Selvan's "intent." Dunne was expecting to learn more from his Human Intelligence Team (HUMINT) than any other source.

The San Selvans also shocked everyone with their use of the Internet to collect enormous amounts of information. Not only did the San Selvans find information about military equipment and techniques, but also personal information about the Marines in the unit. Dunne's wife had even received e-mails from the San Selvans. The e-mails included digital pictures of dead women and children, and they blamed her husband for the killings. Even more disturbing, the San Selvans used a civilian Internet site to find Dunne's home address and phone number. They actually sent Dunne an e-mail on the ship-- a map to his house! Fortunately, IWE was able to send a return message that deposited a logic bomb and disrupted the San Selvans' computers.

Intelligence supporting naval expeditionary forces executing OMFTS into an urban environment will have to be accessible to maneuver commanders at all echelons and be near real time. A suite of "smart" sensors and human intelligence assets, connected by an intelligence architecture, will create a synergistic capability to support OMFTS.

Commanders will not only have traditional information requirements, like locations and dispositions of enemy forces and weapon systems, they will also require knowledge of the enemy's intentions in the urban littoral. The integration of national intelligence assets and Marine HUMINT resources will enhance our ability to gain situational awareness in an urban environment and rapidly disseminate the intelligence to forces maneuvering towards the objective. Once established in the environment, Marines, informed of the commander's critical information requirements, gather information to enhance our situational awareness and provide a measurement of mission effectiveness.

In the future, many threat countries will most likely possess a basic information warfare capability. The days of needing a computer science degree to perform malicious acts on information systems are over. Today, a basic understanding of computers, along with the tools and a strong desire, are all that is needed to send viruses, logic bombs and Trojan horses that can render an information system unusable. Perhaps even a non-detectable information system attack to manipulate the information being used by planners may be the objective. The Internet provides our enemies with access to information that can be used against us, and we need technical specialists to detect and counter these penetrations in order to assure the integrity of our information.

Maneuver

The order to launch the AAAVs from the ship finally popped up on the Captain Kenny's computer screen. His AAAV exited the ship, retracting its suspension and deploying appendages for high-speed water movement. The other 11 AAAVs carrying Kenny's company followed, and the force automatically deployed into formation and increased their speed to 25 nmph. Kenny wished he had a few tanks and LAVs with his company, but most of the LCACs were involved with breaching minefields to create the three LPPs.

The AAAVs crossed the line of departure still at sea, 30 nautical miles from the coast. The formation traveled a route of way-points in much the same manner that a flight of helicopters travel through the air to a landing zone. Once on land, the company would travel through the urban sprawl of San Selva's littorals. The environment was a challenging contrast because populated cities bordered right against thick jungle. Kenny's unit was a visual representation of that contrast: Marines dressed in black and gray camouflage utilities but sitting in green vehicles.

It was going to take a little more than an hour for the company to make the 35 mile swim into the shore. Kenny checked the LCACs' progress on his computer. Hopefully, the LCACs would complete their breach before the AAAVs arrived. The minefields were a deadly nuisance. They were not condensed, and that meant the LCACs had to fire several charges to clear only a few mines. The LCACs had just fired their first few line charges on the beach itself, and they were now unloading Grizzly engineer vehicles to proof the beach. Even after the line charges, there were still many mines that needed to be cleared with a bladed vehicle.

Cobra helicopters and riverine assault craft were escorting the LCACs, making sure the enemy didn't interfere with the LCACs time-consuming mission. So far, the beach was clear of enemy, but the mines were still proving to be a difficult obstacle to breach. Kenny was wondering if it would even be possible to breach the minefield if the enemy opposed the landing. Another company's LPP had been closed after the engineers on the beach were ambushed by a few San Selvans and the enemy fired an artillery-delivered minefield on the beach. An enemy artillery battery was destroyed in the exchange, but it would take too long to create the LPP and that company would need to use another company's LPP. That would waste more precious fuel.

Kenny was still concerned about the need to use the alternate route. The San Selvans were expected to defend in a manner that forced the Marines to burn fuel and use ammunition. They would avoid fighting American combat power and focus their efforts on destroying any resupply effort. If he only had an organic bridging capability, Kenny would have saved valuable time and fuel. Or, if he at least had an organic refueling capability, then he wouldn't need to receive a refuel from the ship. At least the San Selvans did not have a biological or chemical warfare capability. NBC would have slowed the company even more.

One mile from the shoreline, Kenny's lead AAAV entered into the lane that had been cleared by the LCACs. The company progressed single file, slowing their speed to avoid a mistake. Navigators were careful to stay on course. The mine threat was minimal at this point, but everyone was nervous nonetheless. When they were halfway through the minefield, still over 500 meters from the shore, the AAAVs had to transition for ground movement. The transition from high speed water to ground movement had to be done in at least 15 feet of water, and the shallow beach gradient meant they had to do it now. It took 45 seconds for the transition, and the last half mile would be covered at a maximum speed of 10 nmph.

Kenny received another message when he was 300 meters from the shore. One of the AAAVs was reporting that it had lost hydraulic pressure and was stuck in its transition from water to land movement. The AAAV was now unable to propel and steer effectively. He could see on his computer screen that the other AAAVs were slowly moving around the broken landing craft. The wake from the AAAVs caused the broken one to drift, and Kenny was concerned it might slide out of the lane and into a mine. This was a serious problem, and Kenny was about to use his radio to pass instructions when he heard the AAAV platoon commander.

"Bulldog one-three, this is bulldog six, over," said Lieutenant Evans, the AAAV platoon commander. "This is bulldog one-three," answered Sergeant Royal, the vehicle commander in the broken AAAV. Royal had not had time to send the message to the lieutenant. The AAAVs diagnostic system had done it automatically. "We're okay but dead in the water."

"Roger," said Evans. He called the recovery craft to tow the disabled AAAV back out to sea. Unfortunately, this meant that one more of the company's AAAVs was not going to make it ashore. Our ships currently avoid the shore because of the coastal radar, sea-mine, and anti-ship missile threats. In the future, we may need to stay well beyond 25 miles from the shore. We can expect that even our most primitive enemy will soon be capable of purchasing near-real-time satellite data from commercial organizations or rogue governments to pinpoint the location of our ships. This will reduce our ability to generate the element of surprise, and it will also make us more vulnerable to ballistic missiles and precision munitions that can be directed towards our force at sea. The last time the United States Navy faced such a threat in combat -- long range, precision munitions in great numbers -- was against the kamikazes during the Okinawa campaign in 1945. The impact on the fleet was horrid, with 368 ships damaged and 36 sunk. Ominous numbers, especially since current appropriation and decommission plans will leave the Navy with a fleet of less than 300 ships by 2010, of which only 36 will be amphibious ships.

It seems that the most obvious threat to future mobility will be from mines, both on land and in the water. World War I era sea mines are still a significant threat to our ships and landing craft. In one hour on February 18, 1991, the USS Tripoli (LPH 10) and USS Princeton (CG 59) were disabled by sea-mines. The Tripoli, carrying almost 3,000 Marines and sailors, was able to stay on station with a 20 foot hole in her bow, but the Aegis cruiser Princeton had to limp back to port.

Minefields could begin as far out as the 600 foot depth line, and the route to the shore might be blocked by anti-ship, anti-landing craft, and anti-helicopter mines. These minefields will also be covered by coastal artillery and anti-ship missile systems that are protected with integrated air defenses. Getting to the beach will only be part of the problem, however, for mines and obstacles in the surf and on the landing beach will be covered by direct and indirect fire weapons. Modern mines are becoming more and more sophisticated and deadly, and they are now able to discriminate between vessels and actually pick a target. The Navy is working hard to overcome the mine challenge, but we still face the proverbial "brick wall" when encountering mines in shallow water (less than 40 feet) and the surf zone. Identifying and avoiding the minefield is not necessarily the best answer, because the enemy may have placed the minefield hoping for that result. The shore defenses could also be so well prepared that there are no gaps in the minefield leading to a suitable landing beach. We need the ability to conduct an in stride breach. The only solution that is being briefed is using an LCAC to fire line charges into the minefield. This option is unrealistic, because it will only be possible when the beach is void of enemy. Line charges in the surf and on the beach will only reposition the mines, and many will need to be used to open a small breach. Many modern land mines are not detonated by a secondary explosion; therefore, it will still be necessary to proof the minefield with some type of bladed vehicle. Finally, using LCACs reduces the landing craft available to move combat power from ship to shore. A better option might be to create helicopter, ship, or submarine-fired anti-mine missiles or line charges.

Fire Support

Corporal Regnal Simmons aimed his precision targeting system at the truck and pushed the trigger. No weapon fired, but Simmons had just sent a fire mission to the two Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) nearby. With the push of a button, the JSF received Simmons location, the range and direction to the target, and a digital picture of the target. All Simmons needed to do was give the aircraft the word and they would come in and destroy the truck full of men.

Manning an observation point far into San Selva, Simmons and the five Marines with him couldn't take the chance of letting the enemy surprise them. But they also couldn't waste the assets that were available. Simmons knew that once he used the JSFs, much of his fire support would be gone. There were two AH-1Z Cobra attack helicopters in the area, but they were already low on fuel. He was over 100 miles from the ship, and the helicopters lacked the fuel capacity to stay on station for more than 15 minutes. If he lost his fire support from the air, then Simmons would need to rely on naval surface fire support. The DD-21 Land Attack Destroyer was a great weapon, but its fires would provide only minimal support in this situation. The rounds fired from the ship would require a five minute time of flight to cover the great distance. As deadly as the DD was, it just wasn't responsive enough. Five minutes is a lifetime in a fire fight, and Simmons and his fellow Devil Dogs could be dead before the first round impacted. These fire support problems were not unique to Simmons and his fellow reconnaissance Marines. Captain Kenny would have been in a similar situation if he were here, even with AAAVs. The AAAVs 30mm gun was extremely accurate when used in an indirect fire mode, but it required a lot of ammunition to have the same effect as an artillery system. Unfortunately, there was no artillery system that had the mobility of an AAAV.

Providing fire support to forces ashore will be difficult, especially at extended distances. Although the AH-1Z Cobra and UH-1Y Huey will have increased speed and lift capabilities for weapons, they will not enjoy significant increasing fuel capacity and time on station. Fixed-wing fire support from the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is anticipated to be accurate and responsive, but it is not expected to enter the inventory until FY08. Until we design a fire support platform for the MV-22 -- possibly an AV-22 that operates like a miniature AC-130 gunship -- the MV-22 will be lacking rotary wing escort for long range operations. And as always, surface to air missiles and adverse weather conditions impact the ability for air to provide fire support to ground forces.

Experiments to design future naval surface fire support systems are promising, but they too will have limits. Beginning in FY09, thirty-two DD-21 Land Attack Destroyers will join the fleet. The DD-21 is expected to be armed with the 155mm or 8 inch Advanced Gun System (AGS) and the Land Attack Standard Missile (LASM). These weapons will have ranges between 41 and 150 nautical miles. Until the DD-21 comes on line, ships already in the fleet will be retrofitted with the 5"/62, which will be capable of firing extended range guided munitions as far as 63 nautical miles. Targeting and fire direction control will be more sophisticated, so the threat of collateral damage will also be reduced.

The largest problem with future naval surface fires will be a lack of responsiveness. Because of the great distances, time of flight can be seven to nine minutes. Also, most of the munitions being developed are Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM). DPICM has a significant submunition dud rate (2 to 5 percent depending on terrain), and that will slow free movement through an area into which DPICM has been fired. Additionally, because of the high cost of these precision munitions, many officers are pessimistic about availability to commanders at the tactical level. And we cannot forget the value of a lot of rounds impacting over a large area for a sustained period of time. The demoralizing and neutralizing effects provided by large volumes of inexpensive non-precision munitions that currently exist should not be lost.

After noting the inherent limitations of air and naval surface fires, it should be obvious that ground-based fires are needed to fully support OMFTS. Advancements in the technology and procedures for target acquisition and fire direction will facilitate an OMFTS doctrine, but there is still a severe lack of suitable weapon platforms.

The lightweight 155mm howitzer (XM777) will be a great improvement over the M198 in terms of capability, due in large part to its Automated Fire Control System. The XM777's biggest drawback remains the fact that it is a towed system with the same large logistical footprint as the M198. The two largest detractors of towed artillery are the amount of lift necessary for ship to shore movement of the battery, and the difficulties of employment in an urban environment (turning radius, crew survivability, greater time and space needed to employ the gun).

Unfortunately, we need an additional indirect fire weapon system if we are to fully realize OMFTS. The weapon system should be self-propelled with similar mobility of the AAAV or LAV. A self-propelled system reduces the battery's logistical footprint and increases the mobility of the weapon. One tested solution, the automated mortar system, despite having maneuverability similar to that of an LAV, is unsatisfactory because it is hampered by poor accuracy in both the direct and indirect fire mode. The best answer would be an AAAV with a 105mm or 155mm gun, but it may be necessary to settle for a 105mm mounted on an LAV.

Seabased Logistics

In the TACLOG, Major John Macias was coordinating the resupply missions for the maneuver units ashore. Many units would be 100 miles or more away from the ships when their first resupply would take place. By checking the NCE, he could monitor the fuel, maintenance, and ammunition requirements , as well as, coordinate requests for additional support for each unit. The challenge was going to be in transporting the cargo over such great distances and having it arrive as needed.

After the long swim ashore, each AAAV would have used over 150 gallons of the 400 gallon tank before starting their movement ashore. Each of the three companies would need over 3,000 gallons or 20,400 pounds of fuel to fill-up their tanks once they reached ¼ tank. The company traveling parallel to the coast could be supplied by surface means since the navy had already started clearing the lane to LPP 3. Since that company also had a platoon of tanks attached, they were going to require even more fuel. The units operating within the city were primarily foot mobile and didn't require much fuel, but Macias was anticipating that they would require more ammunition, water, and medical support.

The forces conducting ground resupply consisted of two mobile combat service support detachments (MCSSDs). Each MCSSD would support a maneuver company, but would be capable of being redirected to another unit or to meet air assets for replenishment. These MCSSDs would include six logistic vehicle system replacement (LVSR) refuelers, two medium transport vehicle replacements (MTVR), a 7 ½ ton truck, with water and ammunition, and four LAVs for force protection. These MCSSDs would have to be inserted and extracted by LCAC. Major Macias worried that he had missed his resupply window due to LCAC delays in breaching the minefields. The LCACs currently being reloaded needed to depart the ship within ten minutes to make their scheduled resupply. If they left within ten minutes they could also linkup with the tank platoon which was delayed by LCAC availability.

The companies far inland and in the city would be resupplied by air to ensure that they did not lose momentum waiting for ground resupply. The air resupply for the AAAV units would be conducted by CH-53Es escorted by AH-1Zs. The units in the city would be resupplied by helicopters, UAVs, and MV-22s dropping supplies on the roof tops of buildings that the Marines occupied.

Macias’ biggest concern was security for the resupply missions. The enemy knew that force sustainment was one of the Marines’ critical vulnerabilities. Macias hoped that his forces had enough speed and mobility to prevent the enemy from finding him. Since the maneuver units were already pushing inland, the MCSSDs only force protection assets were the LAVs attached to them. Their only other security would come in the form of a linkup with the tanks.

The mobile combat service support detachments (MCSSDs) must possess vehicles with survivability, firepower, and mobility. The MCSSDs must also be linked to intelligence and command and control. The MCSSD must be capable of moving ashore, linking up with the GCE for a logistics raid/resupply, and egress back to amphibious or MPF shipping. MCSSDs today do not have the weapons systems or vehicle survivability to withstand contact with an enemy force. Combat capable MCSSDs would be equipped with AAAVs (as yet undesigned logistics variant), LAVs, or a new vehicle. These vehicles would drastically increase mobility and survivability for the MCSSD and at the same time decrease the need for the GCE to allocate forces to protect them.

History has shown that MOUT operations will be costly in term of ammunition, personnel, and medical support. This support requires a sizable percentage of available vehicles and aircraft. It is projected that ammunition consumption will increase tenfold during high-intensity urban warfare. It was calculated that during the battle for the city of Hue, Vietnam, U.S. forces expended over 13,000 artillery rounds; 20,000 mortar rounds; and 5,000 naval gunfire rounds in less than a month. Future innovations in precision munitions may reduce the need for a large resupply of ammunition and portable reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPU) can reduce the need to transport water to operating forces. However, until we find a replacement for the internal combustion engine, we will need to resupply the operating forces with fuel. The NCE interface with the automatic diagnostic relays in vehicles and equipment ashore will identify future repair, fuel, and ammunition requirements. The chart below depicts the requirements to resupply a AAAV-mechanized rifle company with fuel.

When combined with the requirements of the entire MAGTF, the lift required quickly overwhelms available assault support platforms. In addition, assault support resupply does not offer the MAGTF an all-weather capability.

The MPF squadrons and amphibious shipping carry thirty and fifteen days of supply respectively. However, these quantities are not designed to support operations in an urban environment, such as those recorded in the battle for Hue. This deficiency in MPF makes the requirements for rapid reachback, improved amphibious/MPF shipping, and seabasing even more important because of the limitations of sea-basing logistics. Since there will be no stockpiles of supplies ashore, the MAGTF will need to have supplies on ship and be able to rapidly obtain support from intertheater and intratheater supporting agencies.

These methods of tactical resupply will require enhanced training for the personnel who conduct them. Support officers and enlisted Marines will need to be able to plan and execute resupply operations, as well as methods of insertion, maneuver, fire support, and extraction of a somewhat heavy and vulnerable force in an unfriendly environment. These Marines, with vehicles and equipment designed specifically for MCSSD operations in an OMFTS environment, will provide the MAGTF commander with responsive, survivable, and capable logistics.

Training and Education

The engineers were done with their initial cuts in the roof and setting of explosives when Lieutenant Dunne's radio operator said the commanding officer was calling. "Phoenix-six, this is phoenix-two, over," said Dunne into the hand-set. He listened as the CO told him that the building one of the other platoons was assaulting had caught fire and they were conducting an emergency extract. They were not sure how the fire had started, but it would be impossible to stay. Dunne looked over and saw the bright glow. It looked bad, and he wondered if there was any chance they would get all the Marines off the roof before fire consumed it. He was struck with an overwhelming urge to get to the bottom floor of his own building before the same fate hit his platoon.

"Sorry, sir," said an Air Force sergeant from the FAC team who bumped into Dunne. The sergeant was well experienced in using the Air Force AC-130 now providing fire support over the Marine position. Accompanying the sergeant was a Marine with a laser designator, the briefcase-size replacement to the MULE. The AC-130 and laser-guided munitions were the only fire support Dunne could use without causing collateral damage.

BOOM! The engineers blew a six feet by six feet hole in the roof. Two stun grenades were thrown into the hole, followed closely by an entire fireteam armed with M203s. They carried their weapons with one hand on the pistol grip and the other on the magazine-- both index fingers resting on triggers. Depending on the threat encountered, the Marines were ready to fire either an M16 bullet or a 40mm bean bag round from the M203. Thumbs rested on switches for a laser spotter that could also illuminate shadows where the Marines' night-vision goggles had difficulty seeing. All the maneuvering of the fingers sounded complex, but it was child's play, literally, for a generation that was raised on video games.

There was no gunfire, and other Marines jumped into the hole, falling awkwardly amongst the rubble caused by the breach, knocking their elbow and knee pads into chunks of concrete. They fanned out and searched the floor like a spreading ink blot, with several men carrying fire extinguishers and spraying any sign of smoke or flame. Furniture was strewn about, and the stairs were still blocked, but Marines were positioned to cover them anyway. An industrial drill was used to punch a hole in the floor for the video observation unit, and the engineers started cutting to create a breach to the next floor. The old building had no elevator, and sending Marines down the side of the structure was too risky. Using explosives on the wood floor would only increase the likelihood of fire. Cutting down was the only option, and, fortunately, the interior floors were thinner and easier to cut through than the roof.

The platoon was progressing quickly until gunfire erupted as they jumped from the fourth floor to the third (Point A of Figure 1). An M240G squad positioned on the fourth floor (Point B of Figure 1) in a covering role started firing through the floor at the enemy. The firefight raged with no visibility between the combatants-- the two sides firing through floors and walls at each other.

The deafening noise forced Dunne to send a Marine down into the firefight to stop the Marines from moving forward. Dunne's action was a common requirement in dimensional warfare. The violence was devastating, with bullets ripping chunks out of the thin walls, creating gaps that M203 gunners began firing high explosive grenades through. The crossfire created by the machine guns and the rifle squad gained the desired result: the enemy stopped firing.

After the Marines on the fourth floor ceased fire, those on the third crashed through what was left of the wall between them and the enemy. Water sprayed from holes, reducing visibility. Dunne was concerned there might be also be ruptured gas lines, and he looked for the Navy technician attached to his platoon to cap gushing pipes. The squad leader on the third floor entered the room (Point C of Figure 1) and was shocked to see there was no enemy. He paused for a second before yelling at his Marines to fall back, but it was too late. From the safety of the apartment building across the street, the enemy again opened fire, but this time it was with RPGs. None of the Marines in the room escaped the bloodshed: 2 were killed, and 4 were wounded.

The enemy had positioned themselves where they would not be vulnerable to Marines on the roof. The machine-gun squad leader on the fourth floor, understanding that the Marines below had been ambushed, directed his Marines to a position where they could fire on the other building (to Point D of Figure 1). But the enemy had already fallen back, and all the Marines could see was that the gunfire from the squad below had ripped through their building and into the apartment building, wounding several civilians (Point E of Figure 1). A sniper from yet another building took one shot (from Point F of Figure 1) before falling back himself. His shot hit the machine-gun squad leader in the head, killing him instantly. Dunne grabbed the field phone that had been brought through the breaches and called to the roof. Despite all the money spent on technologically advanced communication devices, the wire phones were still the most reliable method of communication. Staff Sergeant Lee, the platoon sergeant, was on the roof with the extra supplies and a dozen Marines: most of the radio operators, the FAC team, a sniper team, and the logistics detachment. "Staff sergeant, I've got wounded down here. Call for a medevac. And I'm going to need help," said Dunne. Not only did the wounded and dead reduce the platoon's combat power, but moving them back through the breaches to the roof for evacuation was going to be a laborious, timely evolution.

"I've got one up here, too," said the staff sergeant. "When the shooting started down there, Wilson yelled that he saw enemy. Using the hand and arm signal right from the FMFM 6-5 (Marine Rifle Squad Manual), he put his rifle in his shoulder and pointed at where he thought they were. It was Echo Company, sir. A Marine over there saw a weapon pointed at him and instinctively fired. The only thing that saved Wilson's life was his bulletproof vest." Dunne fought the feelings of nausea as he signaled for the engineers to start another breach. The platoon was attacking an unoccupied building, yet three Marines were dead and five were wounded, including two key leaders. Worst of all, he had to get through two more floors before someone lit the building on fire, trapping and killing the rest of his platoon. He couldn't even pause to evacuate his wounded. Getting to the ground floor wasn't going to end the hostility either. Dunne knew the situation would shift on the spectrum of conflict because when the sun came up he would meet an organized counterattack or rioting civilians-- maybe both.

Why weren't we better prepared? Dunne asked himself.

As emphasized in MCDP-6, people determine success in battle, not machines. The Marine Corps must develop the doctrine and experience needed for OMFTS to become reality. If there is one thing that impedes the Corps' ability to execute OMFTS in the future, it is that we are not fully employing our company-grade officers to "test" the OMFTS doctrine. The Tentative Manual for Landing Operations published in 1934 was the product of officers from Quantico schools, many of whom were only captains. Every year beginning in 1935, the schools conducted practical exercises in which students and staff worked out the details of using the new doctrine to conduct amphibious operations, including assaults on Truk (1935), Palau (1936), Guam (1939) and Saipan (1940). Today, as they participate in amphibious problems reminiscent of Tarawa, Marine officers relive the experience of Holland M. Smith, who stated in 1926 that Marine Corps Schools were still in the thrall of "outmoded military thought . . . floundered among the outdated doctrines of World War I." The students attending Amphibious Warfare School today will be the lieutenant colonels and colonels commanding the first fully OMFTS units, yet most have had little exposure to OMFTS beyond a few lectures and guest speakers. The captains of 1933 were using the doctrine they helped write less than ten years later in World War II. Ten years from now, when we have the needed technology, will we be properly prepared to execute the OMFTS doctrine?

The Marine Corps Combat Development Center should create training packages that require Marine officers to plan for an amphibious operation taking place in a 2015 setting. Here is an example: require students to plan and execute a map exercise using the attack on the Eastern coast of the United States (Richmond scenario) described in the OMFTS concept paper. These training packages should be incorporated in the curriculum of formal schools, taught by mobile training teams, included in the courses at the Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups, and completed during unit PMEs. Such efforts will increase Marine officers' understanding of OMFTS, produce constant "reality checks," and also improve the likelihood that OMFTS will be experimented within the Fleet Marine Force.

The training for small-unit leaders, particularly noncommissioned officers, must also be improved. A basic foundation in decision making is created during the Crucible at the Recruit Depot, but that foundation needs to be enhanced for OMFTS to be possible. Since there will be few "rear areas," all movement will need to be tactical; therefore, combat skills will become even more important. School for enlisted Marines that have 25 hours of general military subjects but barely any field skills will not help us obtain mastery of OMFTS. Noncommissioned Officer Schools and Staff Noncommissioned Officers School probably need to become more like Combat Squad Leader School and Platoon Sergeant School, while Squad Leader School and Platoon Sergeant School need to become more like the Infantry Officer Course. Schools for officers need start with basics but build to a focus on recognitional decision making with an enhanced tactical picture.

Conclusion

Operational Maneuver from the Sea is a warfighting philosophy that couples maneuver warfare and technological advances to create a force that moves rapidly to a decisive objective. By creating forces that will use the seas as maneuver space, we will enhance our ability to use our strength to exploit an enemy weakness and attack a center of gravity. The LCAC, MV-22, and AAAV will make this new doctrine possible, but it will not become reality unless we address other shortfalls. New methods are needed for command and control, as well as innovative ideas of how to manage enormous amounts of information. Maneuver forces will not be able to exercise full mobility until we design new systems and techniques to breach minefields. Intelligence needs to be equipped and organized to capitalize on the information collect with sensors by combining it with HUMINT. Continuous fire support will not be available if we do not appropriate an artillery system that has the mobility to provide direct support to maneuver units. Moving logistical support from a seabase to units ashore will not occur without new organizations designed to deliver long range combat service support. Most important, training and education must be designed to enhance the level of thinking needed from Marines at all levels of command if OMFTS is to occur.

The MOUT Homepage Hot Links:

Marine Corps Concept Paper - Operational Maneuver From the Sea (Concepts Division - MCCDC)
Amphibious Warfare School (AWS - Marine Corps University)

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