The potential for future U.S. military involvement in expeditionary operations in urban areas will grow exponentially. U.S. military intervention within developing nations has increased over the last eight years as a result of increased chaos, as compared to the number of intervention during the Cold War. The emerging new world disorder brings the potential for continued military commitment in many of these regions well into the 21st century. U.S. forces committed in the past decade have increasingly found themselves operating within the dense populations of urban areas, such as Somalia, Liberia, Bosnia, and Haiti. The United States Intelligence Community's organization, defined by the Cold War threat, does not effectively and efficiently provide the type of intelligence needed for urban-based military operations. We must be prepared to operate across the spectrum of conflict in the urban environment that requires the establishment of a new center to fulfill and coordinate these specific and unique types of intelligence requirements. This center founded on emerging technologies coupled with a new joint urban doctrine will revolutionize our ability to operate in urban areas.
As we enter the new millenium, the world will begin the "Urban Century," characterized by rapid and unplanned growth of cities and their populations. The population growth in cities between 1990 and 2025 is estimated to be over 300 percent; the urban population might reach 4,400,000,000. Every day hundreds of thousands of people in developing countries migrate to economic and political centers – the cities. Inadequate infrastructure to support this rapid urban population explosion creates the potential for instability and chaos. From a sociological perspective, the third worlds is now entering the modern age facing similar problems that all industrial powers once experienced, except that these problems are multiplied by the introduction of elements from the information age coupled with the problems created by young and inexperienced governments.
Because of this city growth and the inherent potential for instability, militaries may well find themselves conducting an increased number of operations on urbanized terrain. The United States has historically protected interests abroad, and now as the sheriff of the New World Order, will see an increase in the potential for urban confrontations. Operations within the past decade have often been what we title "operations other than war" in the form of humanitarian assistance; peace-keeping, - making – enforcement; internal security; and evacuation of non combatants. These operations are in fact as lethal as any across the spectrum of conflict. These are quickly becoming the prototypical situations that plague the emerging security environment, and most center around cities. Additionally, we must not forget that several countries offer the potential to rise as peer competitors in the first half of the next century. We must prepare to operate across the spectrum of conflict to include high intensity city combat.
Great military planners from historic, pre-modern, and modern ages have viewed cities as their opponents' centers of gravity. Cities are often the political, economic, cultural, information, transportation, and religious centers that provide wealth, power, and social influence to many countries and with these, adversarial frictions. In the post-modern age, we must come to understand (in terms of knowledge) that control or influence versus total destruction of our enemy's center of gravity(s) can effectively achieve our desired end state. In fact, conflict termination and later conflict resolution are better served when the post-conflict costs are minimized. Intelligence plays a significant role in this accomplishment.
In the past, the U.S. has often used large forces to physically destroy a city in order to defeat our opponent. We need to look only at the significant campaigns of World War II to see the lasting effects of such methods. Some may argue that the United States was fighting a "total war", a war for national survival which accepted total physical destruction. In the future we may not have the resources or the support of the American people in terms of the "will" to wage total war in order to achieve limited objectives. Joint Vision 2010 states that "…instead of relying on massed forces and sequential operations, we will achieve massed effects in other ways." To operate in such manner implies significant intelligence and information capability in order to create a shared situational picture. The purpose of this architecture should be to facilitate decentralized decision making in the uncertain, not to achieve certainty in a chaotic environment.
The Marine Corps, designated as the proponent for urban operations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is currently leading the working group that is developing an operational concept for urban operations that is in concert with the tenets of Joint Vision 2010. First, we must come to a common understanding and perception about cities. We must learn to view cities from a different perspective. A city is often viewed in one of two ways: as a living organism or an intricate machine. We may compare a city to a car with its many parts, while another may describe it in biological terms – as in the human body. The first viewpoint is simplistic and fails to recognize the nonlinear characteristics of humans and our fluid environment. The biological viewpoint sees a complex system comprised of many inner-related sub-components, each of which interacts with the other components or sub-components in a complex and varying manner that cannot be predicted.
Let's look at a city in terms of the biological analogy. A city is much like the human body in that it has a multitude of complex systems, some more important than others, each providing for effective, efficient, and continued operation. The system architecture is hierarchical, each dependent upon a central system that provides command and control for the other systems. In the human body, the primary control system is the central nervous system, while in the city it is or will soon become the "information grid." Each system is comprised of a network of nodes that connect one system to another and provides a means of control an/or influence over the nodes and sub-systems with which it is connected – or interconnectivity.
Using a cancer analogy, how would a medical professional treat cancer? Do doctors routinely damage the human body to the point that no means exist for continued life in the treatment of cancer? This would be an absurd assertion, though this has been our primary military approach to the treatment of "cancer" in urban operations. Our enemy may be compared to cancer-ever changing and adapting to new environments, sometimes elusive while other times strong, ever-present, waiting for an opportunity. We have often destroyed the city to kill the enemy. A new approach to future operations will require the leveraging of key systems within a city to impose our "will" on the enemy in the moist advantageous manner. The manner that well achieve this influence is uncertain and dependent on the changing situation. We must maximize the use of technology to provide an information feedback loop that supports decentralized decision making and execution in order to remain adaptive and fluid.
Assume you fall ill and have sought medical care from a doctor. Does he or she not try to determine the nature of your problem? He or she will gain situational awareness, assuming the doctor has been properly educated, by asking the right questions to identify symptoms and by running diagnostic tests. This same doctor applies judgement gained from experience and significant knowledge or "basic" intelligence data necessary to begin his initial assessment and later surgery if required. The point is that policy makers and military planners, and perhaps others, have a real requirement for basic city intelligence. Whether it is a humanitarian mission or high-intensity conflict, basic intelligence is in high demand because of the unique nature of built-up areas.
What are the basic intelligence requirements for urban areas? A new term, "CITYINT" is becoming a common buzzword. It is in fact a reference to the unique and immense basic, current, and estimative intelligence requirements necessary to reduce uncertainty for decision makers and planners at all levels who may find themselves involved in urban-based operations, be it a combat or non-combat mission. Several factors weigh into the determination of information or intelligence requirements associated with urban operations.
The first and foremost, which relates to all future military operations, is the necessity to conduct activities with the populations of host countries. Poor performance in terms of excessive collateral damage may erode relationships in future operations that are and will be conducted in conjunction with allies or other partners. The Cold War model of attrition warfare is no longer acceptable, nor has it or ever will serve to achieve our objectives in the gray or mall war arena. Recent Rand studies point out that political and other factors mentioned above will increase the constraints and restraints placed on commanders and will force them to operate within rules of engagement that require the precise use of fires. Detailed knowledge gleaned from intelligence is an inherent requirement of leaders at all levels for such operations.
Recent military urban operations have posed complex intelligence problems with many variables that influence day-to-day successes, and the achievement of long term goals. The battle field will be gray, not black and white. The assymetrical threat has ben elusive, difficult to identify, understand, or predict. Even the conventional threat has the ability to capitalize on the characteristics of urban geography. We know little about the "bad guy" because he often does not wear a uniform. Our opponents fail to operate in a manner that we understand. We often fall prey to applying western-centric and Judeo-Christian ethic models on the problems within developing nations.
Our efforts, resources, and time have been focused for so long on the former Soviet Bear that we have failed to recognize the street thug down the road. Today, that street thug is who must face, and he lives in the city. Charles Taylor's MPFL in Liberia, the FARC in Columbia, the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, Aideed in Mogadishu, are all examples of threats we may engage in today's developing nations. What information and intelligence will we need to effectively plan, decide, and adapt? How do we produce this type of intelligence with so many potential target areas?
The physical environment also affects our ability to provide knowledge to decision-makers. An urban area is very complex and is a conglomeration of planned and unplanned manmade construction. In Mogadishu, the city block is no bigger than a conference room, creating new problems for imagery analysts. Mexico City, as an example, is composed of perhaps the largest slum in the world. The city is an unplanned, unorganized, complex collection of alleys, shanties, and trails that create a complex maze that provides certain friction for any operation. The three dimensional nature of built-up areas magnifies the difficulties of intelligence collection and analysis necessary to meet ever larger requirements. The specific requirements that assist those personnel on the edge of the "Empire" are vast.
Innumerable variables influence the priority for intelligence collection. The intelligence Community cannot satisfy all the requirements from all the customers because of finite resources in terms of money, personnel, and time. There are generally two types of intelligence requirements: standing and ad hoc. Standing requirements are those that are long term in nature against a known or potential threat. Ad hoc requirements are those that are usually short notice as a result of an emerging threat or crisis. An increased number of these types of requirements have become common place because of the uncertainty in the emerging security environment. Several studies have highlighted the fact that commanders are in need of basic intelligence.
Intelligence is often categorized into three types: estimative, current, and basic. We can "watch" a particular target or country for purposes of producing each type of intelligence. Basic intelligence does not receive the attention and priority of current or estimative therefore limited resources are allocated for such purposes. Resources are allocated against each target and specific category of intelligence that will be produced. Basic intelligence on a city in a small developing nation in Africa is at the bottom of a long list as compared to the collection and analysis to support counter proliferation or watching a peer competitor.
It is interesting to note that most of the crises in which we have intervened with military force had a low intelligence priority, in both collection and analysis, before the onset of the crisis. The result was and is limited intelligence necessary for detailed planning. In time of crisis, even with the area of concern, basic intelligence receives less attention than current or estimative intelligence requirements. The solution by the Intelligence Community to these crises has been to create an ad hoc task force to satisfy the requirements, thereby creating a detriment to watching other potential threats. This has been the only workable solution available, for better or worse. Senior intelligence leaders make tough decisions such as where to accept risk in order to satisfy current needs of forces on the ground. In the end, the basic intelligence requirements and qualitative all source analysis are not provided or is often not available in a timeframe which "best" supports the operation. Country handbooks are a good example of this point. Often we see these books, which are usually very good, released after the initial forces have been introduced. Do we effectively meet critical time requirements? Can we do better?
In urban operations, intelligence requirements are many, heavily in the form of basic information, and are magnified by the nature of the terrain, the large population, as well as the political nature of the operation. The following is a simple list of generic requirements necessary for planning a military operation across the spectrum of conflict in a built-up area.
- Population, size, demographics, religion(s).
- Size, street layout, subterranean areas.
- Transportation systems.
- City government.
- Leaders, who, influence.
- Military installation, size, activity.
- Water, power, food sources and distribution.
- Language(s) and dialects.
- Cultural aspects and social structures and interaction.
The Intelligence Community (IC), specifically the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), can better support military operations in urban areas with the creation of an Urban Analysis Center (UAC) to serve the needs of the regional commander and service chiefs. Currently, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) has the only dedicated urban-analysis section specifically created to focus on urban studies as it relates to warfare. MCIA created the small urban analysis section to support the operating forces. The interest has grown rapidly because of the requirements related to this subject within the Marine Corps, the other services, and government agencies. The IC center would be a "bigger" version of the MCIA effort and function much like the community Counter-Terrorism and Non-Proliferation Centers.
The analysis center should best be established within the Department of Defense to maximize the priority benefits of all source collection and thorough military analysis in order to produce detailed and specific basic intelligence. Where better to locate this new center then under the oversight of DIA, an organization responsible for satisfying the military intelligence requirements of the National Command Authority, the Joint Staff, and the Unified Commanders in Chiefs? This center may be a "virtual" center tying many agencies and people together, or perhaps a physical entity with assets located together. The intent is to create a clearing house to collect, analyze, and disseminate information and intelligence related to urban areas for many users, but focused on supporting the military.
The urban analysis center will serve several purposes. First, it will create, use, and update an urban geographic information system of designated world cities. This system can be used as a "reach back" reservoir for the National Command Authority's, the CINC's Joint Intelligence and Analysis Centers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Task Forces, and the Services intelligence centers and activities. Today's information technology, advanced communications systems, and computers provide the potential to disseminate information and intelligence from the UAC to the user in "near real" or "real" time. This is the type of capability that can be realized with the use of current and emerging technology.
Second, the UAC will provide current and estimative intelligence related to cities. Rather than depend entirely on government analysts, the center will tie into experts within the academic and business communities to provide current and estimative reports that will be incorporated into the production of final products.
The University of Wisconsin, for example, has a significant urban planning program to include geographic information systems. Why should we expend resources to maintain a "standing" capability that may not be required? Outsourcing may be essential in time of crisis. Research and development funds can be allocated to identified academic institutions to maintain a breath of knowledge in cities and urban regions of interest or potential crisis. The fusion of outsourced analysis, coupled with the intelligence produced within the center, will provide the "CITYINT" necessary to satisfy policy, planners, and decision makers.
The analysis center will be responsible for components of strategic intelligence narrowed on the city or urban area. Below is a short list of those components, with a short explanation, that must receive extensive attention to produce detailed and in depth intelligence in order to effectively support decision makers:
- Armed Forces: Includes the identification of para-military, military, police, and other armed groups that have the potential to fight. What are the capabilities and limitations of each? How are they vulnerable?
- Biographic: Who are the key leaders within each political, social, and military groups? What is their education, ideology, religion, and motive? "What makes them tick?"
- Economic: How is the economic system organized, and how does it function? What are the economic sources within the city?
- Geographic: Identify key infrastructure systems such as power, water, food, and telecommunications (to name a few). What are the critical nodes in each system? What is the lay out of the city? Where and what is the key terrain?
- Sociological: "Cultural Intelligence." What are the mores, values, cultural taboos, languages(s) and dialects within the urban area? These are the things often overlooked that have significant implications on the conduct of military operations.
- Political: How is power distributed, government organized, who are the players or groups with or without power and why?
At the operational level, the warfighting CINCs must identify those cities that hold significance as potential hot spots in their area of operations. Secondly, intelligence must be focused in order to provide the granularity 0fintelligence necessary to plan and execute operations in accordance with Joint Vision 2010 concepts. What are the specific systems within each city that are of significant value to U.S. forces and our potential adversary? How is each system organized and what are the sub-components of the system? What and where are the critical nodes of these systems? Does the potential adversary understand the significance of these nodes and to what extent is each protected? Each city is unique and must be analyzed accordingly.
In summary, we must use a directed telescope approach to identify which system(s) are critical to the function of a particular city. The collection effort must not be solely focused on the enemy's command and control infrastructure. Every city has some key systems that provide the sustainment and operation of everyday activities. We must evaluate each of these through a cultural lens to better place them in context. These are the systems that should be targets for intelligence collection, analysis, and production to support future military operations.
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