The US military has a long history of urban operations. Since the early 1940's, our military forces have been involved in urban battles in Manila, St Lo, Aachen, Seoul, Hue, Saigon, Panama City, Al-Khafji, and Mogadishu. We have conducted urban aviation operations in Libyan, Iraqi, Kuwaiti, Sudanese, and Yugoslavian built-up areas; and executed operations other than war (OOTW) in the urban jungles of Lebanon, Somalia, Liberia, Albania, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. These operations are but a few examples - and span the level of operations from mid to high intensity conflict through humanitarian, security (peacekeeping/peacemaking), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).

Since 1945, there have been more than 250 naval interventions and 90 percent have involved cities. As "America's 911 Force," Marine expeditionary units are often first "in country" and the most in need of timely and accurate urban threat, infrastructure and cultural assessments and studies on short demand.

Demographic trends make it a near certainty that future operations will involve more of the same. Population models estimate that majority of the world's population will live in cities by 2005. Seventy percent of these cities will be located on the world's littorals and by the year 2000 - 21 of the 30 largest cities will be in the Third World - 24 by the year 2015.

An increasing citizenry and rural refugees overwhelm these cities. Unemployment, lack of medical care and adequate housing and subsistence is exasperated by the diverse cultural, ethnic, political, and religious differences of groups who are located in close proximity within a constrained environment. As centers of population, culture, communications, transportation, economics, and seats of governments, cities are societal centers of gravity. This concentration of societal centers of gravity also makes these areas the centers of gravity of military campaigns.

Cities also occupy historically strategic key terrain, enhancing their value as military objectives. Many cities were originally developed to defend and/or exploit valuable geographic chokepoints. These cities dominate sea and landlines of communications and as such, should potential threat forces so decide, can be used to deny or hinder the rapid and safe entry or transit of US expeditionary forces.

As focal points of population, commerce, and government, cities are the likely points of interface between US interests and the interests of foreign governments or non-state entities. In the post-Cold War international security environment, urban areas have been and will continue to be a locus for US military intervention. As such, our intelligence agencies, centers and activities must be prepared to support these operations beyond the current "reactive" mode – a proactive approach is the common sense solution.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab's (MCWL) Urban Warrior Conceptual Experimental Framework states that timely and accurate intelligence is especially critical to urban operations and should support two primary functions: battlefield visualization and situational awareness. This statement is right on the mark.

Battlefield visualization is the three-dimensional display and analysis of the urban terrain features, cultural factors, forces (enemy, friendly, and uncommitted) and events in sufficient detail to support operational and tactical level planning and operations. To be successful in battlefield visualization, data from national, theater, organic and non-organic collection assets (especially human intelligence to include operational forces "on the scene") must be analyzed and fused into a common picture. This picture must be constantly refreshed with new information and intelligence. However, unless an accurate and user friendly baseline database (prepared well in advance) exists, this effort at battlefield visualization will be "playing catch-up" in an era of short notice and rapid military deployments into urban areas.

Situational awareness (SA) is the understanding of the urban battlefield in sufficient detail to support effective decision-making at all levels of command – from the squad leader "on the street" to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) or Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. This SA includes a wide range of factors that include the urban infrastructure; threat order of battle (OB), Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) as well as the enemy's potential and likely courses of action; and the local population to include its culture. At the same time, this SA must be selective in enabling leaders at each echelon to conduct current and plan for future operations. An overload of irrelevant information/intelligence will result in a loss of local (street through theater) SA – an important factor in the constrained and fluid urban environment.

A large majority of the information and intelligence needed to support battlefield visualization and situational awareness is available well before a warning order commits US forces. Moreover, we now have the technological means to display this information and intelligence in a user-friendly format. The "weak links" are resources (manpower and funding) and the commitment to do this job right. Building an urban database will never receive the attention that current intelligence briefings and crisis action teams (CATs) do upon the onset of a military deployment or intervention. However, this same database and the associated intelligence products it would generate - if it existed - would enable military planners to step out of the current realm and into future operational planning as well as delete the word crisis from CAT resulting in the formation of "action teams."

Even if executed well in advance of urban operations, the intelligence challenge is daunting. Questions that require accurate and detailed answers abound:

 Which city? – Based on instability factors, threat analysis or second guessing where the National Command Authority (NCA) will commit.

 Why are we there? – The focus of intelligence collection efforts and products: humanitarian, peacekeeping/peacemaking, conventional combat, or a combination.

 What is the desired end-state? – The intelligence required even if the end-state is not adequately defined.

 What are the cultural intelligence requirements? – Population, urban social structure and interaction, do's and don'ts that affect military operations. Understanding the culture we are getting involved with, what "makes the people tick, their structure, where authority lies, the difference in their values and ours and their way of doing business." The requirements needed to overcome the natural cultural bias that limits a commander's ability to understand what is going on around him and to make informed decisions.

 What intelligence requirements are needed to support the three-dimensional nature of urban operations? – The building, street, subterranean and air space levels.

 What are the city infrastructure and critical service intelligence requirements? – Points of entry, transportation, utilities, resources, ports, airfields, helicopter landing zones, roadways, railways, bridges, subways, other subterranean features, power plants, water systems, food distribution systems, sewage and waste disposal, petroleum and natural gas facilities, telecommunications, medical facilities, and building construction. Key US and Ally facilities and the lines of communication to and from them.

 What special intelligence requirements are needed to support rules of engagement? – Combatants, non-combatants, fence sitters, or indifferent; the local populace, and associated TTPs.

 What is the urban threat and OB? – Conventional military, paramilitary, terrorists, insurgents, guerrillas, organized crime, ground OB, air OB, missile and antiair OB, and communications and electronic OB. The asymmetric threat – one or more - or all of the above. The utilization of information operations as well as utilizing the local populace as a shield to blend in or to influence in such a way to be detrimental to US operations.

 What is the host nation support OB? – Military, paramilitary, militia, civil defense, police, fire and rescue, logistics, and government services.

 Who and where are the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and what are they providing? – The humanitarian burden they relieve US forces from, the security arrangements they require. The NGOs that are valid/capable and the ones that are either hostile, opportunist or inept. The specialty each provides (medical, clothing, subsistence, training, etc.).

 Is the operation US only or part of a coalition operation? – Coalition forces' capabilities and limitations, TTPs, interoperability with US forces, and coalition force country's desired end-state.

 Are our intelligence collection assets, files, and assessments readily available to and useable by follow-on forces? – Human Intelligence (HUMINT), local databases, and other intelligence products and collection sources.

Though daunting as these requirements may be; the Intelligence Community (IC), can make great strides in fulfilling them by making a concerted effort now rather than later. The demands of the urban operating environment are so great and the potential risks posed to operating forces so costly, to do otherwise is a giant first step towards a potential catastrophic intelligence failure.

The J-8 Land and Littoral Warfare Assessment Division's Joint Urban Operations Working Group has assessed a requirement for the establishment of an Urban Operations Analysis Center. Moreover, this assessment directly ties the existence of such a center to the successful conduct of urban operations. The assessment also identifies high priority joint urban mission needs. Included among the most critical of these missions needs is a detailed, accurate knowledge of the urban environment.

Urban analysis centers/activities/branches specified tasks should include:

 Continuous revisions of the Marine Corps' Urban Generic Information Requirements Handbook (GIRH) to further identify and refine MOUT intelligence requirements.

 Transforming the Urban GIRH into a city studies template.

 Prioritization of the world's urban areas based on "friction factors" using the same approach as other estimative questionnaires used to identify likely areas of instability.

 Production of in-depth city studies that address urban cultural and social considerations, infrastructure and services, and potential threats, threat OB and potential and likely courses of action.

 Integration of city studies into computer assisted visualization tools.

 Continued production of MOUT case studies (but add more focus on past US operations). Interviews of combatants to include "friendly" and "enemy" when feasible.

 Production of unclassified urban "How They Fight" articles and lesson plans to be utilized during MOUT training.

 Participation as subject matter experts and Red Cell commander and staff (opposing force) in all MOUT related wargames and seminars. Extensive use of wargaming utilizing a "disinterested" Red Cell – not the "2" who has a vested interest in making the commander's plan "work".

 Providing instruction and instructional support material to threat and non-combatant role players during MOUT training exercises.

 Production of videos based on MOUT city studies, case studies and urban threat studies.

Implied tasks would include:

 Constant liaison with IC and other DOD and non-DOD agencies that conduct MOUT related analysis and production.

 Constant liaison with Commonwealth, NATO, and others who have conducted (or are conducting or plan to conduct) MOUT related operations, exercises, studies and assessments.

 Proactive and constant liaison with non-traditional sources of MOUT related information and intelligence such as NGO's, academic organizations and potential host country organizations and individuals with subject matter expertise.

 Active participation in MOUT studies, evaluations and experiments.

 Cultural Intelligence – Responsible for the collection, analysis and production of intelligence products related to urban cultural requirements to include the population, social structure and social structure interaction. Includes all aspects of the population to include demographics - ethnic structure, racial structure, religious structure, national origin structure, and tribal/clan structure; also includes the interaction between these structures and likely attitude of these structures towards US intervention.

 Urban Threat Analysis – Responsible for the collection, analysis and production of intelligence products related to potential urban threats. Includes the full spectrum of urban threats: conventional, paramilitary, insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, militarized criminal organizations and gangs. Also includes ground, air, naval, missile and antiair artillery, and communications and electronic orders of battle where applicable.

 Infrastructure Intelligence – Responsible for the collection, analysis and production of intelligence products related to urban infrastructure and city services. Includes critical urban services, resources and material production, ports and harbors, airfields, helicopter landing zones, roadways, railway, bridges, subways, other subterranean features, power plants and power distribution, water systems, sewage and waste disposal, petroleum and natural gas facilities, communications, medical facilities and services, and building/structure construction and layout.

 Integration - Responsible for the fusing of the intelligence products produced by the Cultural Intelligence, Urban Threat Analysis and Infrastructure Intelligence entities into battlefield visualization products. Integration would also be the focal point for integrating other agencies urban related products into urban analysis products and maintaining constant liaison with centers, agencies, activities and units conducting MOUT related research and analysis. Most importantly, Integration would ensure the "common" picture and interoperability of its products among the various levels of command and potential joint and coalition partners.

That said, those responsible for the provision of information and intelligence should forge beyond "current" requirements and "lanes-in-the-road" and "rice bowl" restrictions – its time to make a concerted effort to fully support those Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen "on the streets."

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