This paper describes a concept and proposes a methodology for collecting intelligence and conducting military operations in urban areas.

The Problem. General Charles C. Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps described the most probable battlefield of the future as “the three block war” and directed that the Marine Corps focus its experimental efforts in developing new concepts and technologies that can revolutionize urban warfare. The operational environment is described in a Defense Intelligence Reference Document of December 1997 produced by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity entitled: The Urban Century: Developing World Urban Trends and Possible Factors Affecting Urban Military Operations.

The ability to support operations with intelligence in urban areas requires Battlefield Visualization (the “what”), the ability to depict and analyze urban terrain, objects and events in three dimensions; and Situation Awareness (the “why”), the commander’s understanding of the people, resources, and a wide range of forces (such as: culture, politics, religion, economics, etc.) and their relationships. Technology has enabled great potential for Battlefield Visualization and it is clear that enormous advances are taking place that will affect the individual Marine in the near future although it is unclear exactly which path they will take. In contrast, advances in Situation Awareness, have been much more limited and although some significant successes have occurred, they tend to pass unremarked.

The critical fact is, with respect to urban areas, the ability to visualize an area provides very little specific insight as to the people and forces acting within it. Visual and electronic observation of an urban area sometime provide an indication of activities taking place, but alone, present an obscure picture with little indication of the cause or significance to the uninformed observer. For example, airborne surveillance could easily detect a traffic jam but it would provide little indication or prediction as to why and when it would occur or whether it were a routine or exceptional event.

In urban areas, Battlefield Visualization will be primarily important in the planning phase and, once the commander has selected a course of action, for supporting detailed execution. Situation Awareness, in contrast, enables the commander to choose the optimal course of action, the probable consequences of each course of action in the battlespace and the relative importance or context of events within the battlespace. For this reason, Situation Awareness is more important to the ultimate success of the mission because without it, a commander is limited to successfully accomplishing a series of arbitrary, self-assigned milestones, such as “deliver X tons of food” or “prevent infiltration into district Y” without knowing if these tasks contributing positively or negatively to overall success.

The distinctive feature of low- to mid- intensity operations in urban environments is that it is that they take place in an environment filled with people. Situation Awareness in these circumstances is principally knowledge of what these people are doing, what they expect, experience, hope and fear, and what is important to them. Technical and quantitative forms of intelligence have limited potential to provide knowledge of these dimensions of human experience. In Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia and elsewhere, HUMINT and it’s related discipline, Counterintelligence proved to be the commander’s primary tools for understanding the context dimension of an urban environment.

Based on these observations, a new concept that parallels advances in Battlefield visualization is needed to support the Marine Corps focus on Urban Operations. This concept is based on the following points.

 The Marine Corps present HUMINT/CI program has proven it’s effectiveness and efficiency time after time in the recent past in environments ranging from Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia to South-west Asia and Saudi Arabia. However, the program is small and any single operation in urban terrain requires a large proportion of the Marine Corps’ total HUMINT and CI assets.
 Marine Corps HUMINT and CI personnel are acknowledged to be among the most experienced and effective in the intelligence community but, as a consequence, it takes an exceptionally long time to produce a HUMINT/CI Marine.
 Urban environments will often have vast numbers of willing low-level sources who can provide insight into “their corner of the battlefield” and cue other intelligence assets or operational forces. These sources can readily be utilized to support tactical forces without greater undesirable implications and without requiring the direct involvement and high level of training of a HUMINT/CI specialist. This routinely occurs in the normal course of an operation and it could be enhanced if it were deliberately planned and were managed by HUMINT/CI specialists.
 The Marine Corps’ worldwide reputation, positive attitude and the personal traits of the individual Marine can be an extremely beneficial example to the local population. There is often a strong benefit in having a visible force forward and “showing the flag” in a positive manner.
 The best form of force protection against non-conventional threats in an urban area is continual awareness of the activities and intentions of the local population gained by interacting with them.
 Collateral damage due to either excessive or inadvertent application of force must be minimized to an unprecedented extent. This requires small-unit leaders to understand and weigh the consequences of their actions to an extreme degree.

The Urban Awareness Concept calls for the development of a task-organized ground combat force organic to the MAGTF, with doctrine oriented to gaining and maintaining Situation Awareness in urban areas. It will be an infantry force trained in basic observation skills required for an urban environment, elicitation techniques and enhanced reconnaissance techniques, accompanied by HUMINT/CI specialists at all levels to manage the HUMINT effort and exploit critical sources. This concept employs the principles of the successful Vietnam-era Combined Action Group with its’ companies and platoons (CAC and CAP). The complete urban force would integrate the functions listed below. Most of these functions are already organic to the MAGTF, some are found only in the Reserve component and while others are presently at the Joint level. Irrespective whether dedicated personnel are available to perform each function, it must be addressed or there will be a gap.

Infantry. The infantry force is the key element of the urban awareness concept. The infantry force’s daily activities bring it into constant direct contact with the population and require the force to deal with it on a routine basis. Many of the specific activities the infantry force engages in, result in continuous contact with the population: conducting security and reconnaissance patrols, establishing and manning checkpoints and strongpoints, conducting infiltration, surveillance and sniper missions, executing humanitarian missions including: distribution of relief supplies, securing relief sites, assisting with civil affairs actions, noting problem areas (i.e., previously overlooked groups with acute hunger or medical needs). The infantry force can interact with the population in a positive, overt manner that permits passive and systematic collection of combat information, guided and coordinated by CI/HUMINT Marines and can serve to rapidly cue it’s collocated HUMINT Exploitation Team (HET) to people that merit further attention. The relationship between infantry teams or squads and members of the HET is that of beat cop to detective. The infantry teams are the obvious presence, first responders.

CI/HUMINT. The HET provides direction and management for the urban force’s intelligence mission which is secondary only to it’s operational mission and develops, manages and exploits sources within the force’s AOR. It provides expertise, training and oversight for intelligence activities within the urban force and performs the following additional functions:

Interrogator/Translator (IT): IT Marines play a key role in supporting the CI effort. The MAGTF Commander may authorize IT personnel, who have received training in tactical HUMINT, to augment and support CI personnel in the performance of Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations. Additionally IT Marines can assist in debriefing Marines after missions and vet local and volunteer linguists. Finally they support the force by preparing automated translation aids in support of other elements, particularly the infantry. IT Marines should be used as translators only as a last resort.

Force Protection: CI Marines conduct Force Protection Assessments and implement security programs designed to protect personnel, facilities and equipment through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services supported by intelligence, counterintelligence and other security programs.

Liaison with other US, allied and local intelligence organizations and police forces.

Military Police. MPs share many characteristics in common with the infantry force in that they are in constant contact with the population - but it is normally on a fleeting basis. However, their opportunity for observation occurs at critical times and during periods of tension. MP units are often in good positions to note changes in behavior, patterns or to detect illicit activities or concealed preparations. Specific activities related to the urban force include:

Law Enforcement- control of looters, roadblocks
Traffic Control-control of US and local traffic, convoy control
EPW/detainee control-legal requirements, facility management
Crowd Control Planning

CSSE. Combat Service Support Enterprise provides the “carrot” of services and resources that may be needed by the local population and will be one of the most positive elements of the urban force as perceived by a population in need. It is important that the CSSE work closely with the Civil Affairs function in determining actual local needs and provide feedback regarding local reaction to delivery of services/resources. CSSE activities which bring support personnel into contact with the population include:

Engineering:
Barriers/Protective Structures
Civil Action/Humanitarian
Electrical Power
Water purification
Transportation
Humanitarian supplies-food, books, materiel

Logistics:
Refugee processing and movement

Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs is a commander’s tool both to execute his legal and moral responsibilities towards noncombatants in the area of operations and to identify needs, plan, manage and execute humanitarian operations. In Somalia, CI teams routinely deployed with CA teams to meet with sources and provide force protection against clandestine or criminal forces in the target recipient group. CA is a complex function that provides an important means for positive interaction featuring close interaction and cooperation with the population but one that can go badly awry with long-term ramifications if mishandled or neglected. It includes the following areas.

Civic Action
Medcap/Dentcap
Liaison with NGOs
Negotiations with local leaders
Mediating local disputes

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Although this sensitive function is not organic to a MAGTF, if PSYOPS are conducted in conjunction with a MAGTF operation in which an urban force is employed, the urban force should be carefully integrated into and its input considered in executing the operation. The urban force should also serve as an important source for evaluating the effectiveness of the operation.

Linguist Support. The concerns and circumstances of a non-English speaking inhabitant can seem very abstract to a non-language qualified Marine. The situation is slightly better if a noncombatant speaks pidgin English but unfortunately this often has the result of making Marines view the person as childish or colorful. Language capability has frequently been acknowledged as a crucial shortfall within the DoD but the other strength a language qualified individual almost always has, whether learned through instruction or upbringing, is greater cultural awareness. Supporting urban operations of any type requires large numbers of linguists, preferably one for each unit that is operating separately, be they companies, platoons or squads. There are several sources for linguists, each with its own pitfalls and characteristics.

DoD uniformed and Civilian
Contract linguists
Volunteers

Management and quality control of linguists is essential, regardless of the source.

Other

Legal- investigations, claims, interpretation of resolutions, agreements, treaties, etc., law of war, advice concerning ROE, local law. These have long-term and possibly great financial impact on the operation and US Government.

Religious- Religion is often a powerful and sensitive positive or negative factor that the MAGTF has a limited capability to influence. Chaplains are the command’s advisors and may be able to work to a surprising extent with local religious leaders even if they are of a much different faith. It is important that the urban force be able to accurately gauge the role of religion and potential reactions to US operations.

Contracts- Contracts for locally procured services and material may have great significance to the local economy and will tend to require dealing with businessmen and leaders who have an interest in maintaining the status quo, no matter how bad it is. Individuals who control resources in impoverished areas are often a large part of the basic problem. Contracting officers and commanders need to be aware of who benefits from contracts and the likely outcomes of contracts being awarded. They should consider accepting less than maximum possible performance if necessary if it results in greater economic good. Since such economic impacts can drastically affect the outcome of the mission, the urban force leadership needs to be aware of pending contract awards and who is being considered for them. For example, the best qualified local personnel for removing mines are likely to be the same individuals who planted them.

The need for interaction of potentially all of these functions, some of which are very unfamiliar to Marines cannot be overstated. If they are not coordinated through command supervision with a clear overall strategy, they will operate at cross-purposes and present a confusing and ineffective picture to the local population.

Employment of the Urban Awareness Force. The urban force orients on demographics in the form of districts, regions, neighborhoods or clans rather than on terrain or geography. The process of developing the detailed demographic data will itself provide a commander with insight regarding the local situation.

Duration. The Urban Awareness Force can conduct operations of any duration in urban areas but its effectiveness is directly related to the length of time it can stay in the operational area and rises greatly as the duration of the mission increases.

Drawbacks

This concept was developed to optimize the effectiveness of the force in the operational environment but there are some reasons it may be incompatible with the Marine Corps mission and with concepts which were explored in Urban Warrior. The concept inherently requires preparing for many tasks that are not directly associated with fighting and are often and not surprisingly viewed as onerous, such as manning checkpoints and dealing intimately with an unfamiliar population that may seem exotic, sullen and smelly. The critical problem will be indoctrinating Marines with the understanding that these tasks are indeed, only a means to an end, and that they are, in fact, a more efficient and effective means to accomplish the mission than direct combat, which may not even be an option. This concept requires a wiser, more patient and perceptive Marine who is nonetheless, very much a warrior.

On the positive side, Marines often intuitively grasp these concepts and employ them in real world operations. The principles in this concept lead to greater personal situation awareness and a sense of involvement which transforms otherwise tedious tasks into engrossing ones. A Marine who has been told to “observe & report all activity” within a certain sector and who has no idea of the significance of what he is observing has little incentive or urgency other than his own self-discipline.

 The concept not oriented to short-duration rapidly moving operations. HUMINT operations require time to establish even basic relationships between people and are inherently more time consuming to develop than other forms of intelligence. Two weeks is probably the minimum time the urban force would need to be on the ground before it started to pay dividends but once the results start, they would increase exponentially.
 It is inherently manpower-intensive. The urban force might be able to substitute for a much larger force or mitigate the need for a large supporting force but the daily activities it performs: interacting with the populace, patrolling, manning checkpoints, surveillance, crowd control, security, resolving disputes, humanitarian assistance, medcap/dentcap, psyops; can fundamentally only be performed by human beings, and highly trained ones at that. Some functions such as surveillance and counter-sniper can be augmented by technology but overall, technology could enhance, but not replace Marines.
 The force must be above a certain size to be effective (critical mass). The functions it must perform are very diverse and the premise behind it is that it will support the main force by dealing with large numbers of local inhabitants. The urban force can be likened to a net that obtains information by chance interaction. If the net is too small, there is a distinct possibility that it will never be in a position to collect the needed information. Experience indicates that a reinforced company-sized unit is probably optimal but such a unit could support a large AOR, possibly a medium-sized city.
 Training and assessing the readiness of an urban force would be difficult. The higher-level functions it performs are complex and difficult to recreate in a training environment. Operational experience would be essential. Commanders and key personnel would need to be chosen very carefully. Even at the level of the individual Marine, some Marines would be incompatible with such a unit.

Recommendations

1. Continue development and refinement of the Urban Awareness concept and incorporate it into Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory experimentation 2. Conduct a detailed study of the applicability of the experiences from the Vietnam era Combined Action Program to urban operations.
3. Assess the possibility/need to create a new category of credentialed individual authorized to conduct specific and limited types of low-level source operations within the scope of policy and law.

Visitor since 23 February 1998

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