Urban Warfare: The Future - Yes or No?

Washington Times Urban Warrior Letters to the Editor Debate

Washington Times
10 November 1998
Urban Warrior Debate
Letters to the Editor
4 and 10 November

Major Jeff Newell states in his 4 November letter, “National interest is missing in Urban Warrior,” that “Marines are developing a military strategy divorced from political reality.” He makes reference to the “Weinberger Doctrine” and the Clinton administration’s unwillingness to commit ground forces to high-risk missions that do not represent vital U.S. interests. Additionally, he poses a challenge to the “proponents of urban warfare” to show “tangible evidence” that future opponents are preparing to fight the United States in an urban environment, and to define a “vital U.S. interest” that would justify the commitment of ground forces to this type of combat.

To address Major Newell’s point concerning the “political reality” of the Marine’s Urban Warrior experiments, “reality” is a function of current international and political conditions. I feel that the Marines have done their homework and have stepped well beyond the “political reality” argument. If recent history is any indicator, the Marines are well justified in pursuing urban warfare. Operations Desert Storm not withstanding, U.S. military operations in Panama, Haiti and Somalia, as well as the British operations to retake the Falkland Islands, demonstrate the importance of cities in military operations. As a force reliant on naval support, the Marines depend on established port facilities to sustain their units in combat.

Concerning the need for Pentagon leaders to demonstrate “tangible evidence” tat our future foes are preparing to fight U.S. ground forces in cities, the indicators are self-evident. A potential enemy, faced with defeat or outright destruction, will take all necessary measures to neutralize the U.S. technical superiority. During the Gulf War, for example, Saddam Hussein will fully positioned command and control and other military units in civilian facilities to decrease the likelihood that the United States would attack those units. Lt. Gen. (Retired) Jay M. Garner, who headed the Army’s effort in the last Quadrennial Defense Review, took the point of view of an enemy fighting the United States when stating in the 9 November issue of Army Times: “If you’re fighting me, and you have this great Air Force and this great Navy with these precision weapons, I’m going to find a way for you not to use them. I’m going to fight you in the city so you’re going to have to kill the city or kill me. Or I’m going to take refugees. I’m going to let you kill civilians and see how that flies on CNN. Doing that gives you a big problem.”

If Major Newell is expecting to see bunker construction or other indications of preparation in downtown Baghdad or Pyongyang as “tangible evidence,” I submit to him that those facilities have existed for years.

“Vital U.S. interest” is an undefined standard that is subject to change. Unlike its predecessor, the current administration has not faced a major crisis requiring it to ponder, much less commit ground forces to urban combat. Had the Iraqis continued their attack into Saudi Arabia in August 1990 and seized the port cities of Damman or Dhahran, the United States would have been obligated to fight in urban terrain to take these cities back.

During Operation Desert Storm, the U.S.-led coalition’s objective was to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait. This objective implied a willingness to fight in Kuwait City. Only the risk of envelopment caused the Iraqis to withdraw from Kuwait City.

South Korea looms as another theater of operations where the United States will fight in urban terrain. If North Korea invades South Korea, the larger cities certainly will be considered vital to U.S. interests.

Contrary to Major Newell’s contention that the Marines should justify the energy expended in preparing for urban combat, I submit that the other services should be tackling the same issues with equal vigor. As a matter of “political reality,” U.S. forces deploy and fight wherever told to do so. As a matter of “physical reality,” cities are key and often-critical terrain. The Marine Corps, having done a thorough threat analysis, is preparing to meet both realities.

Major Thomas J. Roth, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Major Newell’s letter asks a good question: “What tangible evidence suggests that likely U.S. foes are preparing to engage us in cities?” Unfortunately, his line of reasoning against the Marine Corps’ move into the urban arena is not so good.

Since Ia Dang in November 1965, America’s foes have sought ways to negate U.S. superiority in fire support. From the 33rd North Vietnamese regiment in the Ia Dang valley to the ambush of Pakistani peacekeepers in downtown Mogadishu in 1993, numerically and technically inferior forces have known how to stop us from bringing our full weight of cannon to bear.

If getting the U.S. forces to bottle up in a back alley makes it easier to kill them, you can bet our enemies know this and will exploit it at the earliest opportunity. As a Marine Officer, I would not choose a “three-block war,” but with the increasing likelihood of operations other than war scenarios that we find ourselves in, I need to be trained and ready for them.

World demographics indicate a definite tend towards urbanization of the planet’s population, with 70 percent living in or near cities by the middle of the next century. Ask any troops in Bosnia - - nobody needs to keep the peace on a flat stretch of ground where you can shoot to the maximum range of your weapon.

Major James F. Desy, USMC, Quantico, Virginia

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