The Treaty of Paris formally made the Philippines a possession of the United States. The treaty was signed, however, without any Filipino representation, and thus the Army of the First Philippine Republic continued its struggle for independence. The capture of Gen. Aguinaldo did not end the war for independence: Gen. Miguel Malvar took over and continued the armed campaign. Gen. Malvar was eventually forced to surrender, but others, like Gen. Macario Sakay and Artemio Ricarte, would continue the fight. (1)
While the army fought to keep the Philippines free, the Americans tried various means to neutralize the it. Reinforcements from the U.S., calculated tactics and reconcentration, execution and exile of freedom fighters, among other methods, were used to subdue to the Philippine army. As the fighting eventually died down, a civil government took over and a generally peaceful period began. The campaign for independence shifted to the political arena, with missions being sent to the U.S. to lobby for independence and the desire for freedom being expressed in newspapers, stage plays and other forms of public media. (2)
During the American regime, there occurred sporadic revolts - among them those of the Pulahanes, the Colorums and the Sakdals - due to social injustice and expressing the desire for independence. Internal security was thus a problem for the Americans to contend with. During this period, too, Japan loomed as a hostile military power, thus posing an external security threat.
There was, however, no true Philippine Army under the Americans from 1901 to 1935. Filipinos who desired to serve in the military profession could only join military forces created by the Americans, which were used to subdue fellow Filipinos. It was a dilemma for Filipino soldiers who wanted to serve - in order to serve they had to do so under a foreign flag, and fight their own countrymen. The alternative was to leave the military profession.
Eventually the Americans promised independence, after a ten year transition period which was known as the Philippine Commonwealth. The Commonwealth was inaugurated in 1935, and it was during this time that the modern Philippine Army was born.
Military Forces created under the Americans
Philippine Scouts
As part of the American pacification drive against the Army of the First Philippine Republic, the Americans organized special forces officered by Americans but manned by Filipinos. This followed the time-honored tradition of colonial powers using native troops to quell dissent, under the principle of divide and rule. The first unit of this type was experimental, one company of Macabebes organized in September 1899 and led by Lt. Mathew Batson, U.S. Army. It was experimental in the sense that Batson's superiors - including Gen. Arthur MacArthur - did not trust any Filipino enough to arm them; Batson had used the Macabebes as guides and interpreters earlier, and was convinced of Macabebe loyalty. The experiment proved successful, with the Macabebes fiercely loyal to their new masters. The Macabebes, incidentally, were descendants of Mexican Yaqui Indians who were brought to the Philippines by Spain. (3)
A month after the first company was organized, four other Macabebe companies were created, and in the next two years, Ilocano, Cagayano, Boholano, Cebuano, Negrense and Ilonggo companies were formed, in addition to more Macabebe companies. The Americans specifically did not form any Tagalog companies because they feared they might turn against the Americans. These units fought battles, guarded strategic areas and camps, guided and interpreted for U.S. troops. The American commanders noted their loyalty and martial skill, but the top commanders still did not trust armed Filipinos. They were officially considered civilian contract employees and only lightly armed, partly because of fears that they would rebel, and also partly because they sometimes tended to be overly cruel to captured Filipinos suspected of being members of the Revolutionary Forces. Not until February 1901 were Filipinos allowed to officially become members of the U.S. Army. At this time, the different Filipino companies officially became known as the Philippine Scouts. (4)
The Philippine Scouts took over from U.S. troops, many of whom were volunteers and whose enlistments were up and thus went home. The organization was a part of the regular U.S. Army, but it was a segregated unit: its men could not transfer to other non-Filipino units of the U.S Army, and pay scales of the men was less than half that of the regular American soldier. (5)
The Philippine Scouts became an elite unit of the U.S. Army in the Philippines, and the American officers of the various Scout units had nothing but praise for the Filipinos in uniform. As a unit of the U.S. Army, however, the Scouts served American strategic purposes and not Filipino nationalistic goals: it was a proud, highly-trained unit of a colonial army.
The Philippine Constabulary
The Philippine Scouts initially operated in pacification campaigns against remnants of Aguinaldo's army and other Filipino armed movements opposed to American rule. These operations were carried out as military actions, under direct U.S. Army control during the first years of American colonial administration in the Philippines, when a military administration was in power. However, there were many abuses which were carried out by the U.S. Army, particularly since some of Aguinaldo's officers and men fiercely continued the struggle for independence.
In July 1901 the military government was replaced in American occupied areas by a civil government, the Philippine Commission. On July 4, 1902, after Malvar’s surrender, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt officially declared the Fil-American War (called "insurrection" by the Americans) over.
With the war officially over, theoretically, direct military actions were no longer necessary and instead, the maintenance of peace and order and the suppression of crime became the priority of the civil government. This was a part of the continuing pacification campaign to neutralize the unsurrendered elements of the independence army. The Philippine Commission passed the Sedition Act and the Brigandage Law, which branded Filipino freedom fighters as bandits and criminals and subject to execution or long prison terms. The newly-established civil government did not want the U.S. military to take over in this duty, as excesses might be committed; the U.S. Army itself did not want its units - especially the Scouts - to operate under civilian authority. The Philippine Commission, under Governor General William Taft, thus believed that it needed its own armed force, organized along military lines, but with the main aim of enforcing laws and maintaining order in order to consolidate American control over the Philippines. (6)
Thus, the Insular Constabulary was born on 18 July 1901, with the passage of Organic Act No. 175. It was empowered to "prevent and suppress brigandage, unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections and other breaches of the peace and violations of the law." Since the Sedition Act and the Brigandage Law had declared Filipino freedom fighters as criminals, then the Constabulary was a colonial organization to suppress independent nationalistic ideals. It was not, however, meant to function as an army since its main concern was for internal security.
Like the Philippine Scouts, the Constabulary was manned by Filipinos but officered by Americans or other whites. A few Filipinos were, however, allowed to become constabulary officers, among them Licerio Geronimo, the general who had killed Gen. Henry W. Lawton during the Fil-American War. Lt. Col. Henry T. Allen, a graduate of West Point, was designated as the first Chief of Constabulary and given the brevet rank of Brigadier General. (7)
Gen. Allen and the Insular Constabulary, or I.C., were pressed into action right away, with hardly any time to organize and train. Officers, men, uniforms and weapons were a motley lot, and breaches of discipline were frequent, until more stringent training and disciplinary measures were enforced. Allen quickly took steps to improve the force, build professionalism and esprit de corps, and increase its effectiveness. He decentralized command of the IC, establishing three constabulary districts under which operated the cornerstone of the constabulary, the provincial units. (8)
Because of the "carnival-style uniforms" and the lax discipline of the early days, the U.S. Army in the Philippines looked on the I.C. with skepticism and ridicule. They joked that I.C. meant "Inspected and Condemned", and hesitated to provide modern weapons, forcing Gen. Allen to obtain weapons and equipment from civilian sources. (9)
Allen and his men were unfazed by the U.S. Army's attitude, and instead strove to develop his force. Quickly the force's name was changed to Philippine Constabulary, and in 1904, an academy to train its officers was established. This school eventually became the Philippine Constabulary Academy, with a three-year course. (10)
Throughout the American regime, the two armed forces existed side by side: the Philippine Scouts, as part of the U.S. Army, trained for military operations and centered in strategic military camps; and the para-military Philippine Constabulary, under the civil government, trained for maintaining internal security and decentralized, with numerous small units and camps throughout the country. Neither of these, however, was a true Philippine army for and by Filipinos. As long as the Philippines remained a colony of the United States, there could not exist an independent Philippine army tasked with the defense of the Filipino nation.
Peaceful Struggle for Philippine Independence
The American conquest of the Philippines had not killed the Filipino's quest for freedom and independence. Instead of an armed struggle, which would have been futile in the face of American military might, many Filipinos instead opted for a peaceful campaign to express their nationalism. Literature, plays, newspapers, rallies and demonstrations all actively expressed the desire for independence, so much so that the Americans would pass the Sedition Act in 1901 to ban such expressions. Later, in 1907, the Americans, through the Flag Law, also forbade the public showing of the Philippine flag. (Not until 1916 was the did the Americans allow public showing of the Philippine flag). Despite these measures, Filipinos found ingenious ways to circumvent these laws, although many times they would be arrested and jailed for expressing their nationalistic sentiments. A classic example is the "Aves de Rapina" case, where the editor and owner of the newspaper El Renacimiento were charged with libel and sentenced to pay a fine and serve jail terms simply because an American felt alluded to by one of the paper’s editorials. (11)
Because of the continued Filipino desire for freedom, the Jones Law was passed in 1916, declaring that Philippine independence would be recognized as soon as a stable government was established. Governor General Francis B. Harrison interpreted this to mean hastening the Filipinization of the government in the Philippines, and replaced Americans with Filipinos wherever and whenever possible. To press for the speedy grant of independence, Filipinos organized independence missions to the U.S.
In 1921, however, the move towards independence received a setback with the election of President Warren G. Harding, a Republican who did not sympathize with the intentions of the Jones Law. To keep the issue alive and express Filipino sentiments, Filipino politicians organized more independence missions to Washington, D.C. to lobby for Philippine independence.
The clamor for Philippine independence increased in the 1920s and the early 1930s, and in 1930 the First Independence Congress was held to discuss the independence issue thoroughly and present a report to the U.S. Congress. Various periodicals, groups and even artists and musicians joined in the chorus for independence. (12)
Independence Legislation
Partly as a result of this clamor, the U.S. legislature took up the question of Philippine independence, and in 1932 came up with the Hare-Hawes Cutting Bill. The bill proposed a ten-year transition period wherein the Philippines would prepare for independence under a largely autonomous government. Prior to the inauguration of the transitional government, a constitutional convention would be called to draft a constitution. Although the transitional government would be almost completely autonomous, foreign affairs and financial matters were left in the hands of the Americans, and the U.S. would retain the right to maintain military and naval bases even after Philippine independence. (13)
The bill was passed over U.S. President Herbert Hoover's veto in January 1933, but it was rejected in the Philippines after a bitter political battle between its supporters and detractors. Senate president Manuel L. Quezon, who had long been in the forefront of the political campaign for independence, went to the U.S. to personally seek a better alternative to the Hare-Hawes -Cutting Act.
Quezon was able to lobby for the passage of a slightly amended law, the Tydings-McDuffie Act. The main points of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act were unchanged: a ten-year transitory period; limited autonomous government, with an American High Commissioner acting as the representative of the American president; approval by the American president of important Philippine bills; and the maintenance of U.S. naval stations after independence. Although almost a carbon-copy of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, it was as far as the Americans would go, and Quezon lobbied to have Filipinos accept the independence legislation. (14)
The Filipinos accepted the Tydings-McDuffie Act, a constitutional convention was called, the 1935 constitution was adopted and national elections were held. The Philippine Commonwealth, with President Manuel L. Quezon at the helm, was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, thus launching the Philippines on the road towards independence.
One of the heavy problems that the Commonwealth had to solve was that of national defense. Throughout the American regime, little thought had been given to preparing for this, since defense was an American responsibility. Even though it was an American responsibility, U.S. military forces in the Philippines were only capable of limited defensive campaigns in Luzon, and could not hold the whole country against a determined invader. The Americans had not developed a Philippine Army because they feared it might revolt or might cause serious repercussions in U.S. relations with Japan. Despite this lack of defense preparation, Americans opposed to Philippine independence cited the supposed incapacity of Filipinos to defend their country as one reason why the Americans should not leave: without an army, how could an independent Philippines protect itself against any foreign intruder?
Military Development and Strategy under the Americans
U.S. Plans and Policies
Prior to 1935, the Filipinos had no national security policy for the defense of the country. What security and defense policy there was the product of the Americans: For the period that the Philippines was an American colony, responsibility for the security and defense of the Philippines lay with the U.S., which developed war plans accordingly. But the American government and its military thought in terms of protecting U.S. interests above everything, and thus their strategic plans were mainly for them and not exclusively for protecting the Philippines. The Americans developed a system of war plans color coded to denote the potential enemy. War Plan Orange covered a potential war with Japan, while War Plan Brown contended with the possibility of a large- scale Filipino uprising against the Americans. Both these plans called for a defensive campaign waged by U.S. Army forces in the Philippines, to hold Manila Bay by withdrawing to Bataan and Corregidor. In the case of War Plan Brown, Manila was to be held if forces permitted; but in both cases, the American forces were to hold up until reinforcements from the U.S. arrived. (15)
Corregidor and its satellite islands in the mouth of Manila Bay were thus fortified, and the Bataan peninsula became the site of the annual war games of the Philippine Division. The Philippine Scouts were an intrinsic part of this defense scheme, which, because of lack of funds and resources, conceded that much of the Philippines could be temporarily occupied by hostile forces. Despite the importance the Philippines played in American foreign policy, the U.S. Congress was unwilling to pay for the cost necessary to defend it. (16)
During World War I, when as many American officers as possible were needed in the battlefields of Europe or in the continental U.S., Filipinos were allowed to be commissioned as officers in the Philippine Scouts. Earlier, Filipinos had been allowed to become cadets at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point; on graduating, they became officers in the Scouts. Vicente Lim was the first Filipino to graduate from West Point, and became one of the first Filipinos commissioned as an officer in the Scouts. In the 1920s, selected Filipino Scout officers were also allowed to attend U.S. Army technical schools for career advancement. At about this time, the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis began accepting Filipinos as midshipmen. Since, however, there was no naval counterpart of the Philippine Scouts, the Annapolis graduates became officers in the PC. (17)
The Philippine Constabulary continued its duties as the semi-military arm of the civil government, always under an American chief except from 1917 to 1921, when the first Filipino chief of Constabulary, Brig. Gen. Rafael Crame took over. With the untimely death of Gen. Crame, the PC continued under American command until the eve of the Commonwealth, when Brig. Gen. Basilio Valdes became the second Filipino to become chief of the Constabulary. (18)
Filipino-organized Forces
The Philippine Scouts were professional officers and men but they continued to be a unit of the U.S. Army, and thus followed U.S. military policy and strategy. The Philippine Constabulary was basically an enlarged and strengthened police force, under the civil government, but not trained or prepared militarily to fight a full scale war in the defense of the country. Some Filipinos who led the campaign for independence realized that a Filipino army would be necessary to realize and maintain national sovereignty.
The first Filipino armed force to be organized by Filipinos under the American administration was the Philippine National Guard. Manuel Quezon, on the eve of the American entry into World War I, offered to the U.S. a whole division of Filipino troops as a sign of loyalty to the U.S. and the Philippines' commitment to freedom. The successful organization of a Filipino armed force would also show the world that the Philippines would be ready for independence, with an army of its own. The National Guard was thus created in March 1917, shortly before the Americans entered World War I. The National Guard consisted of three brigades, one each from northern Luzon, southern Luzon and the Visayas, with separate cavalry, coast artillery and aviation units. Filipino and American officers were appointed, and men were recruited. (19)
The Guard, however, faced many problems, among them reluctant and very delayed support from the U.S. Army, which strongly doubted the usefulness of the force. Without sufficient training - which could not be done overnight - the Guard would only be a problem if sent overseas. If left in the Philippines, the U.S. Army feared armed Filipinos might turn against the administration. Faced with a shortage of qualified instructors and trained men, the National Guard indeed suffered from lack of training: some of the recruits even had to be instructed how to read and write, and how to use toothbrushes.
Just before the end of the war, the U.S. Congress authorized the Guard to be federalized and become a part of the regular U.S. Army. However, the call to mobilize came much later, and the Guard was finally federalized only after World War I had ended. It was authorized to train for three months, but after that, no more funds were forthcoming and the Philippine National Guard was disbanded. What could have been the basis for a Philippine army thus faded away because of lack of funding.
Two other semi-military organizations were created before the Commonwealth years: one, the First Semimilitary Unit of Insular Employees, was formed in 1923. It was a private group, organized along military lines and trained on rudimentary military drill. It tried to foster patriotism, but being a private organization with little government support, it appears to have died shortly. (20)
The second group, the National Volunteers of the Philippines, was organized by a group of civic-minded politicians, lawyers and landowners. It was officered by the elite and manned by the peasants and laborers of the founders. It remained a private group, however, failing to get government recognition. (21)
In addition to these groups, a few colleges and universities had instituted military training courses, but these were not required. Without an independent army, graduates of these courses had no professional career to look forward to, unless they joined the Philippine Scouts or the Constabulary.
While there were several military or semi-military groups that appeared during the American period, none of them was specifically geared towards being a truly organized and trained Filipino army. The Commonwealth government thus would have to establish its own army as part of its national defense program.
Laying the Foundation of a Citizen Army
Concepts of National Defense
It should be noted that the decade of the 1930s was one of violence and of spreading totalitarianism. In Europe, the Third Reich was rising and flexing its muscles under Adolph Hitler, and as the '30s rolled on so did Hitler's tanks across Europe. In Italy, Benito Mussolini rekindled the embers of a new Roman Empire, and in Spain, Franco took over after a bloody civil war. Closer to the Philippines, Japan had been rattling its sword in Manchuria and China since the 1920s, after annexing Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1910. In 1931, Japanese troops seized Manchuria after staging an incident that served as a pretext to attack Manchuria's feeble army.
On the eve of the Commonwealth, then, the subject of national defense and an army became the subject of much discussion. Various views were aired on how the army could be built: on whether compulsory military training should be carried out in schools; on how large the army should be and how it should be organized; on whether it should be separated from civil, internal security duties or not; on whether it could be built around the PC or whether it was better to start from scratch; on whether to base national defense plans on a committee or on the ideas of one man. (22)
Because there was no Filipino who had the expertise and experience in modern military organization, strategy and tactics, Quezon turned to no less than the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Gen. Douglas MacArthur. In early 1934, just after the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed, Quezon approached MacArthur. MacArthur had served in the Philippines three times, and had met Quezon then; having been commanding general of the Philippine Department - the U.S. Army in the Philippines - he had direct knowledge of Philippine conditions.
"Do you think that the Philippines can be defended after they shall have become independent ten years hence?" Quezon asked MacArthur.
"I don't think so," said MacArthur. "I know that the Islands can be protected, provided, of course, you have the money which is required."
To MacArthur, only sixteen million pesos would be needed annually - just ten million pesos in addition to the already existing PC appropriations. He considered a small regular force with a citizen army as the backbone for the nation's defense. This concept would become the basic idea behind the Commonwealth Army. But before it could be put into effect, various legal foundations had to be laid. (23)
Even before the Constitutional Convention sat down to frame the basic law of the land, the Philippine legislature had drafted a bill proposing to create a Bureau of National Defense and specifying its duties. Besides simply creating a new government office, it also sought to train officers and men for an army to be created later. Gov. Gen. Frank Murphy, however, vetoed the bill. Although fully sympathizing with the Filipino desire to provide for their defense, he felt that the bill had not sufficiently studied the problem of national defense. Instead, Murphy suggested taking advantage of the experience of military professionals. Quezon had, in fact, already done just that. (24)
The 1935 Constitution
The 1935 Constitution laid some of the groundwork for the Commonwealth Army. Among the basic principles in the charter was that "the defense of the State is the prime duty of the government, and in the fulfillment of this duty, all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service." This principle gave the government the authority to organize military forces to fulfill its duty, and paved the way for legislation that could make compulsory military training. (25)
The National Defense Act
MacArthur began working on a defense plan which would embody his promises - a complete defense system at the cost of only sixteen million pesos a year - to Quezon immediately after their meeting. He assigned two members of his office, Majors James Ord and Dwight D. Eisenhower, to develop a concrete plan based on his ideas. Working on the strict budgetary constraints imposed by MacArthur’s promise, Ord and Eisenhower fleshed out a plan which was paper thin. (26)
The basic plan was to organize a small regular force, which would be built with the PC as a nucleus, supplemented by a large reserve force. The regular force would serve several functions during peace time: provide the framework for army organization, instructors for reservists’ military training and maintain peace and order within the country. The reserves would be twenty-one-year old and above Filipino males who would have undergone military training; in time of emergency or war, the reserves would be called up to form a citizens army. All Filipinos who turned twenty years would be required to register, and out of the registrants a total of 40,000 young men would be called annually for five-and-a-half months of training. To keep what they learned fresh, regular refresher training for ten days a year was planned for the next ten years, after which the reservists went into the Second Reserve. By this time, a continuous stream of younger trainees would be processed and available for the army.
To save on money, MacArthur’s defense plan called for a gradual build up of the army, with training classes starting small and gradually building up to the full quota of 40,000 men a year. Camps for this training would gradually be built up throughout the country to ensure that all areas would have their own reserve units; ideally, trainees would be defending their own home regions. Weapons acquisition would also be built up gradually, starting with the least costly; as the army’s infrastructure was built up, the money initially spent on construction could then be spent on obtaining more expensive and more modern types of weapons.
To further save on money and training time, it was planned to carry on pre-military training in schools, so that when trainees reported, they would have some basic knowledge on military matters.
MacArthur chose Ord, Eisenhower and two other officers to comprise a special U.S. Military Mission which would advise the Commonwealth government on national defense. MacArthur’s official position was Military Adviser to the President of the Commonwealth. The mission arrived in Manila in October 1935 bringing with it the basic defense plan and drafts of the proposed national defense act. (27)
The draft act was submitted to Filipino legislators headed by Claudio Sandoval, head of the National Assembly’s Committee on National Defense. After making some changes in the act to suit the Philippine legal system, the bill was presented to the National Defense Council, which recommended that it be promptly passed by the National Assembly. (28)
Quezon himself presented the National Defense bill to the National Assembly during the assembly’s first session on November 25, 1935. In his speech to the assembly, Quezon declared: "Self defense is the supreme right of mankind, no more sacred to the individual than to the nation." As such it was the "first and most urgent need" of the Commonwealth. (29)
After some discussion, the bill was enacted by the National Assembly, and on December 21, 1935, Quezon signed into law Commonwealth Act No. 1, the National Defense Act. Whether a fully operational army could be developed in ten years at a budget of sixteen million pesos, however, remained to be seen.
Creation and Build-up of the Philippine Army
Headquarters, Philippine Army
The first step to organize the Commonwealth Army was the appointment of officers to head the army. On January 11, 1936, Quezon issued Executive Order No. 11, which formally appointed retired PC Col. Jose de los Reyes as acting chief of staff of the army, with a rank of brigadier general. To assist him were Brig. Gen. Basilio Valdes, Chief of the Constabulary, and Col. Guillermo Francisco, who had been chief of staff of the PC under Valdes. With the top three officers in the army named, Headquarters Philippine Army was formally organized; it was temporarily housed in the Oriente Building, where the PC had had its headquarters. Although Gen. de los Reyes - who was most senior of the surviving Filipino PC officers and had risen through the ranks - was only appointed in an acting capaacity, he laid the ground work for establishing the army’s organization and set the basis for the first registration of trainees. (30)
Executive Order No. 11 also established the PC as the nucleus of the Army, where it would become the PC Division. In addition to the PC Division, the First Regular Division was activated on January 18 as the major combat unit of the army. The Philippine Army was now a reality.
Registration and Reserve Force Training
Immediately after establishing the army’s headquarters and regular units, preparations had to be made for the registration of twenty-year old Filipino males. Regulations were issued, directing these youths to register as part of their national obligations; shirking this duty was punishable by a fine and a prison term. The registration period was set from April 1 to April 7 every year. (31)
Since this was the first time in the country’s history that such a nationwide registration was to be held, its success or failure would be an indicator of public support for the national defense plan and for the army. Much publicity was given to the obligatory nature of the registration, and even Quezon went around the country to explain the defense plan.
The registration went on smoothly in the first week of April, 1936, and the results exceeded everyone’s expectations. Turnout was beyond the estimates, and its is believed that even those who were over or under aged registered. Because of this success, Quezon felt that plans could be speeded up and the full training quota of 40,000 - instead of the original 6,000 under the plans for gradual growth - could be trained in 1937.
The first 40,000 trainees were picked from the total number of registrants, and grouped into two training classes for 1937, the first to begin training in January, and the second in July. The trainees reported on schedule, and each class trained for five-and-a-half months at camps throughout the Philippines.
The trainees were issued standard equipment - as much as possible locally made, too support local industries. This included khaki shorts and shirt; guinit (coconut fiber) helmet; rubber shoes; blanket and mosquito net.
Training included military organization, drills, map reading, security, marksmanship, bayonet practice, scouting and patrolling and tactical field exercises. In addition, since many of the trainees had never gone to school, they were taught basic hygiene, care of equipment, citizenship and vocational skills. (32)
During the whole training period, the men were paid five centavos a day and were thus known as "Sundalong Sinco" or "Five-centavo soldiers."
The basic training centers were infantry, but special cadres were established: Camp Dau for field artillery, and engineer, medical, signal and quartermaster at Fort William McKinley (today’s Fort Bonifacio), under the direct supervision of the U.S. Army.
The first training sessions were considered highly successful by contemporary observers, despite some problems. The real test, however, would be their performance in actual war.
Reorganization of the General Staff
With various programs in operation - registration, reserve training, regular force operations - the simple general staff which had been organized in January 1936 had to be reorganized. Col. Paulino Santos, a retired career PC officer who had served as director of the Bureau of Prisons, was made Major General and appointed chief of staff of the Philippine Army on May 4, 1936. Gen. de los Reyes, who had been acting chief of staff, was also promoted to major general and made provost marshal general, in charge of the PC Division. Gen. Valdes was also promoted to major general and became the deputy chief of staff. Col. Francisco was promoted to brigadier general and placed in command of the First Regular Division.
Gen. Santos’ term as chief of staff was characterized by developing the training programs carried out by the army, making use of his experience as director of prisons. He built on the foundations laid down by Gen. de los Reyes and oversaw the establishment of both the army’ regular and reserve units.
To flesh out the general staff - now known as the Central General Staff - three assistant chiefs of staff were named. Gen. Vicente Lim, the first Filipino graduate of West Point and a career Philippine Scout officer, recently retired due to physical disability was named assistant chief of staff, War Plans Division. Col. Fidel Segundo, also a career Scouts officer and West Point graduate was assistant chief of staff, Intelligence, Operations and Training Division. Col. Rafael Garcia, also a West Pointer and Scouts officer, was assistant chief of staff for Personnel and Supply. These three Philippine Scouts officers were the most senior Filipino officers in the U.S. Army and were also the most qualified in terms of training and experience. (33)
In 1938, the Constabulary was reconstituted as a separate force, and peace and order functions were removed from the army. With the army now concentrating on external security, Maj. Gen. Basilio Valdes was appointed chief of staff of the army on January 2, 1939, and was given a free hand to choose his staff. Under Valdes and his staff, the army was developed as a more professional organization, and whose main mission was the defense of the nation against foreign intrusion. Valdes, however, was a career PC officer, and to bolster the military character of the army, Brig. Gen. Vicente Lim was appointed deputy chief of staff. The Central General Staff was modified in June 1939, to reflect the more systematic administration of the army. G-1 was placed in charge of strategic war plans and reserve unit employment, with Brig. Gen. Lim in charge. G-2, Col. Fidel Segundo, remained Operations, Training and Intelligence; G-3, Col. Rafael Garcia, became Supply and Industrial War Plans; G-4, Personnel, was headed by Lt. Col. Irineo Buenconsejo and G-5, a new office, was placed in charge of budgetary matters, under Capt. Amado Magtoto. (34)
A final reorganization took place in 1941, just before the outbreak of war in the Pacific. The Central General Staff was modified to conform to the U.S. Army system, with G-1 being Personnel, G-2 Intelligence, G-3 Training and Operations and G-4, Supply. Two other offices remained unnumbered: that of the Budget and of War Plans. (35)
The various reorganizations showed a continuing development of the army in line with its changing roles, and in keeping up with modern military trends. The aim was always for greater systematization and efficiency.
Development of the Officers Corps
The original defense plan placed much attention on the mass training of reserves to build a sizable reserve force which could be mobilized throughout the country. However, these reserves had to be led, and an especially important part of the development of an army is the training of its officers. Although the Constabulary had been made the nucleus of the army, the PC officers were not trained nor experienced in large scale combat operations; thus most of its officers had to be retrained.
The Commonwealth’s defense plan had one basic school to train new regular army officers, and this was the Philippine Military Academy (PMA). The old Constabulary Academy was unfit for the new requirements of the army and the nation’s defense system, since it was designed to train officers for law enforcement and internal peace-keeping operations. The curriculum was thus expanded to four years, equivalent to a baccalaureate degree, and oriented towards military operations for the defense of the country against external threats. PMA class 1940 was the first class to graduate under the National Defense Act, and all seventy-nine graduates were given regular commissions into the Philippine Army. (36)
Since, however, the army needed a larger number of officers - regular and reserve - to command the army’s units, other schools and training institutions were founded. There was the Reserve Officers’ Service School (ROSS), which was a crash course compressed into three months. Qualified young professional men underwent this specialized training to become reserve officers. Two schools were established, one in Baguio and one in Manila, in U.P. (37)
Other sources of reserve officers were the School for Reserve Commission, or SRC. Promising enlisted trainees were chosen and given the option to train for five more months to qualify for a reserve commission; and the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), which was made compulsory in all universities and colleges. A special school called the Reserve Officers Training School was also established to train teachers to handle pre-military training in high school. (38)
The lowest rank in the army was, however, a rank lower than the U.S. Army: newly commissioned officers started as Third Lieutenants, with a much lower pay and stature than any officer in the U.S. Army. And the army needed a large number of qualified officers in higher ranks.
One source for this was to assimilate Filipino officers of the Philippine Scouts. Since, however, they were officers of the U.S. Army with different pay scales from the Philippine Army, and since their experience necessitated higher ranks and positions in the Philippine Army, a formula was adopted where assimilated ranks higher than the Scout ranks would be given to those Scout officers who joined the Philippine Army. Virtually all the Filipino Scouts officers joined the Philippine Army (some only temporarily) to help in its development. (39)
For a period of five years, Quezon was given the authority to appoint officers in the army to positions higher than Third Lieutenant, provided they were qualified. This allowed Quezon to tap highly skilled and experienced professionals and give them reserve commissions. (40)
To further develop them, selected officers were sent to the U.S. for specialized training in U.S. Army command and service schools, such as the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. (41)
The Regular Force
The combat arms of the Regular Force was composed of the Infantry, the Cavalry, the Field Artillery, the Coast Artillery Corps, the Air Corps, the Corps of Engineers, the Signal Corps, the Offshore Patrol, the General Staff Corps. The initial Services of the Army were the Adjutant General’s Service, the Judge Advocate Service, the Quartermaster Service, the Medical Service, the Ordnance Service and the Chaplain Service. Later the Chemical Corps, Army Nurse Corps, Inspector General’s Service and Finance Service were added. (42)
The heads of the various arms and services comprised the Special General Staff. The Special General Staff and the Central General Staff comprised Headquarters, Philippine Army.
When the army was created, its nucleus was the constabulary. The bulk of the constabulary were composed into the Constabulary Division, which was responsible for maintaining peace and order throughout the country. The army was, in the beginning, given the dual task of providing for internal and external security, hence the Constabulary Division. However, internal peace-keeping functions detracted from the army’ main mission, and thus the constabulary was reconstituted as a separate force, under the Department of the Interior in 1938. (43)
The main land combat unit of the regular force was the First Regular Division, based at Camp Murphy (today Camp Aguinaldo). The First Regular Division was formed on January 18, 1936, and served as a training cadre for trainees in Camp Murphy. It experimented with equipment, drills and orders suitable for Philippine conditions. It went on field maneuvers every year, and, being the premiere land unit of the army, paraded at all official Commonwealth functions. It was a complete division, with infantry, field artillery, cavalry, chemical, medical, quartermaster and engineering units. (44)
The army being tasked with the entire defense of the Philippines, it had air and naval arms. The Philippine Army Air Corps (PAAC), which was formerly the Philippine Constabulary Air Corps, was the air arm of the army, was conceived to defend Philippine skies, and to perform reconnaissance and liaison functions. The defense plan called for one hundred fifty fast fighter bombers, which would be the first line of defense for the country. (45)
The Offshore Patrol (OSP), on the other hand, was the naval arm of the army. It was planned to equip the OSP with fifty fast torpedo boats, which although small, could strike and deliver heavy damage against larger warships. It received its first torpedo boat in early 1939. Both the OSP and the PAAC were to keep enemy forces away from Philippine shores, but failing this, the army would provide beach defense. The naval and air elements were made adjuncts to the land forces as part of the comprehensive defense plan. (46)
In 1938, the First Coast Artillery Regiment was formed, preparatory to the arrival and emplacement of coast artillery guns to defend the major straits and water approaches to the Philippines. It trained in Fort Wint, at the mouth of Subic Bay. (47)
Growth and Development of the Army
The army initially concentrated its attention on the massive training programs for reserve officers and men. After the first two years, these programs were in place and the army could develop more time to actual defense strategies and plans.
One phase of this development was the procurement of arms and ammunition, and in this the U.S. Military Mission helped negotiate the purchase or loan of weapons, equipment and ammunition from U.S. sources. The U.S. Army, however, was hesitant to sell modern weapons, fearing the possibility of a revolt or changing the power balance in Asia and antagonizing Japan. Thus, the Philippine Army was handicapped by its inability to obtain affordable, modern weapons. Because of price considerations, the standard infantry weapon was the M1917 Enfield rifle, of which large stocks remained from World War I. Although not very suited to the Filipino soldier - they were quite long and heavy, and suffered from breaking extractors and ejectors - they were available, and since they were not as reliable as other contemporary weapons, were allowed to be sold to the Philippine Army. Field artillery pieces and similar large weapons were not sold to the army, but instead loaned from U.S. Army stocks in the Philippines, subject to transfer - or, if the Americans saw fit, recall - later on. (48)
Some officials in Washington even believed MacArthur’s presence in the Philippines was detrimental to American policy, and moved to have him reassigned to the States. MacArthur, however, chose to retire from active service in the U.S. Army, and stayed in the Philippines as military adviser. As a retired officer, however, he no longer had the clout to negotiate arms sales with the U.S. Army, thus further setting back the weapons acquisition plans of the army. (49)
Aircraft for the PAAC were also bought, but the fast fighter bomber which MacArthur envisioned did not exist. Thus, the PAAC obtained training planes which could double as scouts and light bombers. The fast torpedo boats that MacArthur wanted for the OSP likewise did not exist in the U.S., and negotiations had to be made with the British, who had developed such boats in World War I. (50)
As the training program progressed, the army divided the Philippines into military districts: five at first, later expanded to ten. In each of these military districts, a supply center was built, and one reserve division was created. In case of war, each district would call the reserve division to duty, equip them, give them refresher training and send them to defensive areas. (51)
In 1939, to further systematize the army, serial numbers were adopted, which became the basis for promotions. (52)
To control the conduct of its officers and men, the army established a system of military justice and courts martial in 1938. Efficiency boards reviewed the service and conduct of, particularly, officers, and could recommend them for promotion or disciplinary action. (53)
In major civic functions, such as the anniversary of the Commonwealth, select units of the army would appear in public, on parade, to show to the people their army.
Practice mobilizations
As part of the training and to keep the army prepared, as well as to assess the results of reservist training, practice mobilizations were scheduled. The first training mobilization was held in May 1938, with half of the 1937 trainees being called for a ten-day refresher training period. More men reported than those called, and the practice mobilization was publicly proclaimed a success: the units had been formed and exercises had been held. But unknown to the public was that the practice mobilization had brought to light many defects in the defense plan. (54)
Problems
Among the negative lessons shown by the practice mobilization was that most of the trainees forgot what they had learned the year before. Since the mass training of reservists was one of the corner stones of the national defense plan, this fact showed a glaring error in the plan. Quezon saw MacArthur immediately after the test mobilization to discuss the actual state of the army and its problems.
Gen. Lim and other members of the Central General Staff pointed out that the plan was lopsided, training a mass of reservists without the necessary officer corps. Because so many of the trainees were illiterate, they had to be taught basics reading and writing, and even elementary sanitary practices: this diluted the actual time spent on military training. Many of the trainees, therefore, learned very little, and what little they learned, they quickly forgot.
The shortage of qualified military officers was chronic. Since the army had originally been built with the PC as its nucleus, it absorbed officers and men who were not trained in military operations, and thus had to be retrained. But the army spent too much time on domestic peace and order functions, necessitating the separation of the PC from the army. This move, however, further reduced the number of officers and men available in the regular force.
MacArthur’s plans of producing reserve officers in short periods of time also proved faulty. Many officers were half baked or unqualified, because the training periods had been too short. With these as instructors, the trainees could not learn very much.
Furthermore, because of the strict budgetary constraints imposed by MacArthur’s sixteen million peso estimate, the army was acquiring obsolete weapons and equipment, which were the only ones affordable. The MacArthur’s optimism as to the low cost proved wrong, and funds were quickly used up for constructing barracks and other infrastructure. There was hardly any money left for acquiring modern weapons.
The same budget restrictions resulted in the acquisition of faulty equipment. The guinit helmet, although locally made, was no good in modern warfare, and some of them warped under the sun or cracked when they fell on the ground. There were shortages of reserve equipment, too, which would become obvious when full-scale mobilization was called.
The basic plan was also too Luzon-centered, and the defense of the Visayas and Mindanao was almost non-existent. The naval component of defense was unrealistic with just the OSP. MacArthur’s assurances that his plan would work was actually just an exaggeration, Lim and the other members of the General Staff told Quezon. Quezon had entrusted defense planning almost entirely to MacArthur and did not ask the opinions of the general staff, and thus the plan itself did not have the constructive comment that it could otherwise have received. (55)
Changes in Leadership and in the Plan
With all these problems being brought to his attention, Quezon took steps to change what he could. He distanced himself from MacArthur, feeling that he had been duped. He even considered firing MacArthur and sending him back home. It seemed that the enormous expense on the defense plan had been misdirected. Opponents to the defense plan had criticized the expense as too little for effective defense, but too much for the Commonwealth: it took money away from other basic responsibilities of the government such as education. Quezon, realizing the errors of MacArthur’s plan, publicly changed his position on national defense changed: whereas before he felt Filipinos could successfully defend the Philippines, now he believed otherwise. In his speeches, he brought the responsibility of defending the Philippines back to the U.S.: as long as the Philippines was still a possession of the U.S., the responsibility of defense was still in the hands of the Americans.
Quezon cut the budget and restricted military spending, but appointed Gen. Lim as Deputy Chief of Staff so that a professional Filipino officer could direct the defense plan. Maj. Gen. Basilio Valdes, the new chief of staff, was a career PC officer with medical, rather than military training; with Lim as deputy, the army and the defense plan could now be developed along more serious lines. In private, Quezon promised Lim and the General Staff that he would allot money for weapons procurement without informing MacArthur. (56)
Outbreak of War in Europe
On September 1, 1939, Germany suddenly invaded Poland, plunging Europe into war. The Poles fought back bravely, but raw bravery was no match against Hitler’s tanks and planes. Hitler’s blitzkrieg showed to the world that new methods of warfare were at hand, rendering the weapons and tactics of World War I obsolete. The war in Europe had a strong influence on Quezon, who was in the midst of reassessing the defense plan. The fall of France to the Germans in May 1940 further convinced Quezon that MacArthur’s obsolete plan was of limited value and worse, a waste of money.
Quezon consulted the general staff more often and pondered various ways to make the army and the defense plan more viable. He considered building the First Regular Division to full strength, stationing its units in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. He created the Department of National Defense to supervise defense matters - and further distance himself from MacArthur. (57)
But Quezon now began to think that the mass training of reservists was a mistake, and ordered cutbacks in training expenditures. In fact, he publicly cut the budget of the army, although secretly he allotted funds for the procurement of modern weapons. The main question now was, was there enough time to remedy the situation? (58)
Continued growth of the Army and Preparations for War
Despite Quezon’s public about-face on the defense issue, the army continued to grow by momentum: training continued; weapons - including modern mortars - were purchased; efficiency boards continued weeding out undesirables from the army’s ranks. In March, 1940, PMA graduated its first class of seventy-nine new officers under the new curriculum: this was a promising development as they were the future of the army. An army nurse corps was authorized, and the first fifty-eight nurses were appointed in August 1940. The General Service School was established to train more reserve officers. Local drill methods, substitute equipment and replacement parts were developed. Field training was conducted more realistically, and field artillery units went to Lingayen Gulf to practice firing at waterborne targets. (59)
The public clamor for stronger defense preparations became strong, contrasted with the early days of the Commonwealth when many criticized the defense plan and the army. With Europe at war and Japan fighting in China, it only seemed a matter of time before the Philippines itself would be engulfed by war. (60)
Call to Arms: Acid test for the Army
On July 24, 1941, Japan sent military troops into South Indochina. This move was the last straw for the U.S., which had been pressing for Japan to get out of China. The U.S immediately froze all Japanese assets in the U.S. and the Philippines, and declared a total embargo on all scrap iron and oil shipments to Japan.
Under the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the Philippine Army was called into the service of the United States and an overall headquarters, called the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), was created. The army, however, was not federalized, or made an intrinsic part of the U.S. Army: the U.S. Congress carefully chose its words, because calling the Philippine Army to the service of the U.S. meant the army remained a separate force, with its own rates of pay and its own organization. The Filipino soldier would train and fight side by side with Americans, but would not be allowed the same privileges that he deserved. (61)
MacArthur was appointed commanding general of the USAFFE. With MacArthur in charge of military preparations for war, and the Philippine Army under him, Quezon without hesitation turned to MacArthur to congratulate him on his appointment.
MacArthur quickly went into business and began the paperwork that would mobilize the reserve units of the Philippine Army, begin refresher training, and prepare them for war. This was no longer for practice or training; this time it was the real thing.
To meet the sudden demand for field grade officers, regular officers were promoted and reserve officers were called up.
The PAAC was the first army unit inducted into U.S. service, at formal rites in Zablan Field in Camp Murphy, on August 15. One infantry regiment of each reserve division was called to the colors on September 1. The other regiments and units were scheduled to be called up regularly afterwards, following a timetable that would give all units three months refresher training. By March, 1942, all units would be fully prepared to face the enemy. (62)
As the Philippine Army was mobilizing, however, on December 8, 1941, Japanese planes attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. Within hours, Japanese forces bombed Philippine soil, and the Philippines was at war. The army would now meet its test.