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Chapter VI

A Time of Great Challenge and Sweeping Change
or (An Army in Transition)
(1986-to date)

The decade encompassing the years 1986 to 1996 is the most dramatic time in Philippine modern history. During the span of ten years, the Filipinos witnessed the passing of the torch by the virtue of ballot from Ferdinand E. Marcos to Corazon C. Aquino and then to Fidel V. Ramos. The transition from dictatorship to democractic rule had always been rough. Such a drastic change in the government set up extremely affects the nation’s armed forces which have to deal with the prevailing political and economic scenario.

In 1985, real gross domestic product (GDP) posted a negative growth of 4.68% while inflation was placed at 23%. A marked loss of corporate confidence in the Philippines was manifested in the decline in capital expenditure, steep increase in interest rates and low savings rate. Foreign debt stood at a staggering amount of US$26.25. By 1986, the overthrow of the Marcos regime became an imperative consequence.

By 1988, the government of Mrs. aquino introduced a recovery program to help revialize the economy, As a result nominal GDP had increased from US$33billion tp US$40 billion. Inflation and unemployment rates also went down. In 1989, the failed coup by rightist rebels menaced government efforts to reinvigorate the economy. Fortunately, despite this episode, hefty foreign investment poured in by the first quarter of 1990. However, in the same year, copper prices went down and Philippine oil production sharply declined. Although the country posted positive growth in exports, the amount of imports overtook exports. Political instability continued to discourage foreign investment. Worse, a powerful earthquake shook Metro Manila and northern Luzon which alarmed the business community.

In 1987, the new Omnibus Investment Code maintained that only 40% foreign investment could be allowed in non-pioneer areas in the Philippines’ Investment Priority Plan, however 100% foreign ownership is permitted to companies to be located within export processing zones if production would be entirely allocated for exportation. The measure proved successful in making the country more attractive to foreign investment

Moreover, to enhance foreign investment confidence and improve the business environment in the country, mssive infrastrusture development programs were initiated.

Since the early 90s, the country has experienced a political and economic resurgence. Political stability is no longer in doubt with the success of peace initiatives with Muslim separatist forces, the weakening of the leftist movement, and the spirit of participation of the rightist movement. However, political infighting within the Senate remains unpredictable and public confidence in the judicial system remains fragile.

Under the leadership of President Fidel V. Ramos, the government developed a vision and program of reform and sustainable development called PHILIPPINES 2000. The programs aims to improve the quality of life of all Filipinos, as well as to attain the status of a newly industrialized country by the year 2000.

The Philippines has opened up its economy in response to the growing trend of globalization and trade liberalization. For the first quarter of 1996, the economy, based on GDP, grew by 4.66% while Gross National Product (GNP) reached 7.1% in the first half of the year--representing the country’s fastest GNP growth in six years. Now, the Philippines, which used to be known as the sick man of Asia, is tagged as the next Asian Miracle. Recently, the country reaped multiple victories with its hosting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation which brought together 18 heads of states of member countries including US President Bill Clinton. With the government’s resolute commitment to participate and take advantage of the unlimited opportunities for trade, investment, and information technology that cooperation among countries have to offer, it is only a matter of time before the country fully realizes the gains of all its efforts.

The historic People Power Revolution of February 1986 had an immense impact on the whole organization and thrust of the Philippine Army. Although it began with great promise of sweeping change, the mood was a mixture of apprehension and excitement. During this climactic period, more than ever, the Philippine Army leadership was resolute to form a "new" Army more readily responsive to its mission and better effective in counter insurgency operations. Foremost it endeavored to establish a leaner, more compact, and mobile force.

A lean and compact force meant a reduction in troop strength to a size that the organization is able to competently support and the doubling of reserve components.

Mobility refers to the capability for immediate deployment anytime and anywhere in the archipelago of a battalion or even a brigade in no more than three days.

The mission of the Philippine Army was refocused to reflect the new role it is tasked to perform against the emerging socio-political and military scenario. Thus the Army mission came to be: To organize, train, equip, and provide Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained security operations, independently or jointly with other AFP units to help uphold the sovereignty and integrity of the Republic.

The integrity and sovereignty of the country was threatened by the unabated growth of the MNLF, MILF, and CPP/NPA/NDF forces and the emergence of the ultra rightist groups which continued to gather strength over the years. Although, clearly these forces posed a significant threat to national security, nevertheless the Army continued to retain the upperhand and unceasing control over the situation.

Various campaigns were carefully planned and launched against the enemies. The most noteworthy of these campaigns were were the Special Operations Teams or SOT and the Army Concern on Community Organizing for Development or ACCORD.

Since it is the Army who are positioned in the frontline of battle against the four destabilizing forces, the leadership of the AFP resolved to commit its resources to the Philippine Army.

To safeguard the welfare of each soldier is to protect the well-being of the entire organization. The Army can only hope to buoy up the spirit of its men if it is able to display genuine concern for their physical, mental, and professional condition. Every year, the Army strives to implement programs aimed at improving its structure, delivery of services, monetary, and other benefits. In the end, it hopes to motivate its men to discharge their duties with vigor and vitality.

The Philippine Army aims to become an organization with a highly efficient, modern, and responsive human resource as its backbone. This can be achieved by continuous application of the highest standards in the Army’s procurement and retention system through judicious implementation of attrition policies, and strict adherence to schooling standards.

To function efficiently, the Army procured the appropriate number and the right people who can perform proficiently their respective assigned tasks. It is in this line that the Army maintained a percentage fill-up responsive to its major role in internal security operations and in consonance with its streamlining program. During the height of the campaigns against the three major threat groups, the Army needed to upgrade troop strength every year. The years 1986 to 1991 saw troop strength rise considerably from ______ to _____ , at the same time the Army became more selective through the enlistment of only highly qualified draftees and trainees into the regular force. Those who did not make the cut were immediately phased out. This move ensured the continuous inventory of quality manpower ready for deployment to the various parts of the country. However, numbers alone do not make up a good Army. A good soldier also requires moral soundness. The institutionalization of the AFP Code of Ethics in each and every soldier enhanced his professionalism. Values formation and inculcation of ‘soldierly’ values of Discipline, Valor, Competence, Solidarity, and Loyalty were constantly emphasized. Exemplary performance of duty were given timely recognition through awards and decorations, while due punishments and disciplinary actions under a strict military justice system were administered without bias against misfits in uniform.

The Army’s greatest asset are its soldiers. Whether fighting against internal or external threat or performing administrative work, the Army continuously ensured the security and welfare of its soldiers as well as improving their quality of life through various programs.

The Salary Standardization Act, now on its final phase of implementation, aims to upgrade the salary scale of all government employees, including soldiers at a level comparable with those received by their counterparts in the private sector. By 1997, all soldiers, alongside all government employees, will receive its full value.

The Army expedited the procurement of appropriate and quality combat clothing and individual equipment to improve the survivability of our soldiers. Being properly equipped not only enhances efficiency but also uplifts the morale of the soldier.

Medical and dental facilities and services were made readily accessible to the troops especially those in line units, through the assignment of medical officers and dentists down to the Infantry Brigade level. Station hospitals were also established starting in Infantry Divisions. Soldiers requiring special medical are sent to private hospitals with better equipment for better care. Moreover, it is a principle in the Philippine Army that a soldier never has to pay for his medicines.

Under a new deployment scheme, personnel were assigned and reassigned based on a regionalization program and rotation policy where a soldier is given the opportunity to be assigned in his region of origin and gets to perform garrison and combat duties for the purpose of upgrading skills, exposure to different work types, and combat experience.

More officers and enlisted personnel were able to avail of their rightful Rest & Recreation privileges after long exposure to combat duties. Cultural shows provided the much needed diversions for the physically and mentally drained soldiers. Although limited in capital, the Army sought to provide decent shelter to both officers and enlisted men through various on-base and off-base low-cost housing projects.

To uplift the quality of life of its soldiers and dependents while in the service and after retirement, the Philippine Army undertook livelihood enhancement programs like technical training and livelihood assistance. On the other side, the military values education program continued to develop the moral and spiritual side of the Army soldier through value sessions, seminars, and spiritual enlightenment. These have made him more aware of his responsibilities towards the organization to which he belongs, his family, and the community where he is assigned.

Sports activities were also greatly encouraged by giving full support to the conduct of many inter-unit athletic competitions especially at the lower levels of command. The Army’s participation in national and international competitions also gained headway. The triumph of boxers Roel Velasco, Reynaldo Galido, and Ronald Chavez and cyclist Gerardo Espiritu and company in the Marlboro Tour competition brought much honor to the Army. Also noteworthy is the Army’s consistent victory in the annual AFP-PNP Olympics, the foremost athletic competition among the major services.

Meanwhile, the elimination of purposeless red tape in the processing of death and separation benefit claims brought consolation and encouragement to the men in uniform and their families. Before all these could be achieved, the Army had to infuse the use of information technology. The computerization of records paved the way for easy and immediate access to information and improved accuracy. In addition, the computer-based personnel information system resulted in the efficient career management program of training, placement, and promotion.

The Army’s ceaseless counterinsurgency campaigns began achieving significant strides in 1992 which significantly affected its manpower requirement. Thus, troop strength was gradually reduced to a size appropriate to its needs. Likewise, headquarters and garrison personnel was pruned down to the barest minimum; those affected by the downsizing were reassigned to field units where they are needed the most. This reduction and troop distribution is in consonance with the Army’s goal of achieving a lean and mean organization.

Each soldier plays a key role in every army operation whether performed within the confines of the office or in the middle of the battlefield in far-flung areas. However, they can only be relied upon to successfully carry out their mission if they are adequately equipped and given ample support through timely procurement and distribution of much needed supplies.

The stepped up campaign against the CPP/NPA/NDF and MNLF forces in the late 1980s necessitated the prioritization of the logistics requirements of the field units assigned to neutralize these forces. Armored vehicles, which congregated in Metro Manila before and after the February 1986 revolution were redeployed to the field in every tactical brigade and infantry battalion where they will serve their purpose. Mission essential items such as weapons & ammunition, transportation, communications, petroleum, oil and lubricant supply, uniform requirements, and health supplies were immediately procured and delivered to the field. Assorted Combat Clothing & Individual Equipment (CCIE) items were promptly distributed to the personnel manning the frontlines. Repair and maintenance of equipment, facilities, and installations to prolong serviceability also took precedence over other concerns. The Army’s logistics concern inluded the support and maintenance of the various camps’ facilities particularly light & water and other life support systems, and the maintenance of existing and development of future camps in line with the PA Modernization Plan.

To enhance the army’s capability to shoot, move, and communicate (SMC), the Army acquired new equipment. It also expedited the repair and maintenance of existing ones to maintain a desirable fill-up and improved serviceability. For firepower, a high serviceability percentage of individual and crew-served weapons was achieved through the replacement and the refurbishing of old firearms. Special firearms like submachine guns and sniper rifles were procured for specialized missions of the PA Counter-Terrorist teams of the Special Forces and the sniper teams of the Scout Rangers. This was complemented with the maintenance of appropriate levels of basic ammunition load requirement through timely procurement and reloading. As part of equipment upgrading of old guns, eight 105mm howitzers were fitted with upgrade kits to increase their range of fire. For transportation and communication, the Army maintained a high PA-wide equipment fill-up and serviceability profile through repair and rebuild activities and the acquisition of new equipment. This was achieved by maintaining a pool of highly-trained personnel for repairs with the corresponding stock of spare parts for all PA transportation and communication equipment.

The Philippine Army logistics inventory shows an array of foreign military equipment. The Army strives to manufacture its own equipment through its Self Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) program. Most of the Army’s firearms, the M16, and ammunitions are now locally produced. The local transport industry have gotten involved and is now testing and evaluating prototypes of its military vehicle designs. However, as of now it still proves more economical and practical to procure more sophisticated military equipment from foreign sources. Majority of equipment are procured from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries and other allied countries of which the United States still remains the biggest supplier. The Philippine Army accumulated a huge collection of US military equipment through the US military aid. The military aid, which are in the form of grants, were in compensation for the use of military bases in the country until 1991 when the Philippine Senate voted against its further use. This grant was used by the AFP to procure military equipment, but only from US suppliers. Thus, majority of Philippine Army equipment and supplies were US-made such as M16 rifles, M35 trucks, and the Hummer multi-purpose vehicles. As the Army exhausted the FMS grants and began utilizing its own appropriations, it began to look for other markets for its equipment, thus, it consequently became less dependent on US suppliers. Recently, the Army purchased British-made SIMBA armored fighting vehicle to augment its inventory of US-made V150s. It also contracted with GIAT Industries of France to upgrade its 105mm howitzers. An important part of the SIMBA deal is the transfer of technology and manufacture of the said vehicles in the country, thus contributing to the Philippine economy. Contracts with other arms and equipment suppliers also include similar agreements. It will not be long when the SRDPs objective will be fully realized.

The information technology wave has significantly affected the Philippine society and the world. The Philippine Army was ahead in recognizing and reacting to this global trend. Way back in 1978 when the Army Management of Information Center (AMIC) was organized (it was renamed to Electronics Data Processing System Center in 1986 and to AMIC again in 1996) to deal with the utilization and application of computers in every aspect of Army activities. The center also supervises the PA Management Information System program (PAMIS) with the objective of creating an information-based administrative and operational system for the Army.

The unequaled capability and versatility of the personal computer necessitated the acquisition of at least one in every infantry battalion. The PC has become one of the most important and indispensable administrative tool of the Army’s line units. As it found its way into the soldiers in the field, the PC also found its way into the remotest barrios of the country. Realizing the need for computers to facilitate administrative tasks, all Army infantry units were supplied computers which in a limited way were also made available for use by the countryfolks. The measure exposed the barrio people to the advances in and the application of information technology in every day life.

Aside from computers, the Army also procured state-of-the-art military equipment. An example is the grid positioning system (GPS). The GPS is a satellite-based and operated piece of equipment that can replace and is more versatile than the magnetic compass. The Army also began to use night vision goggles (NVG) to enable soldiers to see and consequently maneuver in the dark. Radio interceptors and direction finders proved highly effective in intercepting enemy radio transmission and the location of its source. As the Army pursues its modernization program, more high-tech equipment will find its way in the Army’s logistics inventory to further improve the administrative and operational effectiveness of its soldier.(Note: Sidebars on PA Present Logistics Inventory and Future Acquisitions)

The passage of RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act (BCDA) of 1992 authorized to raise funds through the sale of portions of the land of all military camps in Metro Manila and the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of former US military installations. Except for Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City, all bases in Metro Manila were affected by this law to include Fort Bonifacio, the home of Headquarters Philippine Army and major PA combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Exempted from the sale are approximately 100 hectares of Fort Bonifacio which will be utilized for the National Security Brigade and PA officers housing area. The proceeds of the sale will be used to finance the transfer of these military camps and the construction of new ones, the self-reliance and modernization program of the AFP, the expansion of the AFP’s medical facilities, and the modernization of the government arsenal.

The BCDA requires the relocation of all PA units in Fort Bonifacio in phases starting 1995 up to the year 2001 when Headquarters Philippine Army is projected to have transferred to its new home. By 1995, major units have already relocated like the transfer of the Light Armor Brigade to Camp O’Donnel in Tarlac and of the Reserve Command to Camp Riego de Dios in Tanza, Cavite. In 1996, the Training & Doctrines Command and the Special Forces Regiment have relocated to Fort Magsaysay and the First Scout Ranger Regiment to Camp Tecson in San Miguel, Bulacan. Meanwhile, other units whose future relocation site has not been determined have temporarily relocated within the 100-hectares retained area of Fort Bonifacio.

To support the PA Base Development Program, new base locations were surveyed and studied to conform with the country’s National Defense Strategy and with PA’s Base Force-Base Camp concept. Master development plans of these new bases were already made and submitted to higher headquarters, with construction to start upon approval of the plans. Meanwhile, existing camps will undergo rehabilitation and improvement of facilities to provide for the requirements of the reorganization and restructuring of the units that will be located thereat.

The officers and men of the Philippine Army undergo rigorous training programs to make sure that they are fully equipped with the skills and adequately prepared to perform the tasks at hand. Training and education are provided at all levels of the command to upgrade competence and provide a fulfilling career. To what will it become of men if their superiors do not possess the qualities of a leader and the commitment of a patriot? No matter how powerful or modern today’s equipment may be, there will serve as futile instruments if the men tasked to operate them are ill-trained on their use.

The Philippine Army was geared toward providing full command support to all training activities and the incorporation of mission essential subjects to enhance discipline and instill patriotism in all Army soldiers. More important, training systems were intensely refined by centralizing career and institutional courses. Courses were standardized and restructured to emphasize leadership, professionalism, psychological & physical stamina and teamwork.

The Training and Doctrines Command (TRADOC), reorganized in 1995, is the premier training institution of the Philippine Army. To revitalize training, service extension schools (SES), Army Training Groups (ATGs), and Division Training Units (DTUs) were organized. Training groups in the Visayas and the Mindanao areas were set up to handle career and institutionalized courses to cater to the training needs of soldiers based in those area. The 3rd ATG in Cebu services the units in the Visayas while the 4th ATG caters to units in Mindanao. The eight DTUs (one per Infantry Division) conduct in-service training courses, candidate soldier training and retraining of infantry battalions. The Special Forces School, Scout Ranger Training School, CMO School, and The Intelligence School offer specialized training and are under the control and supervision of TRADOC through its Army Wide Support Training Center (AWSTRAC) for uniformity and course accreditation.

Various individual training courses were held to prepare military and civilian personnel to assume new positions and increase their competency in their present jobs and boost career opportunities. Officers and enlisted personnel were sent to foreign military schools not only to obtain new ideas and doctrines but also to foster brotherhood with foreign armies. Individual specialized courses were conducted to improve the combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities of the Army. Unit training such as refresher courses improved the fighting capability and effectiveness of combat units especially of the infantry battalions.

In preparation for the full implementation of the Special Operations Teams Concept (SOT) in the late 80’s, special SOT mobile training teams conducted numerous SOT training in support of this army-wide campaign. A short course for company commanders was designed and conducted during the height of the campaign against the communist insurgents. This aimed to produce capable and qualified company commanders and unify the efforts in counterinsurgency from this unit level. For the higher level of command, the Pre-Command Course for Battalion Commanders was created to prepare officers projected to command a battalion, the unit level where direct administrative and operational control is critical.

In 1995, the first Army Command And General Staff Course was conducted. This course aimed to prepare senior or field grade officers for higher command or staff position such as battalion commander or division staff. The former AFP CGSC was upgraded to become the Joint Services Command and Staff Course.

The small group instructions (SGI)concept was developed and practiced in the early 1990s by the Training and Doctrines Command. Aimed at improving instructor-student interaction, the SGI type of instruction specifically provides for low instructor-student ratio to make classroom and field activities more personal and dynamic. As a result of this ratio, better student participation and closer supervision of student performance were observed.

The introduction of computer-assisted training added a new dimension in teaching. The use of automated rifle firing familiarization equipment not only saves on training ammunition but offers an almost real firing experience to students. Battle simulation equipment offers battle scenarios for decision-making exercises in the classroom. This method was appropriately recognized by the IT community. In 1996, the officers assigned at the Combat Arms School of the TRADOC were cited for their work in developing a battle simulation software that became one of the finalists in the National Search for IT Excellence and merited a P100,000.00 cash prize. The software is now being used as an instructional aid for students of infantry/armor/artillery courses during battle simulation exercises.

Joint exercises with the other major service commands like the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Air Force were conducted to emphasize among others harmony and coordination among the forces on the ground, in the air, and the seas.

To improve relations with other armies, aside from its many training benefits, the Philippine Army regularly conducts bilateral military exercises with allied countries such as the United States and Singapore. Even after the pull-out of the US military forces in the country, the RP-US Balikatan exercises is continuously held annually in the different parts of the country. Meanwhile, the ANOA-SINGA ground exercises are hosted alternately by the Philippines and Singapore.

The Philippine Army has been an active participant of the AARM (ASEAN Armies Rifle Meet). The armies of all ASEAN countries meet annually in a rifle and shooting competition. The member armies of this regional group take turns in hosting the event. Aside from upgrading the shooting skills of the soldiers, the meet is also an opportune time for fostering camaraderie and brotherhood among the soldiers of the region.

The Army, during this period, continued its focus on the conduct of internal security operations against the three (3) major domestic threats of the country: the CPP/NPA/NDF; the Muslim secessionists ; and the ultra-rightist groups. As the government was able to wager peace with the rightist groups and the Misuari-led Moro National Liberation Front, it has started peace dialogues with the now weakened communist group and the Muslim extremist group of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Immensely successful in contributing to the whole armed forces counterinsurgency campaign, the Philippine Army continued to work hard in the achievement of total peace in the country.

To complement its internal security operations, the Philippine Army actively participated in national development by involving in public works, giving assistance during national emergencies, initiating socio-economic projects and community related activities as incorporated in the overall civil military operations program. Internationally, the Army contributed by sending representatives to the Philippine-United Nations Guards Contingent to Iraq.

In the late 80’s, at the height of its counterinsurgency campaign, the leadership of the Philippine Army opted to reduce its span of control through selective decentralization and simplification of the Army organization to generate initiatives at the lower rungs of the ladder. Many units were activated and organized than those that were deactivated. In 1986, two Infantry Brigades Separates, one each in Regions 8 and 12 were organized to augment the existing five Infantry Divisions. By October 1987, there already exists six Infantry Divisions, two Infantry Brigades Separates, and sixty-seven Infantry Battalions. The year 1988 however was more significant when two (2) Infantry Brigade Separates were upgraded into the 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions. In addition, a GHQ Brigade was absorbed as PA units; Ground Operations Tactical Intelligence Battalion (GOTIB) was redesignated into the Intelligence & Security Group; the Home Defense Forces Group (HDFG) into the Special Forces Group; and Infantry Brigades were assigned a new numerical designation relative to the Infantry Division it belongs. In 1990, the PA Light Armor Regiment was upgraded into an Armor Brigade. Due to the participation of the First Scout Ranger Regiment units in the failed December 1989 coup attempt, the entire FSRR was disbanded on December 1990. The SR Battalions were transformed to infantry battalions and were distributed to the infantry divisions. However, on May 1991, the FSRR was reactivated on the recommendation of the Davide Commission. The build-up of other combat support and combat service support units were also prioritized. In 1992, the Service Support Brigade was upgraded to the Service Support Command absorbing the Military Support Points of LOGCOM, AFP which were renamed Forward Service Support Units (FSSUs), in order to provide more efficiently service support to units in the field. Meanwhile, the Civil Military Operations Unit was upgraded to Psychological Operations Group in May; the Reserve Command was activated in July absorbing the thirteen Regional Community Defense Units (RCDUs) of the Infantry Divisions. ( Sidebar on Present PA Organizational Setup)

This reorganizational pattern was the effect of the decline in the insurgents’ threat in the 90’s, the involvement of some units in URG activities, and the pursuance of the PA Modernization’s Force Development program of ensuring a more credible external defense posture. PA continued to review and streamline the force structure to eliminate unnecessary duplication and overlapping of functions while ensuring that it is realistic and consistent with available resources and threat assessment. Presently, the Philippine Army maintains an organizational structure capable of maximum flexibility in operations and adaptability to possible reduction or wartime expansion without much reorganization while upgrading the capabilities of its units to enhance combat effectiveness and operational readiness.

Meanwhile, the Philippine Army realized its role in nation-building aside from its traditional military roles. The Army Engineers strength and capabilities were revised to become more responsive to the social and economic needs of the people. Five Engineer Brigades and one Engineer Construction Battalion are presently organized and deployed in various parts of the country to support the development programs of the national government apart from its military engineering works In 1990, the Special Forces Regiment (SFR) activated the 18th SF Disaster Emergency Assistance and Rescue Company to assist in disaster, relief, and rehabilitation efforts. This unit were employed during national emergencies saving many Filipino lives in the process. The SFR also organized the 30th SF Counter-Terrorist Company to emphasize the country’s hard stand against terrorism. (Sidebar on major PA unit activation/deactivations by year)

The Philippine Army also ensured the availability of an adequate number of qualified and well-trained reserve force in line with the PA Reserve Force Development program. To achieve this, the fourteen RCDGs of RESCOM with its 72 Community Defense Centers (CDCs) continued to organize reservist units as part of the PA Total Force concept of a mix of regular army units and standby reserve units. The Army aims to have one Ready Reserve Battalion physically accounted, organized and trained in every province nationwide. Likewise, the Philippine Army continues to operationally control para-military or civilian defense forces to assist in counterinsurgency operations and village defense. The Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF)as it was earlier called was renamed to the Civilian Armed Force Geographic Units (CAFGUs). This force, composed of volunteer civilian villagers, are organized in CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) companies to assist the Army in securing their own territory from insurgent and secessionist threats. The late 80’s saw the slow but significant increase in the number of newly organized CAA companies, but, as the peace & order situation in some areas improved, many companies were disbanded.

During the EDSA Revolution, the CPP/NPA/NDF maintained a wait-and-see stance due mainly to the unexpected rapid development of events of the revolution. Its failure to take advantage of the momentary division of the Armed Forces has turned into a wasted opportunity in the furtherance of their goals.

On the other hand, the military during the immediate post-EDSA days rode on the success of the revolution. It took advantage of its gains in terms of public perception. Civilians painted the armed forces as the true and dedicated protector of the people.

While CPP/NPA/NDF activities were sluggish during this short period, it did not last for long. Realizing its flat-footed posture, it immediately began to rebuild and strengthen its force until it reached a significant size, strength, and capability that posed an alarming threat to national security. At its peak in 1988, the CPP/NPA numbered to around 25,200 armed insurgents. Thus, the government lost no time in re-examining its approach to the communist insurgency. The AFP launched Campaign Plan Lambat Bitag 1, 2, 3 & 3a with the Army propelling its Special Operations Teams into action.

Prior to 1988, the PA concentrated its efforts in destroying the CPP’s armed components, the New People’s Army, mainly through military tactics. The Army remained victorious in most armed confrontations as reflected in the number of enemies killed and enemy firearms recovered. However, this strategy could not claim total success for it failed to arrest the political activities of the insurgents. The NPA easily negated the government-initiated military campaigns by easily replacing their neutralized comrades with new recruits.

The SOT was in support of the AFP strategy Lambat Bitag which called for a well-motivated, committed and disciplined soldiery to fully undertake the TRIAD concept. The TRIAD concept refers to the three-tiered approach composed of Intelligence, Civil Military Operations, and Tactical/Combat Operations. As a counterinsurgency weapon, it sought to unite and mobilize the Filipino people to collectively check the political and armed expansion of the CPP/NPA/NDF, particularly in the countrysides.

The Special Operations Team (SOT) concept is the brainchild of MGen. Mariano P. Adalem. The feasibility of adopting the SOT as an Army strategy against the insurgency movement was first tested in 1988 by the 403rd Infantry Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division based in Misamis Oriental and Bukidnon under the stewardship of then Colonel Adalem. The SOT was primarily designed to dismantle the communist political infrastructure in the barangay level and extinguish its mass base support. At first try, the SOT proved very successful and showed great potential. Thus it was implemented nationwide in September of the same year. By the end of 1988, the SOT succeeded in neutralizing 1,101 barangays and the bringing about the surrender of 102,683 members, subversive mass activists, and sympathizers of the CPP/NPA/NDF.

The dismantling of the CPP/NPA/NDF barangay political infrastructure begins with the identification and public exposure of CPP personalities as well as supporters of the movement within the barangay; thereby sources of communist influence in the locality are isolated from the social mainstream. The members of the barangay can then rally their support for the democratic movement. Other activities in support of the SOT strategy are the setting up of counter CPP/NPA/NDF organizations; organization of clandestine barangay intelligence networks and the intensification of the organization of village defense.

Tactical Brigades were deployed to priority CPP guerrilla fronts nationwide. Maneuver units were encouraged to occupy hinterlands and strategic chokepoints to counter CPP movement. Spot command visits were frequently conducted to ensure compliance by field commanders. These efforts resulted in the surrender of many Communist party members, and sympathizers and the recovery of assorted firearms.

The success of the SOT was instrumental in strengthening the faith and loyalty of the people to the State. So successful was the SOT that in 1991, after almost three (3) years of operations, 14 of the 61 priority guerrilla fronts addressed were already dismantled, the number of affected barangays reduced by 48% (from 8,496 to 4,100), its regular armed strength reduced by 29% to 16,360 and its firearms was reduced by 12% to 10,770. By 1993, dissident strength and firearms was down to 8,730 and 7,900 respectively. Out of the 8,496 dissident affected barangay in 1988, it was down to 984 affected barangays representing only 2% of the total number of barangays nationwide. By 1995, the number has considerably decreased that the AFP has transferred the primary responsibility on matters affecting internal security, including the suppression of insurgency, to the Philippine National Police as mandated by Republic Act 6975. However, the following area are retained to the AFP to undertake primary role as called for in Executive Order 216: all provinces in the island of Minadanao; Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi; all provinces in the island of Samar; all provinces within Cordillera Administrative Region; Southern Quezon and all provinces of the Bicol Region. The Army’s SOT success against the insurgents was the result of the combined and coordinated activities in this three fields of operations:

Combat/Security Operations - Combat/security operations were geared towards the destruction of the main enemy force/armed components. The conduct of combat operations on pinpointed enemy strongholds, lairs, and at designated constriction areas resulted to the destruction and disorganization of the CPP/NPA’s command and control. Other efforts were intended to block the main communication and supply lines to paralyze and weaken their armed capability. Tactical Brigades, on opportune time and as situation develops, conduct combat operations to decisively destroy the bigger enemy formations such Bn-size MRGUs (Main Regional Guerilla Units) and neutralize their strongholds. The line battalions, likewise, conduct combat operation against the enemies of smaller formation (Coy-size) and the splintered groups.

These combat/security operation were likewise conducted for the protection of developmental activities in the area being undertaken by other government agencies and civic and non-government organization, deny the terrorist-dissidents from intimidation and extorting revolutionary taxes from legitimate entrepreneurs; to secure vital government facilities and installations; and protect local government officials from the atrocities of the dissidents so that the needed basic services are delivered to the people and that continued socio-economic growth of the area is ensured.

Intelligence - Efforts were directed towards supporting the execution of the overall PA mission as it greatly enhanced the operational stance of our tactical units addressing the insurgent armed threat. Timely and reliable production and dissemination of intelligence gave the combat units the tactical advantage in many armed confrontations leading to the decimation of enemy armed groups and the destruction of vital enemy camps. Intensified execution of intelligence projects contributed significantly in the identification, apprehension, and neutralization of top CPP/NPA/NDF personalities as well as the recovery of numerous arms cache of the enemy. As part of the TRIAD concept of operations, Barangay Information Networks or BINs were created at SOT-ized barangays. These BINs were tasked to gather information and monitor enemy activities in a particular area. Residents were recruited as members of the BINs and after a brief training and equipping, these people worked closely with their army handlers. These barangay nets in turn will form a larger municipal intelligence network. The intelligence networks proved successful in the collection and monitoring of timely information about enemy activities and locations. This enabled the military in providing confirmed targets and establishing priorities in carefully planning for tactical and combat operations. The use of Signal Intel (SIGINT) further enhanced the information gathering capability and proved to be a valuable asset as army radio interceptors catch very vital enemy transmissions.

Civil Military Operations - CMO countered the issue exploited by left-leaning organizations, revived the image of the AFP through improved troop behavior, and sustained the fighting will of the troops through closer supervision by the Chain-of-Command. It also weakened the revolutionary fervor of the enemy and their mass base through propaganda and continued psychological warfare.

Developmental efforts were also undertaken in the area as spearheaded by the Army Engineer units. It was primarily aimed to let the people in the area feel the sincerity of the AFP, and the government as a whole, in promoting their welfare and to provide them the necessary infrastructure that will uplift their well-being and hasten the economic recovery of the place. In coordination with other government agencies and local officials, the AFP through the Army units in the area, constructed roads connecting the remote barangays to the mainstream of society and/or farm to market roads that spurs the economic activities of the local folks. Likewise, school buildings, medical and dental clinics, waiting sheds and others were constructed for the benefit of the people. It must also be noted, that developmental activities is an integral part of the whole CMO effort.

Politically, an internal rift in the national leadership of the CPP/NPA had permeated among the ranks of the regional cadres and led to the split of the party into three factions. The biggest faction, the Stalinist group, was headed by Jose Ma. Sison and advocated for the continued implementation of the traditional dissident strategy. The other factions, on the other hand, are composed of younger party leaders and declared autonomy from the group of Sison. The rift became increasingly irreconcilable and widespread demoralization resulted in numerous cases of desertion.

The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe which was highlighted by the collapse and repudiation of the ideology right at its birthplace, the USSR, provided the opportunity for the Army to hasten the downfall of the local communist movement. The turn of events has made the communist insurgents ideologically orphans and their struggle irrelevant. Precious foreign financial support were also cut-off.

In July 1992, the President called on Congress to repeal Republic Act 1700 which legalized the Communist Party of the Philippines and similar organizations and allowed them to compete freely, openly and peacefully in the political, economic and social arena instead of following the path of armed struggle. The repeal removed the legal obstacle in pursuing the insurgents applying to them the basic law of the land or the Revised Penal Code.

Civilian volunteers from cleared barangays after SOT operation were organized, trained and developed to compose the territorial/geographical forces to shield the enemy recovery efforts. After training these CAAs, they were strategically deployed in the enemy’s former strongholds as stay-behind forces to allow the line battalions to pursue the remaining armed groups.

Considering resourse constraints, CAA units were deactivated in selected areas/areas restored to normalcy and subsequently, new CAA companies were activated in the newly cleared barangays surrounding the known guerrilla strongholds or constriction areas as the operating government forces moved closer to finally destroy the armed elements.

The CAA program ensured that territorial forces are in place where holding forces are needed to allow the PA maneuver forces to pursue the armed terrorist-dissidents and likewise, maximizing the utilization of the already scarce government resources.

This total approach addressed the conditions for breeding insurgency that the CPP/NPA/NDF exploited. The government troops provided security as against the enemy’s sowing of fear to the people. They provided the necessary infrastructure and encouraged NGO’s for livelihood and other missionary projects for socioeconomic development to address poverty and ignorance. Unit commanders imposed discipline to the soldiers to correct the misconception of injustice and abuses. The Army units closely worked with the local governments to insure that basic services were delivered thus projecting a responsible government.

Although there was a general decline in almost all aspects of the communist revolutionary struggle, the Philippine Army will continue to sustain the winning momentum. The GRP and CPP/NPA/NDF are still in the negotiating table trying to look for a peaceful solution to the decades old war. Meanwhile, the Army’s focus will shift to the Mindanao problem. As the government found a partial solution with the peace pact with the MNLF and the SPCPD, it strives to do the same with the other secessionist groups. Whatever the outcome may be, the Philippine Army will continue to perform its role of supporting the multi-sectoral effort of accelerating the achievement of a lasting peace in the country.

The armed struggle of the Moro National Liberation Front against the Philippine government was highlighted during the Third Islamic conference of Foreign Ministers in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1972. The Organization of Islamic Communities (OIC) expressed serious concern over the plight of Muslims living in the Philippines.

The root of the Muslim rebellion can be traced to the time of Spanish rule. Before the arrival of the Spaniards, Mindanao, the archipelago of Sulu and Palawan were indigenous territories to 13 Muslim ethnolinguistic groups and 10 Lumad tribes. For centuries, Mindanao, with its sultanates and principalities under the Islam religion, in effect was a separate country from Luzon and the Visayas regions. When the Spaniards came in the 16th century, they attempted, but without success, to colonize the Muslims through the might of the cross and the sword. They even went to the extent of commissioning Christianized natives from Luzon and the Visayas to fight the Muslims.

However, the defeat of the Spaniards did not stop them from excluding Mindanao in the transfer of sovereignty to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris in 1898. The move was vehemently despised by the Muslims who had no intention of being a part of the Republic of the Philippines.

During the American colonial rule, brute military force was used to suppress Muslim resistance. Several land laws which required the registration of lands, voided all land grants from Muslim sultans or datus, and declared all lands not registered under the Land Registration Act of 1902 as public lands.

Muslim political and cultural institutions such as the rule of Datus and succession to traditional titles were dissolved. The Lumads were equally subjected to comply with Christian rules which affected their land ownership and land use. Moreover, Christians from the Luzon and the Visayas were resettled in Mindanao which significantly affected the demography of the region. By 1970, Christians became the majority in Mindanao.

While the Lumads opted to pursue justice for their grievances through peaceful means, to assert their right over their territory and preserve their culture, the Muslims decided to take up arms. The different secessionist armed groups were the direct result of the Muslim aspiration for autonomy.

The MNLF/BMA - the largest separatist group organized by Nur MISUARI in the late 60’s. This group has opted for meaningful autonomy with the objective of creating an independent state with a separate security force in Mindanao. The highest governing body of the MNLF is its Central Committee with no fixed membership while the Bangsa Moro Army is its military arm. By 1995, the estimated strength is placed at 17,000 from 13,900 in 1990 with an estimated 9,340 firearms. The MNLF’s main camp is in Timabangan, Indanan, Sulu with the bulk of its forces in Southwestern Mindanao specifically in Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi and the Zamboanga provinces. This group has been the recipient of financial and logistical support from several Islamic organizations and countries.

MILF - The Moro Islamic Liberation Front is the next biggest separatist group after breaking away from the MNLF in 1977 with the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Force as its military arm and Ustadz Hashim SALAMAT. By 1995, the MILF strength is placed at 5,980 with 7,730 firearms. Its main camp known as Camp Abubakar is established at Barira, Maguindanao with the bulk of its forces at Lanao and Cotabato provinces.

MNLF-Reformist Group (MNLF-RG) - The Lanao-based MNLF Reformist Group is also a breakaway group which separated in 1981 when then MNLF vice chairman Dimasangkay PUNDATO dissociated with MISUARI due to leadership and policy differences. It is presently headed by Abdullah SANCOPAN as Chairman. The group has some 280 members with 120 firearms.

National Islamic Council Command (NICC) - the third breakaway MNLF group known as the National Islamic Council Command (NICC) was created in Nov 1991 by former MNLF/BMA Chief of Staff Melham ALAM who was removed for questioning the leadership of MISUARI.

Abu Sayyaf Group/Al Harakat Al-Islamiya 9ASG/AHAI - a radical extremist group and a source of great concern to security because of its propensity to commit violence, terrorism and has adopted the official name "Al Harakat-Al-Islamiya" (AHAI) with the same objective of creating a separate Islamic state in Mindanao through "Jihad" (holy war). It operates mainly in Basilan, Sulu and Zamboanga area.

Even with ongoing peace talks between the government and the MNLF, the Philippine Army kept a credible presence and a high state of readiness in Muslim dominated ares in Mindanao. The Army continued to conduct security operations on secessionists’ areas in accordance with cease-fire agreements. In spite of the informal truce with the Southern Philippine secessionists, occasional armed hostilities were recorded. The Army however maintained the upperhand in these engagements. A look on the result of tactical operations conducted will confirm the gains of the Philippine Army in these confrontations. (Sidebar on Results of SPAG related activities by year)

Several government reconciliation programs like the National Reconciliation and Development Program (NRDP) has contributed to the surrender of thousands of Muslim secessonists and their firearms.

The peace efforts with the biggest autonomous group, the MNLF, are turning out positive results as members of that group started to conduct joint peacekeeping operations with the Philippine Army. However, much is yet to be done in achieving peace in Mindanao since the other groups, particularly thr MILF and ASG, are escalating their terroristic activities. These terroristic activities not only target the military but civilians as well through kidnapping, hold-ups, extortion, and even the mass execution of the innocents. In some confrontations, some groups even use children as protective shields against soldiers’ fires and also hijack buses and kidnap women just to protect themselves from pursuing government troops. The initiative by the government to negotiate with the MILF is under way and that the successful agreement with the MNLF will pave the way for a similar understanding with the othr groups. Nevertheless, the Philippine Army effected the addition of more units and repositioning of troops in Mindanao if only to strengthen government position and ease up the apprehension of the civilian sector.

During the Marcos regime, the government began to forge a peace agreement with the Muslims of Mindanao. In 1976, the Tripoli Agreement which provided for the establishment of autonomy for 13 provinces in Southern Philippines and Palawan and a call for the immediate ceasesfire between government and MNLF forces was signed. However its implementation never got anywhere. During the term of Corazon Aquino, again the government pursued talks with the MNLF with the signing of the Jeddah Accord. However, the implementation phase of the accord also never came about as the government found unacceptable the demand of the MNLF for the full autonomy of the islands of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Palawan, and Tawi-Tawi, comprising 23 provinces.

It is only during the term of President Fidel Ramos that a peace agreement finally became a reality. The first round of exploratory talks between the Philippine Government and the MNLF was held in Tripoli, Libya in October 1992 followed by a second round in April 1993 in Cipanas, West Java. Formal negotiations and the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement on the formation of various committees were held in November 1993 in Jakarta, Indonesia. This was followed by a series of consultation-workshops, mixed committee meetings, and peace and development summits. In June 1996, the Eight Mixed Committee Meeting was held in Davao City which resolved to establish the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in the areas covered by the Tripoli Agreement. The SPCPD was envisioned to serve as the mechanism to implement the SZOPAD.

The SPCPD is composed of a Chairman in the person of Nur Misuari who was handpicked by the President, a Vice Chairman, and three deputies representing the Muslims, the Christians, and the Lumads. The Council is tasked to oversee the promotion, monitoring, and coordination of the peace situation in the affected areas; provide support to the local government units; and render assistance to the Commission on Election in the conduct of elections, referendums, plebiscites, and people’s initiatives. Peace and economic prosperity are the Council’s reasons for being. The sincerity and determination of both signatories to the Council will be put to test as they try to prod their constituents into working together, settling their religious and cultural differences, and uniting for the good of whole region and the country as well.

The formation of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development and its leadership by MNLF Chairman Nur MISUARI drew grave criticisms from various sectors. While some took to the streets to make their sentiments known, others decided they needed to take up arms and form covert vigilante groups. Church leaders, private business, and government officials from members of the House of Representatives to Barangay captains felt betrayed by the government’s failure to consult them and the lack of information on the issues involved. Their resistance to the Council stems from their suspicion that the move is a actually a step toward the establishment of a provisional government with the power over local government units. Instead of unifying the people of Mindanao, the SPCPD provided the impetus for divisiveness and heightened the conflict between Christians and Muslims.

As a result of this extreme resistance to the Council, the government led an information campaign in the affected areas to convince the people, majority of which are Christians, to support its peace initiative. The PA IMPLAN ‘SANG-AYON to AFP LOI 31-96 ‘UNAWAAN’ called for the continuous conduct of information dissemination about the SPCPD to lead for to a better understanding and acceptance by the populace and their leaders. PA Speakers Bureau were organized and dispatched to lead the information drive. Marathon dialogues with the various sectors were conducted. Clarifications and explanations were given. Transparency regarding the negotiations with the MNLF was pushed. Slowly but steadily, this effort has achieved a breakthrough in pacifying and winning the confidence of the Christians, and in convincing them into accepting the SPCPD as the key to lasting peace in Mindanao.

For the military, the full implementation of the SPCPD signifies a spark to the end of the decades old armed confrontation with their Muslim brothers. Many lives have been lost including those of men, women, and children who were caught in the crossfire. Vast sums of financial resources gone to waste without the benefit of enduring results. So much time spent in waging battles instead of forging peace.

With the cessation of violence in the region, the Army can now concentrate in addressing external threats which call for a more sophisticated foreign policy and improved international relations and in doing its share in nation building through deeper socio-civic involvement.

Meanwhile, majority of the soldiers of the MNLF will be gradually integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines. A big majority of them will be enlisted into the Philippine Army. However, they must undergo retraining and reorientation. By January 1997, those who will be selected will already start training with the Army. Finally, Filipino soldiers, whether Christians or Muslims, will be fighting side by side for the sake of only one cause.

The stabilization of the peace and order situation in former venues of conflict provided the impetus for the dramatic transformation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Although national defense and security remained its key priorities, the AFP’s role took on another dimension when it was called upon to actively participate in nation building.

Letter of Instruction (LOI) 42/94 tagged as Unlad Bayan set into motion the Philippine Army’s direct involvement in countryside development. While this LOI is distinct and separate from the AFP Campaign Plan Lambat Bitag, this will provide the transition of the AFP’s role from counterinsurgency to a more involvement in the government’s development thrusts. Unlad Bayan beckoned the men in uniform to commit its resources to national and local government initiatives toward peace and development specifically in empowering various communities and its people to be effective participants in nation building.

In response to this call, the Philippine Army created an implementing plan labeled as Gintong Nayon. Gintong Nayon emphasizes the coordination of military forces with civic and sectoral organizations for the attainment of developmental goals. Even if trained to fight the enemy in battle, with training and reorientation, the Army with its organizational structure, geographic reach, and experienced and dedicated human resource were soon right for the job.

To ensure the success of Gintong Nayon, the Army developed a program that reoriented its men and women toward a totally different approach to enduring peace and development.

From where the SOT left, the ACCORD steps in. The Army Concern on Community Organizing for Development Program (ACCORD) was envisioned to preserve the gains of counterinsurgency operations; organize or strengthen community-based organizations; encourage individual and collective human capability in community building; and educate, train, organize, and develop communities as participants in social development. ACCORD is an important component in enhancing the consolidation and development phases of the Special Operations Teams Strategy.

ACCORD brought to fore the Army’s capability to highlight the inherent talents of members of the civilian community and utilize them for their own good. The Program encouraged each member of a barangay to actively participate in community development and promotes a culture of self-reliance.

The men and women of the Philippine Army was organized into ACCORD Teams each composed of a squad of nine men. The size of each Team, also referred to as community workers, was reinforced or decreased depending on the size of the community it was assigned to serve. The Team’s initial task is to gather information about the community. Leaders or potential leaders are identified and issues and problems affecting the barangay are analyzed. Once these preliminary actions are accomplished, the ACCORD Team engages in direct dialogue with the members and participate in activities to gain the community’s trust and confidence. When the ACCORD Team is already well immersed in the community, it encourages the community to form groups or organizations or combine existing organizations and select their leaders for each organization. Each group or organization is then tasked to assess in detail the needs of the community and consequently form a development agenda-- a plan of projects geared to alleviate the living condition in the area.

The ACCORD Team helped in executing the projects and in monitoring and documenting its progress. The success of each community project is essential to the success of the ACCORD program as a whole. Thus, in necessity, the ACCORD Teams maintained the goodwill they have earned through occasional visits to the community and consistent monitoring and rendering of support.

To complement the ACCORD program, the Philippine Army also largely contributed to nation-building through construction of roads and bridges, school-buildings, river controls, power lines and electricity restoration, and others engineering works. Civil works projects like the resettlement projects in Bukidnon for the Mt Pinatubo evacuees and in Mindoro for the rebel returnees showcase the vital role of the Army Engineers. In 1996, the Army Engineers were called in by the President to assist the national government in finishing the construction of the ‘megadike’ that will control the flow of lahar in Pampanga. The ‘megadike’ project was expected to be completed before the rainy season, but as the planners realized its non-completion with the early on-set of the rains, they called in the Army engineers. In the protection and preservation of our forests, the Philippine Army has intensified its drive against illegal loggers while simultaneously embarking on reforestation projects in all parts of the country. To highlight this, every major unit in the Army maintains a nursery to supply its massive tree-planting activities.

To emphasize the role of development in national security, an American author DAVID HALBERSTAM states that ..."National security is no longer an index of weaponry ( which is essentially a missile and tank count), if it ever really was, but a broad array of factors reflect, the general state of national well-being. It includes the ability of a country to house its people, to feed them, to educate them, to provide them with opportunities in keeping with their desires and education, and to instill in them the trust and optimism that their lives are going to be valued and fruitful. It is well to remember that the just and harmonal society is, in the long run, also the strong society."

The Philippine Army intensified its civic action program to complement the programs of various government agencies. Numerous medical and dental civic action programs were conducted to benefit the majority of our countrymen, particularly in the depressed areas. Likewise, soldier-teachers were deployed in critical and depressed brangays through the Army Literacy Patrol System (ALPS). This has been very effective in providing basic education to people in the far-flung area in support of the "Education for All" program of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.

The Philippine Army continued to interface with civil government agencies and non-governmental organizations in the conduct of integrated relief and rehabilitation activities among victims of natural calamities. In the aftermath of the July 1990 earthquake, the 7th Infantry Division and the 51st Engineering Brigade were the first to provide assistance in rescue and clearing operations. The personnel of the two units were actively involved in the recovery of school children victims pinned by concrete slabs in the collapse of the Philippine Christian College building in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. Meanwhile, the Army engineers assisted the DPWH in road restoration, bridge repair, and clearing of obstructions like boulders and landslides along the Nauillan-Baguio road and the Maharlika Highway aside from assisting in transporting stranded commuters. In the wake of massive destruction of properties and infrastructure in the province of Zambales, Pampanga, Bataan, and Tarlac due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in June 1991, the Army immediately responded by mobilizing personnel and equipment to assist. Significantly, teams from the First Scout Ranger Regiment were posted at strategic areas beneath the slopes of the volcano to monitor explosions and alert Central Luzon residents of rampaging lahar flows. In close coordination with PHIVOLCS, they gave warning signs to impending sudden mudflows that might create floods in the affected areas. The Philippine Army participated actively in the disaster relief operations in Ormoc City and other muncipalities of Leyte affected by Typhoon "URING" by assisting in the search and recovery of victims, transport of relief goods, and the conduct of medical and dental assistance.###

At the height of the People Power revolt in 1986, the Filipinos restored their trust in the military. The long years of harshness it had perpetuated under Marcos's rule were obliterated in a single stroke, if only because this time the soldiers were on their side. General Fidel Ramos, upon his appointment as the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff of Corazon Aquino's revolutionary government, christened the military as the "New Armed Forces of the Philippines." Soon after the happy celebration of Marcos's depature from our homeland that he ruled like it was his kingdom for 20 years did we slowly realize the deeper problems of the military. They erupted like a needle piercing balloons one by one.

Perhaps that was inevitable. The revolt of 1986 was triggered by a coup attempt plotted by officers fiercely loyal to the former Defense Minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, on one hand, and Constabulary officers under the wing of their chief, Fidel Ramos, on the other. It was a temporary alliance for the sake of ultimately ousting Marcos -- an alliance that eventually disintegrated in the face of more serious challanges that laid ahead. The officers were known as the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), which in theory was supposed to bring back the honor of men in uniform but which it unfortunately strayed to the path of division, causing nearly irreparable damages to the armed forces.

Juan Ponce Enrile was a significant factor in the post-Marcos military politics. The officers around him were bent on continuing what they had failed to achieve in the first place, that of taking power and forming a junta that could have been no different from Marcos's authoritarian regime. This had gone uncontrolled for the simple reason that the new president, Mrs. Aquino, did not grasp the maneuverings of powerful forces at play. As commander-in-chief, she had to learn even the most basic of saluting and marching. She erred in political decisions that stirred massive resentment in the military, most notably her order to release all political prisoners. The military felt she was too soft on the communists, and this alone was reason enough to provoke tension that unwittingly served the agenda of those who claimed they were speaking on behalf of all soldiers. "God knows I tried," said Mrs. Aquino in her heart-breaking speech at the Philippine Military Academy, when her efforts in maintaining peace during her first year in power was failing.

Dangerously persistent as they were, the military faction of Marcos's followers went through lengths, with hefty financial backing, trying to destabilize the Aquino government. About five months since she assumed power, on July 6, 1989, about 490 fully-armed pro-Marcos soldiers and 5,000 civilian followers took over the Manila Hotel by the bay in what would become the first of six coup attempts. It was over in 37 hours. The hotel was declared as the temporary "seat of government." At that time the Constitutional Commission whose members were hand-picked by Mrs. Aquino was still in the process of formulating a new consitution, in order to replace the Freedom Constitution brought about by the People Power revolt five months before.

The timing of this putsch was that both Aquino and Ramos were in Cagayan de Oro City down south for the surrender of communist defectors. Arturo Tolentino, Marcos's running mate in the last presidential election, said he was taking over temporarily in the absence of Marcos, took his oath as temporary leader at the hotel's driveway, but they all ran out of steam when no public support came their way.

What many recalled of this incident was the lame punishment given to the rebels. They were merely ordered to do 30 push-ups at a gymnasium. Looking back, this was an ambivalent signal to the military -- those who understood it to mean that they can get away with anything. And because of this, it was hard to tell who was in control. The military culture represents a part of our largely feudal society, so damaging to our psyche if the cycle goes unbroken.

The culmination of the Manila Hotel coup attempt, if it had been successful, was to make Tolentino the country's acting president and Secretary Enrile as prime minister "to continue the fight against the communists without any interruption." The intelligence circle in the general headquarters strongly suspected that Enrile's officers, prominently led by Col. Gregorio Honasan, were privy to the loyalists' plan but were merely staying in the sidelines to see how far things would go.

By November, 1987, President Aquino dismissed Juan Ponce Enrile from her cabinet. That was finally the time the public knew the extent of the conspiracy known as God Save the Queen. Before then Aquino did not know if she had what one might call a "loyal" general on her side. Gen. Ramos hardly revealed his cards, as what most people know by now is his bargaining strength, a remarkable trait that clinched for him his victory in the 1992 presidential election.

The President did not know whom she could count on -- except probably a couple of generals -- when it would come down to a crisis. Brig. Gen. Brigido Paredes, the disgruntled commandant of the Marines, was throwing a party for his promotion; but more than just a party, the guests were laying down the plan for "saving the queen." The target date was midnight of November 11, just hours after the President leaves for a scheduled state visit to Japan. A Marine unit and the Army's Light Armor Brigade were supposed to be involved in the operation.

The Army and Air Force commanders were invited for the party that served as a "briefing" on the plot. The presence particularly of Maj. Gen. Rodolfo Canieso, the Army's commanding general, was critical. He was the Army's man, a rough, battle-hardened officer that is the sort of quality captivating to the soldiers. "I told her (the President) the Army is hers," Gen. Canieso told Renato de Villa, his counterpart in the Constabulary, in a private frank exchange. (For inspite of Ramos's ambiguousness at the time, de Villa, was steadfastly towing the legitimate line).

Taking on the political advantage, the defense minister had demanded from the President that she: 1) abolish her revolutionary constitution in place of the old Marcos constitution; 2) reconvene the pro-Marcos National Assembly; 3) revamp the cabinet that was a mixture of activists and human rights lawyers; 4) replace some local government officials who had all been fired at the outset of her administration; and most importantly, implement an anti-insurgency policy that would leave no compromises for the insurgents. These demands were generally supported by many officers, privately or otherwise. But as it would turn out, the President had to dismiss him to save her own government.

The days went swiftly. Maj. Gen. de Villa had discovered of the plot's intent from Victor Corpus, a former PMA instructor who had defected to the communists and then turned himself in to the military. (He was released by Mrs. Aquino after several years in prison). Corpus had feared for his life when he realized the consequence of having been let in into the plot by an Enrile senior aide.

While the President was away, General Ramos was then only confident that the major service commanders would not join the coup. Minister Enrile was not dissuaded until, at an urgent meeting with all the commanders, Army chief Maj. Gen. Canieso had to tell him the news that the AFP stood loyal to the government.

The frenzy of gathering support did not daunt the President, apparently, as she went ahead with her scheduled state visit in Japan. If the nature of time had gone unfavorably against her, she could have been back in Manila empty of power.

On the night of November 22, 1986, a showdown unknown to many of us then was taking place inside Camp Aguinaldo. Honasan's men were ready for battle. The rebels were to take over Batasang Pambansa, leaving Aquino no choice but to capitulate; thus, the metaphor "saving the queen." The units involved were Scout Ranger companies attached to the Defense Ministry and also to the Presidential Guards; the 16th Infantry Battalion and the 49th Infantry Battalion whose commanders were classmates of Honasan. MGen. Canieso gave them ultimatums and they buckled down.

Ramos, from his office, was trying to talk them out of it, and running out of patience, asked de Villa to do the persuading. But behind closed doors, the Chief of Staff had signed a radio message for all military unit commanders to "disregard any orders from MND or Col. Honasan and MND staff." The lines had been drawn. The early morning silence was a sign that no queen was to be saved. Later in the day, the President went on national television and announced that she had formally accepted the resignation of her defense minister.

The lack of discipline in the armed forces raised the issue of leadership. Many soldiers believe that senior commanders were close to the political circles given the nature of their positions and as such, concluding that the military organization is now being run and mingled by politicians.

This changed with Gen. Ramos as head of the armed forces. Much of the controversy surrounding his supposedly minimal combat record was a matter of perspective. Ramos had been an Army man, having fought in Vietnam along with other officers who would later hold senior positions, and pioneering the Special Forces unit in Fort Magsaysay when he was a young captain. Army officers had preferred someone of their liking at the helm of the institution.

What the soldiers wanted to see however was action, proof of their power and shared illusions of invincibility. Ramos did not fall prey to that mode of thinking; he was a strategist more than anything, wanting his opponents to think they've got something over him when in fact it was usually the other way around.

When, for instance, Ramos appeared to be too forgiving to pro-Marcos rebels who took over the Channel 7 television station in January, 27,1987, most people thought he lacked the courage to strike the whip. That diplomatic performance was seen as avoiding confrontation when needed, compared to that of Maj. Gen. Canieso blasting the Army headquarters with cannons, sending the mutineers scampering out with their hands up in surrender. Maj. Gen. Canieso's heroic action was what fired soldiers into taking a stand. But in time history would judge what makes a leader.

Both incidents involving the take over of the Channel 7 television station and the Army headquarters in Fort Bonifacio, which happened four months apart, were considered relatively minor compared to the other coup attempts. About 100 soldiers from the Army Training Command in Fort Magsaysay were to reinforce the mutineers at the TV station but were stopped by a PC command on the way. Other target points -- Villamor Air Base and Sangley Point Air Base -- did not materialize. The takeover of the Army headquarters on April 18, 1987, known as the "Black Saturday Mutiny" which fell on that day of the Holy Week, was led by a sergeant on the payroll of Marcos loyalist Col. Reynaldo Cabauatan.

Then, it was a time of crises. The mutinees were intended to cut down the legitimacy of the Aquino government: The Channel 7 takeover took place prior to the ratification of the new Constitution and the Black Saturday Mutiny occurred before the first freely-held congressional elections. Mrs. Aquino had to play the chess game right for the survival of the country.

It also became a matter of political priority and personal decision that Maj. Gen. de Villa, a Constabulary man (but also a former Army man), was appointed Chief of Staff after Ramos. Both his and Ramos's terms saw the most precarious situation the country has had yet to face. Their leaderships held them most responsible in steering the country out of trouble. And it was not only a matter of being loyal to Aquino, it was essentially that they were loyal to the people, as soldiers ought to be. It was a judgement call on the part of the President to have had them serve as chief of the armed forces in succession.

So too was her decision to appoint Maj. Gen. Rodolfo Biazon of the Marines to serve as Chief of Staff for an interim period. Biazon, a former Marine commandant, was overtly loyal to Aquino, and although he had little time -- only four months -- to fulfill a normal term, the past chaotic years were about to fade. It so happened that the armed forces needed new faces and a fresh beginning. It was already making a turn from the crossroad, one that would hopefully start healing old wounds.

In 1991, a year before she was to leave office, President Aquino appointed the Army chief, Lisandro Abadia, to become Chief of Staff. His taking over bypassed several more senior officers in the roster, but the decision was fairly met with approval in that it was a step in laying the foundation for a better armed forces. "They know I will die with my boots on," Abadia had said then in the early days of his term. That kind of bravado is what normally soldiers would want to hear. Arturo Enrile, his classmate from the Philippine Military Academy of the year 1962, would take his place as Chief of Staff in 1994, two years into the presidency of Fidel Ramos. By that time the nation was on its way to stability. (Gen. Enrile's term was extended to a few months to oversee the summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation held in Subic in November, 1996 -- an occassion President Ramos highlighted as a coming out party for the Philippines nearly at the turn of the century).

In the time of the coups, the Army was vulnerable and susceptible to radical ideas. The armed forces leadership may have been lucky in thwarting coup attempts, but most often senior officials avoided using the force of law against rebelling soldiers. There was a perception that nobody wanted to lay a finger on the rebels, an incomprehensible behavior to the outside world. This once again drove a wedge between the soldiers and the civilians. At the same time the government hardly had the political will to impose itself , owing to confusions and varying agenda of government officials.

Following the God Save the Queen coup attempt in November, 1986, Enrile's officers were dispatched to provincial units under no restrictions. They remained free to do as they pleased.

Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan of the Army was sent to the Special Operations School in Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija and Col. Eduardo "Red" Kapunan of the Air Force was given an assignment at the Philippine Military Academy. (A third RAM officer who was also among the rebel leaders, Col. Victor Batac of the Constabulary, was sent to the Camp Crame's computer school).

Anybody could have guessed what they were up to, and it should not have had surprised anyone when they led a major coup attempt barely nine months later. Honasan would be captured and some time later escape from his prison on board a ship, then mount the bloodiest coup attempt in December, 1989. He disappeared in the underground afterwards, occassionally giving clandestine press interviews. In the course of the peace process initiated by President Ramos, he ran for public office in 1995 and won a seat in the Senate with popular ratings. Kapunan would follow suit, only he did not make it as congressman in his homeprovince in Iloilo.

At Fort Magsaysay, Honasan had with him training groups of the First Scout Ranger Regiment and the Special Forces -- two of the Philippine Army's elite units as commandant of the Special Operations School (SOS). Apart from the SOS of the Training Command in Fort Magsaysay, other Army units identified as having participated in the attempt were: the 14th Infantry Battalion, the 16th Infantry Battalion, and the 62nd Infantry Brigade. When finally senior officers had caught up with what Honasan was doing, they decided to transfer him to far-off Samar province to lead a battalion. But it was too late. Meanwhile at the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio, the cadets were held back in their barracks by their commandant, then Colonel Lisandro Abadia. The mutiny had also spread in other camps in the provinces.

The armed forces headquarters was ruined by fire, a symbol of what had become of the military. The coup attempt was quashed by loyal forces on the side of Ramos and de Villa. Again, Mrs. Aquino had survived but she was fast losing time in getting her government back on its feet.

Between the coup attempts of August, 1987 and December, 1989, there was time for examination, unprecedented changes, maneuverings, organizing. But always, there was this fear hovering above the country of more things to come. From the presidential palace, Mrs. Aquino had drawn herself to the military. The choice had been defined for her. The country had suffered a blow which she had partly brought on, and the people expected less from the martyred widow who viewed herself as a transitional leader.

It was clear who was virtually in charge. President Aquino fired Joker Arroyo, her powerful executive secretary who openly disdained the armed forces. (He was a human rights activists during the martial law years). There were succeeding shakeups in her cabinet following that. She had some difficulty getting back on track because of the limitations she had set on her government by neglecting to make swift, revolutionary changes at the outset of her administration. President Aquino asked Enrile's successor, Rafael Ileto, to turn over his defense portfolio to Ramos. It was one step closer to the presidency. Ramos in turn gave way to de Villa as the next Chief of Staff. And when Ramos announced his intention to run for President in 1991, Mrs. Aquino appointed de Villa as defense secretary, a post he holds until today. She then endorsed Ramos as her successor, not surprisingly, and he won.

What was happening to the military then? The soldiers remained restive, though it was clear who belonged where. The idealism of the past faded. If it were to become a family once again, there had to be a lot of purging. Some military leaders privately felt the right thing to do was punish the culprits, as in other countries where coup plotters were either jailed or executed. It never came down to that. Why? Nobody could set the rules straight. Many felt we were simply a nation with a tolerance for forgiveness. Said Gen. de Villa when he was Chief of Staff: "If we had thrown the book at them then, it would have thrown the armed forces into a conflagration of immeasurable damage. There was no evidence to put them in jail -- they were just thinking and talking of a coup. Considering that these people were partners just a few months before, how could they be punished? They were heroes. We hung medals on them in front of the cadets. How could we arrest them?"Stability or Subversion?

Catching some breathing spells in between coup attempts, the Army set about planning an anti-insurgency campaign, which had already been delayed in the timetable. The communists envisioned a strategic offensive by the year 1990, but the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 triggered the collapse of communism in most part of the world. As a result, the communist-led National Democratic Front lost a lot of ground.

The Army's Lambat Bitag strategy sought to reverse the losses in the battlefield. Its vital component was the Special Operations Team or the SOTs. The downside of this was that the concept allowed the incursion of fertile, rebellious minds. That was what happened when the 3rd Battalion of the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSSR) in Albay province formed secret links with a so-called Filipinism movement headed by an ex-communist turned Marcos apologist Nilo Tayag. This movement ran inconspicuously parallel but against the better intention of the Army's SOTs.

The Ranger battalion was based in Bicol, a region that was then heavily controlled by communist rebels. The situation allowed the battalion commander to politicize his men -- which theoretically was not forbidden of any intelligent officer unless he wasn't conspiring to overthrow the government. Apart from the Ranger battalion in Bicol, the command staff of the FSSR itself was ran by disenchanted officers who had personal grudges against senior officials in the military hierarchy.

From July to December of 1987, Tayag's Filipinism group held several propaganda campaigns aimed at politicizing the soldiers as well as organizing the rural folks. Tayag said that his brand of ideology became effective because not only did it make the soldiers politically aware it also was a tool for subversion. In one year's time, the group claimed to have organized 43 out of Albay's 719 barangays -- not convincingly victorious but enough to show its influence. A confidential document revealed that the organizers were searching for a party "to direct the movement as well as an armed group to serve as a sword in the pursuit of the struggle." In any case it served their purpose to have allies in the armed forces, referring to the Scout Rangers, "who are also committed to change in society."

The Rangers has a long history. They were the heroes who crushed the backbone of the Hukbalahaps after the second world war. (Former Defense Secretary Rafael Ileto had been its founder). The unit's reputation, however, had gone sour and it was abolished, to be revived in 1983 under Army chief Josephus Ramas. He brought back the Rangers' lost glory, making it an elite and pampered force. In 1988, it was voted the Army's best combat unit.

The Rangers figured heavily, although tragically, in the December, 1989 coup attempt. Their politicization had gone so deep they were described by a former commanding officer of the Rangers as the Army's equivalent of university student activists of the First Quarter Storm. Aware of what they were getting into, they preferred the easy, short cut to power. They didn't succeed. Some of them, captains and lieutenants, became media celebrities at the height of the coup attempt because of their announcements espousing idealism for good government. Unfortunately it destroyed what could have otherwise been a brilliant army career for them. And most of all, what they had done during the December, 1989 coup attempt -- seizing several buildings in the financial district of Makati -- made them responsible for the near collapse of the country's economy.

The unit was disbanded but again re-activated in May, 1991, under the respected command of Colonel Julius Javier. But the Scout Rangers, repeating an earlier record brought about by circumstances, had already lost favor in the eyes of the Army leadership. The strength of its units was reduced from battalion size to company size. They were deployed to provinces in the Visayas and Mindanao, as far away from Manila as possible.

The vacuum left by the Army's elite force was inevitably filled in by the Special Forces, also an elite Army unit. Col. Leo Alvez, was appointed to head the newly reorganized Special Forces. It had in the beginning just a little over 1,000 troops. It increased to about 4,000 and speedily achieved a fairly successful record in the field. Some of its officers though were believed to be sympathetic to the military rebels but leadership and discipline held a firm grip on the soldiers. The Special Forces was held highly as an example for the Army.

The involvement of the Rangers in the December coup attempt was a major letdown to the Army, partly that it came as a shock and betrayal and partly that the innocence of the younger officers was shattered. On the part of the rebels, they saw the harsh exposure of the lieutenants as an advantage to prolong their fight. The young ones were now to continue what they had failed to achieved many times over. The junior officers of the Scout Rangers, who were mostly put in detention, were to fit the role expected of them by the most senior officers of the rebel group. Suddenly a massive propaganda was launched to present the Young Officers Union (YOU), though this underground group were composed mostly of remnant officers from the RAM. Nothing came of it. Chief of Staff Gen. Lisandro Abadia later released the Scout Ranger officers in a gesture of reconciliation to pave the way for peace negotiations that officially began under the presidency of Ramos. Some officers were reinstated in the Army, others left the service.

In October, 1990, nearly a year following the bloodiest coup attempt, the rebels had made another go, but it was to be the last. Again, they failed. Their strategy this time was called "The Enclave Concept" in which there was going to be an uprising in army camps throughout the country. The final outcome as they had hoped would have been to force government troops to spread out in order to quell the rebellion, leaving Manila empty handed for the rebels to capture.

The fugitive Army Col. Alexander Noble, who was former chief of staff of the Presidential Security Guards, triggered his style of uprising on the island of Mindanao. He struck an alliance with Ruben Canoy's Mindanao Independence Movement based in Cagayan de Oro City. He and his men of the ethnic Higaonon group entered the city without resistance, seizing the 402nd Army Brigade outside Butuan City along the way. But to his horror, the support Noble was expecting from other provinces failed to materialize. "I found out I was alone," he had said. "I took an empty cab."

The government was quick, closing down the airport and pier. The rebels began packing out one by one. Heavy rains fell, and just like that, the coup that was to be evaporated. Noble surrendered and was imprisoned for some time. In jail he urged the rebel "executive committee" to negotiate a compromise with the government. The committee reacted strongly against it and dismissed him as an outcast. Six years later, already a free man, Noble participated in the Mindanao Business Conference that was one of President Ramos's economic recovery programs to put the island on the map of the East Asia Growth Area.

One by one, leaders of the coup plots were arrested, dividing them and demoralizing their ranks. At last the military had come to terms with their duty of adhering to the constitution, and, above all, preserve the dignity of the country. Quietly, AFP chief Gen. Lisandro Abadia began seeking out those still in the underground for a peaceful settlement. By historical coincidence, other threats groups were also reaching a conclusion that violence has become counterproductive to their diminishing cause, largely due to the end of the Cold War and the hope of rebuilding democracy once again.

Upon taking office in June, 1992, President Fidel Ramos formed the National Unification Committee effectively making reconciliation a government policy that would eventually provide amnesty to the rebels. Col. Honasan's forces had no other option. His supporters were losing confidence. The failures of their so-called unauthorized military exercise had been rejected by the people and quashed by the vigilance of officers with moral and personal duties. Inspite of their crimes, they were given the chance -- in fact, more than usual, to return to the fold of law which they had so severely mocked. Perhaps most Filipinos prefer to forgive but doing so would not necessarily guarantee repentance by the forgiven.

After several bilateral talks and security arrangements, President Ramos issued a proclamation granting amnesty to the rebels and their supporters and their possible re-instatement into the armed forces in May 1996. He also issued another for a period of application seeking amnesty.

In Retrospect One of the wonders of the People Power revolt in 1986 was that it opened up a reservoir of goodwill from amongst the people and the world. That reservoir gradually drained through the years of Corazon Aquino's leadership, disabling her from governing properly. The sheer courage of her survival is in itself a victory. If the nation had managed to steer itself out of the turbulence of the coup attempts, it was because President Aquino had the strength to stay put. The coup plotters deserve no credit. If they had succeeded in anything at all, it was that they had set back the country longer than necessary. The military rebels wanted power, very little else. Around us today is a sense of prosperity, a sense of direction that we are healing as a nation, no longer the perennial "sick man of Asia." President Ramos, the first military general to be elected president, has proudly demonstrated that democracy can go hand-in-hand with development. In short, we don't need a dictatorship, military or otherwise, to do it for us. Yet it somehow escapes most people that the reforms he had set in motion were similar to his predecessor's political agenda. When Mrs. Aquino offered peace to the communist rebels, the military cried foul. When Mr. Ramos declared he would legalize the communist party, there was hardly any murmur. When Mrs. Aquino flew down to Jolo to meet with Nur Misuari, she was called naive. When Mr. Ramos signed a peace agreement with the Muslim chief, it was hailed as history in the making. When Mrs. Aquino tried to de-regulate the economy, she was accused of selling out the country's national assets. When Mr. Ramos privatized government corporation and put an end to monopolies, he was praised. The difference was time, and most probably, gender. In many conversations with military officers during that period of unrest, they tacitly resented having to be ordered by a woman, especially one who didn't even know how to salute. The rebels had also mocked Mr. Ramos as a coward when he was running the armed forces, but, as evidence showed in the often semi-comical result of the coup attempts, the mockery is best seen the other way around. The rebels claims that their efforts had meant to pressure the government into reforming were not justifiable; violence can never be justifiable. President Ramos has been criticized for taking too much time on state visits abroad. All Mrs. Aquino had to do before was charm the U.S. Congress, resulting in investments pouring in. What Mr. Ramos is doing now is sending a message to the world that we no longer have soldiers taking over high-rise buildings, that soldiers don't shoot one another anymore, that the habit of turning Philippine flags upside down has been out of fashion. Today, ironically, the rebel officers who had done so much ruin under the veneer of good government, are partaking of the fruits of development. In the first year of Mrs. Aquino's administration, a majority believed that the armed forces would be loyal to the government but also had fears that there were those plotting against it. On the part of the military, a big percentage agreed that their most important role in national development is protecting the government. But not many of them would punish their erring comrade-in-arms.

Mrs. Aquino had struggled to hang on at all cost, but by towards the end of her term, it was becoming clear that her defense secretary, Fidel Ramos, had a greater control of the situation regardless of the threats. She even took one brave step forward by picking him as her choice to succeed her against the wishes of her family and personal advisers. By doing this, she knew the nation had no time left for wasting opportunities. The haze of uncertainty was slowly lifting, the winds of political changes looked more favorable. Fidel Ramos's military background reassured the people, said Felipe Miranda, a political scientist expert on military issues. The general, he added, "had intimate knowledge of the military and, while he had military critics, he could rely on adequate military support and could not be so easily misled by politicized military men as Mrs. Aquino and her officials. His constitutionalist record also made people confident that he would actively pursue democratization instead of backsliding into authoritarianism."

As time would have it, a solid chain of command was set in place. As President, Ramos became commander-in-chief. Next in line is his protégé, Defense Secretary Renato de Villa. Gen. Lisandro Abadia remained as chief of staff when President Ramos took over and was succeed by his classmate, Gen. Arturo Enrile. Both generals have proven their loyalty to the chain of command. From the ugly days of coup attempts, the military has changed its focus to that of institution building. No matter the time and chances of luck, both Mrs. Aquino and Mr. Ramos had seen to it that this would happen. For the sake of the country.

A thought escapes some political observers that this may have been the "silent coup" of President Ramos. Several retired military officials now hold civilian posts in government. But, for whatever it was or is, he did not have to fire a shot. And the soldiers ought to know and should know by now, that violence is not the path to power.

With an immense sense of pride and fulfillment, the country has achieved parallel victories in the economic and political fronts. Against a backdrop of economic and political turmoil in 1985 and 1986, the country bounced back and is well on its way to earning its rightfulplace in the community of newly industrialized countries. Although the decade saw the resurgence of destabilizing forces from three sides, the government emerged triumphant because of the efforts of its men in the battlefield and on the negotiating table.

Throughout the various stages of the country’s recent 10-year history, the Philippine Army likewise went through a transformation. Its leadership displayed undiminishing commitment to implement a rational system of compensation, recruitment, retention, deployment, and training that took into consideration the Army’s requirements and the need for career movement, experience and exposure of its people. Welfare and morale boosting programs were greatly improved. Logistics support particularly for the men in the battlefield was given priority.

With the decline of the insurgency movement, the Army prioritized the streamlining of its organization and the shifting of its resources to addressing external threats. After exhausting a significant amount of its resources to defeating the various domestic threats which have placed in peril the country’s peace and order but have now become minor preoccupations of the government, the Army can pursue its long delayed plan to fully modernize its operations in all aspects. Moreover, with the transformation of the country’s economic and political state, it is also posed to take on national government efforts to serve the basic needs of the public.

Although having a rich and colorful record, the history of the 1st Infantry (Tabak) Division was tragically marred by the bloodshed in Mindanao. In April 1995, more than 150 members of the lost command of the Moro National Liberation Front called the Abu Sayaf Group brutally attacked the municipality of Ipil, Zamboanga. This violent aggression resulted in the death of 60 civilians. Eighteen more were reported missing and believed to have been taken as hostages. Major Sabido, the newly installed commanding officer of the 10th Infantry Battalion, First Infantry (Tabak) Division together with three other military personnel were also taken into custody by the Abu Sayaf Group. The failure of the Army to avert and respond to the situation was largely blamed on the deficiency of intelligence effort which led to the relief of Colonel Santiago, commanding officer of the 102 Brigade. From this incident, the Army learned a costly and painful lesson in combat preparedness and the importance of competent intelligence work.

The 2nd Infantry Division carried out a thorough and intense counter insurgency operations through the Special Operations Teams approach. The Division was triumphant in its crusade to destroy the political mass base of the CPP/NPA/NDF. It was instrumental in the conceptualization and implementation of the Army’s psychological tactic called Guerrilla Theater. Because of its success, Guerrilla Theater was later reprised by all brigades and battalions. These PsyOps innovations and the Jungle Fighter’s characteristic intensity were largely responsible for the surrender of a large number of CPP/NPA/NDF men to 2ID units. Counter insurgency operations, specifically OPLAN Ricasricasan, resulted the capture of top communist leader Sotero Llamas alias Ka Nognog at Juban, Sorsogon on May 17, 1995 and neutralization of many communists.

The 3rd Infantry Division is largely known for its Greening Panay Project. The Command spearheaded the massive reforestation efforts involving the participation of military personnel and civilians. The division initiated the communal approach to reforestation which did not only address ecological concerns but more so the roots of insurgency. A unique feature of this communal tree-planting endeavor is the potential economic profit to the tree planters. Farmers planted mahogany and G-melina trees. In 10 to 15 years, the fully grown trees were expected to peg very steep prices which will help alleviate the plight of the farmers as well as address lumber requirements of the country and improve ecological balance. The Project was based on a Memorandum of Agreement entered into with the local government units of the Province of Capiz, and the municipalities of Tapaz and Jamindan and local NGOs. The areas to be reforested were idle military reservations. The project instantly obtained the full support of the communities affected by the project. Initial efforts were directed towards collection and planting of mahogany and G-Melina seeds. The project later expanded to involve and benefit the entire island of Panay.

The 4th Infantry Division was where the SOT operations Army saw its birth and formative years. However, for the 4th Infantry Division, the year 1990 was the most infamous in its history. On October 3, 1990, Colonel Alexander Noble supported by elements of the 63rd Infantry Battalion and CAFGU AA members plotted an uprising and took over the 402 Brigade Headquarters and subsequently the Division Headquarters. Two days later, two T-28 Tora-Tora planes bombed and razed to the ground the 402nd Brigade Headquarters in Bancasi, Butuan City. As a result of this tragic incident, Brigadier General Miguel C. Sol was relieved and Brigadier General Quintin A. Alcudia was appointed as new commander. Although the takeover was short lived, it nevertheless blemished the record of the Division. To offset the negative effect of this catastrophe, Alcudia launched a series of psychological operations which resulted in the surrender of 423 tribal community members, many of whom were CAFGU and CVO members and the recovery of 363 firearms. Eventually, 213 CAAs were reassimilated into the ranks of the CAA. Moreso, the cooperation and trust of the tribal chieftains were regained which paved the way for the normalization of the situation and easing up of tension in the area.

The 5th Infantry Division is distinguished for its succesful campaign in Marag Valley. The campaign called for the proper orchestration and synchronizaton of efforts of the military with those from various sectoral organizations and the local government. The ‘Eight (8) Pillars’ served as the holistic approach and hastened the progress of the whole campaign. A combination of the pillars (Developmental Projects, Civil-Military Operations, Local Government Initiatives, and the Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations) addressed the root causes of insurgency as exploited by the CPP/NPA/NDF to win the people. On the other hand, a combination of the other pillars (CMO/SOT, Combat/Security Operations, CAA Programs, and Peace Initiatives) was aimed to neutralize the CPP/NPA/NDF organization itself. To date, the application of the ‘EIGHT PILLARS’ has caused psychological defect and dissension in the CPP/NPA ranks and released the people of Marag Valley from the bondage of the enemy.

With the 701st Infantry Brigade placed under operational control of the National Capital Region Defense Command, the 7th Infantry Division was the main unit primarily tasked to conduct tactical and security operations to neutralize and destroy known threat groups attempting to overthrow the government.. The brigade, as the counter-coup force of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Metro Manila, played a key role in repelling rebel forces in Camp Aguinaldo during the December 1989 coup d’etat staged by the rightist groups. After that incident, the brigade became the primary security force of the National Capital Region with its units deployed in key areas of Metro Manila and its neighboring provinces. Likewise, the division was designated as the RDF (Rapid Deployment Force) Division of the Philippine Army. To enhance its RDF capability, it actively participated in joint and combined training exercises with both local and foreign armed services.

From the massive combat, intelligence and CMO operations conducted that displaced and weakened the communist terrorists in their AOR, the 8th Infantry Division declared a unilateral suspension of military operations throughout Samar Island and launched the Up-Up Samar Island Movement. This thrust has numerous programs that encouraged the remnants of the TDs to go down from the mountain and join the mainstream of the society not through fighting. These programs were: ‘the journey to the future’ - a trip of Samareños residing in Manila or Balikbayans toward Borongan, Samar; the information caravan; athletic competitions; medical civic actions; healthy baby contests; and socio-economic programs such as reforestation and hogs & poultry raising.

As the designated ‘National Maneuver Force’ of the AFP, the First Scout Ranger Regiment was deployed to various hot spots throughout the country. In response, several Task Group Panthers were organized and deployed. TGP Alpha was deployed to Isabela province, TGP Bravo to Quezon province, and TGP Charlie to Nueva Viscaya and Quirino. All these Task Groups proved to be very successful against the communist insurgents. TGP Charlie alone registered a haul of an 81mm mortar and 79 firearms recovered in numerous encounters and was credited with the dismantling of the Nueva Viscaya-Quirino Provincial Party Committee. Because of its successful operations throughout the country, FSRR was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation in 1988.

The years of sustained peacekeeping operations gave birth to a new breed of living heroes. One is Captain Arturo B. Oritz, Commanding Officer of the 606th SF Company stationed in Negros Occidental, who led his men in annihilating practically the entire guerrilla unit operating in the province in April 6, 1990. This heroic act established a record in the AFP as the first-ever Medal of Valor award accorded in an offensive operation. Consequently, the Special Forces Regiment (Airborne) won the Presidential Streamer Award for the year. The other is Staff Sergeant Francisco Granfil, who displayed utter disregard for his personal safety when he single-handedly engaged a highly superior enemy force during a 12-hour gunbattle in Mati, Davao Oriental in 1988. His heroism saved more than anything else but the lives of the Army and PC men who were caught unaware of the surprise attack.

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