by Andrew P. Smith

The concept of hierarchy, or holarchy, is gaining increasing acceptance as a critical principle in any comprehensive understanding of existence (Ouspensky, 1961; Land, 1973; Jantsch, 1980; Wilber, 1989, 1995). In its most radical form, this view asserts that all forms of existence are holons, which are simultaneously wholes and parts--that is, complete in some sense in themselves, yet also parts of other, higher-order holons. Evidence for holons now comes from many areas of investigation, including empirical sciences such as physics and biology, social sciences including psychology and anthropology, and the observations of individuals in higher states of consciousness.

Many hierarchical models of existence have been proposed. One of the most recent, comprehensive and influential is Wilber's (1995), which incorporates many of the concepts and assumptions of early models while adding at least one novel feature--different aspects of the same level of existence are represented as different, but equivalent, positions on four different axes or quadrants. Because Wilber then uses this model, and its implications, as the basis of a very extensive critique and synthesis of many ideas critical to our entire civilization, it deserves close examination.

I argue here that the four quadrants of Wilber's model are unnecessary, that all of the concepts imbedded in his model can be adequately represented on a single axis or scale of existence. Critical to this argument is a distinction that I draw between two kinds of relationships possible between higher-order and lower order holons, a distinction I propose to refer to by stages and levels. With this distinction made, it is possible to demonstrate first that what are called social aspects of holons are in some respects conceptually indistinguishable from individual aspects; and that interior aspects of holons have an identity relationship with the social aspects.

I will begin with a very brief description of Wilber's model, to acquaint or refresh readers as the case may be. I will then show how stages and levels of existence can be distinguished, and discuss some of the properties of each. I will then move into a discussion of the social and interior aspects of the hierarchy. I will conclude by discussing some implications of the model for some important issues concerning hierarchy and consciousness. Throughout this presentation, I will also be discussing numerous principles of holons and their relationships, with the particular aim of determining to what degree holons on one level of existence are analagous to those on another.

Wilber's hierarchy model is composed of four quadrants, each of which represents a different aspect of existence (see Fig. 5; the figures and tables in this paper are not numbered consecutively, because they are taken out of order from the book Worlds within Worlds). Each of these quadrants displays the same (thirteen) levels of existence, and there is a correspondence between equivalent levels of existence in one quadrant and each of the other quadrants. One of these quadrants, "exterior individual", corresponds to the hierarchy as observed in the exterior (structure/function/behavior) of individual forms of existence, and thus closely follows the world as science describes it, with atoms, molecules, cells, and so on. A second quadrant, "exterior social", represents populations or groups of the same individual levels of existence, ranging from galaxies, which are taken to be immense populations of atoms, to various types of human societies. The other two quadrants mirror this arrangement, but display interior qualities, i.e., consciousness in its broadest definition. Thus "interior individual" ranks the various levels of consciousness corresponding to individual exterior forms of atoms, molecules, cells and so forth, while "interior social" does the same for populations or societies of these individuals.

To reiterate, each level of existence on any one of these four axes represents just one aspect of that form of existence. The other aspects are found at the equivalent position on the other three axes. Thus a conceptually complete graphic of any level could be created by drawing a circle through these corresponding points, and all of existence would be depicted as a series of concentric circles.

Wilber's model, like nearly all others of this kind that have been proposed, begins (on the exterior individual axis) with atoms, molecules and cells, three of the most well-studied forms of existence known to science. In addition to molecules, however, several other forms of existence between atoms and cells would come to the mind of any cell biologist: simple or linear polymers (peptides, ribonucleic acids, starch); complex or folded polymers (proteins, DNA); macromolecular structures (ribosomes; signal transduction complexes) and subcellular organelles (mitochondria, nuclei). These are indicated in (Table 4) , and provide a convenient starting point for our discussion.

All of the forms of existence between atoms and cells listed in Table 1 fit the definition of holons. They are composed of lower-order forms of existence, and in turn are components of higher order forms. Thus small molecules such as amino acids are composed of atoms, and in turn are components of peptides, which are folded polymers. Furthermore, the higher order holons in this arrangement display new, "emergent" properties not found in their lower order components. Some of these properties will be discussed as we go along.

Yet all of these holons do not share all of the same fundamental properties. One major distinction between atoms and cells, on the one hand, and virtually all forms of existence hierarchically between them should be apparent: atoms and cells are capable of an independent (autonomous) existence outside of higher forms of life. While some atoms exist as components of molecules, they may also be found as free forms of matter not bonded to each other. Likewise, cells can exist as unicellular organisms as well as components of organisms.

In contrast, virtually all holons between atoms and cells exist solely within cells. Molecules, with the exception of very simple ones containing one or two types of atoms, are generally not found free in nature (at least, not before human societies began dumping them there). Even more so is the case for simple and complex polymers, macromolecular structures, and sub-cellular organelles. These are almost always found within cells1.

A similar situation exists on the biological level, that is, in those forms of existence between and including cells and organisms. Several higher-order holons can be identified on this level, such as simple and complex cell units, tissue modules and organs (Table 4). And again, we can make a clear-cut distinction between cells and organisms, on the one hand, and these intermediate holons, on the other. Organisms, like cells, can have an existence outside of higher forms of life. Tissues and organs cannot.

In summary, on the physical and biological levels of existence, we can define at least two kinds of holons: those that can exist more or less independently of higher-order holons2 and those that cannot. I propose that we reserve the term "level" of existence for those holons that can exist independently, and "stage" of existence for those that exist only as parts of higher level holons. (To encompass either term, I suggest the use of "plane" of existence, though because of its widespread usage, I will sometimes use "level" in this sense.) To speak more precisely, those holons that can exist independently compose the first or fundamental stage of every level of existence, while those holons that exist only as components of higher order stages compose the higher stages of this level of existence. Thus atoms are the first stage on the physical level of existence, while cells are the first stage on the biological level of existence. Organisms, according to this view, are the first stage on a still higher level of existence, usually referred to as the mental.

In addition to being capable of independent existence, forms of existence on the first stage of a level of existence have other characteristics that clearly distinguish them from intermediate stages. One such characteristic is reproduction, which of course is implied by the ability to live an existence independent of higher-order holons. While atoms do not reproduce, and thus constitute an important exception to this rule3, cells and organisms do. In contrast, none of the components within cells and organisms can reproduce4.

The way in which component holons are organized within cells and organisms is also qualitatively different from the way they are organized in intermediate holons. In all of the latter, the lower, component holons are organized as parts of immediately higher holons. Thus all atoms in molecules are bonded together to form the molecule. All amino acids in a peptide are bonded together to form the peptide. All peptides in a ribosome are bonded together to form the ribosome. And so on.

In contrast, in a cell, all of the lower holons can exist as both free (i.e., not components of the next higher stage) as well as bonded forms (in which they are components of the next higher stage). Thus some atoms exist free in cells (e.g., sodium and calcium ions), while others exist as components of small molecules. Some small molecules, in turn, exist free (individual amino acids), and some as components of polymers. Some polymers exist free, while others are components of higher-order structures.

The same is true for the forms of existence between cells and organisms. Tissues are always composed of associated cells, and organs of associated tissues. An organism, in contrast, contains cells that are not parts of cell units (gametes; red and white blood cells); cell units that are not parts of tissues, tissues that are not parts of organs, and so on.

An essential principle of hierarchies is that new, "emergent" properties appear with higher levels or stages of existence. Thus a molecule has properties not found in its individual atoms; a peptide has properties not found in its component amino acids; a tissue has properties not found in its individual cells. And so on.

Why, or how, do these new properties emerge? Emergence is sometimes regarded as unexplainable, a "gap" in the hierarchy, since the new properties of the higher holon do not reduce to those of its lower-order component holons. However, a closer look at the emergence of stages throws considerable insight into how new properties arise, and in fact allows us to provide a new, and more powerful, definition of a stage. A stage is a new dimension of existence. Literally.

Consider again the level formed between atoms and cells. An atom can be taken, from a certain perspective, as a point, having no dimensions. This is only relatively true, of course. An atom has actual dimensions that can be measured. But for purposes of comparison with other forms of existence, we can regard atoms as so small that they exist as 0-dimensional points.

From this perspective, a simple molecule such as an amino acid can then be viewed as a linear array of atoms, or a 1-dimensional form of existence. A simple polymer such as a peptide may also exist as a one-dimensional structure; in fact, the amino acid sequence of a peptide is known as its "primary structure" (Stryer 1988). More often, however such polymers fold into some form of "secondary structure", such as an alpha-helix or a beta-sheet, which we can regard as a 2-dimensional form of existence (Stryer 1988). Still other polymers, such as globular proteins, feature folding of secondary structure into tertiary structure, which has three dimensions.

Still higher physical stages can be understood in terms of dimensions of time as well as space. A macromolecular structure such as a receptor molecule has three spatial dimensions, but to understand its function, and thus its very existence, these dimensions must be viewed in time. This is because such biomolecules change shape or conformation in certain characteristic ways as they function in the cell. The real existence of the receptor, then, is not as a fixed three-dimensional structure, but a three-dimensional shape that changes over a particular period of time5. Taking this period of time as the window, so to speak, in which we examine it, its existence becomes a changing form or "long body" (Ouspenksy 1961). It has four dimensions of existence, relative to the zero dimensions at which we have abitrarily fixed the atom.

A second dimension of time appears in still higher-order macromolecular structures, or subcellular organelles. These structures consist of many four-dimensional holons--that is, three-dimensional molecules cycling through a fixed period of time--which, as a unit, are moving through a second period of time. This second period of time adds a fifth dimension to the holon.

A similar analysis can be applied to the biological level. I will not go into details here, except to say that the element of time in this case is provided not by shape changes, but by the turnover of cells. Any biological tissue or organ is constantly undergoing a process of self-renewal, in which cells die and are replaced by new ones. This renewal process gives the stage one or more dimensions of existence in time. As with higher order molecular structures, the biological structure cannot be understood as a static group of cells, but one which is changing form over time.

In summary, higher order physical and biological stages can be defined in terms of the number of new dimensions they bring into existence. While the number of such intermediate stages one wishes to define is of course somewhat arbitrary, I have found that the available molecular and cellular data suggest that six is a good fit (Table 4). That is, in going from an atom to a cell, or from a cell to an organism, three dimensions of space and three of time emerge. Thus a cell can be considered to exist at a level six dimensions above that of the atom, and an organism six dimensions above the cell. However, as saw earlier, a cell not only contains all the lower stages of physical holons, but contains them in both free as well as integrated forms--free atoms as well as atoms in molecules, and so on. Thus a cell is not represented by "6", but by 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6.

In all cases, the new dimension of existence that emerges with each successively higher stage is directly related to that stage's emergent properties. We can say that the emergent properties become possible precisely because of the existence of the new dimension available for the holon to function on. For example, one of the most important emergent properties of small molecules is the ability to ionize. One of their component atoms can lose or gain an electron, resulting in an electrical charge associated with the molecule. This charge is stabilized by the presence of other atoms bonded to the ionized atom, and for this reason, ionization of free atoms is relatively rare in nature, though it can be accomplished in the laboratory.

An amino acid, however, which I define as a one-dimensional stage on the physical level, takes this further. Because the amino acid is a linear or one-dimensional array of atoms, two of its atoms can ionize, at some distance apart. This property--two charges of opposite valence on the same molecule--allows the amino acid to act as a buffer, which helps maintain the pH of the cell, an important example of the general holonic property of adaptation. The ability of a molecule to act as a buffer is a genuinely one-dimensional property, for no single atom can behave in this manner.

Likewise, higher dimensional holons on the physical level have properties that depend on their higher degree of dimensionality. For example, the three-dimensional quality of proteins is critical to their ability to act as enzymes, to catalyze metabolic reactions and perform other vital functions in the cell. The three-dimensional shape enables the protein to interact with other molecules in highly specific ways, forming a precise fit between their surfaces. Again, this property could not emerge without these critical extra dimensions.

Still other distinctions between stages and levels of existence will emerge as we go along. For now, though, we can conclude that the relationship between fundamental holons like atoms, cells, and organisms and their components is qualitatively different from that between intermediate forms of existence and their component holons. I thus propose to restrict the word transcendence, generally applied to the emergence of any new holon above a lower-order holon (Wilber, 1995) to that specific instance where a genuinely new level of existence comes into being. I will call the process by which an intermediate stage emerges as transformation. Thus when an amino acid becomes part of a peptide, transformation takes place. When a cell emerges, transcendence occurs.

The use of these terms is not entirely arbitrary. When we say one form of life transcends another, we usually mean something more than that it has new properties not found in the lower, preceding form. We also mean that it has, to a certain degree, become independent of the lower forms. It no longer depends on them for its existence. Thus a cell is independent of most of its individual holons. Removing one atom, one molecule, one peptide, one protein, or one macromolecular structure from the cell will not affect its existence in the slightest. Even removing a single subcellular organelle, such as a mitochondrion, might not affect the cell very much.

In this sense, then, the cell completely transcends its lower-order holons. The same is not true, however, for the intermediate holons. Removing a single atom from a small molecule will very definitely affect its existence--it is no longer the same molecule. Removing a single amino acid from a peptide might not greatly affect some of its properties, but it would alter others, and depending on which amino acid was removed, these properties could be critical. And so on.

The same argument applies to organisms. Remove one cell, one cell unit, one tissue, from our bodies, and we wouldn't even notice it. Removal of an organ would make a difference, but depending on the organ, it might not be vital. And again, removal of lower order holons from intermediate stages has much more impact.

Both transcendence and transformation, of course, are widely used to describe processes occurring in hierarchies, and are also quite familiar to those theorists with a spiritual view, that is, who see all of evolution moving towards a much higher form of life than our own. When we describe the relationship of transpersonal or "spiritual" states of existence to our own, however, a third term very commonly appears: immanence. It is often said that God, or Spirit, is not only transcendent to, but immanent within, all lower forms of existence. Spirit permeates lower-order holons, is found within them as well as beyond them.

If the higher is actually in some sense within the lower, we might expect to find emergent properties of the higher-order holons exhibited as well in their lower-order component holons. The lower order holons, in other words, would to some extent transcend or transform existence characteristic of their stage or level of the hierarchy, and behave like higher holons. Immanence, defined in this way, is found throughout the lower levels of the hierarchy.

Consider again the example of ionization, just discussed. Free oxygen atoms in nature, or more commonly, simple molecules containing two atoms of oxygen, generally cannot ionize except under very unusual conditions. However, the same oxygen atom, when part of an amino acid molecule, may now exhibit this property. The oxygen atom, in effect, is participating in the higher, emergent properties of the amino acid. Although it is a 0-dimensional form of existece, it has acquired a one-dimensional property, the ability to ionize, by becoming part of a one-dimensional holon.

Now suppose the amino acid containing that oxygen atom becomes part of a still higher-order holon, an enzyme molecule. The ionized oxygen atom may be a crucial component the active site of the enzyme, allowing it to catalyze some metabolic reaction. By virtue of its position in the enzyme, the oxygen atom is able to interact with another atom or molecule that it could not interact with as a free oxygen atom. Thus the oxygen atom again is participating in the emergent property, acquiring the ability to do something it could not do by itself. It has acquired a three-dimensional property, while still maintaining an existence as a zero-dimensional stage.

The same is true of the next higher level of existence. Individual cells, when part of a tissue, can communicate with one another in ways that independent cells cannot. For example, chemical factors released or presented by one cell can regulate the growth or physiological activity of an adjacent cell in very specific ways (Stein et al. 1999; Gearhart and Kirshner 1999). Such regulation is not possible, or possible only to a very limited extent, by interacting cells outside of organisms. When cells are part of the brain, the highest and most developed organ, they may take on still even more sophisticated properties. Thus certain identifiable neurons in the visual cortex can respond to relatively complex stimuli, such as specific visual patterns (Wiesel and Hubel 1963; Baron 1987; Reid 1999). Their ability to do this depends on the existence of a complex network of connections with other neurons, and for just this reason, no cell existing outside of an organism could exhibit this kind of behavior.

We may define immanence, then, as the appearance of higher-order properties in lower-order holons. The implications of this phenomenon are extremely profound; it suggests that by associating into higher-order holons, lower-order holons may actually transform themselves, that is, raise their stage of existence on the hierarchy. In other words, a cell in an organism is at a higher stage of existence than an independent cell, and an atom in a cell is at a higher stage of existence than an atom outside of a cell. Generalizing this conclusion, we can say that fundamental systems on every level (atoms, cells, organisms) can exist not only on the first stage of that level, but to some extent, participate in existence on higher stages.

I don't wish to make the argument that immanence, as I have defined it here, has quite the same meaning as when used in the spiritual sense, or that this phenomenon as I have described it is a completely adequate explanation for spiritual immanence. However, I believe it's relevant to our understanding of spiritual immanence. More important, as we will see later, the participation of lower-stage holons in higher stage properties is is a key argument I use in criticizing Wilber's distinction between individual and social aspects of holons. Before we turn to this issue, however, we need to examine a little more closely the nature of holons that form such privileged, higher-order associations.

The preceding discussion has asserted that holons that exist within higher-order holons are qualitatively different from apparently similar holons that exist independently of higher-order holons. They are in fact at a higher stage of their level of existence. Cells that are in organisms are at a higher stage of of the biological level than unicellular organisms. Atoms that are in simple or complex molecular structures are at a higher physical stage than free atoms. I also reiterate that these differences are a direct result of the interactions that the integrated holons form in the presence of higher-order holons. It isn't so much that cells within organisms are biologically different from independent cells (though they may be in some cases), and it certainly isn't the case that atoms within cells are physically different from atoms outside of cells. Rather, the higher-order properties of these integrated holons arise entirely or almost entirely by virtue of their (hetarchical) relationships with other holons of the same or similar type.

The capacity of holons to interact with other holons--both hetarchically, that is, with holons of the same level or stage of existence, as well as hierarchically, with higher order holons--is clearly vital to the evolution of the hierarchy. In fact, there appear to be, at every stage of existence, holons that become parts of higher order holons, and holons that do not.

We begin with atoms, the fundamental stage on the physical level of existence. Though for the purposes of describing a hiearchy, atoms are generally considered as one class of holons, there is an important distinction to be made between them which is critical to the emergence of the entire hierarchy: there are inert atoms (such as helium), which form no chemical bonds with other atoms and which therefore can't become integrated into molecules; and there are reactive atoms, such as carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, that can and do form such molecules. Clearly, only the latter class of atoms can participate in the higher levels of the hierarchy.

Now consider the cell, the fundamental stage on the biological level of existence. The same fundamental division exists within cells, too. There are prokaryotes, which like inert atoms do not bond or associate with one another, and therefore do not form multicellular organisms. And there are eukaryotes, which can associate into organisms6. All organisms, and therefore all the next higher stages in the hierarchy, are composed of eukaryotic cells only.

Finally, consider organisms, the fundamental stage on the mental level of existence. There are invertebrates, mostly asocial organisms that live most or all of their lives in isolation from others of their species; and there are vertebrates, social organisms that join together in groups, communities and societies7. Again, only the latter group participates in higher stages of the hierarchy.

At each level of existence, therefore, there is a subclass of the fundamental stage that is designated as the building block of the higher stages of that level: reactive atoms; eukaryotic cells; social organisms. The common property of these holons is an ability to communicate with other holons on the same level (or to form extensive heterarchical interactions). For reactive atoms, communication takes the form of chemical bonding; for eukaryotic cells, cell-cell associations; for social organisms, sexual and other relationships that hold together groups of animals. Communication, in all the endless forms that it takes throughout the physical and biological worlds, is thus the vital property of holons that enables them to create the hierarchy.

Within each of these interactive holons, moreover, there is an additional distinction that manifests itself on each level of existence. One particular type of holon is particularly endowed with the ability to communicate, to interact with others, and therefore forms the keystone of all further hierarchical emergence. On the physical level, this holon is the carbon atom. Each carbon atom can form chemical bonds with four other atoms, and thus has the ability to organize into complex biological molecules. While many other atoms can also form molecules, if these molecules do not include carbon, they never get off the ground in the great evolutionary project; only molecules with carbon can become complex enough to carry out the functions of cells and organisms. For just this reason, carbon has for literally centuries been regarded as the building block of life; the word "organic" means carbon-containing.

On the biological level, the holon analogous to carbon is the nerve cell. A nerve cell has the ability to form connections, or synapses, with many other cells (hundreds or even thousands), and so is the basis of the most complex biological structure, the brain. Again, many other types of cells can form connections with each other, but if the resulting tissues and organs do not contain neurons, they do not reach the heights of the biological level.

And finally, on the mental level, the corresponding holon is the human being, the most social of all organisms, forming the most complex societies. Other organisms also form societies, but these societies of course do not begin to compare in evolutionary development and potential to human ones.

There are further important analogies among these levels of existence, but I won't discuss them here. What I have said so far should suffice to make several key points about holons on the physical, biological and mental levels of existence: 1) some holons by their intrinsic nature (i.e., before they become part of higher-order holons) are destined (or have the potential) to form higher order holons, while others are not; 2) among the interactive holons that form higher stages of each level, there is one type that is vital to full development of that level; and therefore 3) evolutionary development of the hierarchy is a profoundly selective process; while an immense variety of holons are produced at each level of existence, only a very small proportion of them continue to develop into higher levels of existence.

With this understanding of how holons organize into higher-order holons, let us now take another look at Wilber's quadrant model of the hierarchy. In presenting his model, he takes pains to assert that groups or populations of holons do not represent a distinct level of existence from individual holons. Thus he says, "the individual and the social are not two different coins, one being of a higher currency than the other, but rather the heads and tails of the same coin at every currency" (p. 83). As I noted earlier, in his model social holons form a different quadrant of the model, but one in which every level of existence has a corresponding level of individual existence. Thus galaxies, defined as populations of atoms, exist on stage one of the exterior social quadrant; planets, defined as populations of molecules, are at exterior social stage 2; and various lower vertebrate and human communities correspond to distinct classes of organisms.

By constructing his hierarchy in this way, Wilber (following Janstch, 1980) avoids the problem of regarding relatively unorganized and undiffferentiated populations of organisms as higher forms of life, a status they are given in some other hierarchy models. His basic argument is that such populations do not have the proper relationship to their individual constituents that higher-order holons should have to lower-order ones. Specifically, he applies a rule (his tenet no. 9, p. 61) that says: "Destroy any type of holon [i.e., all holons on any one level] and you will destroy all of the holons above it and none of the holons [more precisely, not all of the holons on any level] below it." Thus if all cells were eliminated, all higher forms of life such as organisms would also be eliminated, but lower forms of life such as atoms and molecules would survive. Since this asymmetric relationship does not appear to hold for unorganized populations--i.e., elimination of all individuals destroys the population, but conversely, elimination of the population eliminates all the individuals--Wilber concludes they should be ranked at equivalent levels of existence.

This rule appears to be correct, and the conclusion it leads to equally correct, as long as the population of holons is indeed unorganized and undifferentiated. Where this reasoning breaks down, however, is with complex social organization, viz., human societies. In this case, there does appear to be a hierarchical arrangement. Such societies clearly possess properties not found in their component individuals--societies can create ideas and technologies that no one member could, for example. Moreover, societies posssess the requisite asymmetry with respect to their individual human members that Wilber takes to be a key proof of higher existence. If all human beings were eliminated, all human societies would likewise disappear, but the converse is not true. If all human societies were eliminated, some individual human beings would or conceivably could remain.

Is Wilber wrong here, then? In a strict sense, perhaps not. His model actually distinguishes several different types or levels (stages, really) of human beings, and each stage corresponds to a different type of social organization. For example, those humans with (only) a complex neocortex live in a tribal/village organization, while those with a higher degree of rationality inhabit a nation/state. When individual holons and their corrresponding social holons are defined this specifically, then elimination of either one almost logically implies elimination of the other. If a particular type of social organization is eliminated, we might presume that so would be the corresponding type of human being.

Nevertheless, there are several serious weaknesses in this approach. First, while elimination of either the individual or the social may eliminate the other, the relationship is still decidedly asymmetric. Elimination of all humans of a particular type would immediately eliminate the corresponding society. In contrast, elimination of the society would have no immediate impact on the evolutionary level of its members. If all nation-states broke down tomorrow, their members would not immediately lose all rationality, all their distinctions from lower forms of humanity. Such asymmetry is even more apparent with lower forms of human or animal organization. Break up families, and organisms do not suddenly lose their limbic systems. Break up tribes and people do not lose their neocortex. At these lower levels surely, and perhaps at higher levels, the organisms might persist indefinitely in the absence of their corresponding social organization.

The implications of the individual/social dichotomy get even worse when two levels of existence are compared. Consider a modern human being, existing on level 12 or 13 according to Wilber. Such a person is considered to be evolutionarily higher than a human being of, say, five hundred years ago, just as modern society is considered evolutionarily higher than society of five hundred years ago. So far, quite acceptable. But what happens when we compare the person of today with the society of yesterday? Are we to say that the person, on level 12 or 13, is a higher order holon than the society, on level 11? Can such an individual in any meaningful sense be said to transcend the society?

A second weakness of Wilber's quadrant model is that it is inconsistent. If one is going to argue that highly organized societies of human beings are not on a different level from their members, but just represent a different aspect of the same level, then one should also argue that the tissues and organs within organisms (and perhaps the organisms themselves), which are highly organized societies of cells, are in the same way no higher than these cells, but just another aspect of cellular existence. Or to put it another way, if one is going to argue that particular types of human beings are associated with particular types of societies, and that therefore elimination of these societies logically eliminates these human beings, then one should also argue that particular types of cells are associated with particular types of organisms, and by eliminating all organisms, one eliminates all these types of cells. Pursuing this logic further, one should also argue that particular types of atoms are associated with particular types of cells and that therefore by eliminating cells we eliminate these atoms. In other words, the principle of asymmetry that Wilber uses to determine ranking in the hierarchy is rendered useless.

Wilber does not make these arguments, because he views all (eukaryotic) cells as comprising the same holon, and likewise all atoms. But this is not really so. As I discussed earlier, there are important, qualitative distinctions between the kinds of cells that make up organisms, and the kind that live an independent existence; there are analogous distinctions between the kinds of atoms that are found in cells, and those that are not. A nerve cell in a human brain, for example, is a higher form of life than a free floating amoeba, and is just as distinguishable from the latter as a human member of a nation state is from a tribal aborigine. In both cases, the two members of the pair being compared share a similar physical and/or biological constitutition (they are both fundamental stages on the same level of existence); but one member of the pair has certain more advanced properties than the other, by virtue of its interactions with others of its kind. The nerve cell has a more advanced degree of perception, due to its synaptic connections with thousands of other neurons; the modern human has a more rational mind, due to his or her social associations with millions of other humans.

In addition to these problems, there is a third weakness of Wilber's individual/social distinction, which gets to the real heart of the problem: it denies the essential point that human societies are a higher form of existence, bearing a relationship to their individual members analogous to that higher forms of biological existence bear to organisms, and that higher forms of physical existence bear to atoms. To put human beings and their societies at equivalent positions in the hierarchy "heads and tails of the same coin"--is to blind oneself to this hierarchial relationship.

Human societies are a higher form of existence? Anyone who has had to deal with modern bureaucracies--and who hasn't?--is likely to find the notion a little laughable. Granted that human organizations can do many things that we individuals can do, they still seem of a very different breed from true life forms. Can they see, sense or feel, for example, in ways that are not just the crude sum of their members?

Here is where the distinction between stages of existence and levels of existence that I introduced earlier becomes critical. Human social organizations are not strictly comparable to human individuals, because these organizations are not autonomous systems. Rather, by analogy with both the physical level of existence (atoms to cells) and the biological level (cells to organisms), human societies constitute intermediate stages of existence on a still higher level, the mental. Just as atoms associate into simple and complex molecules and supramolecular structures, and cells into simple and complex tissues and organs, human beings associate into societies of increasing complexity. And just as these intermediate physical and biological stages do not have exactly the same properties as the fundamental stages on their level (atoms and cells), so human societies do not have the same properties as humans. A biomolecule is not complete and autonomous to the same degree as either an atom, from whence it came, or a cell, part of which it is becoming; a tissue is not complete and autonomous to the same degree as a cell or an organism. Likewise, human societies are intermediate stages, and lack the autonomy of individual human beings.

The perceptive reader may have noticed an apparent contradiction in the conclusion that human societies are to be viewed as stages of existence, analogous to those stages in cells and organisms. Intermediate physical and biological stages, I showed earliler are incapable of independent existence outside of a higher level of existence. Yet human societies do seem to maintain such an independent existence. That is to say, there appears to be no higher level of existence embracing all of these societies, as cells embrace various kinds of molecules and supermolecules, and organisms embrace tissues and organs. Why not?

The most obvious explanation is that the postulated higher form of existence is still in the process of evolving. Taking the lower forms of existence as an analogy again, it is widely accepted that there was an evolutionary period before the emergence of cells when intermediate structures were being created--primitive proteins or ribozymes8, for example, followed perhaps by encapsulated structures that had some but by no means all of the properties of modern cells. It was only after the emergence and proliferation of these cells that these intermediate structures disappeared as distinct, unintegrated forms of life. Likewise, in the evolution of organisms, there were undoubtedly tissue-like aggregations of cells that disappeared when complete organisms took over. To be sure, our knowledge of these postulated transitional forms is very sketchy, and perhaps always will be, since existence at this level does not leave fossil evidence. We are confined largely to testing such possibiities by trying to reproduce them in the laboratory. Even so, it seems clear that transitional forms that in some sense were intermediate between atoms and cells, and between cells and organisms, must have existed9.

In any case, evolution of both the physical level, with the emergence of cells, and the biological level, with the emergence of organisms, has been completed. Thus modern eukaryotic cells are physically, chemically, indistinguishable from their ancestors of several hundred million years ago. They have the same structure and functions, not only in general, but in genetic and metabolic details (Burgoyne 1988). Likewise, modern humans are both physically and biologically pretty much the same as their ancestors of tens of thousands of years ago. In contrast, human societies are very different now from what they were even one hundred years ago, and are still changing.

While this last point seems obvious, it's important to emphasize it, because it constitutes another reason why we should not expect the properties of these societies to be completely analogous to those manifested on lower levels. An important task of inquiry into hierarchy is to understand to what degree properties on a lower level of existence are analogous to those of a higher level. While many analogies have been described, there are numerous places where these analogies seem to break down. I have already suggested that one reason they seem to fail is because the distinction between stages and levels of existence is not made, with the result that holons are sometimes compared that should not be. Thus the idea that human societies are a higher form of life has often been criticized because societies seem very different from human individuals. Understanding the distinction between fundamental stages and higher-order stages helps clear up this problem.

In the case of human societies, the ongoing process of evolution now provides us with a second possible explanation for the incompleteness of analogies. We should not really expect these societies to be analogous to completed higher stages of the physical and biological levels, but rather to these lower level stages as they began emerging hundreds of millions or billions of years ago. Though we really have very little idea of what these earlier stages looked like, an important prediction of the model as I am developing it here (a prediction, admittedly, the author won't live to see tested) is that as time goes on and human social organization continues to evolve (if it does), the analogies between it and the organization of both cells and organisms will grow stronger and more evident.

Yet no matter how strong these analogies become, we will never be able to appreciate them fully. For there is yet another process at work obscuring them, one much more subtle than the factors I have described so far, and one that limits our understanding of not just a particular portion of the hierarchy, of certain holons, but of all holons, of the entire scheme of things. It's critical to be aware of this problem as we try to develop the models we have further.

As human beings, we are in the peculiar position of both being in the hierarchy of life--of being holons that both contain holons and are contained by still other holons--and also being, to some degree, aware of this. We are holons, and can know we are. We are in the hierarchy, and are beginning to understand where we are.

We can never understand the hierarchy completely, however, nor our position in it, for the simple reason that any view of the hierarchy is biassed by the observer's position. That is, the same phenomena appear different to observers on different levels. One holon's view of another is particular to it.

Point of view thus changes throughout the hierarchy at every stage and level, and contributes mightily to what Wilber calls the "sliding" nature of holons. Many others have made the same basic point, but I would like to reiterate it here, to express it in the language of real examples.

Consider a simple process on the physical level. An ionized oxygen atom on an amino acid molecule undergoes a transformation in which a proton, a charged hydrogen atom, is added to it. What, exactly, has happened?

From the point of view of the two atoms most immediately involved--the oxygen and hydrogen atoms--a process of communication has occurred. The two atoms have interacted by forming a mutual chemical bond. From the amino acid's point of view, on the other hand, the process is assimilation, or growth. It has added another form of existence to itself, to make it larger. From the cell's point of view, finally, the process is adaptation. It has buffered, or regulated, the pH of its interior.

Communication, assimilation, adaptation--it all depends on who you are, which is to say, where you are. This example could be multiplied endlessly, at all stages and levels of existence. While many fundamental properties of life appear at every level of existence--reproduction, communication, perception, assimilation, adaptation--the nature of the property depends on the point of view of the holon, which in turn depends on its hierarchical relationship to the phenomenon. What the property "really" is can never be pinned down; it has a different identity on every plane of existence. We could say there is only one fundamental phenomenon occurring, but many ways to see it.

In summary, we can say, as a first rule about perspective, that every holon or process of interaction of holons can be viewed from multiple positions in the hierarchy, and no one point of view is complete. Thus our view, our understanding, of cells and molecules is incomplete because we can't see these holons as they see themselves. Their view, their understanding of the processes they are intimately involved in--however rudimentary this understanding must be--is an area of existence closed to holons at our level.

As I said, this idea is not at all new, but I emphasize it here because it helps us understand another reason why analogies between different levels of existence always seem incomplete: as holons on a particular plane of the hierarchy, we can't see all the other holons in the same way. Holons on the physical level of existence look different to us from holons on the biological level, not just because they "are" different, but because our point of view is different. The physical world is two levels below us, the biological just one world below us.

Even less should we expect to find complete analogies on our own, mental level to physical or biological processes, not only because of its removal from the lower two levels, but because of its immediacy, because we are imbedded in it. We can't see our level objectively. We may reflect upon it, theorize it, "objectify" it, but it remains in a different perspectival focus. For this reason, our societies will have to appear very different to us from organizations of cells and molecules.

Finally, of course, there are stages or levels of existence higher than our own. How do we see them, or indeed, can we see them at all? This is a very crucial issue that I believe can radically change our understanding of the hierarchy. Before we examine it, however, let us consolidate our position as it now stands.

To summarize the recent discussion, I believe the two social axes of Wilber's quadrant model are unnecessary and misleading. They are unnecessary, because the same information, consistent with all the rules of holons that he provides, can be conveyed on a single axis, or pair of them. The distinction between individual and social is also misleading, because it conveys Wilber's conviction that complex organizations of certain holons, particularly human societies, are no higher than their component holons. As I have tried to show, human societies not only have emergent properties typical of higher-order holons, but significant analogies with lower level holons that are accepted by Wilber and others to be higher forms of existence than their components. Thus to say that human societies are not higher-order holons than their individual members is a contradiction of Wilber's own rules.

In coming to this conclusion, I am well aware that these two quadrants in his model, these representations of the social aspects of existence, are critical to much of Wilber's critique of civilization, and I am also aware that he has not come to the model he has without a great deal of thought and reflection. As he points out in numerous places in his book, the four quadrants, or at any rate three of them, have close parallels in the thinking of many major and influential theorists before him, and thus achieve a profoundly satisfying synthesis. I am not, however, throwing the baby out with the bathwater, denying the existence or the importance of the social aspects of existence, collapsing or reducing them to the individual. I'm simply saying that a more parsimonious interpretation of the data allows us to integrate this aspect on a single scale or axis with the individual, for as we move through the hierarchy, the individual becomes social, and the social becomes individual. Indeed, the very definition of holon that Wilber provides--a whole/part--declares that it is simultaneously an individual and a social creature. Wilber's way of illustrating this is to show these dual aspects as dual dimensions. The limitation of this approach is that it ignores the evidence that social and individual holons are not on the same level (stage), but on different stages. This crucial point can only be made by putting them on a single scale and axis.

And isn't that what evolutionary thinking is all about? As Wilber shows again and again and again, evolution (in its healthier forms) proceeds by an alternating process of differentiation and integration. The body and mind differentiate at one stage in human development, and integrate in another. The biosphere and noosphere differentiate in one age of human social evolution, and integrate in another. Wilber (following Jantsch before him) has differentiated the individual and social aspects of holons, shown that important distinctions can be made between them. I have tried to re-integrate them, show that they form a higher-order unity.

Having gone this far, we might as well go the whole hog and ask, what about the exterior vs. interior dualism of Wilber's model? Is this really esssential, or can these two aspects of holons be integrated into a single scale or axis? Though I have so far not dealt with the interior properties of holons (mind, in its very broadest possible meaning), it should be clear, at the outset, that if the arguments dissolving the distinction between social and individual exterior holons (the upper and lower right quadrants in Figure 1) are accepted, then a similar unification of social and individual interior holons (upper and lower left quadrants) will follow. For if everything that was formerly considered social exterior has been moved to a common axis also containing the individual exterior aspects, then everything previously considered social interior will follow it into a second common axis also containing the individual interior aspects. So we are left at this point with a pair of axes, one representing the exterior forms of existence (combined upper and lower right quadrants), and the other the corresponding interior aspects (combined upper and lower left quadrants). The question now becomes, can we integrate these two axes into a single scale that adequately represents everything (without reducing or "collapsing" one aspect into another)?

Let us approach this problem just as we earlier approached the problem of individual vs. social: by considering the rule of asymmetric relationships among holons. To restate this rule, if a stage or level of existence is eliminated from the hierarchy, every stage or level above it is also eliminated, but none of the stages or levels below it. If we apply this rule to an exterior/interior pair in Wilber's model--say, modern human beings and their formal operational or rational mode of consciousness--what do we find?

Clearly, elimination of the exterior form, the human being or her brain, eliminates the interior form. If there are no human beings, there is no human consciousness. After all, every time one of us dies, that person's characteristic mode of consciousness goes with him10. So if we all die, that mode disappears. But is the converse also true? If there is no human consciousness, can there be no humans?

This is a difficult thought experiment to perform, precisely because interior aspects of holons are not tangible objects. While we can envision, in a theoretical way, the consequences of removing all molecules, all cells, or all organisms from existence, it is much harder to imagine what removing all consciousness (of a certain kind) would mean. It might seem at first that if this could be done, all organisms experiencing that mode of consciousness would also disappear. But keep in mind that we are not really talking about organisms, about human beings, here--we are talking about their exterior aspects only, their bodies and their brains11. We are talking about human beings, not as we experience ourselves, but as we see or experience others.

Viewed in this way, it's clear that human beings could survive the loss of all consciousness of a particular type. That is, we can imagine human beings biologically identical to ourselves who no longer have our particular mode of rational consciousness. Indeed, such people are alive today, and of course predominated in earlier cultures12.

By Wilber's rule of asymmetry, then, interior aspects of holons do appear to be higher forms of existence than their physical and/or biological correlates. This suggests that instead of placing interior and exterior on separate but equivalent scales of existence, they should go together on one scale. Thus we could place all forms of human consciousness (magic, mythic, rational, etc.) above all the corresponding brains or human exterior types.

But where exactly do we place them? We already have seen that human social organizations of various kinds can be placed above individual human beings. Do these interior stages go above or below the exterior social stages, or on a different scale entirely?

At this point, a simple though extremely radical notion fairly leaps out at us: can what we have been calling interior aspects of individual holons be in some sense identical to what we have been calling social aspects of the same holons? We know there is a relationship involved, that rational consciousness is associated with the nation state, for example, and magical consciousness associated with tribal or village organization. Can we go further than this and say that they are really the same thing?

I suggest that we can, to this extent: a particular structure of human consciousness or interiority represents what a person sees when he looks at the highest form of social organization to which he belongs. Thus the interior experience of a modern human being is what results when that person looks at the complex groups of people of which he is a member. The interior experience of a primitive tribal villager is what that person sees when looking at the social organization she is imbedded in. And so on.

The apparent interior/exterior dualism of holons, in other words, results from the different views any holon is afforded when looking up, above its position in the hierarchy, compared to down, below its position in the hierarchy. When it looks upwards, at holons above itself, in which it is embedded, it experiences an inner nature, because it is within these higher holons. It experiences itself as a subject--i.e., subjected to the laws of these higher-order holons. When it looks downwards, at holons below itself, it experiences an outer nature, because it is outside or beyond these holons. It sees them as objects, that is, objectively.

It might be argued that we can see the social groups we belong to as exterior to ourself, just as we see inanimate objects in our environment. But what we see is simply other human beings exterior to ourself--other holons like ourselves who share our stage of existence. What makes a group a social organization is, of course, the relationships between its members, and these relationships we see only in an inward sense. We can't see group relationships as exteriors.

Yet when we look at holons below us, we can see relationships as exteriors. For example, when we look at our bodies, we see the relationships between our cells. These relationships, which as we have seen have some analogies to the relationships among ourselves in our groups, are now understood as exterior forms, not as an inner experience. And likewise with molecules, atoms and so on13.

To summarize, what we call interior aspects of a holon are, in this model, simply the holons above that holon, as they are seen or experienced by that holon. What we call exterior aspects of that holon are what the holons above that holon experience when they see it.. Thus, just as there is no real distinction between individual and social aspects of holons--every holon is an individual from one point of view, but a group or society from another point of view--so there is no real distinction between exterior and interior aspects of holons. Every interior aspect of a holon is, from the point of view of another holon, an exterior aspect. And vice-versa.

I want to conclude this paper by discussing several important implications of understanding holons in this way. Before I do, however, I want to emphasize what this model does and does not do. It does not "explain" consciousness. It does not show how consciousness "emerges" from material or biological forms of existence, even supposing that to be possible. Consciousness, in this model, ultimately derives from Spirit or Ground, and exists in some sense independent of (though also completely within) the hierarchy.

What this model does purport to explain, in an obviously preliminary manner, is how consciousness of a particular degree, what we generally call mind, comes to be associated with a particular form of existence. While consciousness is always here or present, the type of consciousness that a particular holon has depends on where in the hierarchy it is situated, and what it sees as it looks above itself. Mind, in this model, is not conceptually distinguishable from human social organizations, in the same way that the individual holons are not conceptually distinct from social holons. Any individual holon, from some perspective, appears as a social holon. Likewise, any exterior holon, from some perspective, appears as mind or interior.

With that cautionary note, I now want to show how this model can help illuminate to three important issues related to the hierarchy in general, and to consciousness in particular.

One of the most well-agreed upon characteristics of higher consciousness is that it does not, at a certain level, distinguish between subject and object. References made to this feature of higher consciousness in the classical spiritual texts of Buddhism, Hinduism, Sufism, Taoism, and esoteric Christianity are so numerous, and so well known, that they require no further discussion. While it may be that some states beyond ordinary human consciousness do not exhibit this feature14, there can be no question that if one goes far enough beyond this ordinary state, the distinction between subject and object disappears, or to speak more precisely, is transcended. One becomes one with a higher form of life.

How are we to understand this in the context of our model of the hierarchy? I have postulated that the subject/object dualism results from our ability to see holons both below us and above us, with those below us seen as objects, and those above us seen as subjects. Recalling our earlier discussions, we can also add that 1) the higher-order holons that we see as subjects are stages of existence above us--not complete, autonomous levels; and 2) we participate in some of the properties of these stages by virtue of being lower-order holons within them. Putting all of this together, we can conclude that the subject/object dualism results from our position in the hierarchy as fundamental (zero-dimensional) stages within higher-order stages in a as yet incomplete higher level of existence. This dualism is transcended only when we become part of, not just a higher stage, but a genuinely higher level of existence15.

Let me clarify this further. The dualism does not result simply from the fact that we are not fully evolved, that we have not reached the highest state of consciousness possible to us. It results from the fact that we are between levels. We have partly transcended the mental level, but have not done so completely. When we completely transcend this level, and take up existence on the next level, we will be complete and autonomous forms of existence again. This does not mean that we will have gone as far as we can, that we will have reached the highest state of consciousness. It simply means that we will have reached a consolidation point, have again become fundamental or zero-dimensional stages with no existence as yet in still higher stages on our level.

In other words, subject/object dualism is characteristic only of holons on intermediate stages of existence. It is not characteristic of holons at the fundament of any level. From this it follows that levels of existence below us, as well as above us, may also experience a transcendence of subject and object. This brings me to the next major implication of the model I want to discuss.

An enduring source of confusion and controversy among those interested in higher consciousness is that states of consciousness found in people of earlier cultures, and also of young children, seem to have some of the characteristics of the higher state. In particular, such people seem to have some sense of oneness with the world, of connectedness to an environment we feel separated if not alienated from. This had led some people to see children or primitives as role models in the quest for higher consciousness.

In a seminal paper, "The Pre-Trans Fallacy", Wilber (1989) argued that this position fails to distinguish the very real differences between prepersonal and transpersonal states. In the former state, subject and object are fused together; they have not differentiated, revealed their different natures. After they do differentiate, in the growing child or the evolving human beings, there is the possibility of their being re-integrated into a new, higher order unity. In this new unity, their original differentiation is in some sense preserved, yet is transcended. Thus the absence of subject/object dualism in higher consciousness.

Our model follows this reasoning very closely, and extends the concept to other levels of existence between that on which human beings exist.. As we saw earlier, every new level of existence, as it initially emerges, is complete and autonomous, capable of an existence independent of higher-order holons. Thus the first cells were not parts of organisms, and the first organisms were not parts of societies. A holon of this class therefore experiences itself (to the extent that it has experience) as the entire world; it experiences no subject/object duality. There is no looking up at interior forms, because there are no higher-order holons of which it is a part. There is also no looking down at exterior forms, because all its component holons are completely integrated into itself (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6).. Everything that it experiences is part of itself. This is basically how the newborn child experiences itself, and it is also to some extent how human beings of the very earliest times saw themselves16.

One important implication of this idea that I will just mention in passing is that there may be states of consciousness beyond that in which evolving human beings first experience transcendence of subject/object duality. The new autonomous level of existence may become part of still higher stages, again experiencing a subject/object split (but now a much higher and more complex subject as well as object), to be transcended in still a higher form of existence. The latter could be the fifth state of consciousness (deRopp, 1967) or what Wilber calls the nondual.

Of all the phenomena modern evolutionary theory (neo-Darwinism) has difficulty explaining, none has proven more refractory than the emergence of human consciousness. The enormous complexity of the brain makes it very hard to fathom how such an organ could have emerged simply from natural selection. Not only would it seem that an enormous number of mutational changes would have had to occur, but a great many of them would have had to be preserved in the species for a long period of time before actually being selected. Let us see why that is.

It's generally acknowledged that the biological evolution of our species, including that of our brain, was complete about 50,000 years ago. At that point, human beings had all the potential necessary for manifesting consciousness as we know it today, and perhaps even for still higher modes of consciousness17. That is to say, the brains of humans then were identical to ours, except for changes occuring during learning, which presumably would involve the formation of new connections among neurons in the brain. But the earlier brain is supposed to have had as much potential to form these connections as our brain does.

This raises an obvious question: if primitive humans had the potential for exhibiting, say, rational, formal operational modes of consciousness, why wasn't this potential manifested? Why did it take so many tens of thousands of years for this consciousness to emerge? The usual answer to this question is that the our ancestors lacked the proper social environment that would make full unfolding of the potential of his brain possible. Echoing this conventional wisdom, Wilber says:

Even without close examination, this argument, widely accepted as it is, seems very weak to me, because I have trouble believing that the degree of consciousness increase involved necessarily required a very sophisticated social environment. To appreciate the problem, let's compare a primitive human with a modern developing one. Wilber's model, backed by considerable evidence, asserts that the stages of human evolution are grossly parallelled in the development of every modern child. From this it follows that a child at any level of development is quite like one of our ancestors at a particular level of evolution. So, for example, if, following Wilber, we take people of tribal/village cultures of 10-20 thousand years ago to be representative of the magic stage of consciousness, they had a cognitive development (on the average) corresponding to a child of about four or five. A characteristic of this stage of development/evolution is that the person believes that he controls events in the natural world around him. In the following stage, the mythic, the developing (age 6-8) or evolving (early nation state) human being replaces this view with one in which some authority figure (God or father) is in control.

So the question becomes: why can every modern child get past the magical stage, whereas the ancient tribal/villagers could not? Does a child really learn that she can't control the wind or the sun, for example, only because other people tell her she can't--or because, as her brain matures, and continues to accumulate information about the natural world, it becomes capable of making the rather elementary observations that disprove this notion? Does the modern child of that age really have great advantages over the primitive in further development?

This problem, it seems to be me, becomes even more perplexing when we go back to even before the magical stage, to an even more primitive mode that Wilber calls the archaic stage, and ask why early humans--again, with brains just like ours at birth--took so long to get past that. As noted in the previous section, at this very early stage of human evolution, the individual probably did not completely differentiate herself from her surroundings, including others. And again, the question looms: why can the modern child do this so easily? Is she really taught to make these distinctions by others, directly or indirectly, verbally or non-verbally? Or does her real-life personal experience make this obvious?

Be that as it may, however, there is a deeper problem with the view that the social environment provides the difference. Read the quote from Wilber again: he is saying that the entire biological potential for creating the neural correlates of all the stages of consciousness that followed--mythic, concrete operational, formal operational, and so on--was already present in the human brain many thousands of years ago, just waiting for emergence of the right social conditions to unfold it. We are asked to believe that the brain evolved in such a way that it contained the potential to manifest many highly sophisticated qualities long, long before those qualities were actually manifested.

To be sure, the concept of such latent change, in and of itself, is not an evolutionary fantasy. Darwinism is quite consistent with the notion that genetic changes can accumulate in a group or pool of organisms, and just sit there unused for a long period of time before they actually encounter an environment in which they are advantageous and therefore become selected for (Stebbins 1982). In fact, this is thought to be the process underlying punctuated equilibrium, a relatively fast evolutionary change that is often mistakenly thought to involve non-Darwinian mechanisms (Gould and Eldredge 1993). However, it's one thing to envision this occurring for a relatively few mutations that result in some fairly simple structural (that is, exterior) change. It is quite another to imagine it happening on the scale and complexity that would be associated with a major shift in consciousness.

So the notion that the brain of primitive peoples contained all the potential for creating the higher exterior stages on Wilber's paradigm is very difficult to reconcile with modern evolutionary theory. However, if we turn to what seems to be the only alternative explanation, that the primitive brain really was different from the modern one, that no social environment would have enabled it to develop further, we run into even worse problems. To begin with, if the brain really was different in this sense--had a biological organization different from ours, and not convertible to ours by any purely cultural forces--then we are dealing with a different species, literally. Whatever this tribal man was, he wasn't Homo sapiens. All the textbooks in evolution and anthropology would have to be rewritten..

And that isn't the worst of it. If the biological correlates of higher stages of consciousness were yet to come, if this Homo magicus was going to evolve into Homo mythicus and so on, we have to assume that major genetic changes occurred after this point in history. This is really hard to swallow, because 50,000 years is a flick-of-the-eyelash in the evolution of even one very simple trait, let alone several distinct stages, each of which involved the emergence of new structures or arrangements in the brain. Even supposing such changes could have occurred, moreover, they would have been confined to one geographically isolated group of human beings where they began. The entire human race world-wide could not have followed such a path.

In summary, the evolution of multiple stages of human consciousness seems to imply one of two scenarios, one of which is flat-out impossible, the other merely extraordinarily unlikely. The hierarchical view developed here, however, can provide some critical new insight into this process. It does this by distinguishing three types of evolution, each of them initiated at a different level of existence.

Genetic or biological evolution is initiated by mutations in genes, which results in changes in the biological properties of the organism. The genes are passed from one generation to the next by biological reproduction. If a new property results in a selective advantage, the gene underlying it may become predominant in a population of these organisms.

Cultural evolution is initiated by alterations in the connectivity of nerve cells, which results in changes in the mental properties of the organism. The changes in neuronal connectivity occur as a result of social and other environmental factors, and the resulting new mental traits (memes) can be passed from one generation to another by mental reproduction, that is, by education or other social institutions. Mental reproduction is not, however, dependent on biological reproduction. The changes may spread and become established within a single generation, though again by natural selection.

Finally, what I simply call transcultural evolution is initiated by changes in the relationships of people, and results in changes in the entire culture. For example, individuals in positions of political, economic or social power may be moved about or replaced, resulting in a major alteration in the structure of the society. These changes are also subject to natural selection, though not at the level of the individual, but at the level of an organization. That is, the changes may be passed along from one organization to another.

Notice the analogies here. Biological evolution involves a change in atoms (zero-dimensional systems on the physical level) within the genetic material (fifth-dimensional system on the physical level). Cultural evolution involves a change in nerve cells (zero-dimensional systems on the biological level) within the brain (fifth-dimensional system on the biological level). Transcultural evolution involves change in people (zero-dimensional systems on the mental level) in large organizations (higher dimensional systems on the mental level. In the case of transcultural evolution, the analogy is not complete, because the mental level is still evolving.

While evolution can occur at all three of these levels, biological evolution of human beings, as we saw earlier, was finished long ago. But both of the two other evolutionary processes are occurring, and both affect human consciousness. Cultural evolution impacts consciousness directly, by altering the physiology of the brain. This occurs, for example, through the use of language as well as non-verbal communication, intentional as well as by example. As a result of these processes, new connections among neurons are selected for.

Transcultural evolution, on the other hand, impacts consciousness indirectly. It does not by itself change the biology of the human brain, but rather changes the relationships among people in their social organizations. As we saw earlier, it is our view of all these higher-order holons that comprises our interior qualities, our mode of consciousness. So by creating new such holons, transcultural evolution creates a new field in our interior vision.

In other words, while the potential for realizing higher stages of consciousness was in the human brain tens of thousands of years ago, this potential largely took the form of an ability to see whatever higher stages of human organization subsequently formed. Most of the work of subsequently ascending these stages was performed by the gradual development of human civilization. Thus the mind of the modern child unfolds further than that of our ancestors did partly because of direct social conditioning, which in effect creates the connections between the brain and higher-order holons. But in addition to this process of cultural evolution, transcultural evolution is also at work, creating more of these higher-order holons. The child is given both better vision than her ancestors, as well as an expanded panorama to view.

I have argued here that Wilber's four-quadrant hierarchical model, containing distinctions between individual and social aspects of holons as well as between their interior and exterior properties, can be non-reductively represented on a single scale or axis of existence. I began by arguing that a distinction should be made between what I call stages and true levels of existence. Every level of existence features a fundamental stage and several intermediate stages. Both the properties of and the relationships between fundamental and intermediate stages are different. Fundamental stages, including atoms (physical level), cells (biological level) and organisms (mental level) are relatively autonomous, and can exist independently of higher-order holons. In contrast, intermediate stages normally exist only within a higher level of existence. Thus most molecules and supramolecular structures exist only within cells; tissues and organs exist only within organisms. The main exception to this rule is during the evolution of a higher level of existence, when intermediate stages form transitional units until the emergence of the higher level is complete.

With the distinction between stages and levels firmly drawn, I then showed that human social organizations are higher stages of evolution of human beings. They have true properties of higher stages of existence, and thus can and should be represented on the same scale as individual holons, just as organisms, which are organizations of cells, and molecules, which are organizations of atoms, are represented on the same axis as their lower order holons. A further unification of the interior and exterior is achieved upon recognizing that the higher, social stages of human existence are in a sense identical to what we call mind. That is, mind or interior properties of humans is what is experienced when we look at the higher-order holons in which we are imbedded. Exterior properties of holons, conversely, are what a higher-order holon sees when it looks at its components.

Thus every holon can be understood as an individual or a society, depending on the perspective of the observer. Likewise, every holon can be viewed as an exterior or interior property, depending on this perspective. The resulting unified model of existence throws light on the nonduality of higher states as well as of lower levels of existence, and helps understand how the human brain and its associated consciousness originally evolved.

1. Many of these stages of existence can exist independently under artificial conditions. For example, scientists can isolate proteins from cells. But such proteins are viable--that is, retain their native structure and function--only under special conditions.

2. This would seem to undercut the very definition of holon, which is supposed to be both a whole and a part of something higher. Moreover, in the strict bottom-up view of evolution, in which lower precedes higher, it seems clear that there must be a "top" to the hierarchy at all times, populated by the newest emergent holons that are yet not parts of higher-order holons. However, in Wilber's broad model, which I follow in general, Spirit or Ground is always present, so what appears to be highest-order holons imbedded in the ground. Nevertheless, the relationships of newly emergent holons to Spirit would be very different from that between manifest higher and lower-order holons.

3. Any hierarchical model that attempts to define and describe its stages/levels very precisely eventually begins running into such "exceptions". I referred to another discrepancy earlier when I noted that some small molecules can have an independent existence. We will see more as we go on. It is possible, of course, to brush these exceptions off as not having significant impact on the "big picture", and that is what most hierarchy theorists do. However, if one believes, as I do, that the analogies between different levels of existence are very extensive, these discrepancies should serve both as warning flags that there is a serious lack of understanding somewhere, as well as signal areas of investigation that might bring forth radically new discoveries. Is it possible, for example, that atoms do reproduce, but because it happens so rapidly, and with no net change in their numbers, that the process can't be observed? This notion, preposterous as it appears, would also remove another glaring inconsistency in the properties of atoms. Though a general emergent property is that higher-order holons have a longer lifetime than their lower-order components, atoms are considered to exist indefinitely.

4. Intermediate stages may reproduce themselves in a limited sense, but such reproduction is always subsidiary to the reproduction of a fundamental system. Thus DNA reproduces itself during cell division, but this is part of the overall process of the cell's reproduction, and is controlled by the cell. Simple tissues may reproduce themselves, but this process is not organized at the tissue level, but represents the simple sum of reproduction of many cells.

5. For example, an ion channel, which is a pore in the cell surface membrane formed by one or several protein molecules. Certain ions pass in or out of the cell by going through this pore, and their flow is regulated by changing the size and or shape of the pore. The latter, in turn, results from a change in shape (what molecular biologists call conformation) of the proteins forming the pore. Whenever an ion channel is activated--by certain drugs, for example, or by a change in the voltage across the membrane--these proteins change their shape, open the pore, then after a certain period of time, revert to their original shape, closing the pore (Guyton, 1994). Thus the channel, as a meaningful functional unit, has a temporal dimension as well as spatial ones.

6. There is now recognized to be a third class of cells, archaebacteria, and it has been proposed that they form a third fundamental division (Woese, 1990). However, there is some controversy over this idea (Woese, 1998), and in any case, eukaryotes remain as the only type of cell that organizes into higher forms of life.

7. There are some significant exceptions to this generalization, of course. Some invertebrates, most notably insects, are social, and some vertebrates are asocial. However, almost all higher vertebrates live in at least a nuclear family arrangement, and most invertebrates outside of insects are asocial.

8. A ribozyme is a RNA molecule with the ability to catalyze a chemical reaction. Thus it has the functional properties of an enzyme, yet also the potential for carrying genetic information. As such, it is a promising candidate for a transitional form in the evolution of cells (Horgan, 1996).

9. This is an interesting example of where our knowledge of one level of the hierarchy might be used to understand not a higher level, as is generally the same case, but a lower level. That is to say, study of human social organizations, if they truly are the higher stages of an emerging new form of life, might throw light on the evolution of cells and organisms.

10. I am not arguing here that all consciousness per se would also disappear. If consciousness were simply an emergent property appearing at a certain point in the hierarchy, then it should completely disappear, at least all manifestations of it on or above the human level. However, in Wilber's model, which I follow in this respect, a universal consciousness (Spirit or Ground) exists prior to the evolution of any of the hierarchy, and would remain regardless what portions of the hierarchy, interior or exterior, were lost. Thus by interior I do not mean, and presumably Wilber does not mean, consciousness per se, but a particular manifestation or experience of it.

11. A radical interpretation of the interior vs. exterior dualism might hold that the interior applies only to inner experience or awareness. If this is so, the exterior aspects of human beings would include more than just their physical and biological qualities. They would also include all intersubjective aspects--language and all other mental phenomena, so far as they are observable in one person by another.

I am not defining interior in this very strict sense, because this awareness, as I understand it, is really a very fleeting apprehension of the universal Spirit or Ground. Therefore, if this is what we are to mean by interior, elimination of it would necessarily eliminate the latter, too (see the previous note). In any case, Wilber's discussion of his model (p. 192), makes it clear that he, too, regards intersubjective aspects of holons as interior properties.

However, even if we wished to use this more restricted definition of interior, my argument is not necessarily undercut. In this case, we would ask the question: could human beings with all the intersubjective characteristics of rational consciousness exist in the actual absence of any awareness? Could a person who thinks rationally and abstractly, uses complex language, and so on, and so on--a person who looks like any other person to any other person--exist without any inner experience? Philosophers of mind call such a hypothetical person a zombie. And most of them, such as Chalmers (1996), who uses the concept extensively in his approach to understanding consciousness, believe that a zombie is logically possible. That is, a person with all exterior aspects of his form of life could exist in the absence of any inner experience. Whether a zombie is biologically possible, evolutionarily possible, is of course another question.

12. It might be argued that human beings at a lower stage of consciousness are not really biologically identical to us. They must have some differences in their brains accounting for their lower mode of consciousnsess, though these differences apparently have no genetic basis (they would presumably result from the formation of new connections among previously existing neurons). Wilber alludes to this in describing a hypothetical (though as yet unconfirmed) brain structure or physiology (SF2) characteristic of the rational consciousness stage only.

Defined in this very specific manner, it is true that elimination of all consciousness of a particular stage also eliminates all the corresponding exterior forms of that stage. The exterior does depend as much on the interior as the other way around. However, as we saw earlier in the discussion about individual vs. social aspects of holons, the same reasoning can be applied as well to lower levels of the hierarchy. For example, if all organisms were destroyed, then all cells of the kind that exist in organisms would also be destroyed. If all molecules were destroyed, then all reactive atoms of the kind that make up those molecules must also be destroyed. (Even supposing some of these reactive atoms existed free as well as in molecules--though in this model, if they did exist free they really aren't the same kind of atoms--we must assume that some of these free ones are always combining into new molecules. So destruction of all molecules would have to presuppose destruction of all reactive atoms.

Thus we can see that if we want to get very specific about the kinds of holons that form higher-order holons, we can never use Wilber's rule of asymmetry to determine what is higher and what is lower. This rule only works when we lump all fundamental or zero-dimensional stages together as one class. When we do this, destruction of all molecules spares some atoms. Destruction of all organisms spares some cells. And likewise, destruction of all rational consciousness spares some human beings.

13. Of course, much of our understanding of lower forms of existence such as cells, molecules and atoms now comes from an interior view as well. Thus we create theories based on our observations of these lower forms of existence, and test the theories by experiment. We could say this is a process of comparing our view of the lower forms with the view of other holons of our type (i.e., other people). But our raw experience of cells, molecules and atoms is not complexed with all this knowledge we now have of them. Our direct experience of cell relationships is simply as bodies or tissues; our direct experience of molecular relationships is as materials. This sharply contrasts with our direct experience of the groups we participate in, which is manifested as thoughts, ideas and other interior qualities.

14. Wilber (1995) and others seem to make such distinctions. I would argue, based on both personal experience as well as on the model proposed here, that the next distinct level of consciousness is characterized by transcendence of subject/object duality. Any experience of higher consciousness that does not have this feature, in my view, is not a higher level. It might be considered a higher stage, analogous to the stages of ordinary human consciousness; but like the latter, and like the intermediate stages of lower forms of life, it is a transitory one, inherently unstable.

15. Implying that there must be an autonomous form of life integrating all of human societies and lower forms of life.

16. Even lower organisms can, of course, distinguish themselves to some extent from their environment. If they couldn't, they wouldn't survive. In the model developed here, transcendence of subject/object dualism appears in the earliest invertebrate organisms. All organisms beyond them have already begun some differentiation, including early human beings. Nevertheless, the experience of the latter is clearly much closer to a non-dualistic view of the world than ours.

17. Viewing the human brain as having had for tens of thousands of years the potential to realize not simply modern ordinary states of consciousness but even higher states creates still another problem for the view that only the appropriate social conditions are necessary to unfold the potential. If this view is correct, removing a newborn from one culture and raising it in a higher culture should result in the child developing the higher worldview. We obviously can't perform this experiment with ancient societies, but we might do it with current cultures that are in many respects at the stage of much earlier ones. The evidence from such studies does indeed support the social conditioning view.

But then consider this. If our brains have the potential to develop higher consciousness, it should follow that raising an infant in a society composed of people who have all realized this higher consciousness will result in the child, too, attaining this state. And this should happen as certainly and inexorably as today's children reach rationality. But my experience on the path to higher consciousness, and I believe that of most others, is that realizing this state is not and can never be like "growing up". It requires extraordinary efforts and suffering. So I do not see how the brain can be said to have the potential to realize higher consciousness in the same sense that it has the potential to realize ordinary states.