A Public of Individuals
free art magazine

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no.4 Feb/ Mar/Apr 2003

A reply to Chris Jones' 'Return to the real world'

by Richard Larter

The gallery ghost is sadly astray. What a shame he did not take my words to mind when I wrote "You are reading these words, but who can say what it means to you? Consciousness is your own unique experience." In a long reply the ghost becomes a mind-reader of my mind, and attempts to tell me what I said.

Did I create a world which I termed the 'art world'? Would this be the same art world where Matthew Collings launched himself? Did I attempt to expose the benefit of perception active within the practice of art by gleaning authority from the abstract world of 'scientific facts'? I did not. Then I manufactured an argument filled with abstract "societies" and fictitious "theys" - pouring in the great unwashed "ours, us and we". Plus the "our" whose collective "mental activity" I apparently claim to know the truth about. This is something I did not claim. Then I get clobbered by the 'us' who are lied to by politicians and officials, and I am even asked "when was the last time Bush, Howard ,Kemp or Keating" lied to me. "When was the last time they spoke to you?" asks Jones.

Later I am accused of Cartesian dualism, the mind infallible, the body no more than fallibility, because in Jones' opinion I privileged the elitist mode of perception. Jones uses deductive abstract arguments, he espouses simple, judgmental, rational thought. For example, "from the fixed locality of your writing station you perceived our extremely ignorant and imperfect world. How did you do this from your seat?" to quote Mr. Jones again.

As for Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), to him perception is always embodied. Perception in itself does not exist, it is in the lived world. A matter of interest to the reader, Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" was written in 1945. Colin Smith translated the book for Routledge in 1962. The 2002 edition I do not know but suspect it to be a reprint. Merleau-Ponty and phenomenology found difficulty coping with the problem of 'otherness'. The "I speak" issue treats every subjective (even if embodied) instance as a unity present in itself. Then in the illusion of pluralising it, raises this instance to the power of 'we'. This 'we' becomes a unity, the unity of collective otherness and heterogeneity are thus done away with. In other words it cannot explain how a move can be made from the individual 'I speak' to the fact that another speaks.

"We do not know how we think - this is a scientific fact", I wrote. We do not know in spite of the best efforts of all thinkers. Human consciousness, awareness and the subjective features of human existence, we cannot explain or understand, but at least nowadays we are aware of this. Why do swirling electrical patterns in a brain lead to thoughts or sensations? Why can a thought or a desire move electrons and ions in the brain, thus triggering physical movements? Are these questions a meaningless muddle of concepts? Does Mr. Jones know the answers?

I quote, "but it's these mind games that sustain your argument, Richard. By claiming a meaning exists out there somewhere in an 'art world' is to repeat an idealistic, intellectual and therefore disembodied analytic process of perception, authorised on high from the vestige of some crumbling ivory tower." Thank you Jones, but I did not argue this.

Texts are constantly interpreted. Authors' intentions and beliefs are open to any interpretations, even malicious ones. Umberto Eco has written on the subject. I feel that Jones has wilfully misinterpreted my text; not being a mind reader I am unable to say why.

Richard Larter is an artist. He is represented by Watters Gallery.

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no.4 Feb/ Mar/Apr 2003

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