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Transcript of a Meeting at the White House

JFK: . . . particularly what we're going to do about it. Maybe a lot of people know about what's there, but what we're going to do about it really ought to be, you know, the tightest of all because otherwise we botch it up.

McNamara: Mr. President, may I suggest that we come back this afternoon prepared to, to
answer three questions. First, should we surface our surveillance? I think this is a very important..........

McNamara: I mean should we state publicly..........

JFK?: Oh.

McNamara: . . . that, that you have stated we will, we'll act to take out any offensive weapons. In order to be certain as to whether there are or are not offensive weapons, we are scheduling U-2 flights or other surveillance..........

Carter?: What's the [skull number, commissar?]. [Laughs]

McNamara:...........or reconnaissance flights to, uh, to obtain this information. We'll make the
information, uh, public.

JFK: There may not be one. All right, why not?

McNamara: This is one question. A second question is: Should we precede the military action
with political action? If so, on what, uh, timing? I would think the answer's almost certainly, yes.  And I wouldn't, I would think particularly of the contacts with Khrushchev. And I would think that if these are to be done, they must be scheduled in terms of time very, very carefully in relation to a potential military action. There must be a very, very precise series of, of contacts with him, and indications of what we'll do at certain times following that. And, thirdly, we should be prepared to answer your questions regarding the, the effect of these strikes and the time required to carry them off. I think..........

Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Transcripts. No
classification marking. The source text is a 35-page transcript of audiotape 28.1. Identifying
footnotes in the source text are not included. For Taylor's draft account of this meeting, October 16, including a list of participants, and Carter's memorandum for the record, dictated on October 17, see the Supplement. Carter's memorandum is also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 145-147. McGeorge Bundy had informed the President about the U-2 photographs of the missile sites at 8:45 a.m. October 16, and Kennedy immediately called for a meeting of his principal advisers at 11:45.