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    For centuries, Unites States involvement in foreign affairs was virtually nonexistent.
Yet, with time, our nation evolved from a diplomatic island to a central continent of diplomacy.
The trend started with the growth of industrialism and flourished under the guiding hand of
President Theodore Roosevelt.  The importance of foreign affairs steadily escalated with both
world wars and peaked with the rise of Soviet power and the onset of the Cold War.  Thus, with
the United States quickly becoming a major power in world diplomacy, the role of presidency
expanded as well.  With the discovery of Russian missiles in Cuba, Kennedy faced not only a
diplomatic crisis, but a potentially deadly threat to nation security.  Thus, using his
Constitutional power as commander-in-chief and his ever evolving political power as chief
diplomat, Kennedy successfully and justifiably attempted to remove the Russian missiles.  Given
these powers, Kennedy’s reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis followed both political and
constitutional constraints.

    President George Washington set the early tone for United States foreign relations with
his farewell address to congress.  In this famous farewell address, Washington called foreign
diplomacy “one of the most baneful foes of republican government.”  Consequently, this view
became the dominant mentality of the newly formed government.  To the young nation,
isolationism seemed attractive because it prevented serious entanglements with foreign powers
and thus protected nation security.  Because isolationism protected the United States from other
nations, it could grow and flourish.  Fortunately, this policy proved to be relatively easy to
implement.  Entire oceans separated the United States from both Europe and Asia, limiting
interaction and conflict. Thus, our nation remained a largely isolated nation for centuries.  With
the exception of a few minor scuffles, United States foreign policy was practically nonexistent in
Europe in Asia for centuries.

    At the dawn of the twentieth century, however, foreign policy began to change.  As
Secretary of the Navy and as president, Theodore Roosevelt pushed for a stronger military
presence.  Thus, our growing navy increased its influence in the western hemisphere as our
nation gravitated towards imperialism.  To justify this shift in foreign policy, Roosevelt declared
the “Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine” which gave the United States the right to intervene in
internal affairs in Latin America.  Thus, the creation of a new foreign policy caused the United
States to exert her influence upon the western hemisphere.

    While the strength of our foreign policy was continued to grow, it was destined to
become even stronger and more widespread.  By the early twentieth century, United States
foreign policy, although markedly aggressive within its own sphere of influence, had only
molded the western hemisphere.  However, growing global economic and diplomatic circles
broadened our scope even further.  Thus, when conflict in Europe and Asia arose, the United
States inevitably participated.  As a result, we became the world’s strongest military and
economic power by the end of World War II.  However, with the growth of Communism in Asia
and Eastern Europe, our government and military played an even greater role sustaining world
peace and promoting democracy. The presidencies of Truman and Eisenhower demonstrated this
role through their attempts to stifle Communism with the policy of containment.  Thus,
thwarting the Communist advance became a chief diplomatic, military, and political goal of our
nation.  As a result, the president, as chief diplomat and commander-in chief, became our
nation’s most powerful weapon against Communism.  Thus, newly-elected President John F.
Kennedy assumed task of containing communism the moment he took the oath of office.

    Within a year of his presidency, however, Kennedy faced a major diplomatic crisis.  Late
in the summer of 1962, Russia had mysteriously increased commercial shipments to Cuba.  The
United States was suspicious, but did not act.  Then, on September 2nd, the Soviet Press released
a document signed by Cuban and Soviet leaders (3 pg 3) officially acknowledging that the
Soviets were sending “defensive” military aid to Cuba.  Kennedy, and the rest of his
administration, grew suspicious, believing that the Russian-Cuban military alliance could be a
threat to national security.  From all appearances, the supposed military alliance suggested a
Cuban surrender to the principles and ideals of Communism.  In Document H, Charles Burton
Marshall suggests that Khrushchev and the Communists gave military aid at first with
“trepidation,” wondering if they could get away with it.  In his words, “The United States would
never abandon Cuba to Communism.”

    Thus, President Kennedy and the rest of the nation feared additional expansion of
Russian influence.  At first, the Russians assured Kennedy that the only ties between the two
nations were economic.  In addition, soviet premier Khrushchev asserted that the weapons in
Cuba were purely “defensive” and posed no threat  to the United States.  However, the newly
forming alliance, even if it was purely defensive as the Russians asserted, expanded the soviet
power across the Atlantic Ocean.  Kennedy had a reason to be concerned and a political
obligation to defend his country.  Unfortunately, however, the White House officially accepted
the Russian explanation and chose to trust the Communists.  This choice became Kennedy’s first
mistake of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  While his apathy had little military significance at the
time, it lowered his prestige (Document H).  In a sense, the United States lost a small portion of
political power by allowing Khrushchev to call the shots.

    Kennedy’s trust, unfortunately, turned out to be highly misguided.  His reaction to
ensuing situation produced his initial anger towards the Russians.  While the Russians
maintained that the weapons they were sending to Cuba were purely defensive, they were
actually building a stockpile of nuclear weapons.  However, through reconnaissance by U-2 spy
planes, intelligence found several missile launch sites such as those at San Cristobal (Document
E).  On the morning of Tuesday, October 16th, president Kennedy awoke to the news U-2 spy
planes had located several of these launch sites.  He subsequently launched his own attack
against the Russians, though never felt and heard only by a few close friends, as a veritable
torrent of profanity.  To the public, however, his words were a little milder though given with the
same intensity and passion.  In an address to the nation, Kennedy called the missiles a “flagrant
and deliberitae defiance” of the Rio Pact of 1947. (Document F)  In addition, Kennedy
maintained that the Soviets had defied the Charter of United Nations.

    Kennedy’s initial emotions were undoubtably stronger because Russia had deceived him.
Perhaps his anger caused him to favor more a violent retaliation and led him to suggest air
strikes and invasions as potential military options.  Whatever the reason, the news on the 16th
placed a heavy burden upon his back.  As he faced the situation, he stated,  “I don’t think it’s
unfair to say that the United States...........is now passing through one if its most critical periods.”
(1 pg 82) In any event, the situation in Cuba forced Kennedy to react.  In response, Kennedy was
faced with the task of forming a plan that would work within all political and Constitutional
boundaries.

    The Constitution’s specific guidelines dealing with the president’s diplomatic power are
sketchy at best.  According to this document, the only applicable powers of the president include
his position as “Commander-in-chief” and his ability to create treaties with Congress’s
ratification.  From the outset, United States relations with Russia appeared to be an entirely
diplomatic issue.  From that perspective, Kennedy would have been unable to act in any measure
against Russia.  After all, the Constitution gave him diplomatic power only with the consent of
congress.  However, Russia’s obvious aggression changed the situation entirely.  By moving
offensive missles into Cuba, the Russians violated the Charter of United Nations.  In addition,
their deception suggested that they intended to use the weapons for offensive rather than
defensive purposes.  In other words, the Russians had changed the diplomatic scene from one of
simple diplomacy to one of war.  Thus, United States’ reaction to Russia became a military
operation which Kennedy could justifiably guide as the nation’s commander-in-chief.
Consequently, the threat of war gave Kennedy the Constitional authority to implement any
diplomatic strategy aimed at defending the United States from the Russian empire.

    Politically, Kennedy was limited by the United States foreign policies already put in
place.  For centuries, the United States had isolated themselves from European and Asian world
powers.  Not until the early twentieth century did the United States become a major player in
world affairs.  By this time, our role had changed from that of a passive observer to that of an
active participant.  Following the second world war, the United States, under the leadership of
Harry S. Truman, began to actively contain the communists.  This trend continued under
president Eisenhower.  Thus, it became Kennedy’s political responsibility to do the same.  In
addition, Kennedy ran for president on a political platform that promised to take a harder line
against the Russians.  Kennedy promised to be firm and prevent it’s spread to the Western
hemisphere.  Thus, Kennedy faced the obligation to actively fight the communists.  In the Cuba,
the Russians demonstrated to Kennedy a clear act of aggression.  Their total ignorance of
treaties, coupled with their lying about their military forces in Cuba suggested purely aggressive
intentions.  By all appearances, their act provocatively threatened the national security of the
United States.  Thus, Kennedy was politically impelled, both in his implementation of United
States foreign policy, and in his protection of national security, to prevent Russia’s deployment
of missiles in Cuba.  These factors gave Kennedy ample reason to carry out all possible
diplomatic and military measures to remove them.

    Acting withing the constraints before him, Kennedy attempted to formulate a plan of
action against the Communists.  Initially, Kennedy called together a team of top advisors to form
the ExComm commitee. (1 pg 80) At the first meeting, he called for an air-strike, saying “we’re
going to take out these missiles....we can’t wait two weeks while we’re getting ready to roll.” (2
pg 118-119) In comparison, the majority of his advisors suggested gentler and more diplomatic
approaches.  However, to Kennedy, military action seemed to be most effective option.  Even
former president Eisenhower believed that words would have little effect ( 1 pg 85).  He belived
that military action, namely, an air strike, would most effectively remove the missiles and send
Russia a clear and important message.  (1 pg 86)  However, an air strike had limitations as well.
While it certainly might destroy most of the  missiles in Cuba, it could also trigger a counter-
strike against the United States.  If that were to occur, millions of people might die in the
ensuing nuclear war.  Perhaps Kennedy overlooked this in his haste, but his initial raction was
certainly understandable. Document B shows the island of Cuba ajacent to the United states.
On Cuba’s shore, three small missiles stand pointing towards the United States.  On the United
States’ shore, six larger missiles stand near a sign saying  “For Russia if we’re attacked from
Cuba.”  The political cartoon suggests the dominance of the United States military.  Kennedy,
following this line of thought, believed his military could win a nuclear war.  However, such a
war was simply too risky and the ExComm committee chose to pursue other options.

    Thus, diplomacy was the only remaining option.  It could potentially remove missiles,
save millions of dollars, and prevent harm to millions of lives of American civilians.
Consequently, the ExComm committee sought to use diplomacy rather than direct military
action.  Most of Kennedy’s colleagues believed that a quarantine or blockade would be the most
effective and least dangerous option.  However, even this alternative found its detractors who
believed in strong military action.  In Document A, four MIT students express their opinion that
such an action was to indecisive, stating “this pathetic situation would not exist today had the
pressident acted couragelously, and saged a rapid, forceful decisive invasion of Cuba.”  Perhaps
even more expectedly, Nikitiv Khrushchev disagreed as well, although for slightly different
reasons.  In Document C, he writes to Kennedy that a quarantine was violating “international
law.”  Kennedy expected Khruschev’s disagreement, but he also risked the disagreement of other
world leaders.

 Kennedy and his White House staff faced tremendous political pressure to amend their
actions.  Politicians and civilians alike feared the situation was nearing breaking point.  At any
moment, anything could trigger nuclear war.  In document D, Boby Dylan, write’s these words
about the situation at hand:

     “I was walking down the sidewalk
     not causing any arm.
     The radio reported
     and sounded with alarm.
     The Russian ships were sailing
     all across the sea.
     We all feared at daybreak
     it was world war number three.”

    Not surprisingly, Kennedy faced great political pressure to act quickly and decisively.
Thus, within two days, he implemented a blockade.  As a chiefly military operation, a blockade
lay within Kennedy’s constitutional powers as Commander-in-chief.  According to Document I
(US News & World Report), “several carriers, some cruisers, dozens of destroyers,
even..submarines” filled the sea.  The blockade was set to stop or destroy all ships heading
towards Cuba.  Yet, the risk of a military confrontation ran high.  One wrong move, one mis-
communication, and two entire nations would be engaged in nuclear war.  Fortunately, the
confrontation never came.  Kennedy and Khrushchev, both living with the fear of invasion and
both on the brink of declaring their own invasion, prevented a crisis through their continual
communication through the media.  Kennedy almost authorized an attack several times and had
even readied the United State’s missile arsenal and military.  However, he was able to avoid
crisis through clever diplomatic decisions.  After the exchange of several letters with
Khrushchev, Russia agreed to remove its missiles from Cuba.  In exchange, the United States,
though having fewer and less offensive missiles in Russia’s neighbor Turkey, withdrew those
missiles as well.

    From the time of the signing of the Constitution, politicians have continually attempted
to define the powers of the President.  Consequently, as political situations have evolved with
the times, so also has the power of the executive branch existed in a state of flux.  Because the
Constitution gives only general guidelines for the office, they often change politically - however
unfortunate - according to the purposes of those who interpret them.  Perhaps, then, the strongest
limitations on a president’s actions are political rather than Constitutional.  These limitations,
while often unseen, are often even more powerful.

    As Kennedy molded his response to Khrus and the Russians, he knew he would face
tremendous political pressure from all those who disagreed with either his decision, or its
outcome.  Should he fail, all posterity would point to the prophetic voice which offered him the
best solution that he didn’t take.  However, Kennedy followed his need to seek advisors.  Even
within the opening hours of the crisis, Kennedy formed the ExComm team and continually
referred to them for their advice.  Thus, by his referral to political allies, he was able to
successfully mold his response within the political constraints set before him.  Fortunately - or
perhaps unfortunately - Russia’s clear act of aggression saveed Kennedy and the United States.
Because Russia’s aggressive motives appeared obvious enough, the White House administration
could handle the situation from an entirely military standpoint and avoid Constitutional
questions of peacetime diplomacy.  Thus, throughout the initiation and implementation of the
United States blockade of Cuba, Kennedy’s actions coincided with all Constitutional and
political limitations.

Copyright 2001, David Hall.