"Blest be the man that spares these
stones.
And curst be he that moves my
bones"
-Wm. Shakespeare's epitaph
PREFACE
This paper is divided into two parts. Chapter One is a general survey and
background discussion of theoretical developments in the discipline of
archaeology in the twentieth century, and synthesizes the epistemological
trends of culture-history, processualism and post-processualism. Chapter
Two is a survey and discussion of developments in the sub-discipline of
rock art studies and summarizes current theoretical trends.
CHAPTER ONE
DEVELOPMENTS IN ARCHAEOLOGICAL THEORY AS A WHOLE - EPISTEMOLOGY AND CULTURE-
HISTORY, PROCESSUALISM, AND POST-PROCESSUALISM.
Epistemology is concerned with how we know things. In archaeology there has
been considerable discussion recently about epistemology and the need to
consciously and deliberately explicate the assumptions underlying how we
approach the study of material culture and how we reconstruct the past.
This problem can be thought of as the problem of archaeological inference
(Watson 1990). Can archaeologists accurately and safely infer past behavior
and past beliefs and ideas from presently existing and possibly transformed
objects?
The history of how archaeology has been done in the twentieth century might
be summarized into three broad approaches: description, explanation, and
interpretation (Trigger 1989). These are now incorporated as primary phases
in most contemporary archaeological excavation. The culture-history approach
described and ordered artifacts in chronological sequences using stratigraphic
excavation, stylistic seriation and eventually dendrochronology and radiocarbon
dating. This descriptive approach dominated most of the Twentieth Century and
produced as its final work product, charts and maps of cultures based upon
artifacts, and cultural sequences and chronologies based upon excavation of
stratigraphic layers.
Although it certainly described change over time of artifacts and inferred
cultures based upon changing artifact styles, its critics during the period
of the New Archaeology, led by authors such as Lewis Binford (1962,1965,1968,
1972), argued that culture-history did little else. The New Archaeologists,
who in a "toned down" form became the processualists, argued that meaning was
rarely self-evident and the epistemology of the culture-history approach had
simply assumed that history was all that we needed to know. The data and facts
meant something historically and were viewed as fairly self-evident in meaning.
The culture-historians were criticized by processualists because description
alone was considered insufficient to explain the meaning of artifacts. The
New Archaeologists argued that archaeologists could be easily misled and could
not know and explain what facts meant unless they became "scientific" and used
the deductive-nomological or hypothetico-deductive methods of hypothesis,
testing, modification and retesting until finally an approximation of the
truth was achieved. The philosophy and model underlying this approach was
logical positivism derived from the Enlightenment thinkers who answered the
question of "how we know what we know" by arguing that we can only really
"know" something if we use the methodology of science. The New Archaeologists
asked what all those facts excavated by the culture-historians meant. They
argued that so-called facts do not exist apart from theory and to understand
and explain facts, archaeologists must interpret facts in light of theories
and abstractions. They were also interested in asking new questions about why
there was change over time, what the forms of social organization were, and
what the adaption to the environment was by these societies i.e. what was the
environment like and how was food and the other necessities of human life
obtained. The New Archaeologists wondered how we could know that we were not
just making it all up - a concern taken up by the post-processualists like
Hodder (1986), Shanks (1987) and Tilley (1982) that followed.
The New Archaeologists thus began to look to science and positivism for the
way to say something with relative certainty about the past. With the
scientific model of epistemology underlying their efforts, they began to
search for covering laws for past societies that would be analogous to the
covering laws found in physics or chemistry. Unfortunately, as the post-
processualists pointed out, the New Archaeologists have never been able to
find a single covering law that was of any real importance. The post-
processualists, led by Ian Hodder (1986, 1989), and drawing on the post-modern
movement and literary theory, looked elsewhere to literary studies - for a
new model or trope for archaeological epistemology. Post-processualism
questioned the assumptions of unbiased observation underlying the epistemology
of positivist science. Arguing that theory preceeded seeing or perception,
contextualists maintained that "science" was an ideology that filtered
perception. Positivist science was itself called into question. Rather than
looking for covering laws, post-processualists argued in favor of the
importance of historical particularism, and a recognition of the presence in
the archaeological record of previously unstudied particular individuals and
groups such as women and minority groups. The post-processualists argued that
the meaning of artifacts was contextual, cultural, and cognitive or ideational.
Artifacts were significant for more than simply the study of the adaption to
an environment of a system that could be described in a flow chart. The
interpretation of artifacts using a hermeneutic and contextual approach was
argued for, and a perceived male bias in contemporary interpretions of past
objects was criticized . Male archaeologists were argued to have privileged
investigation of what they found interesting as males, overlooking the
subjects and contributions of women and minorities to past societies and
cultures.
MARXISM, CULTURAL ECOLOGY, SYSTEMS THEORY, AND POST-PROCESSUALISM
Although there were a wide variety of theoretical approaches to archaeology in
the twentieth century, the foundational ideas are few and are arguably variants
on Marxist ideas articulated in the nineteenth century. Karl Marx wrote that:
In the social production which men carry on, they enter into definite
relationships that are indispensable and independent of their will; these
relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their
material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production
constitutes the economic structure of society-the real foundation, on which
rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite
forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life
determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual
processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their
existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their
consciousness ( Marx 1906).
Material conditions influence the non-material. Unlike the later archaeological
simplifications of his ideas, such as cultural ecology, Marx recognized that
the relationship between technology, social organization, and ideology was a
dynamic one and dialectic in nature. People in pre-industrial societies
buffered themselves against starvation by organizing themselves in shifting
social organizations that responded in better or worse ways to changes in the
environment. In this manner the influence of Darwinian evolutionary thinking
lies at the base of much Marxist thinking - including that of the Cultural
Ecologists. The materialism of Marxism, of course, tends to focus on the
economic and environmental realm as driving the social system which responds
and adjusts to that environment. In the case of ideology, religion masks or
"opiates" the economic realities of unequal distribution of resources and
differential access to the means of production. Both Marxism and cultural
ecology share a profound materialistic view of human beings as economically
"rational" thus often missing the influence of the "irrational" and altered
states of consciousness on the creation of ideology, the patterning of social
organization, and superstructure. Religion may or may not be "the opiate of
the masses," but "opiates" have arguably been at the heart of many religions
that affected economic systems. Marx acknowledged that ideology and religion
directly influence the economic base (Marx 1957).
It has also been commonly observed that in times of economic stress, ritual
and religious activity will increase. Recent studies of pre-industrial
societies have indicated that most behavior is not focused on economic
activity either in hunter-gatherer societies or even in some agricultural
societies. The industrialized nation states of the nineteenth century and
the often two income post-modern workstyles of the information age are perhaps
another matter.
Kent Flannery in "The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations" (1972: 399-400) has
noted the disaffection with purely ecological approaches that did not produce
the hoped for explanatory power when applied to complex societies. Flannery
viewed this failure to have been caused by the cultural ecologists’ focus on
studying "techno-environmental matters" and the exchange of matter and energy,
thus leaving the exchange of information to the humanists. Flannery cited the
dangers of this development in theory by using as an example a perversion of
a ritual regulatory mechanism that caused an evolutionary change in a Mexican
village in Oaxaca. He argued for the incorporation of the study of "information"
back into the ecosystem model of archaeology.
Elizabeth Brumfiel (1983) also suggested that ecological variables alone were
insufficient to account for the formation of the Aztec state and a structural
approach to the study of political dynamics or political ecology enhanced the
understanding of how states emerge. The ecological approach of Julian Steward
favoring population increase as the triggering mechanism for state formation
was contrasted with that of Marx-Engels whose model "regards state formation
as a process generated by particular sociocultural orders. Certain types of
stratified societies for example, are said to possess an internal dynamic that
exerts pressure for state formation even when the relationship between the
human population and its environment is stable (Brumfiel 1983:261). Brumfiel
felt that the "superior managerial capacity of state government" may have
caused some states to form but that if states form in the absence of "a serious
disparity between population and resources" then internal forces within the
system should be investigated (Brumfiel 1983:262-3). In the case of the
formation of the Aztec state warfare was "rooted in the internal political
dynamics of the pre-state politics" and centralization of authority occurred
because "new political options suddenly [were] opened by the evolving dynamics
of political interaction" including "the intensification of civil war,
invasion, and shifting alliances" (Brumfiel 1983:266,270). Brumfiel’s
historically particular and politically detailed reconstruction of the
formation of the Aztec state - full of human agency and historically specific
political actors - ultimately seems more compelling and persuasive than the
cultural-ecology hypothesis or Marx-Engels postulates or any of the state
formation theories without similarly detailed supporting data.
A contrary and explicitly Marxist approach and conclusion was exemplified by
Berbeck (1995) who argued that archaeologists working on state formation in
Mesopotamia focused too narrowly on political organization and overlooked
economic data. She concluded that: "Mesopotamian societies in the 6th millenium
B.C. can be shown to be politically ‘stable’ but economically changing"
(Bernbeck 1995:1). She also pointed out that "change in the economic sphere
need not necessarily be accompanied by change in the political sphere and vice
versa" (Bernbeck 1995:1). Unlike Brumfiel’s study which was based partly upon
ethnohistoric sources, Bernbeck unfortunately had only pottery, settlement
patterns, building material, kilns and agricultural devices to work with.
William Sanders (1962:34) has argued for an historically particular cultural
ecological approach in the study of mesoamerica civilizations, defining
cultural ecology as "the study of the interaction of cultural processes with
the physical environment." The environment was "an active, integrated part
of the cultural system not a passive extra-cultural factor" (Sanders 1962:35).
Mesoamerica was, of course, a diverse environment and the relationships between
"environment, agricultural technology, and socio-political systems" were subtle
(Sanders 1962:41). Although he favors the view that the development of
civilization was a corollary development to urbanization occurring first in
the humid highlands with intensive agriculture, he did not think that
archaeological materials could yet resolve the outstanding conflict with the
opposing view that it developed in the humid lowlands based upon slash and
burn agriculture (Sanders 1962:42-3).
Interestingly, Karl W. Butzer (1980) postulated that civilizations behave as
adaptive systems rather than organic entities i.e. with a life cycle of birth,
growth, and death. In his view civilizations become unstable "when a top-heavy
bureaucracy makes excessive demands on the productive sector [and] breakdowns
result from chance concatenations of mutually reinforcing processes, not from
senility or decadence" (Butzer 1980:517). Citing the unique and very particular
history of ancient Egypt, with information presumably from the hieroglyphic
written histories, he concluded that the important systemic variables included
1) "a progressive social pathology from a top-heavy and metastable
sociopolitical pyramid," 2) leadership such as with the strong leadership of
Ramses III [ramses3] (1182-1151 B.C), the first Ptolemies and the early Roman
emperors, 3) foreign interventions, and 4) ecological stress from Nile behavior
(Butzer 1980:5). Butzer illustrates a cultural ecology approach that cites
environmental stress as only one of many factors that in combination could
cause a process of decline. His emphasis on other political events and
historical particularity seems sophisticated and scholarly and recognized the
complexity of the situation. It is not clear, however, how much of his
information came from excavation archaeology and how much came from written
texts. Whether or not the degree of focus and detail that Butzer achieved can
be reproduced in the absence historical records is not clear.
SYSTEMS THEORY, PROCESSUALISM, AND POST-PROCESSUALISM
Systems Theory, borrowing much from information theory (developed to apply to
businesses and computers, but also living organisms), claimed like Marx, that
there were three levels or subsystems of society: the ideological or religious,
social organization, and technology (Flannery 1968, 1972). Each had a function
and the structure of the network of relationships and feedback loops could be
diagrammed with flow charts and arrows. The energy flow could be then observed
and diagrammed in a metaphorical tribute to societies as computers or machines
that break down when the parts are not synchronized. The amount of information
that flowed (in these pre-Internet societies) was a standard for how complex
the society was. Systems theorists saw specialized states arising due to a need
for information management. In this view change occurred from inside the
machine. It was thought that through settlement studies and studies of
hierarchies and wealth, correspondences could be made to reconstruct the
society. Instead of Durkheimian organic and mechanical metaphors of society,
the business and computer metaphor was adopted.
Post-processualists would find this computer and machine metaphor for human
organization to be lacking in a recognition of human cognition, historical
particularity, and the importance of agency and habitus or the style that
gives people a dynamic "feel for the game" (Bourdieu 1977; Hodder 1986,1989).
Feminist archaeologists would also point out that this approach led to a kind
of archaeology where the people being described were without faces or genders,
were not particular individuals, and the particular local history was de-
emphasized (Tringham 1994, Conkey 1984).
Cultural ecology, "a term devised by Julian Steward to account for the dynamic
relationship between human society and its environment, and in which culture
is viewed as the primary adaptive mechanism", simplified the Marxist model
into the notion that base always determines superstructure or a kind of Marxism
minus the dialectics (Renfrew and Bahn 1975). Where Marx had a recognized a
dialectic process with ideology affecting economy, cultural ecologists saw a
"one way conversation" where economy determined ideology. Perhaps the most
extreme application of this view postulated that the Aztecs engaged in human
sacrifice because of a "protein deficiency" rather than because of political,
cosmological and religious ideology. With the theoretical shift towards looking
more closely at societies’ relationship to the environment, Julian Steward
(1955) and William Sanders (1962) methodologically began the more sophisticated
settlement analysis that has come to be expected in contemporary North
American archaeology. The postulation of a culture core, consisting of a
constellation of subsistence and economic patterns that are the more basic
features of a society, and the idea that social organization is secondary and
an adaption is a kind of pared down version of the Marxist model (Marx 1906).
Cultural ecologists thought that the more successful the society, the larger
the population would become, and that with the introduction of agriculture,
social change was due to the combined effects of population, economy and
environment. Karl Butzer (1980) viewed social conditions as dynamic, and social
organization as primarily an adaptive system. Economy was the most important
factor and sets of ecological opportunities that arose over time drove the
system. The echoes of Darwinian organic bodies adapting to changing
environments was a clear metaphor. Social organizations, like organic species,
had to change with fluctuating environmental stresses and conditions, or
become extinct in a ecologically linked world. Ecological crises adjusted
population (ala Malthus) and reorganized the religion, ideology, and politics.
This postulated an external cause for societal change and focused on the study
of cultural interactions with the environment. The changing environment created
a bounded set of choices or opportunities within which a culture had to operate
to provide food and shelter or die. The population increases brought about by
surplus energy generated by the agricultural revolution also drove social
change and the development of complex societies and new state organizations,
which were initially thought to have been needed to organize irrigation of
the fields and to redistribute resources in times of environmental stress.
Processualists would incorporate this general viewpoint and continued to
emphasize the importance of the processes involved with environmental and
cultural change (Binford 1965). Later archaeologists would notice that a
cultural ecology approach, where the economy for the most part determined
everything else, resulted in the view that there was really no need to look
at superstructure or ideology or religion because those were supposed to be
in some sense "fictions" to mask the disparities of economic distribution.
Why would archaeology need to study rock art or indigenous religious beliefs.
Even Marx, from whence these materialist ideas originally came, indicated that
things were not so one-sided (Marx 1957). The post-processualists pointed out
that economics in social organizations may be directly affected by ideology
and religion. The economic base is in dialogue with ideology. Eventually there
was also open rebellion against Christopher Hawkes (1954) postulation of a
"ladder of inference" that made ideology and religion the most difficult
subject to know from working with material culture. Cognitive processual
archaeologists, like Colin Renfrew (1982), rejected the idea that
archaeologists working to discover cognitive, religious, and ideological
patterns in prehistory were simply engaging in any more "speculation" than
an environmental archaeologist.
Processual archaeology, a complex development in materialism, with many
theorists and advocates, argued for a new recognition of the taphonomic
processes in archaeology. Behavioral archaeologists, like Michael Schiffer
(1983, 1988), argued against the assumption that artifacts were in situ
"fossils" of bygone cultures, and pointed out the many natural and cultural
transformation processes that made the earlier culture-historical data
collection approach and Binford’s early statement (that artifacts were
"fossils" upon which past reconstructions could easily be made), look
epistemologically simplistic.
With the development of post-modernism, archaeological theorists like Hodder
(1986) and Tilley (1982) turned to the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School,
hermenuetics, and the post-modern critique of logical positivism. In their
view, theory directly influences what is perceived (i.e. "I wouldn’t have seen
it if I hadn’t believed it"). They also argued that science is itself a western
ideology that has tended to silence and exclude minorities and women. Post-
processualists argued that today’s cultural setting directly affects our
interpretation of the past i.e. we necessarily put ourselves in the past and
see our mirrored image there. Adopting a relativist position, post-processualist
s argued that archaeology can never really "know" an external objective "truth"
that was the past. There are only our own perceptions today to work with. This
suggests that objectivity is more difficult than what was assumed by the New
Archaeologists. If archaeology is concluded to be a projection of ourselves
onto the past, archaeology is never truly objective. According to post-
processual archaeological theory, the same phenomenon of a multiplicity of
meanings for objects, was also true of the makers of the material culture,
who if they were here today to ask would give different contextual meanings
or readings of the objects that they had made. Meaning would vary depending
upon the person asked. Post-processualists argued that processualists had
epistemologically assumed that simply by following a scientific methodology
one could know something objective about the past in a relatively straight-
forward manner.
Post-processualists thus questioned the underlying assumptions about human
perception that were being made by science itself. Human beings perceive and
filter facts and data in an individual and culturally particular manner (Gibbon
1984). This recognition suggested the need for a cultural reassessment of
archaeology itself, and led to the recognition by some of a kind of unreflexive
ethnocentrism where "scientific" archaeologists tended to see what they wanted
to see in the past, and necessarily turned the endeavor into a white male
dominated one. Feminist archaeologists pointed to statements by men that about
"Venus" figurines represented the cultural equivalent of Upper Paleolithic
centerfolds. Feminist archaeologists looked at processualism and began asking
the question: "Where are the women?" (Conkey 1984, Tringham 1994)
Post-processual archaeology, as expounded by Hodder (1986: 156-60), did
recognize the contributions of processual archaeology in encouraging the idea
that culture is adaptive and for incorporating systems theory, information
exchange theory and the importance of environmental theory. Hodder also
processualism’s contribution to archaeological method in raising concerns
about problems with inference, sampling, and research design. Hodder’s
contextual archaeology incorporated a dialectic use of Marxism and
structuralism and attempted the "breaking down of dichotomies, set up within
archaeology, between individual and norm, structure and process, ideal and
material," and "subject and object" (Id.).
It was argued that Binford’s writings, however, did not describe a meaning-
laden process and ignored the power of individuals to create change (Hodder
1986:157). The active social process of individuals improvising and creating
culture was minimized. According to Hodder (1986; citing Greene 1987), in
contextual methodology, "material culture can be interpreted as having
different meanings to different groups at different times in the past" and
the variability of text interpretations is linked to issues of power. People
endlessly see things from different perspectives (Hodder 1986:160). Hodder
saw structuralism with its "search for structures, codes of presences and
absences, that lie behind historical and adaptive processes" as at odds with
empiricism and positivism (Hodder 1986). He acknowledged that structure had
different meanings to different structuralists, but argued that there is a
reality behind measurable evidence, and for too long ideas, meaning structures,
and ideology had been left out of the research by processual materialists
who thought that archaeology could not carry out "palaeopsychology" (Hodder
1986:163) Instead of looking at the meaning content of symbols, material
symbols were merely being seen "as indicators of contact, cultural affiliation
and diffusion." In Hodder’s view meaning was contextual and not universal and
archaeologists who used Native Americans only for the purpose of testing
general statements ignored the concerns of the people themselves. Critical
Theory had argued that the myth of the "apolitical" scientist was basically
just another ideology of power from which people need to be liberated.
Hodder was optimistic about recovering historically particular meanings from
the archaeological record because he thought that historical meanings were
real and produced real effects in the material world that were coherent,
structured and systematic (Hodder 1986:164). Hodder also made explicit his
agreement with earlier critiques of the assumptions of positivism by saying
"it is false to separate theory and data, since the latter can only be
perceived in relation to the former" (Hodder 1986:165). Post-processualism
also showed a greater interest in the subjectivity of archaeologists and the
effect of the social context of archaeologists on their interpretations of the
past. With material culture being viewed as a material form of text, making
use of linguistic codes, this "specific and concrete product, written to have
effects in the world" could be interpreted for its historically particular
meanings rather than simply being explained as evidence of trade contact, etc.
Philosopher, Linda Patrick (1985) in asking "Is There an Archaeological record"
suggested a possible synthesis of processualism’s concern to reconstruct and
purify from distortion presently existing materials (and show the past natural
conditions to which people in the past had to adapt), with post-processualism’s
concern to interpret the meaning of past material symbols. "Structural or
contextual archaeology draws inferences beyond those of new archaeology, moving
from ‘material phenomena’ to ‘mental phenomena,’ analyzing artifacts and
behavior in terms of culturally specific codes, and studying individuals’
symbolic and social strategies for living in groups and for tackling the
environment in creative ways" (Patrick 1985:56). Patrick further suggested
that the ubiquitous metaphor of an archaeological "record" - either a fossil
record or a textual or historical record may not actually be accurate and a
new trope may be needed that more accurately reflects what the epistemology of
archaeological inference is actually about.
Patrick also wrote an excellent summary of the major works in structuralism
and semiotics since World War Two and their relationship and influence upon
post-processual archaeology. This body of anthropological thought is in no
small part what post-processualism has drawn from in formulating a model of
archaeological evidence as a "body of material symbols" (Patrick 1985:40-44).
An anthropological subfield begun in the 1950’s that archaeologists have not incorporated into their thinking, (for reasons that are not clear to me) was the development in anthropology of a body of work on proxemics (the proximity at which human social interactions take place) and kinesics (the study of energy use and motion by people - particularly as they facilitate communication). Hall (1959, 1977) and Birdwhistell (1970) for example, provide several books that would seem to have obvious implications for how megaliths were designed, would have been phenomenologically experienced, and the ancient social distances and mental templates that people had for prehistoric public gatherings. CONCLUSION In choosing a preferred theoretical approach towards reconstructing the past, the original Marxist outlook that incorporated a dialectic between superstructure and base and that was historically particular and detailed still seems more persuasive than the early cultural ecology or systems theories. This is not to say that the cultural ecologists’ concern with the environment is not an important component of archaeology, but it is only one part of the picture. The cognitive archaeologists, post-processualists, and even the later cultural ecologists like Butzer, concluded that the ideational and religious realms were equally important and should not be overlooked in the attraction to the scientific methodology available for environmental reconstruction. Anthropological archaeology cannot leave out human agency, individual actors, ideology, religion and beliefs of the past. Patrick’s suggestion that archaeology may need a new metaphor to replace the idea that we are working with a "record" or "fossils" is interesting and bears further thought. She did not suggest a new metaphor for the field, but raised an intriguing question for the future. GO TO CHAPTER 2 "CURRENT TRENDS IN ROCK ART THEORY"GO TO CHAPTER 2 "CURRENT TRENDS IN ROCK ART THEORY"GO BACK TO KEVIN CALLAHAN'S WEBSITE
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