from "A Study of History" by Arnold J. Toynbee, 1952
"Christian and Islamic theology was a presentation of Christianity and Islam in terms of Hellenistic philosophies, and Hindu theology was a presentation of Hinduism in terms of the Indic philosophy, while Mahayana was a school of Indic philosophy which had converted itself into a religion without ceasing to be a philosophy at the same time. The philosophies, which were already hard-set systems of ideas when the rising western religions had to reckon with them, had once been dyanmic intellectual movements; and in this youthfull stage of life and growth - which was comparable to the growth stage of modern science - the Hellenic and Indic philosophies had encounters with the pagan religions which the Hellenic and Indic civilizations had inherited from primitive man. At first glance it might look as if these two precedents were reassuring. If Manknid had survived two past encounters between Religion and Rationalism, was not that a good augury for the outcome of the current conflict? The answer was that , in the earlier of these two previous encounters, the current problem had not arisen, while in the later encounter it had recieved a solution which had been so efficatious for the purposes of its own time and place that it had survived to become the crux of the problem confronting the twentieth-century Westernizing world. In the encounter between a dawning philosophy and a traditional paganism there had been no problem of reconciling Heart and Head because there had been no common ground on which hte two organs could have come into collision. The pith of primitive religion is not belief but action, and the test of conformity is not assent to a creed but participation in ritual performances. Primitive religious practive is an end in itself, and it does not occur tothe practitioners to look beyond the rites that they perform for a truth which these rites may convey. The rites have no meaning beyond the practical effect which their correct execution is believed to produce. Accordingly, when, in this primitive religious setting, philosophers arise who set out to make a chart of Man's environment in intellectual terms to which the labels "true" and "false" apply, no collision occurs so long as the philosopher continues to carry out his traditional religious duties; and there can be nothing in the traditional rites that could be incompatible with any philosophy. Philosophy and primitive religion encountered on another without colliding, and at least one conspicuous apparent exeption to this rule takes on a different complexion under closer scrutiny.... A new situation arose when the higher religions came on the scene. These higher religions did, indeed, sweep up and carry along with them a heavy freight of traditional rites that happened to be current in the societies in which hte new faiths made their first appearance; but this religious flotsam was not, of course, their essence. The distinctive new feature of the higher religions was that they based their claim to allegiance on personal rvelations held to have been recieved by their prophets; and these deliveries of the prophets ere presented, like the propositions of the philosophers, as statements of fact, to be labelled "true" or "false". Therewith Truth became a disputed mental territory; henceforward there were two independent authorities, prophetic Revelation and philosophical Reason, each of which claimed sovreign jurisdiction over the intellect's whole field of action. Thus it became impossible for Reason and Revelation to live and let live on the auspicious precedent of the amicable symbiosis of Reason and Ritual. "Truth", it now seemed had two forms, each claiming an absolute and overriding validity, yet each at odds with the other. In this new and excruciating situation htere were only two alternatives. Either the rival exponents of the two now coexisting forms of Truth must arrive at a compromise or they must fight it out intil one party or the other had been driven from the field. In the encounters between Hellenic and Indic philosophy on one side, and christian, Islamic, Buddhist, and Hindu revelation on the other, the parties had arrived at a peaceful accomodation in which Philosophy had tacitly consented to suspend the exercise of rational criticism against the deliveries of Revelation in exchange for being allowed to reormulate the phrophets' messages in the sophists' language. We need not doubt that the compromise was made in good faith on both sides, but we can see that it contained no real solution of the problem of the relation between scientific and prophetic Truth. The would-be reconcilliation of the two kinds of Truth in terms of the new mental dicipline called Theology was no more than verbal, and the formulae consecrated in creeds were doomed to prove impermanent because they left the equivocal meaning of Truth as ambiguous as thay found it. This pseudo solution of the second conflict had been handed down the generations to become more of a hindrance than a help... The true solution could not be found until it had been recognized that the same word "truth", when used by philosophers and scientists and when used by prophets does not refer to the same realities but is a homonym for two different forms of experience. ... For more than two hundred years the churches had been seeing science capture from them one province afer another. Astronomy, Cosmogony, Chronology, Biology, Physics, Psychology, had each in its turn been siezed and reconstructed on lines incompatible with the established religious teaching, and no end of these losses wa in sight. As some eccliastical authorities saw the situation, the only remaining hope for the churches lay in complete intrasigence. This "die hard" spirit had found expression in the Roman Catholic Church in the decrees of the Vatican Council of A.D. 1869-70 and in the anathema pronounced against Modernism in A.D. 1907. In the domain of the Protestant Churches of North America it had entrenched itself in the 'Fundamentalism' of the "Bible Belt". It was similarly manifested in the Islamic world in hte militantly archastic movements of Wahhabism, Idrisism, Sanusisism, and Mahdism. Such movements were symptoms, not of strength, but of weakness. They made it look as if the higher religions were rding for a fall. The most serious symptom was that, in professedly democratic and professedly Christian countries, four-fifths of the religion of five-sixth of the population was, in practice, now the primitive pagan worship of the deified community concealed under the fine name of patriotism. pg 112 - 119, 1952, Toynbee Toynbee.txt