A Year of Glory
June 1862 - June 1863
The Campaign of Second Manassas
Following the Seven Day's Battles, McClellan's Army, camped on the
James River only 20 miles from Richmond, remained a threat to the
Confederate capital. Nevertheless, in mid-July, Lee reorganized his
army into two commands under Jackson and Longstreet and embarked on a
series of daring moves that took the war north, back to the doorstep
of Washington. Counting on McClellan's continuing lethargy, Lee first
sent Jackson northward to block the advance of the Federal army from
that quarter. Then he turned his back on McClellan entirely and
launched an offensive with all his forces where the Federals least
expected it, initiating a campaign that for a time reversed the tide
of the war.
The Union army that Lee was out to attack was the newly formed Army of
Virginia, made up of three corps stationed around Washington and the
Shenandoah Valley. Lincoln, hoping to go on the offensive following
McClellan's failure on the Peninsula, combined the
forces of Irvin McDowell, Nathaniel Banks, and Franz Sigel, each of
whom had been defeated by Stonewall Jackson in his famed Valley
campaign, under the leadership of Major General John Pope.
Pope, as commander of the Union Army of the Mississippi, had orchestrated
the capture of Island Number Ten and Corinth, Mississippi. His new
mission would be to protect Washington and the upper Shenandoah, and,
if possible, sever Lee's connections with the valley.
Lee found himself faced with a dilemma. McClellan's army was still
camped on the James River, threatening the Rebel capital. With the
formation of the the new Federal army, Lee could easily be trapped
between the two. But he also believed that McClellan wouldn't
advance without sizable reinforcement, and decided to sieze the
initiative. He began by sending Jackson's
command to Gordonsville via the Virginia Central Railroad in mid-July.
Lincoln also had his eyes on Gordonsville. He recognized the strategic
importance of the crossroads of the Virginia Central Railroad, Richmond's
connection with the Shenandoah Valley, and the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad. By moving on Gordonsville and Charlottesville, he hoped Pope
would draw pressure off McClellan and back onto Richmond.
Pope initially concentrated his army on a line from Fredericksburg to
Culpeper Court-House and Sperryville. Directing operations from
Washington, on July 17, he ordered Brigadier General John P. Hatch to
advance his cavalry and destroy the railroad around Gordonsville and in
the direction of Charlottesville. Hatch, dragging along his infantry
and artillery, got to Madison Court-House, some fifteen miles from his
goal, before he realized that Ewell had moved faster, and arrived at
Gordonsville ahead of him. Hatch declined to fight and retreated to
Sperryville.
Pope next ordered cavalry commander Judson Kilpatrick to strike the
Virginia Central Railroad near Beaver Dam Station, on July 19. In
addition to burning the depot and tearing up the track, the regiment
captured a young Confederate captain whom they later released. The
captain, one John Singleton Mosby, would later gain great notoriety
as the South's most feared partisan fighter.
The raid's minor success spurred a series of reconnaissance operations
on July 21, 22, and 24. Hatch was again ordered to strike the Virginia
Central Railroad and failed. He was relieved of command and replaced
by General John Buford, who would become the hero of the first day at
Gettysburg, in July, 1863. Although inconsequential, the cavalry
actions did prove to Pope that Jackson indeed faced him with an
estimated 30,000 troops.
As Pope watched Jackson, Lee watched McClellan. As July dragged on,
and "Little Mac" did nothing, Lee sent more troops after Jackson.
With the arrival of A.P. Hill's division on July 29, Jackson now felt
ready to move against Pope. Coincidentally, on the 29th, Pope left
Washington, to join his army in the field.
Pope, on August 6, ordered the army to concentrate on Culpeper. He
intended to move against Jackson's left flank, and cut the railroad
between Gordonsville and Charlottesville. He maintained a steady
correspondence with Major General Henry W. Halleck, who had arrived in
Washington in late July, to become General-in-Chief of all U.S. armies.
Halleck wanted Pope to proceed with caution. Pope wanted McClellan to
abandon the Peninsula and combine with his Army of Virginia. Halleck
agreed, and on August 4, ordered the Army of the Potomac north, advising
Pope that the move would be a slow, cumbersome one.
Jackson was apprised of Pope's advance on Culpeper on August 7, also
learning that, of Pope's three corps, only Bank's had arrived. Jackson
moved, and after a slow day of marching on the 8th, arrived within eight
miles of Culpeper, at Cedar Mountain, on the 9th. Banks, although
unsupported and outnumbered, struck first. He was initially successful
and for two hours drove Jackson's troops back, but then the attack faltered,
and the tide turned. Jackson counterattacked and drove Banks from the
field.
Late in the day, and early on the 10th, the remainder of Pope's army
arrived, evening the contest. Jackson, realizing he could do no more
damage for the time being, ordered a retreat back across the Rapidan.
In their discussions of the battle, Pope and Halleck frequently
mentioned the Union Army's options should there be a need to retreat.
The Rebels had the initiative and weren't about to give it up.
Lee was ready for the next step on August 13, when he ordered
Longstreet's 28,000 man corps to join up with Jackson. Hood's division
would follow close behind, as would Stuart, and the cavalry. Lee
himself, left Richmond on the 15th to join the army at Gordonsville.
From here on, Longstreet would command the army's "Right Wing" of five
divisions totalling 30,000 men, while Jackson commanded the "Left Wing"
of three divisions with 24,000 men.
The Battle of Second Manassas
With the consolidation of his army complete following Cedar Mountain,
General Lee wanted to strike General John Pope's Army of Virginia
quickly. Lee and Jackson believed that Pope, currently camped between
the Rapidan to the south and the Rappahannock to the north, could be
trapped by a flank attack to Pope's left. Wanting to attack on August
16th, Lee quickly realized that all the pieces were not in place,
particularly Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry brigade, currently 30 miles to the
south. He decided, therefore, to move the army to the Rapidan on the
16th and 17th, then cross and attack on the 18th.
Unfortunately for Lee, his orders, through Stuart, to Fitzhugh Lee on
the plan of battle, were unclear as to the timing of the attack. Lee's
cavalry brigade was slow in reaching the Rapidan from it's previous
location over thirty miles away. Needed to screen the army's movement,
the cavalry's late arrival forced General Lee once again to delay the
attack, this time to the the 20th.
The delays were costly. Since Cedar Mountain, Pope and Halleck had
become overly cautious. Late on the 18th, a Union cavalry patrol,
on a reconnaissance across the Rapidan, came upon General Stuart's aide
with a satchel full of orders for Fitzhugh Lee. Upon seeing the
correspondence, which outlined Lee's plan of attack, Pope had enough.
He immediately put the Federal army in motion north across the
Rappahannock.
Over the next week, both armies wrestled for position. Lee began to
formulate his newest plan. He began by sending Stuart, with the Rebel
cavalry, to raid the Federal supply depot at Manassas Junction. He
then divided his army and sent Jackson off to the northwest to go
through Thoroughfare Gap and approach Pope from behind. Pope, thinking
that Jackson was on his way to the Shenandoah Valley, began to
concentrate on Longstreet and devise a way to turn the Rebel flank.
Jackson arrived at the Orange and Alexandria railroad, seven miles from
Manassas Junction, late on the 26th. His men feasted on the Union
supplies Stuart had captured, then prepared for the approaching battle.
Pope, finally realizing what had happened to Jackson, turned the army
around and also headed north. Lee and Longstreet then marched off in
Jackson's direction, intending to join up with him as quickly as possible.
Pope arrived at Manassas Junction on the 28th and searched in vain for
Jackson, who had moved further north. That evening, as Brigadier
General King's Federal division marched eastward down the Warrenton
Turnpike, Jackson attacked John Gibbon's brigade, near Brawner's Farm.
Despite losing nearly 1,300 men, Jackson managed to draw Pope's full
attention. Pope, thinking he had Jackson right where he
wanted him, ordered a Federal attack on his position the next day.
The Federal attack begank at dawn on the 29th. Jackson was established
along a railroad embankment which provided excellent protection
against the Union's piecemeal assault. Additionally, Fitz John Porter,
who had finally arrived from the Peninsula, was fooled by Stuart's
cavalry into thinking that a massive Rebel attack was about to overwhelm
him, and failed to charge Jackson's right flank. This allowed Longstreet
to slip into position on Pope's left and await his opportunity.
The Federal attacks on Jackson's position continued throughout the day.
As night fell, Pope believed he had gotten the better of the Rebels,
and determined to finish them off the next day. Early on the 30th, mistaking
Confederate realignments for a general retreat, and still unaware of
Longstreet's presence, Pope ordered a pursuit of Jackson's army.
Jackson's men, now low on ammunition, hung on as
long as possible, until Lee, realizing that Pope was fully committed to
the attack, directed Longstreet's artillery to open on the Federal left
flank. When the Union attack began to waver, Longstreet attacked.
Jackson's exhausted men moved forward as well and drove Pope's army
back across the old First Manassas battlefield.
Saving the Federals from complete disaster were brigades from the
divisions of Reynolds, Sykes, Reno, and Schurz, who stubbornly held the Manassas-
Sudley Road, then the slopes of Henry House Hill, preventing the
Confederate right from reaching the Warrenton turnpike and cutting the
Federal line of withdrawal. As dusk fell, the Confederate attack ended,
and Pope's army made an orderly retreat. By midnight, all but a few
stragglers were across Bull Run and trudging toward Centreville and
Washington.
As Pope fell back on Centreville, he was reinforced by more of
McClellan's troops arriving form the Peninsula. Some fighting
occurred at Chantilly on September 1, but as the Union army fell back
on the Washington defenses, the battle and the campaign came to an end.
As the campaign ended, so ended the short career of John Pope as Commander of the Army of Virginia. Lincoln, realizing he needed to bring in someone who could restore confidence and organization to the army, turned again to George McClellan. Initially given the task of organizing the defenses of Washington, McClellan soon found himself again the commander of the Army of the Potomac. Despite his failure on the Peninsula, the army loved him, and very soon he was leading them into battle in the Sharpsburg (Antietam) Campaign.
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