Final paper (without footnotes) for Political Liberalism, Prof. B. Douglass, Georgetown University, Fall 1997
IV. David Gauthier, disciple of Hobbes
Why agree to Morals by Agreement?
IV. David Gauthier,
disciple of Hobbes A prime example of the liberalism that seeks to
ground itself in some conception of essence inherent in man is that of
David Gauthier, who was a faithful disciple of Hobbes. We shall briefly
outline his argument for universalist application of (his) liberal thought
here, along with an outline of criticism. Gauthier's example is just one
representing the old flaws of liberalism in regard to the claim to universality,
and will contrast and illuminate the new mistakes Richard Rorty makes when
trying to avoid some of the old ones of Gauthier.
Gauthier's essence of man is,
in good liberal tradition, his rationality. Based on a thin conception
of the individual as the rational economic man, called "constrained maximizer",
Gauthier employs a contractarian approach to give "morality a rational
basis (so) that we can affect its affective hold." In other words: Gauthier
acknowledges affections and emotions in man, and the rational construct
of morals by agreement is to serve the affective hold of morality. But
affections don't play a role in the conceptualization of the individual.
It remains, apart from it's rational faculty, an unencumbered being.
A final image of the "liberal individual" of the concluding chapters shows
that Gauthier’s imagination can stretch beyond the algorithms that dominate
the middle chapters of his book. But the theory that he has developed
subordinates human affections to maximizing one’s own utilities. Ultimately,
the image of the liberal individual is not an ingredient of Gauthier’s
cake, but the icing to make it look better. As for universalism,
Gauthier claims that liberal thought is superior because it produces
a practice, a "way of life (that is) more advanced than another" in four
respects: a) density of population; b) duration of life; c) material well-being;
and d) "most important, is breadth of opportunity."
In other words: with the possible exception of b), it is more advanced
to live in New York City than in Yuma, Arizona. How are these criteria
defended? "We appeal to what seem plain facts about human preferences",
such as the wish for reproduction, longer duration of life, "a desire for
material well-being (though primarily manifested among those who believe
it possible)", and "the desire for a broad range of vocational and avocational
opportunities" (again, "manifested primarily by persons who are socialized
to conceive themselves as free, autonomous individuals, and not as born
to play some pre-determined role" ). In other words: the "plain facts about
human preferences reflect the updated version of Hobbes self-preserving
man with a taste for material well-being, now with the sophistication of
the middle-class concert-season ticket holder. These "few factual but hardly
controversial assumptions about human preferences" are the essence of the
liberal individual of the last chapter, the essence of the constrained
maximizer with Gauthier’s book on the shelf. Based on that essence and
"on the basis of our theory" (a rhetorical trick: Gauthier’s theory builds
on the idea of just such an essence), Gauthier claims universal superiority
of his way of life.
Why agree to Morals by Agreement? How can he support his claim?
Is it empirically true? Has is such convincing appeal to others that they
should necessarily accept it? Is it some ideal we would feel compelled
to subscribe to? Being a theory that begs for agreement already in it's
name, and universal in claim, it would necessarily have to be agreeable
to non-liberals if it is to uphold it’s own standards. To enforce it would
betray both the contractarian model, and the liberal idea of tolerance.
- However, liberal practice may indeed prove superior in that it replants
other ways of life, forces them out of existence, but not necessarily "justifiable"
so . And Gauthier does not feel sorry about it. Citing the example of Eve
planting a garden, Gauthier himself explains how market mechanisms, once
started, will draw everything else into their dynamics. So may the
Western world benefit the rest of the world with capitalism and it’s structural
impact on ways of life. But an empirical, descriptive observation can hardly
be taken as a normative prescription. - Are it, then, the facts about human
preferences that are perceived as true, and therefore appealing? No - as
we have said, these facts are acceptable only when Gauthier’s assumption
about the essence of man is shared. - What else may be so appealing about
Gauthier’s ideas?
Maybe his contractarian model. After all, since it is based on a thin
conception of the person that in essence is agreeable to a large number
of people, it is up for choice to join. Rational, not-pressured choice,
to contractarians, privileges liberal society "as it’s unique outcome".
But "it is in virtue of the moral emptiness of mere agreement that all
contractarian models seek to ground agreement in a conception of a person
whose nature or interests are affirmed or fulfilled by the terms of that
contract." So, the contract itself, as an abstract situation, has
no moral force - it all turns back again on the conception of the person
that is employed. With which we well might not agree - see above.
Universal claims pervade life despite non-agreement.
Why accept the outcome of Gauthier as a non-liberal? There is no answer
for non-liberals, who are very unlikely to accept his liberal premises
of the outcome - the liberal individual. Persons who are not disposed to
engage in utility-maximizing behavior only will not accept Gauthier’s prescription,
either. Why should "metaphysical men", respected citizen such as Martin
Buber or Abraham Joshua Heschel, ever accept Gauthier? They would not.
- And how does Gauthier pass the human-rights test? Will he insist on human
rights? He will, on one hand - because ideally, the liberal individual
is supposed to cooperate only with those partners who have proven themselves
not to take advantage of others. However, in practice, human rights are
uninteresting for the liberal individual. In real life, dealing with a
human-rights violating government such as in China, a situation is much
more likely in which the Chinese trading official has a good record of
reliability, while others are responsible for the human rights violations.
If a deal with Mr. Peng-Li from the Economic ministry is good, why not
make it?
So Gauthier’s universal aim may not even be accepted by those who think
of themselves as liberal human rights activists. But, and that is the critique
I make of both Gauthier and Rorty, the universal claim and force of their
argument makes it impossible to stay away from it. Gauthier’s morals derived
by agreement pervade the private life of liberal individuals, as well as
of non-liberal individuals whose chosen way of life is supplanted by Gauthier’s
"superior" one. Gauthier forces the outcome of his thin conception of the
person down their throats - even though they might not want it, because
they conceive of themselves as authentic beings in holding more attributes
than Gauthier’s economic man or it’s luxury version, the liberal individual.
Such a political life based on a thin conception ultimately disenchants
man from public political life.
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