Final paper (without footnotes) for Political Liberalism, Prof. B. Douglass, Georgetown University, Fall 1997

General Contents

VI. Final Thoughts
The universal dictate of freedom
Bibliography
 
 

VI. Final Thoughts In estimating both Gauthier and Rorty, I believe both have not recognized that the perception of human beings as unencumbered selves was a politically useful tool, and provided well for the establishment of a just political order only: I believe the universalist claims that gave political liberalism much of its force cannot be extended to people who either have a perception of themselves that is different from the necessarily thin conception underlying Enlightenment’s universal claims (such as other peoples), or who feel disenchanted today by their treatment of political liberalism that pervades their identities (such as disenchanted citizens at home). These particular identities are thicker than the liberal individual, but concur with it. What may then be needed is a new definition of the public and the political realm. Liberalism needs to confront that question.

It was only the idea of the Enlightenment that in order to be authentic, man had to be free from all constraints, and the mistake of the Enlightenment to assume a "thin and unencumbered conceptualization of the individual" could do justice to the whole of man. Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and the other existentialist movements all focused on what man was besides a thin subject to liberal thought and practice for political purposes. When, out of enthusiasm for the development of a "broader comprehensive philosophy" (Rorty), or "a rational grip on morality", combined with a few casual "assumptions about human preferences" (Gauthier), or a more "neutral language", Enlightenment dismissed more and more of traditional religion and metaphysics, or, as Gray calls it, "local and traditional forms of moral and social knowledge" , man became gradually more disenchanted. Man was treated according to how he was pre-supposed to behave according to the enlightened perception of history as a gradual convergence of values towards the ultimate rationalistic universal civilization. Enlightenment's liberal claims protruded further into the depth of human authentic life than it's thin conception of it should have carried it, and at least today, it needs to get out of again. Existentialism was the private attempt to re-enchant, to be more authentic in one's own life aside from the public liberal vocabulary . Today, what I think we need to learn is to find ways to reintroduce enchantment in public - I am cautious about saying "political" - life without falling prey to parochialism and intolerance. I suggest one way that is done is the strengthening of local identities and man as a relevant public actor again, so that man finds perspectives, as well as the "other" in a "semi-political", public realm. It think it is a Tocquevillian approach, with a concern for practice more than for abstract theory, that needs redefinition for our time. So much about the domestic challenge of liberal universalism pervading our own lives.

The universal dictate of freedom But if the universal dictate of freedom continues to pervade our private lives the way Gauthier justifies it as "no loss for individuals", and Rorty thinks it’s charming - namely, that the agenda of today asks for de-divinization and self-creation -, people are likely to become more disenchanted with liberalism - a tendency that may even endanger political liberalism and it’s institutions. Disenchantment, I hold, cannot be countered the way Rorty recommends finding delight in our common humanity - by reading nice books on Negroes and watching Bosnian mothers on TV. One of Rorty’s biggest losses is his denouncement of tradition, religion, and mystery. As in terms of understanding and seeing the other and his common humanity, I have found no book more compelling than I and Thou by Martin Buber. And it’s appeal lay exactly in it’s underlying mystical notion.
Though I have pointed to the dangers when human beings realize that there may be no more foundations for liberal thought, I do not believe the recognition of that to be a fast-spreading virus. Universalism may be an intellectual or philosophical dead-end for liberalism, but the liberal practice in most countries is not likely to be affected by it too soon in any dramatic way . The disenchantment with politics about it’s liberally consequential non-recognition of parochial identities is held in check by pragmatic, undogmatic political moves.  -
In regard to foreign policy, though, the West needs to become a little more sensitive as to why others refuse human rights. It may not always be because their vocabulary has no place for such conceptions as human rights - often it is just for economical reasons. But we need to find new ways to justify human rights claims. The reasons are likely to be political ones more so than philosophical ones - Rorty has thoroughly and intellectually convincingly disarmed liberal thought. Universal claims, then, may we only make by our living example of an authentic, or enchanted, human life and practice in liberal societies.
 
 

Bibliography
 

· Barber, Benjamin R.: Jihad vs. McWorld, New York 1996
 
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· Gauthier, David: Morals by Agreement, Oxford University Press 1986
 
· Gohl, Christopher: "David Gauthier: Juggling with five different conceptions of the person", Georgetown, 1997
· Gohl, Christopher: "The Civil Rights Movement and it's Effect on the American Political System", Tuebingen, Germany 1997
· Gohl, Christopher: Literature: The Recognition of a Common Humanity - Final Hypertext Project for American Literary Traditions, http://www.georgetown.edu/users/gohlc/final2.htm
 
· Gray, John: Liberalism: Essays in Political Philosophy, 1989, p. 250
· Gray, John: Post-liberalism - Studies in Political Thought, New York 1993
· Gray, John: Enlightenment's Wake - politics and culture at the close of the modern age, New York, 1997
 
· Heinimann, David: Richard Rorty's Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity: False Prophet or Second Becoming? http://elias.ens.fr/Surfaces/vol2/heiniman.html
 
· Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan, London, 17th century
 
· Nietzsche, Friedrich, On the Genealogy of Morals, New York 1967
 
· Sandel, Michael J.: Political Theory, Vol 12, No1, February 1984, p. 81-96
 
· Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, p.xxviii,
 
· Ripstein, Arthur: Gauthier’s Liberal Individual, in: Dialogue: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XXVIII, 1989, p. 63-76
 
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