Snake River Dam Breachings
Patrick Mooney
English C77
November 16, 1999
The federal government is considering mandating the breaching of four dams on the Snake River to protect several endangered sub-species of salmon. A decision may come as early as the end of this year. The Clinton administration has already ordered the breaching of one dam, the privately-owned Edwards Dam in August, Maine, and environmental advocacy groups such as the Washington, D.C. American Rivers Inc. are pushing for more dam demolitions in the coming years (Angelo 1999).
At the heart of the problem are three complex issues that, some argue, are incompatible with the continued operation of four hydroelectric dams on the lower Snake River: the survival of the adult salmon that travel up the Snake River to breed and the young salmon, or smolts, that travel down the Snake after hatching; the fishing rights granted to Native Americans in treaties dating back to the earliest part of the Pacific Northwest states' membership in the United States; and the Idaho farmers' desire for flood water from the Snake, upon which they depend to irrigate their crops.
Snake River salmon populations have declined dramatically since the dams were originally installed. All salmon that spawn on the Snake River must travel past these four lower dams which were constructed and are operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and these dams seriously impede the ability of the salmon to migrate both upstream and downstream. In 1950, for instance, about 4,500 sockeye salmon managed to get past the Lower Granite Dam on the Snake River. In 1990, only two sockeye salmon managed to climb over the fish ladders on this dam (Economist 1990). The dams have also destroyed previously existing spawning grounds for the salmon. Blumm et al. (1998) assert that "the principal factor leading to the decline and subsequent listing of the runs under the protection of ... ESA ... was the construction and operation of these dams."
The currently existing methods of attempting to reduce salmon mortality during migration -- including barging or trucking the salmon around the dams and allowing water to carry salmon safely over the dams, rather than through it -- have proven so ineffective that five sub-species of salmon on the Columbia River and its tributary, the Snake, were proposed as endangered species in 1990. Two were listed by 1993. Because of this, several groups have pressured the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, and other government organizations to demolish the lower Snake River dams. These groups include environmental advocacy groups such as Oregon Trout as well as the Nez Perce, Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Yakama Native American reservation. Because the Edwards Dam breaching went "exactly as planned," according to foreman Louis Estes of H.E. Sargent Inc., a contractor involved with the de-installation, the prospects for other dam breachings nationwide look good.
Native American tribes have a stake in the way that the Snake River is managed because of fishing rights granted to the tribes in treaties dating back as far as 1855 and 1856 (Blumm et al. 1998). Because the ability of the tribes to exercise their fishing rights depends upon the continued existence of the fish, the tribes are legally viewed as co-managers of the salmon resources. The various Native American tribes involved have participated vocally in the political process, sometimes offering legal challenges and frequently releasing or collaborating in the release of fish and river management plans, such as the Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi Wa-Kish-Wit ("Spirit of the Salmon") plan released by the treaty fishing tribes of the Columbia River basin in 1995, which advocated the permanent lowering of reservoir waters instead of artificial transportation of fish (Blumm et al. 1998).
Farmers in the area near the Snake and Columbia Rivers have an interest in the management of these two rivers because they are a source of irrigation water for three million acres of farmland (Economist 1990). Electric companies, of course, are interested in protecting the value of the investment they have made in the hydroelectric dams on the rivers, and residents of the states have an interest in continuing to receive that electricity. An unsigned 1990 article in The Economist states that half of the electricity in the vincinity of these rivers is generated by the dams on these rivers. Some plans, such as reducing the level of water in reservoirs without removing the dams, could affect the multi-billion-dollar shipping industry that uses the river as a medium of transportation. Recreational fishers and the tourism industry could also be affected in various ways, for better or for worse, by some of proposed plans. All of these interest groups claim rights to the water, the fish, or the electric power generated by the dams. Because of the large number and diverse interests of these groups, and because of the complex way that their interests affect one another, this issue has aroused intense controversy in political debate.
Dam breachings are economically expensive projects, and there is very little public money available. American Rivers' dam programs associate, Elizabeth Maclin, advises that "where available, private funds [for dam removal] should be used." The demolition of Edwards Dam cost $2.4 million (Angelo 1999). This cost is based only the physical cost of removing the dam, and does not take into account revenues that may be lost due to the inability to generate hydroelectric power or that might be lost for other reasons.
The additional costs that may accrue due to lost revenues have led other commentators to propose solutions to the problems faced by the fish on the rivers other than removing the dams or reducing the level of water stored. Soast and King (1993) give a summary of several of these, such as installation of improved screens that would be more efficient at diverting fish from turbines than are current models. The cost to install 70 of these screens and a one-mile artificial bypass at the Dalles Dam in eastern Oregon was estimated at $121.5 million. Temporary annual drawdowns during the salmon migration seasons are another possibility; annual cost estimates range from $1.3 to $4.9 billion, depending on the exact plan. The "most drastic" of the plans reported on by Soast and King involves a system of huge gates that would allow salmon to swim freely around four of the dams, which would cost about $5 billion and require that the dams be closed for a total of ten months during the year. According to Hazra Northwest Inc., a Portland, Oregon company hired by the Northwest Power Planning Council to independently review the plan, this plan is essentially unworkable because the amount of time the water level would be lowered precludes any possibility of refilling the dam to an effective capacity, and that "it is probably cheaper to simply breach the projects and abandon any attempt at refilling" (King 1994).
Some projects that were proposed in the past have now been abandoned as quixotic because they are too expensive or carry a concern of negative biological side effects. One of these is a 350-mile pipeline that had been proposed by the Army Corps of Engineers to avoid the necessity of drawdowns. The Corps now says, however, that the $6.1 billion price tag is too high and that other biological concerns make this an unrealistic project.
A third class of options involves continuing on the course of action currently taken by the Corps of Engineers, a policy dubbed "spread the risk," a phrase meaning that a variety of salmon-protection measures -- such as barging and allowing water to overflow the dam and carry salmon safely past turbines -- are used in hopes that, should one of the methods prove ineffective or fall prey to unforeseen circumstances, others will provide adequate protection for at least some of the fish. The problem with this approach is that it does not seem to have been effective in the past -- current management techniques have led to the listing of some sub-species of salmon as endangered. Ray (1996) argues that the spills utilized by the Corps are not effective because they are not implemented properly -- the times when spills are made do not coincide with the times the fish need to get past the dams -- and because smolts go through turbines despite protective measures. He says that 5.5 million of the 8.3 million juvenile spring or summer Chinook salmon that arrived at Lower Granite dam in 1995 passed through at least one set of turbines by the time the Snake River emptied into the Columbia, and that only 1.6 million of those 8.3 million smolts survived the trip to the larger river. Approximately six million Chinook smelt were barged that year. "There is no doubt that barging does not work," he says. "There is no uncertainty associated with barging, other than why we should continue doing it."
Finally, some commentators assert that the overall benefits of breaching the dams or permanently reducing the level of water stored outweigh the overall costs. Blumm et al. (1998), citing various economic analyses, claim that "the overall benefits of drawdowns would substantially outweigh their costs, especially for the state of Idaho." And some involved parties, such as the fishing tribes of the Columbia basin, argue for drawdowns to natural levels based on the fact that this solution most closely emulates natural conditions and, therefore, is best for the species that have adapted to live in these ecosystems (Blumm et al. 1998; King 1994). Ray (1996) argues for this same approach, stating that "the salmon need ... river conditions that approximate the conditions under which the fish evolved."
One aspect of the debate that everyone seems to agree on is that the dams have an enormous impact on the river ecosystems and especially on the fish that migrate up and down the rivers. Charles (1996) admits that some details of river management are still uncertain, but asserts that "we do know that the critical limiting factor in the survival of Snake River salmon and steelhead is the operation of the federal hydropower system. There is no doubt whatsoever about it." The questions that seems to be a matter of debate are what we should do about the problems that the hydroelectric dams cause for the fish and how we should balance the needs of the salmon against the aesthetic value of the rivers and the revenue generated by the hydroelectric dams and by other industries (tourism, transportation, and agriculture) that depend on the state of the river.
Ray (1996) says that the "overwhelming public opinion in the Northwest" is consistent with Idaho Rivers United's goal for the management of steelhead and salmon, which is "the restoration of healthy, self-sustaining, harvestable populations of these fish in Idaho." It seems likely that the administrative decision expected later this year will attempt to balance all of the competing economic interests with the needs of the salmon.
Related Readings
Angelo, Richard. 1999. Breaching of Edwards Dam Unleashes Removal Controversy. Engineering News-Record 243: 13.
Blumm, Michael C., et al. 1998. Saving Snake River water and salmon simultaneously: the biological, economic, and legal case for breaching the lower Snake River dams, lowering John Day Reservoir, and restoring natural river flows. Environmental Law 28: 997.
King, Harriet. 1994. Fish becoming more costly. Engineering News-Record 232: 18-19.
Ray, Charles. 1996. 1995 river operations under the Endangered Species Act: continuing the salmon slaughter. (The Second Annual 'Who Runs the River?' Colloquium). Environmental Law 26: 675-680.
Salmon Trouble. 1990. The Economist 317: 29.
Soast, Allen and Harriet King. 1993. Dam owners have to coddle fish. Engineering News-Record 231: 22-25.
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