Book V
1
'BEGINNING' means (1)
that part of a thing from which one would start first, e.g a line or a
road has a beginning in either of the contrary directions. (2) That from
which each thing would best be originated, e.g. even in learning we must
sometimes begin not from the first point and the beginning of the
subject, but from the point from which we should learn most easily. (4)
That from which, as an immanent part, a thing first comes to be, e,g, as
the keel of a ship and the foundation of a house, while in animals some
suppose the heart, others the brain, others some other part, to be of
this nature.
(4) That from which, not as an immanent part, a thing first comes to be,
and from which the movement or the change naturally first begins, as a
child comes from its father and its mother, and a fight from abusive
language. (5) That at whose will that which is moved is moved and that
which changes changes, e.g. the magistracies in cities, and oligarchies
and monarchies and tyrannies, are called arhchai, and so are the arts,
and of these especially the architectonic arts.
(6) That from which a thing can first be known,-this also is called the
beginning of the thing, e.g. the hypotheses are the beginnings of
demonstrations. (Causes are spoken of in an equal number of senses; for
all causes are beginnings.) It is common, then, to all beginnings to be
the first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known;
but of these some are immanent in the thing and others are outside.
Hence the nature of a thing is a beginning, and so is the element of a
thing, and thought and will, and essence, and the final cause-for the
good and the beautiful are the beginning both of the knowledge and of
the movement of many things.
2
'Cause' means (1) that
from which, as immanent material, a thing comes into being, e.g. the
bronze is the cause of the statue and the silver of the saucer, and so
are the classes which include these. (2) The form or pattern, i.e. the
definition of the essence, and the classes which include this (e.g. the
ratio 2:1 and number in general are causes of the octave), and the parts
included in the definition. (3) That from which the change or the
resting from change first begins; e.g. the adviser is a cause of the
action, and the father a cause of the child, and in general the maker a
cause of the thing made and the change-producing of the changing. (4)
The end, i.e. that for the sake of which a thing is; e.g. health is the
cause of walking. For 'Why does one walk?' we say; 'that one may be
healthy'; and in speaking thus we think we have given the cause. The
same is true of all the means that intervene before the end, when
something else has put the process in motion, as e.g. thinning or
purging or drugs or instruments intervene before health is reached; for
all these are for the sake of the end, though they differ from one
another in that some are instruments and others are actions.
These, then, are practically all the senses in which
causes are spoken of, and as they are spoken of in several senses it
follows both that there are several causes of the same thing, and in no
accidental sense (e.g. both the art of sculpture and the bronze are
causes of the statue not in respect of anything else but qua statue;
not, however, in the same way, but the one as matter and the other as
source of the movement), and that things can be causes of one another
(e.g. exercise of good condition, and the latter of exercise; not,
however, in the same way, but the one as end and the other as source of
movement).-Again, the same thing is the cause of contraries; for that
which when present causes a particular thing,
we sometimes charge, when absent, with the contrary, e.g. we impute the
shipwreck to the absence of the steersman, whose presence was the cause
of safety; and both-the presence and the privation-are causes as sources
of movement.
All the causes now mentioned fall under four senses
which are the most obvious. For the letters are the cause of syllables,
and the material is the cause of manufactured things, and fire and earth
and all such things are the causes of bodies, and the parts are causes
of the whole, and the hypotheses are causes of the conclusion, in the
sense that they are that out of which these respectively are made; but
of these some are cause as the substratum (e.g. the parts), others
as the essence (the whole, the synthesis, and the form). The semen, the
physician, the adviser, and in general the agent, are all sources of
change or of rest. The remainder are causes as the end and the good of
the other things; for that for the sake of which other things are tends
to be the best and the end of the other things; let us take it as making
no difference whether we call it good or apparent good.
These, then, are the causes, and this is the number
of their kinds, but the varieties of causes are many in number, though
when summarized these also are comparatively few. Causes are spoken of
in many senses, and even of those which are of the same kind some are
causes in a prior and others in a posterior sense, e.g. both 'the
physician' and 'the professional man' are causes of health, and both
'the ratio 2:1' and 'number' are causes of the octave, and the classes
that include any particular cause are always causes of the particular
effect. Again, there are accidental causes and the classes which include
these; e.g. while in one sense 'the sculptor' causes the statue, in
another sense 'Polyclitus' causes it, because the sculptor happens to be
Polyclitus; and the classes that include the accidental cause are also
causes, e.g. 'man'-or in general 'animal'-is the cause of the statue,
because Polyclitus is a man, and man is an animal. Of accidental causes
also some are more remote or nearer than others, as, for instance, if
'the white' and 'the musical' were called causes of the statue, and not
only 'Polyclitus' or 'man'. But besides all these varieties of causes,
whether proper or accidental, some are called causes as being able to
act, others as acting; e.g. the cause of the house's being built is a
builder, or a builder who is building.-The same variety of language will
be found with regard to the effects of causes; e.g. a thing may be
called the cause of this statue or of a statue or in general of an
image, and of this bronze or of bronze or of matter in general; and
similarly in the case of accidental effects. Again, both accidental and
proper causes may be spoken of in combination; e.g. we may say not 'Polyclitus'
nor 'the sculptor' but 'Polyclitus the sculptor'. Yet all these are but
six in number, while each is spoken of in two ways; for (A) they are
causes either as the individual, or as the genus, or as the accidental,
or as the genus that includes the accidental, and these either as
combined, or as taken simply; and (B) all may be taken as acting or as
having a capacity. But they differ inasmuch as the acting causes, i.e.
the individuals, exist, or do not exist, simultaneously with the things
of which they are causes, e.g. this particular man who is healing, with
this particular man who is recovering health, and this particular
builder with this particular thing that is being built; but the
potential causes are not always in this case; for the house does not
perish at the same time as the builder.
3
'Element' means (1)
the primary component immanent in a thing, and indivisible in kind into
other kinds; e.g. the elements of speech are the parts of which speech
consists and into which it is ultimately divided, while they are no
longer divided into other forms of speech different in kind from them.
If they are divided, their parts are of the same kind, as a part of
water is water (while a part of the syllable is not a syllable).
Similarly those who speak of the elements of bodies mean the things into
which bodies are ultimately divided, while they are no longer divided
into other things differing in kind; and whether the things of this sort
are one or more, they call these elements. The so-called elements of
geometrical proofs, and in general the elements of demonstrations, have
a similar character; for the primary demonstrations, each of which is
implied in many demonstrations, are called elements of demonstrations;
and the primary syllogisms, which have three terms and proceed by means
of one middle, are of this nature.
(2) People also transfer the word 'element' from this
meaning and apply it to that which, being one and small, is useful for
many purposes; for which reason what is small and simple and indivisible
is called an element. Hence come the facts that the most universal
things are elements (because each of them being one and simple is
present in a plurality of things, either in all or in as many as
possible), and that unity and the point are thought by some to be first
principles. Now, since the so-called genera are universal and
indivisible (for there is no definition of them), some say the genera
are elements, and more so than the differentia, because the genus is
more universal; for where the differentia is present, the genus
accompanies it, but where the genus is present, the differentia is not
always so. It is common to all the meanings that the element of each
thing is the first component immanent in each.
4
'Nature' means (1) the
genesis of growing things-the meaning which would be suggested if one
were to pronounce the 'u' in phusis long. (2) That immanent part of a
growing thing, from which its growth first proceeds. (3) The source from
which the primary movement in each natural object is present in it in
virtue of its own essence. Those things are said to grow which derive
increase from something else by contact and either by organic unity, or
by organic adhesion as in the case of embryos. Organic unity differs
from contact; for in the latter case there need not be anything besides
the contact, but in
organic unities there is something identical in both parts, which makes
them grow together instead of merely touching, and be one in respect of
continuity and quantity, though not of quality.-(4) 'Nature' means the
primary material of which any natural object consists or out of which it
is made, which is relatively unshaped and cannot be changed from its own
potency, as e.g. bronze is said to be the nature of a statue and of
bronze utensils, and wood the nature of wooden things; and so in all
other cases; for when a product is made out of these materials, the
first matter is preserved throughout. For it is in this way that people
call the elements of natural objects also their nature, some naming
fire, others earth, others air, others water, others something else of
the sort, and some naming more than one of these, and others all of
them.-(5) 'Nature' means the essence of natural objects, as with those
who say the nature is the primary mode of composition, or as Empedocles
says:-
Nothing that is has a nature,
But only
mixing and parting of the mixed,
And nature
is but a name given them by men.
Hence as regards the things that
are or come to be by nature, though that from which they naturally come
to be or are is already present, we say they have not their nature yet,
unless they have their form or shape. That which comprises both of these
exists by nature, e.g. the animals and their parts; and not only is the
first matter nature (and this in two senses, either the first, counting
from the thing, or the first in general; e.g. in the case of works in
bronze, bronze is first with reference to them, but in general perhaps
water is first, if all things that can be melted are water), but also
the form or essence, which is the end of the process of becoming.-(6) By
an extension of meaning from this sense of 'nature' every essence in
general has come to be called a 'nature', because the nature of a thing
is one kind of essence.
From what has been said, then, it is plain that
nature in the primary and strict sense is the essence of things which
have in themselves, as such, a source of movement; for the matter is
called the nature because it is qualified to receive this, and processes
of becoming and growing are called nature because they are movements
proceeding from this.
And nature in this sense is the source of the movement of natural
objects, being present in them somehow, either potentially or in
complete reality.
5
We call 'necessary'
(1) (a) that without which, as a condition, a thing cannot live; e.g.
breathing and food are necessary for an animal; for it is incapable of
existing without these; (b) the conditions without which good cannot be
or come to be, or without which we cannot get rid or be freed of evil;
e.g. drinking the medicine is necessary in order that we may be cured of
disease, and a man's sailing to Aegina is necessary in order that he may
get his money.-(2) The compulsory and compulsion, i.e. that which
impedes and tends to hinder, contrary to impulse and purpose. For the
compulsory is called necessary (whence the necessary is painful, as
Evenus says: 'For every necessary thing is ever irksome'), and
compulsion is a form of necessity, as Sophocles says: 'But force
necessitates me to this act'. And necessity is held to be something
that cannot be persuaded-and rightly, for it is contrary to the movement
which accords with purpose and with reasoning.-(3) We say that that
which cannot be otherwise is necessarily as it is. And from this sense
of 'necessary' all the others are somehow derived; for a thing is said
to do or suffer what is necessary in the sense of compulsory, only when
it cannot act according to its impulse because of the compelling
forces-which implies that necessity is that because of which a thing
cannot be otherwise; and similarly as regards the conditions of life and
of good; for when in the one case good, in the other life and being, are
not possible without certain conditions, these are necessary, and this
kind of cause is a sort of necessity. Again, demonstration is a
necessary thing because the conclusion cannot be otherwise, if there has
been demonstration in the unqualified sense; and the causes of this
necessity are the first premisses, i.e. the fact that the propositions
from which the syllogism proceeds cannot be otherwise.
Now some things owe their necessity to something
other than themselves; others do not, but are themselves the source of
necessity in other things.
Therefore the necessary in the primary and strict sense is the simple;
for this does not admit of more states than one, so that it cannot even
be in one state and also in another; for if it did it would already be
in more than one. If, then, there are any things that are eternal and
unmovable, nothing compulsory or against their nature attaches to them.
6
'One' means (1) that
which is one by accident, (2) that which is one by its own nature. (1)
Instances of the accidentally one are 'Coriscus and what is musical',
and 'musical Coriscus' (for it is the same thing to say 'Coriscus and
what is musical', and 'musical Coriscus'), and 'what is musical and what
is just', and 'musical Coriscus and just Coriscus'. For all of these are
called one by virtue of an accident, 'what is just and what is musical'
because they are accidents of one substance, 'what is musical and
Coriscus' because the one is an accident of the other; and similarly in
a sense 'musical Coriscus' is one with 'Coriscus' because one of the
parts of the phrase is an accident of the other, i.e. 'musical' is an
accident of Coriscus; and 'musical Coriscus' is one with 'just Coriscus'
because one part of each is an accident of one and the same subject. The
case is similar if the accident is predicated of a genus or of any
universal name, e.g. if one says that man is the same as 'musical man';
for this is either because 'musical' is an accident of man, which is one
substance, or because both are accidents of some individual, e.g.
Coriscus. Both, however, do not belong to him in the same way, but one
presumably as genus and included in his substance, the other as a state
or affection of the substance.
The things, then, that are called one in virtue of an
accident, are called so in this way. (2) Of things that are called one
in virtue of their own nature some (a) are so called because they are
continuous, e.g. a bundle is made one by a band, and pieces of wood are
made one by glue; and a line, even if it is bent, is called one if it is
continuous, as each part of the body is, e.g. the leg or the arm. Of
these themselves, the continuous by nature are more one than the
continuous by art. A thing is called continuous which has by its own
nature one movement and cannot have any other; and the movement is one
when it is indivisible, and it is indivisible in respect of time. Those
things are continuous by their own nature which are one not merely by
contact; for if you put pieces of wood touching one another, you will
not say these are one piece of wood or one body or one continuum of any
other sort. Things, then, that are continuous in any way called one,
even if they admit of being bent, and still more those which cannot be
bent; e.g. the shin or the thigh is more one than the leg, because the
movement of the leg need not be one. And the straight line is more one
than the bent; but that which is bent and has an angle we call both one
and not one, because its movement may be either simultaneous or not
simultaneous; but that of the straight line is always simultaneous, and
no part of it which has magnitude rests while another moves, as in the
bent line.
(b)(i) Things are called one in another sense because
their substratum does not differ in kind; it does not differ in the case
of things whose kind is indivisible to sense. The substratum meant is
either the nearest to, or the farthest from, the final state. For, one
the one hand, wine is said to be one and water is said to be one, qua
indivisible in kind; and, on the other hand, all juices, e.g. oil and
wine, are said to be one, and so are all things that can be melted,
because the ultimate substratum of all is the same; for all of these are
water or air.
(ii) Those things also are called one whose genus is
one though distinguished by opposite differentiae-these too are all
called one because the genus which underlies the differentiae is one
(e.g. horse, man, and dog form a unity, because all are animals), and
indeed in a way similar to that in which the matter is one. These are
sometimes called one in this way, but sometimes it is the higher genus
that is said to be the same (if they are infimae species of their
genus)-the genus above the proximate genera; e.g. the isosceles and the
equilateral are one and the same figure because both are triangles; but
they are not the same triangles.
(c) Two things are called one, when the definition
which states the essence of one is indivisible from another definition
which shows us the other (though in itself every definition is
divisible).
Thus even that which has increased or is diminishing is one, because its
definition is one, as, in the case of plane figures, is the definition
of their form. In general those things the thought of whose essence is
indivisible, and cannot separate them either in time or in place or in
definition, are most of all one, and of these especially those which are
substances.
For in general those things that do not admit of division are called one
in so far as they do not admit of it; e.g. if two things are
indistinguishable qua man, they are one kind of man; if qua animal, one
kind of animal; if qua magnitude, one kind of magnitude.-Now most things
are called one because they either do or have or suffer or are related
to something else that is one, but the things that are primarily called
one are those whose substance is one,-and one either in continuity or in
form or in definition; for we count as more than one either things that
are not continuous, or those whose form is not one, or those
whose definition is not one.
While in a sense we call anything one if it is a
quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e.
unless it has unity of form; e.g. if we saw the parts of a shoe put
together anyhow we should not call them one all the same (unless because
of their continuity); we do this only if they are put together so as to
be a shoe and to have already a certain single form. This is why the
circle is of all lines most truly one, because it is whole and complete.
(3) The essence of what is one is to be some kind of
beginning of number; for the first measure is the beginning, since that
by which we first know each class is the first measure of the class; the
one, then, is the beginning of the knowable regarding each class. But
the one is not the same in all classes. For here it is a quarter-tone,
and there it is the vowel or the consonant; and there is another unit of
weight and another of movement. But everywhere the one is indivisible
either in quantity or in kind. Now that which is indivisible in quantity
is called a unit if it is not divisible in any dimension and is without
position, a point if it is not divisible in any dimension and has
position, a line if it is divisible in one dimension, a plane if in two,
a body if divisible in quantity in all--i.e. in three--dimensions. And,
reversing the order, that which is divisible in two dimensions is a
plane, that which is divisible in one a line, that which is in no way
divisible in quantity is a point or a unit,-that which has not position
a unit, that which has position a point.
Again, some things are one in number, others in
species, others in genus, others by analogy; in number those whose
matter is one, in species those whose definition is one, in genus those
to which the same figure of predication applies, by analogy those which
are related as a third thing is to a fourth. The latter kinds of unity
are always found when the former are; e.g. things that are one in number
are also one in species, while things that are one in species are not
all one in number; but things that are one in species are all one in
genus, while things that are so in genus are not all one in species but
are all one by analogy; while things that are one by analogy are not all
one in genus.
Evidently 'many' will have meanings opposite to those
of 'one'; some things are many because they are not continuous, others
because their matter-either the proximate matter or the ultimate-is
divisible in kind, others because the definitions which state their
essence are more than one.
7
Things are said to
'be' (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their own nature.
(1) In an accidental sense, e.g. we say 'the
righteous doer is musical', and 'the man is musical', and 'the musician
is a man', just as we say 'the musician builds', because the builder
happens to be musical or the musician to be a builder; for here 'one
thing is another' means 'one is an accident of another'. So in the cases
we have mentioned; for when we say 'the man is musical' and 'the
musician is a man', or 'he who is pale is musical' or 'the musician is
pale', the last two mean that both attributes are accidents of the same
thing; the first that the attribute is an accident of that which is,
while 'the musical is a man' means that 'musical' is an accident of a
man. (In this sense, too, the not-pale is said to be, because that of
which it is an accident is.) Thus when one thing is said in an
accidental sense to be another, this is either because both belong
to the same thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute
belongs is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of
which it is itself predicated, itself is.
(2) The kinds of essential being are precisely those
that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of
'being' are just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates
indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity,
others relation, others activity or passivity, others its 'where',
others its 'when', 'being' has a meaning answering to each of these. For
there is no difference between 'the man is recovering' and 'the man
recovers', nor between 'the man is walking or cutting' and 'the man
walks' or 'cuts'; and similarly in all other cases.
(3) Again, 'being' and 'is' mean that a statement is
true, 'not being' that it is not true but falses-and this alike in the
case of
affirmation and of negation; e.g. 'Socrates is musical' means that this
is true, or 'Socrates is not-pale' means that this is true; but 'the
diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side' means that it
is false to say it is.
(4) Again, 'being' and 'that which is' mean that some
of the things we have mentioned 'are' potentially, others in complete
reality. For we say both of that which sees potentially and of that
which sees actually, that it is 'seeing', and both of that which can
actualize its knowledge and of that which is actualizing it, that it
knows, and both of that to which rest is already present and of that
which can rest, that it rests. And similarly in the case of substances;
we say the Hermes is in the stone, and the half of the line is in the
line, and we say of that which is not yet ripe that it is corn. When a
thing is potential and when it is not yet potential must be explained
elsewhere.
8
We call 'substance'
(1) the simple bodies, i.e. earth and fire and water and everything of
the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both
animals and divine beings, and the parts of these. All these are called
substance because they are not predicated of a subject but everything
else is predicated of them.-(2) That which, being present in such things
as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the
soul is of the being of an animal.-(3) The parts which are present in
such things, limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by whose
destruction the whole is destroyed, as the body is by the destruction of
the plane, as some say, and the plane by the destruction of the line;
and in general number is thought by some to be of this nature; for if it
is destroyed, they say, nothing exists, and it limits all things.-(4)
The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the
substance of each thing.
It follows, then, that 'substance' has two senses,
(A) ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else,
and (B) that which, being a 'this', is also separable and of this nature
is the shape or form of each thing.
9
'The same' means (1)
that which is the same in an accidental sense, e.g. 'the pale' and 'the
musical' are the same because they are accidents of the same thing, and
'a man' and 'musical' because the one is an accident of the other; and
'the musical' is 'a man' because it is an accident of the man. (The
complex entity is the same as either of the simple ones and each of
these is the same as it; for both 'the man' and 'the musical' are said
to be the same as 'the musical man', and this the same as they.) This is
why all of these statements are made not universally; for it is not true
to say that every man is the same as 'the musical' (for universal
attributes belong to things in virtue of their own nature, but accidents
do not belong to them in virtue of their own nature); but of the
individuals the statements are made without qualification. For
'Socrates' and 'musical Socrates' are thought to be the same; but
'Socrates' is not predicable of more than one subject, and therefore we
do not say 'every Socrates' as we say 'every man'.
Some things are said to be the same in this sense,
others (2) are the same by their own nature, in as many senses as that
which is one by its own nature is so; for both the things whose matter
is one either in kind or in number, and those whose essence is one, are
said to be the same. Clearly, therefore, sameness is a unity of the
being either of more than one thing or of one thing when it is treated
as more than one, ie. when we say a thing is the same as itself; for we
treat it as two.
Things are called 'other' if either their kinds or
their matters or the definitions of their essence are more than one; and
in
general 'other' has meanings opposite to those of 'the same'.
'Different' is applied (1) to those things which
though other are the same in some respect, only not in number but either
in species or in genus or by analogy; (2) to those whose genus is other,
and to contraries, and to an things that have their otherness in their
essence.
Those things are called 'like' which have the same
attributes in every respect, and those which have more attributes the
same than different, and those whose quality is one; and that which
shares with another thing the greater number or the more important of
the attributes (each of them one of two contraries) in respect of which
things are capable of altering, is like that other thing. The senses of
'unlike' are opposite to those of 'like'.
10
The term 'opposite' is
applied to contradictories, and to contraries, and to relative terms,
and to privation and possession,
and to the extremes from which and into which generation and dissolution
take place; and the attributes that cannot be present at the same time
in that which is receptive of both, are said to be opposed,-either
themselves of their constituents. Grey and whitecolour do not belong at
the same time to the same thing; hence their constituents are opposed.
The term 'contrary' is applied (1) to those
attributes differing in genus which cannot belong at the same time to
the same subject, (2) to the most different of the things in the same
genus, (3) to the most different of the attributes in the same recipient
subject, (4) to the most different of the things that fall under the
same faculty, (5) to the things whose difference is greatest either
absolutely or in genus or in species. The other things that are called
contrary are so called, some because they possess contraries of the
above kind, some because they are receptive of such, some because they
are productive of or susceptible to such, or are producing or suffering
them, or are losses or acquisitions, or possessions or privations, of
such. Since 'one' and 'being' have many senses, the other terms which
are derived from these, and therefore 'same', 'other', and 'contrary',
must correspond, so that they must be different for each category.
The term 'other in species' is applied to things
which being of the same genus are not subordinate the one to the other,
or which being in the same genus have a difference, or which have a
contrariety in their substance; and contraries are other than one
another in species (either all contraries or those which are so called
in the primary sense), and so are those things whose definitions differ
in the infima species of the genus (e.g. man and horse are indivisible
in genus, but their definitions are different), and those which being in
the same substance have a difference. 'The same in species' has the
various meanings opposite to these.
11
The words 'prior' and
'posterior' are applied (1) to some things (on the assumption that there
is a first, i.e. a beginning, in each class) because they are nearer
some beginning determined either absolutely and by nature, or by
reference to something or in some place or by certain people; e.g.
things are prior in place because they are nearer either to some place
determined by nature (e.g. the middle or the last place), or to some
chance object; and that which is farther is posterior. Other things are
prior in time; some by being farther from the present, i.e. in the case
of past events (for the Trojan war is prior to the Persian, because it
is farther from the present), others by being nearer the present, i.e.
in the case of future events (for the Nemean games are prior to the
Pythian, if we treat the present as beginning and first point, because
they are
nearer the present).-Other things are prior in movement; for that which
is nearer the first mover is prior (e.g. the boy is prior to the man);
and the prime mover also is a beginning absolutely.-Others are prior in
power; for that which exceeds in power, i.e. the more powerful, is
prior; and such is that according to whose will the other-i.e. the
posterior-must follow, so that if the prior does not set it in motion
the other does not move, and if it sets it in motion it does move; and
here will is a beginning.-Others are prior in arrangement; these are the
things that are placed at intervals in reference to some one definite
thing according to some rule, e.g. in the chorus the second man is prior
to the third, and in the lyre the second lowest string is prior to the
lowest; for in the one case the leader and in the other the middle
string is the beginning.
These, then, are called prior in this sense, but (2) in
another sense that which is prior for knowledge is treated as also
absolutely prior; of these, the things that are prior in definition do
not coincide with those that are prior in relation to perception.
For in definition universals are prior, in relation to perception
individuals. And in definition also the accident is prior to the
whole, e.g. 'musical' to 'musical man', for the definition cannot exist
as a whole without the part; yet musicalness cannot exist unless there
is some one who is musical.
(3) The attributes of prior things are called prior,
e.g. straightness is prior to smoothness; for one is an attribute of a
line
as such, and the other of a surface.
Some things then are called prior and posterior in
this sense, others (4) in respect of nature and substance, i.e. those
which can be without other things, while the others cannot be without
them,-a distinction which Plato used. (If we consider the various senses
of 'being', firstly the subject is prior, so that substance is prior;
secondly, according as potency or complete reality is taken into
account, different things are prior, for some things are prior in
respect of potency, others in respect of complete reality, e.g. in
potency the half line is prior to the whole line, and the part to the
whole, and the matter to the concrete substance, but in complete reality
these are posterior; for it is only when the whole has been dissolved
that they will exist in complete reality.) In a sense, therefore, all
things that are called prior and posterior are so called with reference
to this fourth sense; for some things can exist without others in
respect of generation, e.g. the whole without the parts, and others in
respect of dissolution, e.g. the part without the whole. And the same is
true in all other cases.
12
'Potency' means (1) a
source of movement or change, which is in another thing than the thing
moved or in the same thing qua other; e.g. the art of building is a
potency which is not in the thing built, while the art of healing, which
is a potency, may be in the man healed, but not in him qua healed.
'Potency' then means the source, in general, of change or movement in
another thing or in the same thing qua other, and also (2) the source of
a thing's being moved by another thing or by itself qua other. For in
virtue of that principle, in virtue of which a patient suffers anything,
we call it 'capable' of suffering; and this we do sometimes if it
suffers anything at all, sometimes not in respect of everything it
suffers, but only if it suffers a change for the better--(3) The
capacity of performing this well or according to intention; for
sometimes we say of those who merely can walk or speak but not well or
not as they intend, that they cannot speak or walk. So too (4) in the
case of passivity--(5) The states in virtue of which things are
absolutely impassive or unchangeable, or not easily changed for the
worse, are called
potencies; for things are broken and crushed and bent and in general
destroyed not by having a potency but by not having one and by lacking
something, and things are impassive with respect to such processes if
they are scarcely and slightly affected by them, because of a 'potency'
and because they 'can' do something and are in some positive state.
'Potency' having this variety of meanings, so too the
'potent' or 'capable' in one sense will mean that which can begin a
movement (or a change in general, for even that which can bring things
to rest is a 'potent' thing) in another thing or in itself qua other;
and in one sense that over which something else has such a potency; and
in one sense that which has a potency of changing into something,
whether for the worse or for the better (for even that which perishes is
thought to be 'capable' of perishing, for it would not have perished if
it had not been capable of it; but, as a matter of fact, it has a
certain disposition and cause and principle which fits it to suffer
this; sometimes it is thought to be of this sort because it has
something, sometimes because it is deprived of something; but if
privation is in a sense 'having' or 'habit', everything will be capable
by having something, so that things are capable both by having a
positive habit and principle, and by having the privation of this,
if it is possible to have a privation; and if privation is not in a
sense 'habit', 'capable' is used in two distinct senses); and a
thing is capable in another sense because neither any other thing, nor
itself qua other, has a potency or principle which can destroy it.
Again, all of these are capable either merely because the thing might
chance to happen or not to happen, or because it might do so well. This
sort of potency is found even in lifeless things, e.g. in instruments;
for we say one lyre can speak, and another cannot speak at all, if it
has not a good tone.
Incapacity is privation of capacity-i.e. of such a
principle as has been described either in general or in the case of
something that would naturally have the capacity, or even at the time
when it would naturally already have it; for the senses in which we
should call a boy and a man and a eunuch 'incapable of begetting' are
distinct.-Again, to either kind of capacity there is an opposite
incapacity-both to that which only can produce movement and to that
which can produce it well.
Some things, then, are called adunata in virtue of
this kind of incapacity, while others are so in another sense; i.e. both
dunaton and adunaton are used as follows. The impossible is that of
which the contrary is of necessity true, e.g. that the diagonal of a
square is commensurate with the side is impossible, because such a
statement is a falsity of which the contrary is not only true but also
necessary; that it is commensurate, then, is not only false but also of
necessity false.
The contrary of this, the possible, is found when it is not necessary
that the contrary is false, e.g. that a man should be seated is
possible; for that he is not seated is not of necessity false. The
possible, then, in one sense, as has been said,
means that which is not of necessity false; in one, that which is true;
in one, that which may be true.-A 'potency' or 'power' in
geometry is so called by a change of meaning.-These senses of 'capable'
or 'possible' involve no reference to potency. But the senses which
involve a reference to potency all refer to the primary kind of potency;
and this is a source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua
other. For other things are called 'capable', some because something
else has such a potency over them, some because it has not, some because
it has it in a particular way.
The same is true of the things that are incapable. Therefore the proper
definition of the primary kind of potency will be 'a source of change in
another thing or in the same thing qua other'.
13
'Quantum' means that
which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of which each is
by nature a 'one' and a 'this'. A
quantum is a plurality if it is numerable, a magnitude if it is a
measurable. 'Plurality' means that which is divisible potentially into
non-continuous parts, 'magnitude' that which is divisible into
continuous parts; of magnitude, that which is continuous in one
dimension is length; in two breadth, in three depth. Of these, limited
plurality is number, limited length is a line, breadth a surface, depth
a solid.
Again, some things are called quanta in virtue of
their own nature, others incidentally; e.g. the line is a quantum by its
own nature, the musical is one incidentally. Of the things that are
quanta by their own nature some are so as substances, e.g. the line is a
quantum (for 'a certain kind of quantum' is present in the definition
which states what it is), and others are modifications and states of
this kind of substance, e.g. much and little, long and short, broad and
narrow, deep and shallow, heavy and light, and all other such
attributes. And also great and small, and greater and smaller, both in
themselves and when taken relatively to each other, are by their own
nature attributes of what is quantitative; but these names are
transferred to other things also. Of things that are quanta
incidentally, some are so called in the sense in which it was said that
the musical and the white were quanta, viz. because that to which
musicalness and whiteness belong is a quantum, and some are quanta in
the way in which movement and time are so; for these also are called
quanta of a sort and continuous because the things of which these are
attributes are divisible. I mean not that which is moved, but the space
through which it is moved; for because that is a quantum movement also
is a quantum, and because this is a quantum time is one.
14
'Quality' means (1)
the differentia of the essence, e.g. man is an animal of a certain
quality because he is two-footed, and the horse is so because it is
four-footed; and a circle is a figure of particular quality because it
is without angles,-which shows that the essential differentia is a
quality.-This, then, is one meaning of quality-the differentia of the
essence, but (2) there is another sense in which it applies to the
unmovable objects of mathematics, the sense in which the numbers have a
certain quality, e.g. the composite numbers which are not in one
dimension only, but of which the plane and the solid are copies (these
are those which have two or three factors); and ingeneral that which
exists in the essence of numbers besides quantity is quality; for the
essence of each is what it is once, e.g. that of is not what it is twice
or thrice, but what it is once; for 6 is once 6.
(3) All the modifications of substances that move
(e.g. heat and cold, whiteness and blackness, heaviness and lightness,
and the others of the sort) in virtue of which, when they change, bodies
are said to alter. (4) Quality in respect of virtue and vice, and in
general, of evil and good.
Quality, then, seems to have practically two
meanings, and one of these is the more proper. The primary quality is
the differentia of the essence, and of this the quality in numbers is a
part; for it is a differentia of essences, but either not of things that
move or not of them qua moving. Secondly, there are the modifications of
things that move, qua moving, and the differentiae of movements. Virtue
and vice fall among these modifications; for they indicate differentiae
of the movement or activity, according to which the things in motion act
or are acted on well or badly; for that which can be moved or act in one
way is good, and that which can do so in another--the contrary--way is
vicious. Good and evil indicate quality especially in living things, and
among these especially in those which have purpose.
15
Things are 'relative' (1) as double to half, and
treble to a third, and in general that which contains something else
many times to that which is contained many times in something else, and
that which exceeds to that which is exceeded; (2) as that which can heat
to that which can be heated, and that which can cut to that which can be
cut, and in general the active to the passive; (3) as the measurable to
the measure, and the knowable to knowledge, and the perceptible to
perception.
(1) Relative terms of the first kind are numerically
related either indefinitely or definitely, to numbers themselves or to
1. E.g. the double is in a definite numerical relation to 1, and that
which is 'many times as great' is in a numerical, but not a definite,
relation to 1, i.e. not in this or in that numerical relation to it; the
relation of that which is half as big again as something else to that
something is a definite numerical relation to a number; that which is
n+I/n times something else is in an indefinite relation to that
something, as that which is 'many times as great' is in an indefinite
relation to 1; the relation of that which exceeds to that which is
exceeded is numerically quite indefinite; for number is always
commensurate, and 'number' is not predicated of that which is not
commensurate, but that which exceeds is, in relation to that which is
exceeded, so much and something more; and this something is indefinite;
for it can, indifferently, be either equal or not equal to that which is
exceeded. -All these relations, then, are numerically expressed and are
determinations of number, and so in another way are the equal and the
like and the same. For all refer to unity. Those things are the same
whose substance is one; those are like whose quality is one; those are
equal whose quantity is one; and 1 is the beginning and measure of
number, so that all these relations imply number, though not in the same
way.
(2) Things that are active or passive imply an active
or a passive potency and the actualizations of the potencies; e.g. that
which is capable of heating is related to that which is capable of being
heated, because it can heat it, and, again, that which heats is related
to that which is heated and that which cuts to that which is cut, in the
sense that they actually do these things. But numerical relations are
not actualized except in the sense which has been elsewhere stated;
actualizations in the sense of movement they have not. Of relations
which imply potency some further imply particular periods of time, e.g.
that which has made is relative to that which has been made, and that
which will make to that which will be made.
For it is in this way that a father is called the father of his son; for
the one has acted and the other has been acted on in a certain way.
Further, some relative terms imply privation of potency, i.e.
'incapable' and terms of this sort, e.g. 'invisible'.
Relative terms which imply number or potency,
therefore, are all relative because their very essence includes in its
nature a reference to something else, not because something else
involves a reference to it; but (3) that which is measurable or knowable
or thinkable is called relative because something else involves a
reference to it. For 'that which is thinkable' implies that the thought
of it is possible, but the thought is not relative to 'that of which it
is the thought'; for we should then have said the same thing twice.
Similarly sight is the sight of something, not 'of that of which it is
the sight' (though of course it is true to say this); in fact it is
relative to colour or to something else of the sort. But according to
the other way of speaking the same thing would be said twice,-'the sight
is of that of which it is.'
Things that are by their own nature called relative
are called so sometimes in these senses, sometimes if the classes that
include them are of this sort; e.g. medicine is a relative term because
its genus, science, is thought to be a relative term. Further, there are
the properties in virtue of which the things that have them are called
relative, e.g. equality is relative because the equal is, and likeness
because the like is. Other things are relative by accident; e.g. a man
is relative because he happens to be double of something and double is a
relative term; or the white is relative, if the same thing happens to be
double and white.
16
What is called
'complete' is (1) that outside which it is not possible to find any,
even one, of its parts; e.g. the complete time of each thing is that
outside which it is not possible to find any time which is a part proper
to it.-(2) That which in respect of excellence and goodness cannot be
excelled in its kind; e.g. we have a complete doctor or a complete
flute-player, when they lack nothing in respect of the form of their
proper excellence. And thus, transferring the word to bad things, we
speak of a complete scandal-monger and a complete thief; indeed we even
call them good, i.e. a good thief and a good scandal-monger. And
excellence is a completion; for each thing is complete and every
substance is complete, when in respect of the form of its proper
excellence it lacks no part of its natural magnitude.-(3) The things
which have attained their end, this being good, are called complete; for
things are complete in virtue of having attained their end. Therefore,
since the end is something ultimate, we transfer the word to bad things
and say a thing has been completely spoilt, and completely destroyed,
when it in no wise falls short of destruction and badness, but is at its
last point. This is why death, too, is by a
figure of speech called the end, because both are last things. But the
ultimate purpose is also an end.-Things, then, that are called complete
in virtue of their own nature are so called in all these senses, some
because in respect of goodness they lack nothing and cannot be excelled
and no part proper to them can be found outside them, others in general
because they cannot be exceeded in their several classes and no part
proper to them is outside them; the others presuppose these first two
kinds, and are called complete because they either make or have
something of the sort or are adapted to it or in some way or other
involve a reference to the things that are called complete in the
primary sense.
17
'Limit' means (1) the
last point of each thing, i.e. the first point beyond which it is not
possible to find any part, and the
first point within which every part is; (2) the form, whatever it may
be, of a spatial magnitude or of a thing that has magnitude; (3) the end
of each thing (and of this nature is that towards which the movement and
the action are, not that from which they are-though sometimes it is
both, that from which and that to which the movement is, i.e. the final
cause); (4) the substance of each thing, and the essence of each; for
this is the limit of knowledge; and if of knowledge, of the object also.
Evidently, therefore, 'limit' has as many senses as 'beginning', and yet
more; for the beginning is a limit, but not every limit is a beginning.
18
'That in virtue of
which' has several meanings:-(1) the form or substance of each thing,
e.g. that in virtue of which a man is good is the good itself, (2) the
proximate subject in which it is the nature of an attribute to be found,
e.g. colour in a surface. 'That in virtue of which', then, in the
primary sense is the form, and in a secondary sense the matter of each
thing and the proximate substratum of each.-In general 'that in virtue
of which' will found in the same number of senses as 'cause'; for we say
indifferently (3) in virtue of what has he come?' or 'for what end has
he come?'; and (4) in virtue of what has he inferred wrongly, or
inferred?' or 'what is the cause of the inference, or of the wrong
inference?'-Further (5) Kath' d is used in reference to position, e.g.
'at which he stands' or 'along which he walks; for all such phrases
indicate place and position.
Therefore 'in virtue of itself' must likewise have
several meanings. The following belong to a thing in virtue of
itself:-(1) the
essence of each thing, e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself Callias and
what it was to be Callias;-(2) whatever is present in the
'what', e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself an animal. For 'animal' is
present in his definition; Callias is a particular animal.-(3)
Whatever attribute a thing receives in itself directly or in one of its
parts; e.g. a surface is white in virtue of itself, and a man is alive
in virtue of himself; for the soul, in which life directly resides, is a
part of the man.-(4) That which has no cause other
than itself; man has more than one cause--animal, two-footed--but yet
man is man in virtue of himself.-(5) Whatever attributes belong to a
thing alone, and in so far as they belong to it merely by virtue of
itself considered apart by itself.
19
'Disposition' means
the arrangement of that which has parts, in respect either of place or
of potency or of kind; for there must be a certain position, as even the
word 'disposition' shows.
20
'Having' means (1) a
kind of activity of the haver and of what he has-something like an
action or movement. For when one thing makes and one is made, between
them there is a making; so too between him who has a garment and the
garment which he has there is a having. This sort of having, then,
evidently we cannot have; for the process will go on to infinity, if it
is to be possible to have the having of what we have.-(2) 'Having' or
'habit' means a disposition according to which that which is disposed is
either well or ill disposed, and either in itself or with reference to
something else; e.g. health is a 'habit'; for it is such a
disposition.-(3) We speak of a 'habit' if there is a portion of such a
disposition; and so even the excellence of the parts is a 'habit' of the
whole thing.
21
'Affection' means (1)
a quality in respect of which a thing can be altered, e.g. white and
black, sweet and bitter, heaviness and lightness, and all others of the
kind.-(2) The actualization of these-the already accomplished
alterations.-(3) Especially,
injurious alterations and movements, and, above all painful
injuries.-(4) Misfortunes and painful experiences when on a large
scale are called affections.
22
We speak of
'privation' (1) if something has not one of the attributes which a thing
might naturally have, even if this thing
itself would not naturally have it; e.g. a plant is said to be
'deprived' of eyes.-(2) If, though either the thing itself or its genus
would naturally have an attribute, it has it not; e.g. a blind man and a
mole are in different senses 'deprived' of sight; the latter
in contrast with its genus, the former in contrast with his own normal
nature.-(3) If, though it would naturally have the attribute, and when
it would naturally have it, it has it not; for blindness is a privation,
but one is not 'blind' at any and every age, but only if one has not
sight at the age at which one would naturally have it.
Similarly a thing is called blind if it has not sight in the medium in
which, and in respect of the organ in respect of which, and with
reference to the object with reference to which, and in the
circumstances in which, it would naturally have it.-(4) The violent
taking away of anything is called privation.
Indeed there are just as many kinds of privations as
there are of words with negative prefixes; for a thing is called unequal
because it has not equality though it would naturally have it, and
invisible either because it has no colour at all or because it has a
poor colour, and apodous either because it has no feet at all or because
it has imperfect feet. Again, a privative term may be used because the
thing has little of the attribute (and this means having it in a sense
imperfectly), e.g. 'kernel-less'; or because it has it not easily or not
well (e.g. we call a thing uncuttable not only if it cannot be cut but
also if it cannot be cut easily or well); or because it has not the
attribute at all; for it is not the one-eyed man but he who is sightless
in both eyes that is called blind. This is why not every man is 'good'
or 'bad', 'just' or 'unjust', but there is also an intermediate state.
23
To 'have' or 'hold'
means many things:-(1) to treat a thing according to one's own nature or
according to one's own impulse; so that fever is said to have a man, and
tyrants to have their cities, and people to have the clothes they
wear.-(2) That in which a thing is present as in something receptive of
it is said to have the thing; e.g. the bronze has the form of the
statue, and the body has the disease.-(3) As that which contains holds
the things contained; for a thing is said to be held by that in which it
is as in a container; e.g. we say that the vessel holds the liquid and
the city holds men and the ship sailors; and so too that the whole holds
the parts.-(4) That which hinders a thing from moving or acting
according to its own impulse is said to hold it, as pillars hold the
incumbent weights, and as the poets make Atlas hold the heavens,
implying that
otherwise they would collapse on the earth, as some of the natural
philosophers also say. In this way also that which holds things together
is said to hold the things it holds together, since they would otherwise
separate, each according to its own impulse.
'Being in something' has similar and corresponding
meanings to 'holding' or 'having'.
24
'To come from
something' means (1) to come from something as from matter, and this in
two senses, either in respect of the highest genus or in respect of the
lowest species; e.g. in a sense all things that can be melted come from
water, but in a sense the statue comes from bronze.-(2) As from the
first moving principle; e.g. 'what did the fight come from?' From
abusive language, because this was the origin of the fight.-(3) From the
compound of matter and shape, as the parts come from the whole, and the
verse from the Iliad, and the stones from the house; (in every such case
the whole is a compound of matter and shape,) for the shape is the end,
and only that which attains an end is complete.-(4) As the form from its
part, e.g. man from 'two-footed'and syllable from 'letter'; for this is
a different sense from that in which the statue comes from bronze; for
the composite substance comes from the sensible matter, but the form
also comes from the matter of the form.-Some things, then, are said to
come from something else in these senses; but (5) others are so
described if one of these senses is applicable to a part of that other
thing; e.g. the child comes from its father and mother, and plants come
from the earth, because they come from a part of those things.-(6) It
means coming after a thing in time, e.g. night comes from day and storm
from fine weather, because the one comes after the other. Of these
things some are so described because they admit of change into one
another, as in the cases now mentioned; some merely because they are
successive in time, e.g. the voyage took place 'from' the equinox,
because it took place after the equinox, and the festival of the
Thargelia comes 'from' the Dionysia, because after the Dionysia.
25
'Part' means (1) (a)
that into which a quantum can in any way be divided; for that which is
taken from a quantum qua quantum is always called a part of it, e.g. two
is called in a sense a part of three. It means (b), of the parts in the
first sense, only those which measure the whole; this is why two, though
in one sense it is, in another is not, called a part of three.-(2) The
elements into which a kind might be divided apart from the quantity are
also called parts of it; for which reason we say the species are parts
of the genus.-(3) The elements into which a whole is divided, or of
which it consists-the 'whole' meaning either the form or that which has
the form; e.g. of the bronze sphere or of the bronze cube both the
bronze-i.e. the matter in which the form is-and the characteristic angle
are parts.-(4) The elements in the definition which explains a
thing are also parts of the whole; this is why the genus is called a
part of the species, though in another sense the species is part of the
genus.
26
'A whole' means (1)
that from which is absent none of the parts of which it is said to be
naturally a whole, and (2) that which so contains the things it contains
that they form a unity; and this in two senses-either as being each
severally one single thing, or as making up the unity between them. For
(a) that which is true of a whole class and is said to hold good as a
whole (which implies that it is a kind whole) is true of a whole in the
sense that it contains many things by being predicated of each, and by
all of them, e.g. man, horse, god, being severally one single thing,
because all are living things. But (b) the continuous and limited is a
whole, when it is a unity consisting of several parts, especially if
they are present only potentially, but, failing this, even if they
are present actually.
Of these things themselves, those which are so by nature are wholes in a
higher degree than those which are so by art, as we said in the case of
unity also, wholeness being in fact a sort of oneness.
Again (3) of quanta that have a beginning and a
middle and an end, those to which the position does not make a
difference are called totals, and those to which it does, wholes.
Those which admit of both descriptions are both wholes and totals. These
are the things whose nature remains the same after transposition, but
whose form does not, e.g. wax or a coat; they are called both wholes and
totals; for they have both characteristics. Water and all liquids and
number are called totals, but 'the whole number' or 'the whole water'
one does not speak of, except by an extension of meaning.
To things, to which qua one the term 'total' is applied, the term 'all'
is applied when they are treated as separate; 'this total number,' 'all
these units.'
27
It is not any chance
quantitative thing that can be said to be 'mutilated'; it must be a
whole as well as divisible. For not only is two not 'mutilated' if one
of the two ones is taken away (for the part removed by mutilation is
never equal to the remainder), but in general no number is thus
mutilated; for it is also necessary that the essence remain; if a cup is
mutilated, it must still be a cup; but the number is no longer the same.
Further, even if things consist of unlike parts, not even these things
can all be said to be mutilated, for in a sense a number has unlike
parts (e.g. two and three) as well as like; but in general of the things
to which their position makes no difference, e.g. water or fire, none
can be mutilated; to be mutilated, things must be such as in virtue of
their essence have a certain position. Again, they must be continuous;
for a musical scale consists of unlike parts and has position, but
cannot become mutilated. Besides, not even the things that are wholes
are mutilated by the privation of any part. For the parts removed must
be neither those which determine the essence nor any chance parts,
irrespective of their position; e.g. a cup is not mutilated if it is
bored through, but only if the handle or a projecting part is removed,
and a man is mutilated not if the flesh or the spleen is removed, but if
an extremity is, and that not every extremity but one which when
completely removed cannot grow again.
Therefore baldness is not a mutilation.
28
The term 'race' or
'genus' is used (1) if generation of things which have the same form is
continuous, e.g. 'while the race of men lasts' means 'while the
generation of them goes on continuously'.-(2) It is used with reference
to that which first
brought things into existence; for it is thus that some are called
Hellenes by race and others Ionians, because the former proceed from
Hellen and the latter from Ion as their first begetter. And the word is
used in reference to the begetter more than to the matter, though people
also get a race-name from the female, e.g. 'the descendants of Pyrrha'.-(3)
There is genus in the sense in which 'plane' is the genus of plane
figures and solid' of solids; for each of the figures is in the one case
a plane of such and such a kind, and in the other a solid of such and
such a kind; and this is what underlies the differentiate. Again (4) in
definitions the first constituent element, which is included in the
'what', is the genus, whose differentiate the qualities are said to be
'Genus' then is used in all these ways, (1) in reference to continuous
generation of the same kind, (2) in reference to the first mover which
is of the same kind as the things it moves, (3) as matter; for that to
which the differentia or quality belongs is the substratum, which we
call matter.
Those things are said to be 'other in genus' whose
proximate substratum is different, and which are not analysed the one
into the other nor both into the same thing (e.g. form and matter are
different in genus); and things which belong to different categories of
being (for some of the things that are said to 'be' signify essence,
others a quality, others the other categories we have before
distinguished); these also are not analysed either into one another or
into some one thing.
29
'The false' means (1)
that which is false as a thing, and that (a) because it is not put
together or cannot be put together, e.g. 'that the diagonal of a square
is commensurate with the side' or 'that you are sitting'; for one of
these is false always, and the other sometimes; it is in these two
senses that they are non-existent. (b) There are things which exist, but
whose nature it is to appear either not to be such as they are or to be
things that do not exist, e.g. a sketch or a dream; for these are
something, but are not the things the appearance of which they produce
in us. We call things false in this way, then,-either because they
themselves do not exist, or because the appearance which results from
them is that of something that does not exist.
(2) A false account is the account of non-existent
objects, in so far as it is false. Hence every account is false when
applied to something other than that of which it is true; e.g. the
account of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. In a sense
there is one account of each thing, i.e. the account of its essence, but
in a sense there are many, since the thing itself and the thing itself
with an attribute are in a sense the same, e.g. Socrates and musical
Socrates (a false account is not the account of anything, except in a
qualified sense). Hence Antisthenes was too simple-minded when he
claimed that nothing could be described except by the account proper to
it,-one predicate to one subject; from which the conclusion used to be
drawn that there could be no contradiction, and almost that there could
be no error. But it is possible to describe each thing not only by the
account of itself, but also by that of something else.
This may be done altogether falsely indeed, but there is also a way in
which it may be done truly; e.g. eight may be described as a double
number by the use of the definition of two.
These things, then,
are called false in these senses, but (3) a false man is one who is
ready at and fond of such accounts, not for any other reason but for
their own sake, and one who is good at impressing such accounts on other
people, just as we say things are which produce a false appearance. This
is why the proof in the Hippias that the same man is false and true is
misleading. For it assumes that he is false who can deceive (i.e. the
man who knows and is wise); and further that he who is willingly bad is
better. This is a false result of induction-for a man who limps
willingly is better than one
who does so unwillingly-by 'limping' Plato means 'mimicking a limp', for
if the man were lame willingly, he would presumably be worse in this
case as in the corresponding case of moral character.
30
'Accident' means (1)
that which attaches to something and can be truly asserted, but neither
of necessity nor usually, e.g. if some one in digging a hole for a plant
has found treasure. This-the finding of treasure-is for the man who dug
the hole an accident; for neither does the one come of necessity from
the other or after the other, nor, if a man plants, does he usually find
treasure. And a musical man might be pale; but since this does not
happen of necessity nor usually, we call it an accident. Therefore since
there are attributes and they attach to subjects, and some of them
attach to these only in a particular place and at a particular time,
whatever attaches to a subject, but not because it was this subject, or
the time this time, or the place this place, will be an accident.
Therefore, too, there is no definite cause for an accident, but a chance
cause, i.e. an indefinite one. Going to Aegina was an
accident for a man, if he went not in order to get there, but because he
was carried out of his way by a storm or captured by
pirates. The accident has happened or exists,-not in virtue of the
subject's nature, however, but of something else; for the storm was the
cause of his coming to a place for which he was not sailing, and this
was Aegina.
'Accident' has also (2) another meaning, i.e. all
that attaches to each thing in virtue of itself but is not in its
essence, as having its angles equal to two right angles attaches to the
triangle. And accidents of this sort may be eternal, but no accident of
the other sort is. This is explained elsewhere.
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