Book VI
1
We are seeking the
principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them
qua being. For, while there is a cause of health and of good condition,
and the objects of mathematics have first principles and elements and
causes, and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all
involves reasoning deals with causes and principles, more or less
precise, all these sciences mark off some particular being-some genus,
and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor qua being, nor do
they offer any discussion of the essence of the things of which they
treat; but starting from the essence-some making it plain to the senses,
others assuming it as a hypothesis-they then demonstrate, more or less
cogently, the essential attributes of the genus with which they deal. It
is obvious, therefore, that such an induction yields no demonstration of
substance or of the essence, but some other way of exhibiting it. And
similarly the sciences omit the question whether the genus with which
they deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs to the same kind
of thinking to show what it is and that it is.
And since natural science, like other sciences, is in
fact about one class of being, i.e. to that sort of substance which has
the principle of its movement and rest present in itself, evidently it
is neither practical nor productive. For in the case of things made the
principle is in the maker-it is either reason or art or some faculty,
while in the case of things done it is in the doer-viz. will, for that
which is done and that which is willed are the same.
Therefore, if all thought is either practical or productive or
theoretical, physics must be a theoretical science, but it will
theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and about
substance-as-defined for the most part only as not separable from
matter.
Now, we must not fail to notice the mode of being of the essence and of
its definition, for, without this, inquiry is but idle.
Of things defined, i.e. of 'whats', some are like 'snub', and some like
'concave'. And these differ because 'snub' is bound up with matter (for
what is snub is a concave nose), while concavity is independent of
perceptible matter. If then all natural things are a analogous to the
snub in their nature; e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in
general, animal; leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant (for none of
these can be defined without reference to movement-they always have
matter), it is clear how we must seek and define the 'what' in the case
of natural objects, and also that it belongs to the student of nature to
study even soul in a certain sense, i.e. so much of it as is not
independent of matter.
That physics, then, is a theoretical science, is
plain from these considerations. Mathematics also, however, is
theoretical; but whether its objects are immovable and separable from
matter, is not at present clear; still, it is clear that some
mathematical theorems consider them qua immovable and qua separable from
matter. But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and
separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical
science,-not, however, to physics (for physics deals with certain
movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For
physics deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable,
and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but
presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter; while the
first science deals with things which both exist separately and are
immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but especially these; for
they are the causes that operate on so much of the divine as appears to
us. There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics,
physics, and what we may call theology, since it is obvious that if the
divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort. And
the highest science must deal with the highest genus. Thus, while the
theoretical sciences are more to be desired than the other sciences,
this is more to be desired than the other theoretical sciences. For one
might raise the question whether
first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one
kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in
this respect,-geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind
of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all. We answer
that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by
nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an
immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first
philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will
belong to this to consider being qua being-both what it is and the
attributes which belong to it qua being.
2
But since the
unqualified term 'being' has several meanings, of which one was seen' to
be the accidental, and another the true ('non-being' being the false),
while besides these there are the figures of predication (e.g. the
'what', quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which
'being' may have), and again besides all these there is that which 'is'
potentially or actually:-since 'being' has many meanings, we must say
regarding the accidental, that there can be no scientific treatment of
it. This is confirmed by the fact that no science practical, productive,
or theoretical troubles itself about it. For on the one hand he who
produces a house does not produce all the attributes that come into
being along with the house; for these are innumerable; the house that
has been made may quite well be pleasant for some people, hurtful for
some, and useful to others, and different-to put it shortly from all
things that are; and the science of building does not aim at producing
any of these attributes. And in the same way the geometer does not
consider the attributes which attach thus to figures, nor
whether 'triangle' is different from 'triangle whose angles are equal to
two right angles'.-And this happens naturally enough; for the accidental
is practically a mere name. And so Plato was in a sense not wrong in
ranking sophistic as dealing with that which is not. For the arguments
of the sophists deal, we may say, above all with the accidental; e.g.
the question whether 'musical' and 'lettered' are different or the same,
and whether 'musical Coriscus' and 'Coriscus' are the same, and whether
'everything which is, but is not eternal, has come to be', with the
paradoxical conclusion that if one who was musical has come to be
lettered, he must also have been lettered and have come to be musical,
and all the other arguments of this sort; the accidental is obviously
akin to non-being. And this is clear also from arguments such as the
following: things which are in another sense come into being and pass
out of being by a process, but things which are accidentally do not. But
still we must, as far as we can, say further, regarding the accidental,
what its nature is and from what cause it proceeds; for it will perhaps
at the same time become clear why there is no science of it.
Since, among things which are, some are always in the
same state and are of necessity (not necessity in the sense of
compulsion but that which we assert of things because they cannot be
otherwise), and some are not of necessity nor always, but for the most
part, this is the principle and this the cause of the existence of the
accidental; for that which is neither always nor for the most part, we
call accidental. For instance, if in the dog-days there is wintry and
cold weather, we say this is an accident, but not if there is sultry
heat, because the latter is always or for the most part so, but not the
former. And it is an accident that a man is pale (for this is neither
always nor for the most part so), but it is not by accident that he is
an animal. And that the builder produces health is an accident, because
it is the nature not of the builder but of the doctor to do this,-but
the builder happened to be a doctor. Again, a confectioner, aiming at
giving pleasure, may make something wholesome, but not in virtue of the
confectioner's art; and therefore we say 'it was an accident', and while
there is a sense in which he makes it, in the unqualified sense he does
not. For to other things answer faculties productive of them, but to
accidental results there corresponds no determinate art nor faculty; for
of things which are or come to be by accident, the cause also is
accidental. Therefore, since not all things either are or come to be of
necessity and always, but, the majority of things are for the most part,
the accidental must exist; for instance a pale man is not always nor for
the most part musical, but since this sometimes happens, it must be
accidental (if not, everything will be of necessity). The matter,
therefore, which is capable of being otherwise than as it usually is,
must be the cause of the accidental. And we must take as our
starting-point the question whether there is nothing that is neither
always nor for the most part.
Surely this is impossible. There is, then, besides these something which
is fortuitous and accidental. But while the usual exists, can nothing be
said to be always, or are there eternal things? This must be considered
later,' but that there is no science of the accidental is obvious; for
all science is either of that which is always or of that which is for
the most part. (For how else is one to learn or to teach another? The
thing must be determined as occurring either always or for the most
part, e.g. that honey-water is useful for a patient in a fever is true
for the most part.)
But that which is contrary to the usual law science will be unable to
state, i.e. when the thing does not happen, e.g.'on the day of new
moon'; for even that which happens on the day of new moon happens then
either always or for the most part; but the accidental is contrary to
such laws. We have stated, then, what the accidental is, and from what
cause it arises, and that there is no science which deals with it.
3
That there are
principles and causes which are generable and destructible without ever
being in course of being generated or destroyed, is obvious. For
otherwise all things will be of necessity, since that which is being
generated or destroyed must
have a cause which is not accidentally its cause. Will A exist or not?
It will if B happens; and if not, not. And B will exist if C
happens. And thus if time is constantly subtracted from a limited extent
of time, one will obviously come to the present. This man, then, will
die by violence, if he goes out; and he will do this if he gets thirsty;
and he will get thirsty if something else happens; and thus we shall
come to that which is now present, or to some past event. For instance,
he will go out if he gets thirsty; and he will get thirsty if he is
eating pungent food; and this is either the case or not; so that he will
of necessity die, or of necessity not die. And similarly if one jumps
over to past events, the same account will hold good; for this-I mean
the past condition-is already present in something.
Everything, therefore, that will be, will be of necessity; e.g. it is
necessary that he who lives shall one day die; for already some
condition has come into existence, e.g. the presence of contraries in
the same body. But whether he is to die by disease or by violence is not
yet determined, but depends on the happening of something else. Clearly
then the process goes back to a certain starting-point, but this no
longer points to something further. This then will be the starting-point
for the fortuitous, and will have nothing else as cause of its coming to
be. But to what sort of starting-point and what sort of cause we thus
refer the fortuitous-whether to matter or to the purpose or to the
motive power, must be carefully considered.
4
Let us dismiss
accidental being; for we have sufficiently determined its nature. But
since that which is in the sense of being true, or is not in the sense
of being false, depends on combination and separation, and truth and
falsity together depend on the allocation of a pair of contradictory
judgements (for the true judgement affirms where the subject and
predicate really are combined, and denies where they are separated,
while the false judgement has the opposite of this allocation; it is
another question, how it happens that we think things together or apart;
by 'together' and 'apart' I mean thinking them so that there is no
succession in the thoughts but they become a unity); for falsity and
truth are not in things-it
is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false-but in
thought; while with regard to simple concepts and 'whats' falsity and
truth do not exist even in thought--this being so, we must consider
later what has to be discussed with regard to that which is or is not in
this sense. But since the combination and the separation are in thought
and not in the things, and that which is in this sense is a different
sort of 'being' from the things that are in the full sense (for the
thought attaches or removes either the subject's 'what' or its having a
certain quality or quantity or something else), that which is
accidentally and that which is in the sense of being true must be
dismissed. For the cause of the former is indeterminate, and that of the
latter is some affection of the thought, and both are related to the
remaining genus of being, and do not indicate the existence of any
separate class of being.
Therefore let these be dismissed, and let us consider the causes and the
principles of being itself, qua being. (It was clear in our discussion
of the various meanings of terms, that 'being' has several meanings.)
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