Amnesty
International in its report titled "Bhutan: Nationality,
Expulsion, Statelessness and the Right to Return (AI INDEX:
ASA 14/001/2000 dated 01/09/2000 ) has elaborately described
the issue of nationality, expulsion, statelessness of Bhutanese
citizens. The report is reproduced below
AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL REPORT (AI INDEX: ASA 14/001/2000 dated 01/09/2000
) BHUTAN:
NATIONALITY, EXPULSION, STATELESSNESS AND THE RIGHT TO RETURN
INTRODUCTION
This
document outlines the application of international human rights
standards to questions of nationality, statelessness and repatriation
and examines various country situations and repatriation programs.
The prime aim of this document is to assist in bringing about
a solution to the situation of nearly 100,000 people, most
of whom claim to be from southern Bhutan, who have been living
for nearly ten years in refugee camps in eastern Nepal but
it is hoped that it may also be of use to other governments
trying to find solutions to other protracted refugee crises
around the world.
This
paper was first submitted in the form of a memorandum, prepared
for Amnesty International by an independent consultant, to
the Governments of Nepal and Bhutan in September 1999. It
followed calls from the United Nations (UN) Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (hereafter
the UN Sub-Commission) in 1998 and 1999 for an early solution
to the situation of the people claiming to be from Bhutan
who have been residing in refugee camps in eastern Nepal for
nearly ten years. While the two governments have stressed
the bilateral nature of negotiations between them, both have
invited Amnesty International to provide technical input which
may be helpful to this process. To date, neither government
has formally responded to the memorandum, although some oral
comments were received.
Since
this paper was submitted to both governments there have been
further developments in the field of international standards
setting in relation to these issues. Most significantly, the
Human Rights Committee on 18 October 1999 adopted a General
Comment (27) on the freedom of movement as enshrined in Article
12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.(1)
In August 2000, a resolution on the freedom of movement, the
right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return
to one's country, and the right to seek asylum from persecution
was adopted by the UN Sub-Commission.
The
scope of this paper does not permit an authoritative examination
of many of the questions it raises. The aim primarily is to
identify some questions which are worth further consideration
by governments who are dealing with these complex issues rather
than to reach any firm conclusions or make substantive recommendations.
It should be treated more like a working paper, setting out
material which may help to open up further discussions, as
well as trying to focus attention on the human rights issues
which must be an essential part of any negotiations.
The
specific issues examined here include:
"
what makes a person belong to a state, the criteria used to
determine whether a person has an ''effective link'' with
a country
"
the process used to ascertain who is a citizen or otherwise
of a country to which they wish to return, even in cases where
they hold no documentary evidence or the documentation is
contested
" the limitations on denationalization, either for the
purposes of or as a consequence of expulsion
" how the right to return has been dealt with, including
in relation to the right to property
" the role played by international and regional agencies
and mechanisms in helping to progress negotiations of this
kind
The
study draws on a range of sources on nationality, statelessness,
repatriation programs, right to return and specific country
situations. These include UN special rapporteurs' reports,
journal articles, reports of the Organization of American
States (OAS) and Organization of African Unity (OAU), reports
by non-government organizations (NGOs), including Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch and the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights, in addition to relevant national legislation
and international instruments.(2)
The
international standards cited are included for illustrative
purposes and do not imply any specific legal obligation unless
otherwise stated. Equally, country situations referred to
have been put forward as comparative examples, not as an endorsement
of any particular approaches or solutions adopted.
Following
are some of the main observations contained in the paper:
"
Denationalization for the purpose of expulsion is not permissible;
it is a violation of fundamental human rights standards and
breaches international law.
"
There is an increasing presumption in international standards
that denationalization is not permissible if it results in
statelessness. While there are few signatories to the relevant
international treaties, the principles are clear and incorporated
as appropriate into many other international instruments such
as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
"
Where denationalization does take place, at the initiative
of the state or of the individual, it should be surrounded
by the strictest procedural and other safeguards and take
full account of the relevant human rights standards.
"
The individual's link with a state, which finds its legal
expression in the acquisition of nationality, depends on a
variety of factors including his or her birth, parentage,
residence, and the focus of his or her social and other activities
and his or her own sense of identity with that state. There
are no clear cut detailed guidelines on this in international
standards, but the principles are outlined in, for example,
the European Convention on Nationality, and evidence of their
application is found in the law and practice of many states.
"
The right to enter one's own country set out in international
standards does not necessarily depend on formally possessing
that country's nationality.
NATIONALITY
At
its 51st session in August 1999, the UN Sub-Commission called
for ''a fair and lasting resolution which takes into account
. . . . the principles of international law relating to non-discrimination;
the right to return; the right not to be arbitrarily deprived
of one's nationality and the reduction of statelessness.''
This
section of the paper considers international standards on
nationality and statelessness and shows how there has been
a developing recognition that international human rights law
has a significant bearing on state sovereignty in this matter.(3)
It then considers some of the elements of citizenship, obstacles
to acquiring citizenship for individuals who have a genuine
and effective link with a country, some questions relating
to deprivation or renunciation of nationality, and the creation
of statelessness.
2.1
NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Questions
relating to nationality and entry to a territory touch on
the most sensitive areas of state sovereignty, but there has
been a growing recognition that states' discretion in these
matters is circumscribed by principles of international law
and human rights standards, in particular with regard to the
prevention of statelessness and the protection of the right
to enter one's own country.
While
international human rights standards with regard to nationality
are less concrete than in some other areas of human rights,
the past fifty years has seen the development of some important
principles derived from and reflected in the practice of states,
and set out in instruments such as the 1961 Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness and, most recently, the 1997
European Convention on Nationality. These principles are also
found in a number of other human rights instruments of broader
application, such as the UN Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and have been
reiterated continually in declarations by UN, regional and
other bodies. Among the most concrete of these principles
are those relating to the avoidance of statelessness and the
right not to be arbitrarily deprived of nationality.
THE
BHUTANESE REFUGEES: THEIR CURRENT POSITION
Since
late 1990, almost 100,000 Nepali-speaking people have fled
or were evicted from southern Bhutan to refugee camps in Nepal,
or were born in exile to refugee parents. The causes of exile
remain deeply contested. The refugees claim they are victims
of human rights violations and discrimination by the Bhutan
government's "one nation, one people" policy based
on the traditions of the northern Bhutanese. The Bhutanese
government maintains that the people in the refugee camps
are illegal immigrants from Nepal who had overstayed their
contracts in Bhutan or Bhutanese who left the country voluntarily
and thus are deemed to have renounced their nationality under
Bhutan's citizenship law.
Bhutan
and Nepal commenced negotiations to solve the problem of the
people in the refugee camps in November 1992. Since then,
nine ministerial-level meetings between both countries have
taken place. At the last meeting in May 2000, both countries
reported "substantial progress" towards a solution.
Disagreement on the precise unit of verification remains the
main stumble block before a joint team comprising ten members,
five nominated by each government, can start verifying the
documents of the people in the refugee camps. Nepal maintains
that verification should be done by heads of family; whereas
Bhutan is insisting that individuals above 18 should be verified
individually. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
has put forward a formula aimed at bridging both positions.
Nepal has accepted this formula. The Bhutan government to
date has not made a decision.
In
any event, even if verification starts tomorrow, there is
a long way to go before refugees can return. So far both governments
have not harmonized their position on what will happen to
the refugees after verification. Both sides agreed four categories
in October 1993 into which the people in the refugee camps
would be classified. These categories were: 1) Bonafide Bhutanese
if they have been forcefully evicted; 2) Bhutanese who emigrated;
3) Non-Bhutanese and 4) Bhutanese who have committed criminal
acts. As pointed out in the report Bhutan: Forcible exile
of August 1994 (AI Index: ASA 14/04/94), Amnesty International
is concerned that this four-fold classification suggests that
the question whether a person is deemed a national of Bhutan
will be treated as the determining factor in establishing
people's right to return. If this were the case, many of the
guarantees provided under international law as set out in
detail in this document may not be fulfilled.
Amnesty
International is urging that the refugees wishing to return
to their places of origin will be permitted to do so at the
earliest opportunity under a coordinated repatriation programme
and that the sustainability of a repatriation in safety and
with dignity is linked to the returnees' access to a wide
range of human rights on a non-discriminatory basis, such
as the rights to housing, health care, education and work.
The concept of nationality has been developing in international
law for some time. In 1923, the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the Tunisia and Morocco Nationality Decrees Case
(PCIJ (1923)) recognized that, while questions of nationality
remained a matter for a state's jurisdiction, the competence
of states in this area could be affected by international
law and relations between states. The 1930 Hague Convention
was the first attempt to solve problems arising from the conflict
of nationality laws by establishing common standards. In relation
to dual nationality, Article 5 of the Hague Convention provides
that:
''...
a third state shall ... recognize ... either the nationality
of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident,
or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances
he appears to be in fact most closely connected.''
The
1930 Hague Convention thus defined nationality on the international
plane -- that is, its recognition by other states -- in terms
of habitual residence or other close connection. However,
given the contemporary state of international law, this was
not going so far as to say that individuals with such a connection
had any right to a particular nationality, simply that other
states were obliged to recognize that nationality only if
such a link existed.
This
notion of an ''effective link'' was developed further in the
1954 Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala).(4) In that
case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reaffirmed
the principle that ''the best way of making ... rules [relating
to nationality] accord with the varying demographic conditions
in different countries is to leave the fixing of such rules
to the competence of each State.'' But it reiterated also
that ''a State cannot claim that the rules it has thus laid
down are entitled to recognition by another State unless it
has acted in conformity with [the] general aim of making the
legal bond of nationality accord with the individual's genuine
connection with the State''. (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala,
ICJ reports (1955) p.4ff)
So
the notion of a genuine and effective link as a determining
factor in nationality first arose in respect of the recognition
by other states of a particular state's grant of nationality.
It has developed further in the context of broader human rights
law, particularly relating to statelessness and nationality.
Fundamental
rights in this area were enshrined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948. Article 15 of the UDHR states:
1.
''Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2.
''No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality
nor denied the right to change his nationality.''
The
right of individuals to have or obtain a nationality is somewhat
vaguely formulated in the UDHR, in so far as it is a collective
obligation on states, with no single state being obliged to
give effect to it. But the right articulated in Article 15(2)
not to be arbitrarily deprived of nationality implies a clear
obligation on a particular state.
One
obvious question which arises is what amounts to ''arbitrary''
deprivation of nationality. Procedural due process and non-discrimination
would normally be necessary, although not sufficient, elements
in any decision if it is not to be regarded as arbitrary.
More fundamentally, it has been persuasively argued that,
while removal of nationality may be permissible in certain
circumstances (for instance, to avoid dual nationality), any
deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness would
destroy the right to nationality itself which is articulated
in Article 15(1); it would therefore not be compatible with
the aims and objectives of the UDHR, and so could be considered
''arbitrary'' in the sense of Article 15(2).
Since
the adoption of the UDHR, this right not to be arbitrarily
deprived of nationality has been further elaborated in a number
of legally binding treaties and other instruments. Moreover,
with the developing international standards on the avoidance
of statelessness, even the more vaguely formulated element
of the right to nationality in Article 15(1) of the UDHR has
been developed into more binding form, particularly with regard
to children and those who would otherwise be stateless.
At
international level the main instrument for developing in
treaty form the principles set out in Article 15 of the UDHR
was the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
which, as well as elaborating the limits on states' discretion
to remove nationality, contains a number of provisions requiring
that children who would otherwise be stateless should be granted
a nationality.
The
1961 Convention prohibits, with very few specific exceptions,
any loss of nationality which results in statelessness. Articles
5 and 6 provide that any loss of nationality as a consequence
of change in personal status (such as marriage, divorce, legitimation,
adoption) or on the grounds of a change in the nationality
of a person's parent or spouse, shall be conditional on the
possession or acquisition of another nationality. Article
7(1)(a) provides that a state may not permit a person to renounce
their nationality if that would render them stateless. Article
7(3) provides that a national of a contracting state shall
not lose his nationality so as to become stateless on the
grounds of departure or residence abroad, except in the case
of naturalized citizens who reside abroad for a period of
seven consecutive years or more and who fail to indicate their
wish to retain that nationality, or, possibly, in some circumstances,
in the case of nationals born and residing abroad after attaining
majority. Other than those limited circumstances, Article
7(6) provides that a person shall not lose his nationality
if that would render him stateless.
Article
8(1) provides that, generally, a contracting state shall not
deprive a person of his nationality if that would render him
stateless. However, other provisions of Article 8 set out
exceptions to this general rule. The exceptions are: if the
same circumstances apply as to Article 7 (above); if the nationality
has been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud; or if at
the time of becoming party to the treaty the state concerned
specifies that it retains the right, as set out in its national
law, to remove nationality in certain other circumstances
related to entering the service of a foreign state, or if
the person concerned has acted in a manner seriously prejudicial
to the vital interests of the state. In such cases there must
also be provision for the person concerned to have a fair
hearing by a court or other independent body.
Although
only few states (21 states as of May 2000) have ratified the
1961 Convention, it elaborates on the general obligation set
out in Article 15 of the UDHR, and the principles embodied
in it are reflected in the European Convention on Nationality
and the basic provisions of citizenship legislation and practice
in the majority of states. Some authors have argued that its
provisions therefore reflect reference points for determining
customary international law and reflect an international consensus
on minimum legal standards to be applied to nationality. Others
have taken a more cautious position that, while with such
a low level of ratifications it could hardly represent customary
international law, it nevertheless does provide the right
to nationality with some substantive content and ''is indicative
of the extent of obligations of, or the international expectation
on, States in the elimination and reduction of statelessness''.
The UN Special Rapporteur on Zaire has gone as far as stating,
despite the small number of ratifications, that the principles
contained in the 1961 Convention are principles of international
customary law that are impossible for states, even those which
are not party to it, to disregard (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/66,
para. 85). In 1988 the UN Sub-Commission's Special Rapporteur
on the right of everyone to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his own country, stated:
''In
view of Human Rights Law, denationalization should be abolished.
It constitutes a breach of international obligations, ...
There is also a growing tendency to require the acquisition
of another nationality as a precondition for the validity
of denationalization. The recognition of the right to nationality
as a basic human right, in effect, limits the power and freedom
of a State arbitrarily to deprive its citizens of nationality''
(UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/35, para.107)
The
principle of the avoidance of statelessness was reiterated
by the UN General Assembly at its 50th session (1995) when
it called on states
''16.
... to adopt nationality legislation with a view to reducing
statelessness, consistent with the fundamental principles
of international law, in particular by preventing arbitrary
deprivation of nationality and by eliminating the provisions
that permit the renunciation of a nationality without the
prior possession or acquisition of another nationality ...''
(UN General Assembly Resolution 50/152)
The
provisions of Bhutan's nationality law, which provide for
the removal of nationality or which deem that people leaving
the country have renounced their nationality without making
such loss of nationality contingent on acquisition of another
nationality, run counter to these principles. Neither Nepal
nor India normally permit dual citizenship, so Bhutanese of
Nepali ethnic origin originating from either of those countries
who acquired Bhutanese citizenship would have had to relinquish
their former citizenship. It follows that if they are now
deprived of their Bhutanese citizenship, or deemed to have
voluntarily relinquished it by leaving, they thereby become
stateless. The fact that Nepal law provides for reacquisition
of its citizenship by former citizens is not relevant to this
point, unless an individual genuinely makes that choice.
The
right of children to acquire a nationality is reinforced by
Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
Article 7(2) places a special obligation on states in this
matter in the case of children who would otherwise be stateless.
This is a particularly important provision in view of the
near-universal ratification of this Convention.
The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) provides, in Article 9:
1.
''States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to
acquire, change or retain their nationality. They shall ensure
in particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change
of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically
change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or
force upon her the nationality of her husband.
2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men
with respect to the nationality of their children.''
These
two treaties are of particular relevance, as to date they
are among the few international instruments which both Bhutan
and Nepal have ratified.(5)
Article
5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), which Bhutan has signed but has not
as yet ratified, provides that:
''States
Parties undertake to ... guarantee the right of everyone,
without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic
origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment
of the following rights: ... (d) Other civil rights, in particular
... (iii) The right to nationality''.
2.2
REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
At
the regional level, the 1948 American Declaration on Human
Rights goes much further than the UDHR in providing for every
person to have the right to the nationality of the territory
of birth if he or she does not have the right to any other
nationality.
In
1997 the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention
on Nationality which reaffirms the right to nationality and
the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of it. While recognizing
that ''in matters concerning nationality, account should be
taken both of the legitimate interests of States and those
of individuals'' (Preamble), and reaffirming the principle
that ''each State shall determine under its own law who are
its nationals'' (Article 3), the Convention ''establishes
principles and rules relating to the nationality of natural
persons ... to which the internal law of States Parties shall
conform'' (Article 1). These principles, set out in Article
4 of the Convention, include:
a)
everyone has the right to a nationality;
b) statelessness shall be avoided;
c) no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality.
The
Convention requires states parties to provide for the possibility
of naturalization of persons lawfully and habitually resident
on their territory, and in particular to facilitate the naturalization
of spouses and children of nationals and those born on their
territory. It stipulates that ''in establishing the conditions
for naturalization, [a state] shall not provide for a period
of residence exceeding ten years before the lodging of an
application'' (Article 6).
Article
7 sets out the limitations on deprivation of nationality,
which is permissible only on voluntary acquisition of another
nationality, voluntary service in a foreign military force,
conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the
State Party, for nationals habitually residing abroad who
have no genuine link with the state party, or if in the case
of a minor child the reasons for acquiring nationality are
no longer fulfilled, such as if the child acquires or possesses
the foreign nationality of its adoptive parents. In none of
these cases is it permitted to withdraw nationality if it
would lead to the person becoming stateless; the only circumstances
in which a state can withdraw nationality if the person would
become thereby stateless is if the nationality has been obtained
by fraud. Loss of nationality at the initiative of the individual
is permissible under Article 8, but not if the person concerned
would thereby become stateless.
Articles
11 and 12 require that ''decisions relating to the acquisition,
retention, loss, recovery or certification of [a state's]
nationality contain reasons in writing'' and ''be open to
an administrative or judicial review in conformity with [a
state's] internal law''.
The
provision on non-discrimination (Article 5) prohibits rules
on nationality containing distinctions or practices which
amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion,
race, colour, or national or ethnic origin. But it also includes
a provision which is particularly important in the field of
nationality, requiring states parties to be guided by the
principle of non-discrimination between citizens by birth
and naturalized citizens.
2.3
DECLARATIONS OF UN BODIES
As
stated above (see 2.1), the UN General Assembly reiterated
the importance of the prevention and reduction of statelessness
in its 50th session (1995) when it called on states
''16. ... to adopt nationality legislation with a view to
reducing statelessness, consistent with the fundamental principles
of international law, in particular by preventing arbitrary
deprivation of nationality and by eliminating the provisions
that permit the renunciation of a nationality without the
prior possession or acquisition of another nationality ...''
(UN General Assembly Resolution 50/152)
In
recent years, the UN Commission on Human Rights in resolutions
on Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality has
repeatedly reaffirmed ''the importance of the right to nationality
of every human person as an inalienable human right'', and
noted that ''full social integration of an individual might
be impeded as a result of arbitrary deprivation of nationality''
(Resolution 1999/28).
The
Sub-Commission, reiterating the right to nationality in Resolution
1997/31, called on Governments
''to
revise their citizenship laws, with the technical assistance
of the [UN] Centre for Human Rights and with the advice of
the [UNHCR] so that these laws are brought into accord with
international human rights law and the Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness''.
2.4
WHAT TIES A PERSON TO A COUNTRY?
2.4.1
PRINCIPLES
Traditionally
there are two basic principles which govern the acquisition
of nationality by birth: some countries confer nationality
on children born on their territory (the principle of jus
soli, prevalent in the Americas), others confer their nationality
on children born of parents who are nationals (the jus sanguinis
principle). Most states apply some combination of these principles,
taking into account other factors such as residency. Over
the past fifty years or so, increasing emphasis has been placed
on the concept of the effective link or connection with a
state as the determining factor in acquiring citizenship.
Long-term
residency is one of the fundamental means of assessing the
significance of the link between an individual and a state,
but is not the only factor. The various elements it comprises
are described by the ICJ in the Nottebohm case (see 2.1 above).
In that case, the Court elaborated on what is the basis for
the legal bond of nationality:
''...
a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence,
interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal
rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical
expression of the fact that the individual upon whom [nationality]
is conferred ... is in fact more closely connected with the
population of the State conferring nationality than with that
of any other state.''
The
Court also recalled that in deciding cases of dual nationality,
''International
arbitrators have ... given their preference to the real and
effective nationality, that which accorded with the facts,
that based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned
and one of the States whose nationality is involved ... [T]he
habitual residence of the individual concerned is an important
factor, but there are other factors such as the centre of
his interests, his family ties, his participation in public
life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated
in his children, etc.''. (Liechstenstein v. Guatemala, ICJ
Reports 1955, pp.4ff)
The
1961 Convention on Statelessness gives particular attention
to factors relating to birth, either through the jus soli
or the jus sanguinis principle, whichever in the particular
case would be necessary to provide nationality to a person
who would otherwise be stateless. For example, Article 1 of
the Convention requires a state party to provide its nationality
to a person born on its territory who would otherwise be stateless
(jus soli principle). Article 4 requires a State Party to
grant nationality to a person not born in its territory but
who would otherwise be stateless, if the nationality of one
of his or her parents at the time of birth was that of the
contracting state (jus sanguinis principle).
At
regional level, a number of these principles are included
in the European Convention on Nationality (see 2.2 above).
Chapter VI of that Convention requires states, in dealing
with the grant or retention of nationality in matters of state
succession, to weigh several factors including the person's
genuine and effective link with the state, the habitual residence,
and the will of the person concerned. (It also mentions as
a fourth factor the person's territorial origin, since it
is clear that this should be given more or less equal weight
with the other factors when attributing the nationality of
successor states to people who, for work or other reasons,
might be residing at the time of succession outside the territory
of origin which they consider to be their home.)
2.4.2
SOME EXAMPLES OF STATE PRACTICE
The
nationality laws of the states of the former USSR and of former
Yugoslavia have come under international scrutiny in recent
years because of the new nationality laws that were enacted
by the successor states. This paper does not aim to address
the specific question of nationality laws in the context of
state succession, but simply considers some aspects of the
laws of some of those countries in so far as they illustrate
state practice with regard to what constitutes the effective
link, either at the time of the establishment of the new state
and its initial body of citizens, or at a later date by naturalization.
Most
states of the former USSR granted citizenship to all who were
lawful residents, irrespective of their ethnic origin, at
the time their new nationality laws entered into force (the
so-called ''zero option''). By basing their citizenship laws
firmly on the principle of residence at that time, no one
who had been a citizen of the USSR was left stateless after
its dissolution, at least in principle. (Moreover, Russia,
as the successor state to the USSR, also offered citizenship
on application to anyone who could prove residency in any
of the 15 former Soviet republics at the time of dissolution.)
However,
because these states have different rules and policies with
regard to acquisition of their citizenship by people who were
not permanently resident at the time, questions did arise
relating to statelessness in the case of some of the formerly
deported people who had not been able to return to their place
of origin before the disintegration of the USSR, and who,
like others of the formerly deported people, should be considered
to have retained their effective link to their country of
origin throughout the period of their enforced deportation
(see 3.1 and 3.4 below). For example, some of the Crimean
Tatars and Meshketian Turks did not return from Central Asia
to Crimea and Georgia respectively until after 1991, and so
did not automatically acquire citizenship in those states.
Citizens
of the former Yugoslavia, in addition to their Federal citizenship
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), held
the citizenship of one of the constituent republics, and in
principle automatically acquired the citizenship of the state
which was a successor to the republic whose citizenship they
formerly held. This principle was based on legal continuity
and did not necessarily depend on residence at the time the
successor state came into being. However, because republican
citizenship in the SFRY had little legal or practical relevance,
and indeed many people did not even know, until it became
relevant for the purpose of state succession, which republican
citizenship they held, this principle of legal continuity
did not ensure that people acquired the citizenship of the
republic with which they had the closest links.
Moreover,
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the republics which had
been most affected by the war, some people were unable automatically
to acquire citizenship, despite having held the former republican
citizenship, if they were unable to prove their former nationality
because official records had been destroyed. Accordingly,
because of the more or less exclusive application of the principle
of legal continuity in Croatia, with no automatic right of
citizenship given to legal residents who could not prove their
former republican citizenship, UNHCR recommended that all
those from those war-affected regions should be given the
possibility to prove their Croatian republican citizenship
through extraordinary means, including the use of testimonies.
(see also 2.4.3 below)
In
addition to the straightforward principle of legal continuity,
some states adopted different approaches to granting nationality
to residents not possessing the relevant republican citizenship.
Bosnia provided citizenship automatically to all who were
resident on 6 April 1992, and FRY (Serbia-Montenegro) offered
it to all who were resident at the date of the adoption of
the new Constitution (27 April 1992) on application within
a one-year time limit from the entry into force of the Citizenship
Act. Other states, however, have adopted less generous provisions
for offering citizenship.
Of
the Baltic States, Lithuania, where the demographic effects
of Sovietization were less pronounced than in Latvia and Estonia,
and where Lithuanians constituted about 80 per cent of the
population, adopted a modified version of the zero option
approach. This in effect gave automatic citizenship to all
who were resident in 1991 (those who had arrived in the country
after 1940 simply had to undergo a special registration procedure).
But in Estonia and Latvia, where in many regions of each country,
particularly in urban areas, the titular (that is, Estonian
or Latvian, respectively) population was in the minority,
and in the population as a whole only a bare majority, the
citizenship laws granted automatic citizenship only to those
and their descendants who were citizens at the time of the
Soviet occupation in 1940.
Complex
naturalization procedures were established for other residents,
who included people who had lived in Estonia and Latvia all
their lives, and indeed many of whom had been politically
active in the democratization movement at the end of the Soviet
era. Important elements of the naturalization requirements
were, in addition to a residence qualification, proficiency
in the titular language and knowledge of the history and constitution.
The language requirement in particular acted as a severe deterrent
to many long-term residents naturalizing as citizens, particularly
because during the Soviet era, and even after independence
in many of the areas where the Russian-speaking population
was predominant, the titular languages were not used in daily
life (although nowadays the younger generation has the possibility
to learn these languages in school).
Various
mechanisms of the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe (CSCE(6)), the UN, and the Council of Europe at
various times engaged in dialogue on these issues with the
governments of Estonia and Latvia. While recognizing those
states' wish to preserve their identity, of which in each
case their unique language was an important element, and the
special situation arising from those states having undergone
an extended period of Soviet occupation, concerns were raised
about the exclusionary effects of the citizenship laws. For
example, the CSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities
(HCNM) recognized the uniqueness of the language and its special
place in Estonian culture, and that encouragement to learn
the language as part of a policy of promoting access to citizenship
could enhance the prospect that the population would develop
a sense of loyalty towards Estonia, and that learning the
language could be seen as evidence of a willingness to integrate
into Estonian society. But among the points made by the High
Commissioner and other international bodies was that, if some
kind of language proficiency was to be required, the authorities
must make proper provision for language classes at reasonable
cost to enable residents to acquire the necessary proficiency,
and also that the language test should be waived for older
people and invalids or those with disabilities which would
impede them from learning the language. Concerns were also
raised that the language and civic knowledge tests were unreasonably
difficult and required more than the basic proficiency which
was reasonable in such circumstances.
2.4.3
ESTABLISHING EVIDENCE OF NATIONALITY OR EFFECTIVE LINK
In
the case of the Nepali-speaking people from southern Bhutan
currently in the refugee camps in eastern Nepal, the question
arises of how to establish evidence of an effective link with
Bhutan in cases where documentary evidence is absent or disputed.
As shown in section 4 of this paper on repatriation programs,
this is very common in situations where refugees have fled
as a result of war or violence and records have been lost
or destroyed (see, for example, the repatriation programs
to Guatemala, Cambodia, and Namibia described in 4.4). In
such instances the governments in the countries of origin
have usually recognized that it is impracticable or impossible
to insist on verifying the identity of each individual, and
have instead accepted as reliable evidence UNHCR or other
records taken in the country of asylum.
In
other instances such as Viet Nam, where the government in
the country of origin has insisted on verifying each individual
before return, use was made of local records in the returnees'
areas of former residence, so that even where people may have
lost or no longer have their identity documents issued by
their country of origin/return, their citizenship or effective
link in that country could be established by other means.
The lack of identity documents therefore does not need to
be an obstacle if there is cooperation and good faith among
the parties involved and a proper willingness to identify
those people who have an effective link.
In
some cases it may be necessary or possible to confirm former
residence by means of documents other than official citizenship
records, such as title deeds to property, or to rely on testimony
from neighbours or others who can confirm the former residence
of the individuals concerned.
The
question of verifying citizenship has arisen in the former
Yugoslavia, where in many cases local records have been lost
or destroyed. The Principles on Citizenship Legislation concerning
the Parties to the Peace Agreements on Bosnia and Herzegovina,
adopted following a series of regional expert meetings organized
under the auspices of the Council of Europe and UNHCR comprising
representatives from the successor states of the Former Yugoslavia
and from the OSCE, state in Principle 6:
1.
''Where documentary information relating to citizenship is
not accessible or cannot be obtained within a reasonable time
by citizens of the former SFRY, each state shall allow such
persons to provide this information by other means including
statements made by or for such persons.
2.
''Where the information given by the persons concerned shows
that they are citizens of the state or qualified to obtain
its citizenship, the state shall grant or confirm its citizenship
in respect of such persons without delay.
3.
'' Where the citizenship status of refugees and displaced
persons remains unresolved, additional measures shall be taken
to facilitate the establishment of their citizenship.''
In
Cambodia, following intervention by the Special Representative
of the UN Secretary- General, the authorities agreed to use
such methods to confirm the former residence of a group of
around 4,000 Cambodians of Vietnamese origin whom initially
they had not permitted to return. During the 1970s, Cambodians
of Vietnamese origin, many of whose families had been settled
in the country since the nineteenth century or earlier, were
subjected to pogroms and expulsion. Many who fled at that
time had returned to Cambodia, along with new settlers, after
the 1979 invasion by Viet Nam. A prevailing anti-Vietnamese
sentiment continued, encouraged or condoned by the authorities,
and in the early 1990s ethnic Vietnamese were victim of many
attacks attributed to the Khmer Rouge (PDK), where the authorities
took little or no effective action to protect them.
Following
one such massacre in Siem Reap in 1993, over 30,000 ethnic
Vietnamese fled their home villages. Some of these people
did not travel far, and chose to return home after a short
period as internally displaced persons. Others reached the
Vietnamese border, crossed and stayed in Viet Nam. But around
4,000 who fled as far as the border, but then wished to return
to their homes were not permitted to do so. The Cambodian
authorities claimed that they were Vietnamese with no history
of residence or right to return. Their identity documents,
issued under Cambodia's progressively more restrictive and
ethnically discriminatory certification regulations, and which
had effectively denationalized ethnic Vietnamese whose identity
documents had for years previously designated them as Cambodian,
stated that they were Vietnamese citizens.
In
November 1994 an Amnesty International delegation interviewed
a number of these people and found that they had a long-term
history of residence in Cambodia; they spoke Khmer and some
of them had identity documents -- by then regarded as invalid
by the Cambodian authorities -- dating back to the time of
the French protectorate. Amnesty International's delegation
also visited the home areas of some of these people and inspected
the local official records held there, which provided additional
evidence of their long-term residence. Moreover their neighbours
in their home areas could have confirmed that they had lived
there for generations, but up to that time the authorities
had not sought such confirmation.
The
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General recommended
that the Cambodian authorities work in cooperation with UNHCR
and the UN Centre for Human Rights(7) and with the assistance
of Cambodian NGOs in making a register of the families of
Vietnamese origin, obtaining and giving proper consideration
to the relevant documents establishing their long-term residence
in Cambodia, and, in the absence of such documents, obtaining
evidence from neighbours, friends or witnesses to substantiate
their claims of long-term residence (E/CN/4/1995/87/Add.1,
para 38).
In
early 1995 the Cambodian authorities agreed to accept the
assistance of UNHCR and the UN Centre for Human Rights in
taking practical steps to resolve the issue. They established
a screening program to check the documents offered as evidence
of long-term residence, and to allow the people to return.
In the case of those whose documents had been lost or destroyed,
they agreed to accept as evidence of their history of residence
statements made on their behalf by guarantors from their home
villages. By early 1996, all the families had been able to
return.
2.5
DEPRIVATION AND RENUNCIATION OF NATIONALITY
This
section considers the question of the deprivation of nationality
by the state, and of the renunciation of nationality at the
initiative of the citizen, and relates this to international
standards. While in many states legislation on these matters
provides for differential treatment between citizens by birth
and naturalized citizens (with more restrictions on removing
nationality from citizens by birth), there is growing consensus
that principles of non-discrimination should be applied. For
instance, the European Convention on Nationality provides
that each state
''shall
be guided by the principle of non-discrimination between its
nationals, whether they are nationals by birth or have acquired
its nationality subsequently'' (Article 5).
2.5.1
DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY
The
international standards relevant to deprivation of nationality
are outlined above in section 2.1. There is a strengthening
principle in international standards that prevents a state
depriving someone of their nationality if it will result in
statelessness.
Many
states' nationality laws do provide for the state to deprive
a person of citizenship in some circumstances, for example,
for acts undermining the sovereignty of the state, such as
dealing with the enemy in time of war, or on conviction for
treason (as in the United States), but such provisions are
quite limited in their application, and normally subject to
legal challenge.
With
regard to deprivation of nationality for general criminal
acts, one example is provided in the report on Human Rights
and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality submitted by the
UN Secretary-General to the 1999 session of the UN Commission
on Human Rights. According to the United Kingdom (UK) Government's
information contained in that report, UK legislation permits
recently naturalized citizens to be deprived of citizenship
if sentenced by the courts for a serious criminal offence;
but this applies only to those who have naturalized within
the past five years and not if the person thereby would become
stateless. Moreover, the decision is subject to challenge,
and the authorities have to demonstrate that it is in the
public interest. The UK Government also comments that the
power to withdraw nationality is regarded as one of last resort;
it has not been used since 1983 and there were only ten instances
under the preceding legislation from 1948 to 1983. (UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/56, 28 December 1998, paras.31, 33)
With
regard to deprivation of nationality on grounds of treason,
undermining the security of the state, or similar acts, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights examined this question
in 1977 in relation to Chile, where a number of prominent
opposition figures had been deprived of their nationality
during the state of siege, on the grounds of allegedly ''seriously
damaging from abroad the essential interests of the state
during .. states of emergency'' (Chilean Government Decree
No.175, 3 December 1973).(8) The Commission argued that a
state of emergency, being by its nature transitory, could
not justify a permanent measure such as deprivation of nationality
(and, conversely, that any temporary deprivation of nationality
commensurate with the timescale of a state of emergency would
not make sense). The Commission considered both the human
rights aspects of the measure and its effect on relations
between states:
''...
this right [to nationality] is properly considered to be one
of the most important rights of man, after the right to life
itself, because all the prerogatives, guarantees and benefits
man derives from his membership in a political and social
community -- the State -- stem from or are supported by this
right. Because of its unique nature, there is almost no country
in the world where the law uses or applies loss of nationality
as a penalty or sanction for any kind of crime, much less
for activities of a political nature. It is generally considered
that since nationality of origin is an inherent attribute
of man, his natural right, and is not a gift or favor bestowed
through the generosity or benevolence of the State, the State
may neither impose it on anyone by force, nor withdraw it
as punishment or reprisal.
''The
deprivation of nationality ... always has the effect of leaving
a citizen without a land or home of his own, forcing him to
take refuge in an alien country. That is, it inevitably impinges
on another jurisdiction, and no state may take upon itself
the power to adopt measures of this sort. ... [T]he Commission
believes that this penalty -- anachronistic, outlandish and
legally unjustifiable in any part of the world -- is a thousand
times more odious and reprehensible when applied in our own
Americas, and should forever be banned from being applied
by governments everywhere.'' (Third Report on the Situation
of Human Rights in Chile, IACHR OEA/Ser/L/V/II.40 Doc 10,
11 February 1977, pp. 80-1)
2.5.2
RENUNCIATION OF CITIZENSHIP
The
Bhutan legislation contains a number of provisions whereby
a person is deemed to have voluntarily surrendered their nationality
if they leave their agricultural land or leave their country.
A large number of the Nepali-speaking people from southern
Bhutan currently living in refugee camps in eastern Nepal
who now wish to return are alleged to have signed voluntary
migration forms stating that they were leaving the country
voluntarily, with the implication that they were willingly
renouncing their nationality.
A
number of the states whose nationality laws were considered
in this study do contain some provision for assuming the renunciation
of nationality if, for example, a person stays abroad for
a number of years and takes no steps to indicate his or her
wish to retain that nationality. This can be consistent with
the notion of the effective link, if a person voluntarily
absents himself or herself abroad over a long period, and
takes no steps to maintain contact with the consulate of his
or her country of nationality, for example in order to renew
a passport. This is provided for in the European Convention
on Nationality, which permits such loss of nationality if
there is a ''lack of a genuine link between the state ...
and a national habitually residing abroad'' (Article 7(1)(e)).
But even in the case of a prolonged absence, a number of states,
such as the United States, require an affirmative statement
by the individual of his or her wish to renounce nationality.
And even in cases where a person is presumed to have voluntarily
renounced nationality, either by a prolonged absence, or by
an affirmative statement, many states, in line with the principle
in Article 8 of the European Convention on Nationality and
Article 7(1)(a) of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness, do not permit such renunciation if it would
result in statelessness.
With
regard to the point that many of the Nepali-speaking people
from southern Bhutan currently residing in the refugee camps
in eastern Nepal allegedly signed voluntary migration forms
and were provided compensation for selling their property
at the time they left the country, there are numerous reports
that make clear that in many cases, this was done under severe
duress.(9) In this regard, a provision in Annex 7 to the 1995
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Dayton Agreement) explicitly states that no recognition should
be given to any property transfers made under duress in the
context of such people's expulsion and is currently proving
a key factor for the refugees from the former Yugoslavia who
are now seeking to return and regain their property. (see
3.5 below)
EXPULSION
AND THE RIGHT TO RETURN
The
question of expulsion and the right to return are key to the
situation of the people in the refugee camps in eastern Nepal
and intimately linked to the issues of nationality dealt with
in the previous chapter. In the case of the Nepali-speaking
population of southern Bhutan currently residing in the refugee
camps in Nepal, deprivation of nationality has been used as
a justification for their expulsion - or it has been held
to be a consequence of their having left the country and therefore
a possible justification for denying their right to return.
This
section describes the prohibitions of expulsion in international
human rights standards and international law. Most fundamental
of these is the right not to be expelled from one's own country,
but human rights standards also provide protection to non-nationals
or those who may not be habitual residents. This may be relevant
in the case of the Nepali-speaking population of southern
Bhutan whom the authorities have alleged were not Bhutanese
nationals or lawful residents. This section also considers
the other side of that equation -- the right to return to
one's own country, which applies independently of the reasons
for having left.
3.1
PROHIBITION ON EXPULSION FROM ONE'S OWN COUNTRY, RIGHT TO
RETURN
It
is a firmly established rule of international law that no
state may expel its own nationals. Quite apart from violating
the international human rights standards described below,
it infringes the sovereignty of other states if a state expels
or refuses to admit its own nationals.
Article
13(2) of the UDHR states that ''Everyone has the right to
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country''. Article 9 prohibits arbitrary exile.
While
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
does not expressly prohibit expulsion of nationals, this follows
indirectly from the right to entry set out in Article 12(4),
which states that: ''No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of the right to enter his own country''.
It
is significant that the right of entry to one's own country
is not subject to the restrictions which can be applied to
the right to liberty of movement within the state under Article
12(1) or to the right to leave set out in Article 12(2).(10)
The
use of the term ''right to enter'' (rather than right to return)
was to cover nationals of a country who have been born abroad
and who may have never before set foot in the country whose
nationality they hold (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/35, para.98).
The
Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment 27 on Article
12 of the ICCPR, issued in October 1999, states:
''The
right of a person to enter his or her own country recognizes
the special relationship of a person to that country. The
right has various facets. It implies the right to remain in
one's own country. It includes not only the right to return
after having left one's own country; it may also entitle a
person to come to the country for the first time if he or
she was born outside the country (for example, if that country
is the person's State of nationality). The right to returnis
of the utmost importance for refugees seeking voluntary repatriation.
It also implies prohibition of enforced population transfers
or mass expulsions to other countries.''
Article
12(4) of the ICCPR prohibits only ''arbitrary'' denial of
the right to enter, which raises the question of what might
amount to a ''non-arbitrary'' denial of this right. The drafting
history shows that this wording was intended solely to cover
lawful individual exile for those few states which still retained
it as a criminal penalty. However, the drafters did not wish
to go so far as to concede explicitly that exile might be
permissible, so this form of words was used in order to cover
it implicitly. In view of the drafting history, there is no
doubt that the limitation on the right of entry expressed
by the word ''arbitrarily'' relates solely to cases of lawful
exile as a punishment for a crime, permitting no other form
of denial of entry to those who fall within the scope of this
provision.
The
Human Rights Committee's General Comment 27 provides a detailed
explanation of what constitutes arbitrariness in this context.
Paragraph 21 reads:
''In
no case may a person be arbitrarily deprived of the right
to enter his or her own country. The reference to the concept
of arbitrariness in this context is intended to emphasize
that it applies to all State action, legislative, administrative
and judicial; it guarantees that even interference provided
for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims
and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event,
reasonable in the particular circumstances. The Committee
considers that there are few, if any, circumstances in which
deprivation of the right to enter one's own country could
be reasonable.''
The
Committee also makes a point which is particularly relevant
in the context of Bhutan:
''A State party must not, by stripping a person of nationality
or by expelling an individual to a third country, arbitrarily
prevent this person from returning to his or her own country.''
The
international treaties to which Bhutan is a party (CEDAW and
the CRC) and the CERD to which Bhutan is a signatory reiterate
the right to return in the particular contexts of those treaties.
At
the regional level, protection against expulsion and the right
to return are dealt with in Articles 2 and 3 of Protocol 4
of the European Convention on Human Rights, and in Article
22(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights. These provisions
go further than the ICCPR in providing explicit protection
against expulsion from one's own country (rather than simply
leaving it to be inferred from the right to return). But they
are narrower than the ICCPR in so far as these rights are
explicitly limited to nationals. Article 12(2) of the African
Charter does not restrict the right to return to nationals
(although, unlike in the other treaties, this right appears
to be subject to the same limitations as the right to leave).
The
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in May 2000
decided that Mauritania had violated, among others, Article
12 of the African Charter in a communication filed on behalf
of thousands of black Mauritanians expelled in 1989. The expulsion
was triggered by a border dispute between Senegal and Mauritania
in 1989 when, for a brief period of a few weeks, each expelled
the other's nationals. The expulsions from Mauritania continued
thereafter and were not limited to Senegalese but focused
on Mauritanians living in the south of the country. Estimates
of the numbers expelled are as high as 100,000, around 10per
cent of the total population. The expulsions were associated
with extreme human rights violations, including torture and
extrajudicial executions, and most of those expelled had their
Mauritanian identity papers destroyed at the time of their
arrest and expulsion. Many were farmers in the fertile and
relatively prosperous lands of the Senegal river valley, and
many of the villages in that part of the country were subsequently
resettled by members of the Moorish (Arab and Berber) ethnic
groups originating from the north.
The
government has stated that in principle those who wish to
can return and have their citizenship restored. But while
many have accordingly returned to Mauritania on an individual
basis, numerous administrative obstacles have prevented all
but a very few from being able to regain their nationality,
with the rest remaining as stateless persons in their own
country. Estimates of those remaining in Senegal are upwards
of 15,000; they continue to press for a collective recognition
of their citizenship and an organized return under the auspices
of UNHCR, but the Mauritanian Government has continued to
refuse to agree to this. The Senegalese Government has not
been willing to grant them citizenship.
In
its May 2000 decision, the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights urged Mauritania to ''take diligent measures
to replace the national identity documents of those Mauritanian
citizens, which were taken from them at the time of their
expulsion and ensure their return without delay to Mauritania
as well as the restitution of the belongings looted from them
at the time'' of the expulsion.
In
the case of the formerly deported peoples of the USSR who,
at the time of their deportation in the 1940s, were displaced
within their own country in the sense of the USSR, but far
from their home republics, the right to return was later recognized
by the USSR itself and, after dissolution, by the CIS states
in, for example, the 1992 Bishkek Agreement on the situation
of formerly deported populations, and reaffirmed in the Declaration
of the 1996 CIS regional conference on refugees, displaced
persons and other forms of involuntary displacement and returnees.
3.2
ONE'S ''OWN COUNTRY''
Both
the UDHR and the ICCPR refer to the right to enter one's ''own
country'' (rather than the country of nationality). Because
of the disputed nationality status of at least some of the
Nepali-speaking people from southern Bhutan who are currently
living in refugee camps in eastern Nepal (and in any other
case where expulsion has been associated with denial or deprivation
of nationality) the question of what is a person's ''own country''
is crucial to establishing their right to return. This applies
not only to those who are alleged to have voluntarily surrendered
their nationality by leaving the country or whose nationality
status is otherwise disputed, but is important also because
the successive nationality laws in Bhutan, and the way they
have been applied, have made it difficult or impossible for
many long-term residents of Bhutan who might have wished to
become nationals to do so.
The
notion of nationality is obviously the starting point for
the interpretation of one's ''own country''. The draft of
Article 12(4) of the ICCPR referred originally to the right
of entry into ''the country of which he is a national''. But
this was objected to by several states for whom the right
to return was governed, not by rules of nationality or citizenship,
but by the idea of a permanent home. So a compromise was reached
based on UDHR Article 13(2) replacing the words ''country
of which he is a national'' with ''his own country''. In the
Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, however, in response
to requests for clarification by some state delegates, it
was explained that this was meant to denote the country of
which one was a citizen. In support of the expansive interpretation
of ''own country'' it has been suggested that the delegates
in the Third Committee were unaware of the earlier debate
on this matter in the UN Commission on Human Rights, and,
further, that in the Third Committee debates some states (for
example Saudi Arabia) expressed disagreement with this interpretation.
Another view on this is that the drafters were not willing
to make a firm decision either way, but left it to future
practice and interpretation (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/35,
para. 93).
For
some years there has been a prevailing view in the writings
of jurists that the wording which was finally adopted in the
ICCPR guarantees the right of entry for those persons who
have established a ''home'' in a country other than that of
their nationality, whether by birth or by long-term residence.
Such include the children of immigrants and alien workers
who were born in the host country and no longer have a home
in their country of nationality, and immigrants who have lived
many years, but who have not -- for whatever reason -- acquired
the nationality of, the host country.
This
interpretation is confirmed by the Committee of Experts of
the Council of Europe who concluded that the scope of Article
12(4) is wider than that of Protocol 4 of the European Convention,
such that it may include stateless persons and nationals of
another state who have very close ties with the country in
question. Crucially for the case of the Nepali-speaking people
from southern Bhutan, this formulation also bars the practice
of a state depriving a person of nationality for the purpose
of expulsion as stated by the Human Rights Committee in paragraph
21 of General Comment 27, referred to above (see 3.1 above).
The
Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment 27, issued
in October 1999, provides authoritative clarification of the
scope of the concept of ''own country'' in this regard. The
Committee in paragraph 20 stated:
''The
wording of article 12, paragraph 4, does not distinguish between
nationals and aliens ("no one"). Thus, the persons
entitled to exercise this right can be identified only by
interpreting the meaning of the phrase "his own country".
The scope of "his own country" is broader than the
concept "country of his nationality". It is not
limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is, nationality
acquired at birth or by conferral; it embraces, at the very
least, an individual who, because of his or her special ties
to or claims in relation to a given country, cannot be considered
to be a mere alien..... The language of article 12, paragraph
4, moreover, permits a broader interpretation that might embrace
other categories of long-term residents, including but not
limited to stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right
to acquire the nationality of the country of such residence
''
The
criteria to determine the effective link set out by the ICJ
in the Nottebohm case (see 2.1 above) can serve as a basis
for a determination of what is one's ''own country''. The
most important of these is habitual residence, but they also
include property, family, ties, centre of interests and intentions
for the future. The longer an alien resides in a country the
more difficult it becomes to expel him -- and in any event
any such expulsion has to comply with the international standards
on expulsion of non-nationals (see 3.6 below). After a number
of years' residence an initially weak claim to residency matures
into an immunity to expulsion identical to that of nationals,
whether one has become a national or not, so the prohibition
on expulsion of nationals extends to permanent resident aliens
who have established such close links with their country of
residence that they can consider it as their own country.
3.3
THE RIGHT TO RETURN AFTER MASS EXPULSION
Authors
differ as to whether the protection of Article 12(4) of the
ICCPR applies to those who have been the subject of mass expulsion.
The more restrictive view is that the right to enter one's
own country was intended to apply to individuals, not to massive
flows of those such as Palestinians or ethnic Germans displaced
in the years after the Second World War as a result of war
or political transfers of territory or population, and whose
situations require large-scale political solutions. But this
needs to be considered not just in terms of numbers but the
nature and cause of displacement as well. In any case, other
authors hold that the right of return applies even in cases
of massive displacement. Moreover, the argument that large-scale
displacements are excluded from the right to return is contradicted
by international practice, as evidenced in consistent calls
by UN bodies for the return of large numbers of refugees and
displaced, such as Palestinians, Afghans and Greek Cypriots
and, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, by the enforcement
of the right to return in the Dayton Agreement (see 3.5 below).
3.4
THE RIGHT TO RETURN FOR REFUGEES
In
cases where people have voluntarily absented themselves over
a period of many years from their country of nationality or
habitual residence, this may contribute to a weakening of
the effective link. But the situation of refugees and those
who have been expelled from their country, whose absence arises
from factors beyond their own control, is quite different.
Such persons retain the right to return to the country of
nationality or former habitual residence, and the fact they
may have been forced by circumstances to establish a second
home country in the country of refuge should not be invoked
for the purpose of preventing them returning to their ''original
home country'', even if masses of people are claiming this
right.
UNHCR
ExCom Conclusions dealing with voluntary repatriation have
reiterated the right to return:
''The
basic rights of persons to return voluntarily to the country
of origin is reaffirmed and it is urged that international
co-operation be aimed at achieving this solution and
should be further developed.'' (UNHCR ExCom Conclusion No.40,
para.(a)).(11)
The
right of refugees to return has also been reiterated by the
UN General Assembly, which, for example,
''Reaffirms
that voluntary repatriation, when it is feasible, is the ideal
solution to refugee problems and calls upon countries of origin,
countries of asylum, the [UNHCR] and the international community
as a whole to do everything possible to enable refugees to
exercise their right to return home in safety and dignity''
(UN General Assembly Resolution 50/152, para.17)
Even
in situations extending over some generations, while the passage
of time may alter the practical feasibility and political
realities that determine how the right of return can be realized
-- Palestinians being an obvious example -- it does not diminish
the right itself. This is borne out in the repeated calls
by UN bodies for the right to return of Palestinians, as well
as the recognition of the right to return of the deported
peoples of the USSR (see 3.1).
The
right to return applies also to refugees who may have lost
their nationality, who have not lost the bond with the country
of origin and so have the right to return; UNHCR ExCom Conclusion
18 on voluntary repatriation adopted in 1980, moreover, calls
on governments to arrange for nationality to be restored in
such cases (see 4.1).
This
was recognized in the November 1990 tripartite Chile-IOM-UNHCR
repatriation agreement which provided for the return of refugees
including ''those persons who lost their Chilean nationality
because they have acquired the nationality of their country
of asylum or refuge'' (Article II). That agreement thus provided
for the return of refugees who, in many cases, had been absent
from Chile for 17 years or more, and recognized the reality
that, while in many cases such people would have forged links
with their country of asylum, even to the extent of naturalizing
as citizens, they had not thereby lost their links with Chile
and their right to return. Moreover, a number of non-national
former residents of Chile who had been expelled were permitted
to return. (see also 2.5.1 and footnote 8).
3.5
RETURN TO ONE'S HOME, COMPENSATION
The
right to return is considered as one of the ''general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations'', and the admission
of nationals is recognized in the constitutions, laws and
jurisprudence of most states (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/35,
para.89). It is also recognized in international humanitarian
law instruments, numerous UN General Assembly Resolutions,
UNHCR Excom Conclusions, declarations and other instruments.
All these lend support to the argument that the right exists
in international law, even if its precise content is difficult
to define.
More
recently, and of more general application, the UN Sub-Commission,
in its Resolution 1997/29,
''[a]ffirms
the fundamental right of refugees ... to return voluntarily,
in safety and dignity, to their countries of origin and, within
them, to their place of origin or choice, and urges Governments
to assist in and facilitate such return''.
The
plain wording of the international and regional treaties provides
simply for the return to a person's home country, but General
Assembly or other UN resolutions adopted in specific instances
clearly spell out the right of return to one's home.
With
respect to Palestinians, in 1948 the UN General Assembly resolved
that
''the
refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace
with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the
earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be
paid for the property of those choosing not to return and
for loss of or damage to property which, under principles
of international law or in equity, should be made good by
the Governments or authorities responsible'' (Resolution 194,
Article 11);
and
in 1974 the General Assembly reaffirmed
''the
inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes
and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted,
and call[ed] for their return'' (Resolution 3236).
UN
Sub-Commission Resolution 1998/26 on housing and property
restitution in the context of the return of refugees and internally
displaced persons,
''...
Recognizing that the right of refugees and internally displaced
persons to return freely to their homes and places of habitual
residence in safety and security forms an indispensable element
of national reconciliation and reconstruction ...
''Recognizing
also the right of all returnees to the free exercise of their
right to freedom of movement and to choose one's residence,
including the right to be officially registered in their homes
and places of habitual residence ....
''3.
Confirms that the adoption or application of laws by States
which are designed to or result in the loss or removal of
tenancy, use, ownership, or other rights connected with housing
or property, the active retraction of the right to reside
within a particular place, or laws of abandonment employed
against refugees or internally displaced persons pose serious
impediments to the return and reintegration of refugees and
internally displaced persons and to reconstruction and reconciliation.''
This
is a key element in respect of refugees returning to the former
Yugoslavia, where Security Council Resolution 947 affirms
the right of ''all displaced persons to return voluntarily
to their homes of origin in safety and dignity''. The UN Special
Rapporteur on the former Yugoslavia has reiterated his support
for ''the right to return to one's home of origin as a fundamental
human right'' (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/42 para.13).
Annex
7 of the Dayton Agreement, like a number of UN resolutions
on the return of Palestinians, reiterates this and provides
also for compensation in cases where people's homes cannot
be restored to them:
''All
refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return
to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have
restored to them property of which they were deprived in the
course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for
any property that cannot be restored to them.'' (Article I(1),
Dayton Agreement, Annex 7)
The
Dayton Agreement (Article VII) established an independent
Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees with the mandate
to
''resolve
and decide any claims for real property in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
where the property has not voluntarily been sold or otherwise
transferred since April 1 1992, and where the claimant does
not now enjoy possession of that property. Claims may be for
return of the property or for just compensation in lieu of
return''. (Article XI)
One
provision whose underlying principle could be of relevance
to the many Nepali-speaking people from southern Bhutan currently
living in refugee camps in eastern Nepal who state they were
coerced into signing statements of voluntary departure, states:
''In
determining the lawful owner of any property, the ... Commission
shall not recognize as valid any illegal property transaction,
including any transfer that was made under duress ...''. (Article
XII(3))
3.6 LIMITATIONS ON EXPULSION OF NON-NATIONALS
3.6.1
ARBITRARY EXPULSION
Article
13 of the ICCPR states that
''An
alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present
Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a
decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except
where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require,
be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and
to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose
before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially
designated by the competent authority''.
These
procedural guarantees expressly apply to an ''alien lawfully
in the territory'', but in practice it is not possible to
make a clear-cut distinction in this respect between the treatment
to be accorded to lawful aliens and to others. The Human Rights
Committee, in its General Comment 15/27 on the position of
Aliens under the Covenant, has stated that
''if
the legality of an alien's entry or stay is in dispute, any
decision on this point leading to his expulsion or deportation
ought to be taken in accordance with Article 13'' (para.9).
Even
for those states which are not party to the Covenant, a procedure
to question the legality is a logical corollary of the prohibition
on arbitrary expulsion; to that extent Article 13 is a reflection
of customary international law. It has also been argued that
the wide acceptance of the ICCPR, and the small number and
nature of the reservations to Article 13, indicates that the
procedural guarantees it enshrines are at the very minimum
emerging norms of customary international law. One author
has stated the view that there is no doubt that the core of
Article 13, prohibiting arbitrary expulsions, has acquired
the status of customary international law, while the second
part, setting out procedural guarantees, is an emerging norm
(Henckaerts, 1995).
The
African Charter, in Article 12(4), states that
''A
non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party
to the present Charter may only be expelled from it by virtue
of a decision taken in accordance with the law.''
Article 22(6) of the American Convention contains a very similar
provision. Protocol 7 of the European Convention on Human
Rights contains, in Article 1, protection against arbitrary
expulsion of legal aliens which closely reflects the provisions
in Article 13 of the ICCPR.
The
procedural standard set out in the ICCPR is also now laid
down in Article 22 of the UN Convention on Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families, which is a clear statement
of the current position of international law with respect
to the expulsion of legal and illegal aliens, migrant workers
or others. In some countries it is evident that the authorities
have tolerated irregular migration for a period -- for example,
when labour is needed for economic development -- but then
have cracked down on those migrants at a later date. In such
instances, the requirement of the interpretation of treaties
in good faith means that states cannot knowingly condone or
fail to prevent illegal migration or tolerate the illegal
status of migrants at an early stage, then later invoke their
illegal status in order to justify expulsion.
3.6.2
MASS EXPULSION
In
any case of mass expulsion there is a presumption that the
expulsion is tainted with discrimination, arbitrariness, and
therefore inherently unlawful. It is inherently arbitrary
because, among other things, it is impossible to tell whether
among those so expelled are some who are legal residents;
moreover its collective nature makes it virtually impossible
for the state to provide the necessary procedural guarantees.
Practice shows that, even in instances where a mass expulsion
is purportedly aimed at irregular aliens, legal residents
or nationals, or both, are often caught up in such expulsions.
The
ICCPR contains no express prohibition on the collective expulsion
of aliens. But the Human Rights Committee has stated that,
while Article 13 directly regulates only the procedure and
not the substantive grounds for expulsion, it entitles each
individual to a decision in his or her own case and so does
not permit laws or decisions providing for collective or mass
expulsions (General Comment 15(27), para.10, adopted in 1986).
So, while the ICCPR does not expressly prohibit mass expulsion,
the procedural guarantees it requires prohibit that which
characterizes it.
Mass
expulsion is expressly prohibited under the regional instruments.
Article 22(9) of the American Convention and Article 4 of
Protocol 4 to the European Convention both state that ''collective
expulsion of aliens is prohibited''. Article 12(5) of the
African Charter prohibits, and defines, mass expulsion of
aliens:
''The
mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass
expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial,
ethnic or religious groups.''
The
expulsion of Haitians from the Dominican Republic in 1991
(which has resumed from time to time since), and the comments
on it by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, illustrates
some of the other human rights violations likely to arise
in cases of mass expulsion. Over the years, large number of
Haitians have migrated to the Dominican Republic to work on
the sugar plantations, and some have been recruited specifically
for the purpose. Many have lived there for generations. The
population of Haitian origin was a mix of migrant workers,
many of whom had lived in the country since childhood, and
Dominican citizens, some of whom had citizenship papers, while
others, even though lacking such papers, had been born in
the Dominican Republic and so had a right to citizenship under
the Constitution. In June 1991 the Dominican authorities issued
Decree No.233/91, ordering the deportation of any undocumented
Haitian aged under 16 and over 60. This led to collective
expulsions of people of Haitian origin of all ages.
In
August that year a delegation of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights undertook an on-site mission to look into
the situation. In reference to the Dominican Government's
arguments that the expulsions were conducted under the Dominican
state's sovereign law, the delegation stated:
''This
is not something that can be viewed solely from the angle
of sovereignty. We understand, of course, that every State
has the authority to take decisions regarding aliens within
its territory, but when doing so consideration must be given
to the length of time those aliens have been in the country;
the activity they have engaged in; whether or not they were
born there; ... when they have had to leave the country so
abruptly, something that after living there so many years
had never even occurred to them ...''. (Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights Annual Report 1991, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.81.rev.1
Doc.6, 14 February 1992, p.263)
The
Commission found a violation of Article 22(9) of the American
Convention, prohibiting the collective expulsion of aliens.
Their other findings, expressed in terms of breaches of particular
provisions of the American Convention, illustrate the closely-interlinked
violations which are likely to occur in situations of mass
expulsion.
''...
the facts .. violate Article 22(5) [prohibiting expulsion
of nationals] to the extent that the indiscriminate roundups
and deportations in many instances cause the expulsion of
individuals born in the Dominican republic [who] have the
rights and attributes of citizenship, even if they are not
able to prove it. They also violate Article 22(6) [expulsion
of aliens only pursuant to a decision reached in accordance
with law] to the extent that Haitians who could prove their
status as residents are also deported without due legal process
that would enable them to prove that they are not in violation
of [the immigration law]. ...
''The
way in which the expulsions were being carried out violates
Article 8(1), which establishes the right to due process of
law in determining the individual's rights. ... This provision
obliges the Government ... to consider the individual situation
of persons accused of violating the Immigration Law and to
grant them the right to present their defence in the framework
of a formal hearing.
''Article
25 of the Convention [right to judicial protection] is also
violated due to the hasty way in which the repatriations were
carried out, which completely deprived those involved from
any access to a judicial recourse to determine whether they
had the right to remain in the country.''
The
Commission also found that the expulsions had brought about
the forced separation of families, in violation of Article
17(1). (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.81.rev.1 Doc.6, pp.277-8)
REPATRIATION
PROGRAMS
Verification
of refugees prior to their repatriation has not usually been
undertaken as part of repatriation programs, either because
neither party contested the status of the refugees or any
disagreements were sorted out during the process of negotiations
on the return.
The
main exception where the authorities in the country of return
undertook their own verification were the return programs
to Viet Nam and Laos under the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of
Action. The issue also arose, up to a point, in the return
program to Namibia in 1989. However, in these repatriations
the refugees had not been subject to measures of formal or
informal expulsion from the country they had fled, so it is
doubtful to what extent they can be compared with the situation
of the Nepali-speaking people from southern Bhutan currently
living in refugee camps in eastern Nepal.
This
section first describes the provisions made in a number of
repatriation agreements for establishing the identity of those
who return. It then describes provisions which have been made
for the return of non-national spouses, or where children
born in the country of asylum may not automatically acquire
the parent's citizenship.
That
is followed by a section on the principle of return to the
former place of residence or other place of the returnees'
choice, which may shed some light on possible practical approaches
that might be applied in the case of the people currently
living in refugee camps in eastern Nepal.
Following
the general discussion of these three questions is a description
of relevant features of the repatriation programs to Viet
Nam and to Laos under the Comprehensive Plan of Action, to
Namibia from Angola, to Cambodia from Thailand, and to Guatemala
from Mexico.
4.1
VERIFICATION OF NATIONALITY OR OTHER STATUS AND RIGHT TO RETURN
UNHCR's
1996 Repatriation Handbook does not deal with verification
of nationality or other status in the country of origin; it
appears to be assumed. The Handbook indicates that the UNHCR
Voluntary Repatriation Form (VRF) is usually regarded as sufficient
documentary evidence by the country of return. The model repatriation
agreement set out in the UNHCR Repatriation Handbook states:
''Duly
completed Voluntary Repatriation Forms (VRFs), the format
of which shall be mutually agreed upon by the Parties and
UNHCR, shall be recognized by the Parties as valid identity
documents [in the country of asylum and in the country of
origin] and as travel documents for the purpose of the refugees'
return to their final destinations in [the country of origin]''
(Article 17.2).
This
is reflected in a number of the repatriation agreements considered
here (Cambodia, Mozambique, Namibia) which state explicitly
that a UNHCR voluntary repatriation form will be accepted
by the country of origin/return as an identity/travel document
for the returnees. Even in cases where this might not have
been stated so explicitly in a repatriation agreement, in
practice the link to the country is usually assumed in the
case of people who have registered as refugees with UNHCR
or other appropriate body in the country of refuge, with those
records accepted as sufficient evidence of the person's identity
and right to return to the country of origin in the context
of a repatriation program.
In
the event that the authorities in the country of origin/return
do not agree to accept the UNHCR repatriation form as sufficient
evidence of identity for the purpose of return, UNHCR simply
reiterates the provision set out in ExCom Conclusion No.18
that ''the country of origin should provide repatriating refugees
with the necessary travel documents, entry permits, and any
other documentation required for return'' (Repatriation Handbook
Chapter 2.6). In this connection it should be noted that the
Repatriation Handbook also states that in negotiating repatriation
agreements ''core protection elements'' to be included are
''[a]ssurances of ... access to official documentation and
citizenship including for children born abroad'' (Chapter
3.6), and that ''[w]here refugees have lost their nationality,
the country of origin should arrange for its restoration''
(Chapter 2.6).
The
March 1993 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UNHCR
and the Government of Mozambique contains no provision for
Mozambique to undertake identity checks or verification of
the nationality of those who return under the repatriation
program. In line with the principles set out in UNHCR's 1996
Repatriation Handbook it waives the normal immigration and
customs formalities for returnees (Article 4). The associated
tripartite agreement with Zimbabwe states that ''the parties
will waive, simplify or reduce to a minimum their respective
immigration, customs and health formalities to enable ...
the use by refugees of duly completed and certified voluntary
repatriation forms or other simplified procedures as travel
documents in lieu of passports'' (Article 12). The associated
tripartite agreement with Malawi contains substantially similar
provisions (Article 7).
The
1991 Letter of Understanding between UNHCR and Guatemala likewise
contains no provisions for the Government of Guatemala to
verify the identity, nationality or other status of the returnees,
nor does it contain any provision for documenting the returnees
prior to return. It does contain a provision in Article 7
for the documentation of returnees, although it is clear that
this applies to after, not before, return (see 4.4.4 below)
The
1991 tripartite agreement for the return of Cambodians from
Thailand stipulates that UNHCR in consultation with the Thai
Government was responsible for registering the camp population
and providing them with documents reflecting their civil status
and any changes to it (such as births, marriages, divorce)
which took place in Thailand. These documents were to be recognized
by the contracting parties as valid identity documents, and
as travel documents for the purpose of travel to Cambodia
(Article 11).
The
1988 UNHCR MoU with Viet Nam was exceptional among those considered
in that it contains an annex which explicitly sets out procedures
by which the Government of Viet Nam would verify each returnee
before giving clearance for return.
Relevant
features of the Cambodia, Guatemala and Viet Nam repatriation
programs are described in more detail below (see section 4.4
below).
4.2
CHILDREN BORN ABROAD AND FAMILY MEMBERS WHO ARE NON-NATIONALS
Most
of the repatriation agreements considered contain provisions
for non-national family members to have the right of entry
or return, and, where appropriate, for facilitating their
acquisition of citizenship. The UNHCR Repatriation Handbook
states that ''the country of origin should arrange for ...
granting [nationality] to children born outside the territory
and, as appropriate, to non-national spouses'' (Chapter 2.6).
Article
10 of the 1993 MoU between UNHCR and Mozambique states that
''1.
In order to preserve the unity of the family, the spouses
of returnees and/or children who may not themselves be citizens
of Mozambique shall be allowed to enter and reside in Mozambique
as part of such returnees' families. Accordingly the Government
shall regularize their residence in Mozambique in accordance
with the provisions of its immigration or other relevant laws.
''2.
[This] shall also apply to non-Mozambican spouses and/or children
of deceased Mozambican refugees who may wish to enter and
reside in Mozambique in order to preserve their family links''.
In
Central America, the Concerted Plan of Action adopted by the
1989 Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) stated
that voluntary repatriation programs would aim at regularizing
the situation of returnees with regard to the delivery of
identity documents and registering changes in civil status
which had taken place in the country of asylum. The programs
would also provide access to citizenship for children of returnees
born abroad, as well as for foreign spouses when they so desire
(CIREFCA Plan of Action, Article 22). The November 1991 Letter
of Understanding between Guatemala and UNHCR includes an undertaking
by the Government of Guatemala to provide support for the
speedy and complete documentation of returnees as well as
all children born abroad. Partners or spouses of a different
nationality would be provided with full facilities to reside
legally in the country preserving the family unit (Article
7).
The
tripartite agreement covering returns from Thailand to Cambodia
contains no precisely parallel provision. Article 10 stipulates
that ''All juridical status of Cambodian refugees and displaced
persons, for example, births, deaths, adoptions, marriage,
divorce, which occurs in Thailand shall be recognized in Cambodia'',
and Article 12 provides for the repatriation to take place
as far as possible in family units or, where that is not possible,
for family reunification to take place once in Cambodia.
4.3
CHOICE OF RESIDENCE, RESTORATION OF PROPERTY, ACCESS TO LAND
UNHCR
ExCom Conclusion 40 states that repatriation should be ''preferably
to the place of residence of the refugee in his country of
origin'' (paragraph b).
UNHCR's
Repatriation Handbook states that the core protection elements
which must be negotiated in repatriation agreements include
''[a]ssurances of no unjustifiable interference in refugees'
free choice of destination and place of residence in their
home country'' and ''[f]reedom of movement in accordance with
national laws'' (Chapter 3.6). It also states that consideration
must be given to the issue of returnees' access to residential
and, where appropriate, agricultural land as a ''key resource
for returning refugees''. It recognizes that ''the question
of land use and land rights is a contentious and difficult
one in the aftermath of conflict, [where] land previously
occupied by returning refugees may have been sold or `repopulated'.
... UNHCR must attempt to protect the interest and legitimate
rights of returnees with regard to access to land ...'' (Chapter
6.2)
Most
of the repatriation agreements considered provide for repatriates
to return to their former homes or appropriate alternative,
or to another place of their choice, although there is some
variation in the formulations used.
The
1993 UNHCR MoU with Mozambique confirms the right of returnees
to ''return to their former places of residence or to any
other places of their choice within Mozambique'' and states
that ''the government shall ensure that returnees have access
to land for settlement and use, in accordance with Mozambique
laws'' and ''the government shall ... provide appropriate
assistance to returnees who attempt to recover their lost
property'' (Article 5).
The
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by governments
of Central American countries in 1984, asserts the principle
that repatriation should be ''preferably to the place of residence
of the refugee in his country of origin'' (Conclusion 12).
The Concerted Plan of Action adopted by the 1989 CIREFCA Conference
on Central American Refugees reiterates that voluntary repatriation
programs would reflect respect for the principle that refugees
should be able to choose their destination in their countries
of origin, as well as freedom of movement and free choice
of the place of residence, and access to means of subsistence
and to land, under the same conditions as nationals of their
countries (CIREFCA Plan of Action, Article 21(d) and (f)).
The November 1991 Letter of Understanding between Guatemala
and UNHCR contained a guarantee by the Government of Guatemala
that the returnees could freely and without pressure elect
the location where they decide to reside, whether individually
and/or as family units, or collectively. The government also
undertook to provide those returnees who were without land
when they left the country with access to land on the same
basis as other nationals. For those who formerly had rights
to land, the government undertook to do all in its power to
guarantee that they could recover and register it, or, by
agreement with the current occupiers, be compensated with
land similar in quality and location to that previously occupied
(Articles 3 and 6).
In
the 1991 MoU governing the return of Cambodians from Thailand,
the contracting parties undertook to prevent any attempt by
any side to interfere with the free choice of destination
in Cambodia (Article 3). (In fact, so many people opted for
a UNHCR repatriation package of land in Battambang province
that it was not possible to fulfil all the requests, and they
had to be given the cash alternative. But the principle of
free choice of destination was maintained.)
The
1988 UNHCR MoU with Viet Nam states, in Article 3b) that ''The
[Viet Nam government] will ensure that such persons will be
allowed to return to their place of origin. If [this] is not
feasible, they will be allowed to return to a comparable place
of their choice subject to the approval of the authorities''.
(Consistent with the agreement as a whole, this is couched
in terms of the authorities permitting return, rather than
in terms of any inherent right of the returnees to return.)
The
right to return to one's former home is also a key element
in Annex 7 of the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement). It relates to
a situation where there was systematic dispossession and resettlement
of the areas which the refugees had fled. This, and a more
general discussion of the right to return, particularly following
expulsion, is covered in section 3.3 above.
4.4
SOME POINTS FROM SPECIFIC REPATRIATION PROGRAMS
4.4.1
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (CPA): RETURNS TO VIETNAM AND
LAOS
The
authorities in Viet Nam from the outset stressed that they
would examine each case of those refugees who wished to return.
As far back as 1975, when it requested UNHCR to promote voluntary
repatriation, the government emphasized that authorization
for return fell within the government's sovereign rights,
and that each case would need to be examined (statement to
UNHCR ExCom, A/AC.96/521, para.105). The December 1988 UNHCR-Viet
Nam Memorandum of Understanding, which was confirmed in the
June 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action, is couched in terms
of the Viet Nam authorities authorizing return, rather than
in terms of any right of the refugees to return.
The
annex to the 1988 MoU sets out the procedures for verification
before return would be authorized. These procedures include
that UNHCR will send each applicant's dossier to the authorities
in Hanoi for verification (Article 3), and, if cleared for
return, travel documents would be issued by the consular authorities
in the country of asylum (Article 4). Moreover, the MoU, unlike
a number of other repatriation agreements and the model agreement
in UNHCR's Repatriation Handbook, contains no reference to
the waiver of customs and immigration formalities and regulations.
All returnees had to abide by these formalities in the same
way as any other Vietnamese nationals returning to the country.
Although
not stated explicitly in these documents, in practice the
verification related to those of mainly Chinese origin who
had not accepted Vietnamese citizenship. Those ethnic Chinese
who settled in Viet Nam during the last few centuries, had,
while maintaining their customs, culture and language, become
Vietnamese citizens. Many sought asylum in the 1970s and 1980s
in first asylum countries in South-East Asia. Those who were
screened out under the CPA and returned to Viet Nam have not,
to the knowledge of UNHCR, faced any problems in reintegration,
and have been able to obtain their family registration (Ho
Khau) in the same way as any other returnees.
Some
ethnic Chinese, however, arrived in Viet Nam more recently,
having fled China during the 1949 Revolution. In the 1950s
Taiwan offered them Republic of China (RoC) citizenship. Those
who accepted this offer were issued aliens' cards by the local
Vietnamese authorities in the expectation that they would
eventually move to Taiwan (although to date they have not
been accepted for resettlement to Taiwan and it is unlikely
that they will ever be so accepted). The concept of the ''Taiwanese
Chinese'' was maintained by the Viet Nam Government after
1975, who issued those concerned with temporary residence
permits subject to renewal every six months by the local police.
Their children too are registered as aliens, and at the age
of 16 are issued their own alien's card. In terms of the citizenship
law of the RoC, these children inherit citizenship according
to the principle of jus sanguinis. The unofficial Taiwanese
consulate in Viet Nam has continued to renew their passports
on request, although these passports do not confer the right
to settle in Taiwan.
Others
among the ethnic Chinese of 1949 origin did not take up the
offer of RoC citizenship and applied for, and were granted,
Vietnamese citizenship. Others who applied for Vietnamese
citizenship were, for some reason, refused, and others did
not apply for either Taiwanese or Vietnamese citizenship;
these two groups remain without any documentation of either
citizenship.
All
of these four groups of Chinese of 1949 origin were included
among the people who fled Viet Nam and some of them eventually
came to apply for return under the CPA. The Vietnamese authorities
cleared for return all those who had been granted Vietnamese
citizenship. In addition, they cleared around 200 people from
the other three categories, on an exceptional basis (though
it is not clear what criteria they applied when clearing some
and not others in these groups). But most individuals falling
within these three categories were considered as ''non-nationals''
by the Vietnamese authorities and refused clearance for return.
The
matter was complicated by instances where some people in first
asylum countries initially claimed to be RoC nationals, apparently
in the hope of being refused clearance for return and so improving
their chances of third country resettlement. The Viet Nam
authorities stated that if such individuals reapplied as Vietnamese
nationals, they would be accepted for return. When such individuals
did provide information which enabled the authorities to confirm
that they were Vietnamese citizens, they were cleared for
return.
At
the time the refugee camps were closed in June 2000, there
remained about 300 of these ''non-nationals'' in Hong Kong,
and a number in other first asylum countries in the region,
who had not been cleared for return by the Viet Nam authorities.
The Hong Kong authorities at the same time granted all the
remaining ''non-nationals'' permanent residency.
In
the case of returns to Laos from China, a China-Laos-UNHCR
memorandum of July 1991 states the principles for repatriation
but makes no mention of approval by the Laos Government. There
is no formal agreement for returns to Laos from Thailand,
which are governed by procedures agreed in various tripartite
meetings from 1989 to date; the meeting notes do not specifically
state that the government reserves the right to screen returnees,
but this is simply implied in the procedures agreed. In the
early years of the repatriation (1990-1), there were some
delays in the approval of applications; in some cases this
was due to lack of logistical support for transporting returnees,
as well as strict requirements by some provinces in accepting
people for return. However, since 1994 the process has moved
more quickly. To date around 28,000 people have returned to
Laos from Thailand (the vast majority), China and third countries,
with only very few cases questioned by the authorities on
grounds of nationality. Many or most that have been questioned
have been subsequently resolved and so cleared for return.
4.4.2
NAMIBIA
At
the time of the repatriation to Namibia from Angola, the country
was still administered by South Africa, which had, however,
accepted the principle that it should become independent according
to the terms of UN Resolution 435. The repatriation took place
ahead of elections scheduled for November 1989. Given the
particular nature of Namibia's transition, it is not a directly
comparable example for the situation of the people from southern
Bhutan currently living in refugee camps in eastern Nepal.
Nevertheless, it is worth examining because it is one of the
return programs where the possibility of disputed nationality
claims is mentioned in the repatriation agreement, even though
it does not appear to have become an issue in practice.
A
Protocol was concluded in March 1989 between SWAPO (as representatives
of the refugees), UNHCR and the Government of Angola, where
the refugees had been in exile. In addition UNHCR undertook
bilateral consultations with the Government of Angola regarding
the repatriation of those refugees who were not SWAPO affiliates.
UNHCR also entered into separate agreements with South Africa
on procedures for the entry and reception of Namibian exiles
and on UNHCR's role in promoting the voluntary repatriation.
In
the negotiation of the repatriation program, the South African
authorities had initially attempted to insist that the Namibian
citizenship of returnees was certified by their respective
tribal chiefs. However, the South Africa-UNHCR agreement itself
states that the (South African) Administrator General accepted
the UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation Registration Form (VRRF)
as a valid travel document for the purpose of returning to
Namibia (Article 6). It also states (Article 7) that no returnee
will be required to fill out any arrival or any other form.
The UNHCR-South Africa agreement on the role of UNHCR states
that the government undertakes to accept the validity of unexpired
travel documents issued under the auspices of the UN or the
ICRC, and that an authenticated UNHCR voluntary repatriation
form shall serve as a one-way travel and identity document
(Article 17).
The
agreement also states (Article 26) that persons crossing the
border claiming to be Namibian exiles but without the VRRF
would not be turned back, but arrangements would be made for
them to be interviewed by UNHCR who, if satisfied that they
are genuine Namibian exiles, would ask them to complete the
VRRF and then refer them to Namibian immigration officials
for processing. Unusually among the repatriation agreements
studied, this agreement does mention the possibility of disputed
nationality claims, but says that they ''will not serve as
a basis to bar repatriation or deny admission into Namibia
if the applicant can establish to the satisfaction of UNHCR
that he was a former habitual resident of Namibia prior to
his exile'' (Article 18). Thus, it seems clear that the authorities
in the country of origin/return were willing to recognize
UNHCR's registration as evidence of the returnees' link to
Namibia and their right to return.
4.4.3
CAMBODIA
Article
11 of the Thailand-Cambodia-UNHCR MoU stated that the documents
issued to the returnees in the course of the registration
exercise carried out by UNHCR in consultation with the Thai
Government would be recognized as identity and travel documents.
Children born and registered in the camps were recognized
as having the right to return, pursuant to Article 10.
There
was no citizenship verification for the returnees to Cambodia
from the Thai camps -- indeed, it would have been virtually
impossible to conduct such a verification since most records
had been destroyed by the Khmer Rouge. Once the returnees
reached the reception centres (transit centres) in Cambodia,
however, their papers were checked and this enabled the authorities
also to carry out some kind of security screening of those
who had been in camps under effective Khmer Rouge control
or who were suspected of having former Khmer Rouge links,
some of whom returned to Khmer Rouge-held areas out of the
control of the Cambodian authorities. Moreover, the Thai and
Cambodian authorities, as well as the other parties to the
Paris Peace agreement, saw the advantage of ensuring that
as many people as possible returned from Thailand, rather
than remaining in the border camps where they might have posed
a security risk. Few of the returnees had any personal documentation
except the UNHCR registration forms which required simply
the following information: name, sex, age, place of birth,
UNHCR or UN Border Relief Operation ration/registration number,
reception (transit) centre and intended destination. There
may have been some cases where the Cambodian authorities in
the reception centres raised some questions in certain cases,
but this would probably have been for security reasons (see
above), or arising from anti-Vietnamese sentiment (see below);
in any event no cases were known to have been refused for
return. In fact, with the massive rate of return (40,000 people
per month at one stage) a systematic verification would not
have been feasible, even had the Cambodian records not been
destroyed.
However,
while there was no systematic verification of those returning
to Cambodia en masse from Thailand, the situation was complicated
because a very small number of those in the camps in Thailand
who, out of fear or for other reasons, did not wish to return
to Cambodia, were able to transfer to other camps for Vietnamese,
where they entered the CPA screening program. Many such people
were of Chinese or Vietnamese ethnic origin who had lived
at different times in Viet Nam and in Cambodia. There may
have been some among this group who had lived for a longer
time in Cambodia, and for whom Cambodia could have been regarded
as their own country, but it is not known if any clear data
are available on this.(12) Some such people were resettled
as refugees under the CPA, and some who were screened out
apparently eventually returned to Viet Nam.
In
other first asylum countries in the region there were Cambodians
of Vietnamese or Chinese ethnic origin, who had fled from
Cambodia to Viet Nam during the Khmer Rouge period and then
fled Viet Nam and ended up in the camps for Vietnamese in
the region. Some were resettled as Vietnamese refugees under
the CPA. Others, after assessment by Cambodian officials,
were accepted for return to Cambodia. Others, who were not
accepted for return by the Vietnamese or the Cambodian governments,
were eventually recognized as effectively stateless and resettled
elsewhere. However, a number of Cambodians of ethnic Chinese
origin who had remained in refugee camps in Viet Nam, and
who were not formally cleared for return by the Cambodian
authorities, nevertheless returned across the open border
of their own accord, and apparently faced no particular problems
with the authorities after return.
4.4.4
GUATEMALA
The
repatriations from Mexico to Guatemala took place in several
stages over a period from 1984 onwards, while the conflict
in Guatemala still continued. Before 1987 those repatriating
did so spontaneously; UNHCR had no presence in Guatemala at
that time and once past the border there was no international
monitoring or assistance. In 1987 Permanent Commissions representing
the refugees were established to negotiate on their behalf
and on the government side a government repatriation agency
was established, with UNHCR involvement.
In
the early years those repatriating did so spontaneously and
in small groups, but at the end of 1991 a Letter of Understanding
was signed between UNHCR and the Guatemalan Government, recognizing
the right of the refugees to return in a collective and organized
manner. In 1993 the first mass repatriations took place.
There
is no indication that verification of nationality, former
residence or other status in Guatemala was an issue, and in
any case, the population of Guatemala as a whole was not documented.
Most of the refugees were indigenous with a weak sense of
national identity as Guatemalans -- their closest identity
was with the area where they lived and in particular with
their land. From the point of view of the authorities, the
main concern regarding the returnees was security and their
perceived support for the guerrillas. The Guatemalan Government
never contested that those who were registered as refugees
in Mexico had indeed come from Guatemala, and accepted the
registration undertaken by the Mexican Government or by UNHCR
as sufficient evidence of their identity and right to return.
In
view of the lack of documentation of most of the refugees
at the time they fled -- which was common to the Guatemalan
population as a whole -- it was recognized that documenting
the returnees was an important part of the repatriation and
reintegration strategy. Article 7 of the 1991 UNHCR-Guatemala
Letter of Understanding stated ''The Government of Guatemala
... will provide all its support for the speedy and complete
documentation of returnees as well as all children born abroad.
... UNHCR ... [will] provide needed support to the pertinent
state entities and instrumentalities to ensure that the latter
[possesses] such infrastructure as may be necessary to carry
out the terms of this commitment''. Pursuant to this, UNHCR,
in agreement with the Guatemalan Government, established a
project to document all those who had returned over the years.
This project was being actively implemented by 1997 (UN Doc.
EC/47/SC/CRP.43). Although this provision in the Letter of
Understanding and the UNHCR documentation project focussed
only on the documentation of the returnees, it may have had
a catalytic effect in encouraging the new law on personal
documentation, applicable to the population as a whole, approved
by the Guatemalan Congress in October 1997.
The
question of the Guatemalan citizenship of the children born
in the camps and of foreign spouses was already addressed
in general terms in Article 22 of the CIREFCA plan of action
(see 4.2 above); Article 7 of the 1991 UNHCR-Guatemala Letter
of Understanding provides for the return and lawful residence
of non-Guatemalan partners and spouses. The Letter of Understanding
does not explicitly provide for the citizenship of children
born in the camps, but this would have been unnecessary, since
Article 144 of the 1985 Guatemala Constitution provides that
children born abroad of Guatemalan parents are Guatemalan
nationals.
Some
of the Guatemalan refugees in Mexico, however, having been
there for almost a generation and in some cases having married
and established families with Mexicans and become integrated
into local communities, did not wish to return to Guatemala.
The children who had been in Mexico were in any case entitled
to Mexican citizenship by birth under the principle of jus
soli. The Mexican Government's migratory stabilization plan
for Guatemalan refugees, announced in August 1996, granted
legal immigrant status in Mexico to those who did not opt
for voluntary repatriation and afforded accelerated naturalization
procedures to those with Mexican spouses or children (UN Doc.
EC/47/SC/CRP.43). However, it is important to distinguish
this situation from that applying to the people in the camps
in Nepal, since the Guatemalan refugees had not been subject
to formal or informal measures of expulsion or deprivation
of their Guatemalan citizenship, and they had the opportunity
of returning to Guatemala had they wished to do so. The Mexican
offer of settlement and citizenship applied only to those
who had expressed a wish not to return to Guatemala.
The
main issue from the point of view of the returnees to Guatemala,
especially in the early stages, was access to land, as is
evident from the prominence given to this question in the
1991 Guatemala-UNHCR Letter of Understanding. During the 1980s,
the Guatemalan Government's policy was that all returnees
had to apply for amnesty and were then settled by the army
in ''development poles'' or model villages. While in some
cases refugees were able to recover their land if it had remained
idle because of the conflict, more often the land had been
occupied by displaced peasants (who were moved to these areas
by the army for security reasons) or by larger landholders.
This applied in particular to the lands which had been formed
into cooperatives and had been the centre of conflict in the
1960s. Problems in recovering land were often exacerbated
by the difficulty of proving legal ownership even though the
land may have been in the family for generations -- many people
had lost title deeds and municipal records of land holdings
had been destroyed during the conflict.
The
1991 Guatemala-UNHCR Letter of Understanding contained a government
guarantee that returnees who had no land when they left the
country would have access to land on the same basis as other
nationals, and that those who formerly had rights to land
would receive government assistance in recovering it or obtaining
land similar in quality and location by way of compensation
(Article 6). In 1992 an agreement was signed between the Permanent
Commissions of the refugees and the Guatemalan Government
whereby the government undertook to enable the refugees either
to recover their former lands or to purchase new land. But
even after this the pace of return was slow, largely because
of the government's failure to implement this aspect of the
agreement effectively.
* * * * * * * * *
Amnesty
International hopes that this summary of international law,
standards and practice in relation to issues of nationality,
statelessness and repatriation will be given full consideration
by Nepal and Bhutan in their negotiations to find a clear
and fair solution within a reasonable time to the situation
of the people claiming to be from Bhutan who have been residing
in refugee camps in eastern Nepal for nearly ten years. The
organization also hopes that this report may assist other
governments and agencies seeking to find solutions to similar
situations of displacement in other parts of the world.
APPENDIX: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Amnesty International: Cambodia - Arbitrary Killings of
Vietnamese (ASA 23/05/93); Kingdom of Cambodia - Human Rights
and the new government( ASA 23/05/95); Kingdom of Cambodia
- Diminishing respect for human rights (ASA 23/05/96)
2. Amnesty International: Bosnia-Herzegovina - Who's living
in my house? (EUR 63/01/97)
3. Batchelor, Carol: Stateless persons - some gaps in international
protection (7 IJRL 232 (1995))
4. Batchelor, Carol: Statelessness and the problem of resolving
nationality status (10 IJRL 156 (1998))
5. Chan, Johannes: The Right to Nationality as a Human Right
(HRLJ vol. 12 (1991))
6. Dowty, Alan: Return or compensation - the legal and political
context of the Palestinian refugee issue (USCR/World Refugee
Survey 1994)
7. Gasarasi, C.P.: UN Resolution 435 and the Repatriation
of Namibian Exiles (3 JRS 1990 p.340ff)
8.
Goodwin-Gill: The Refugee in International Law (OUP, 1996)
9. Henckaerts, Jean-Marie: Mass Expulsion in Modern International
Law and Practice (Nijhoff, 1995)
10. Jagerskiold, Stig: The Freedom of Movement, in Louis Henkin
(ed), The International Bill of rights - CCPR (1981)
11. Lawand, Kathleen: The right to return of Palestinians
in International Law(IJRL Vol 8 No.4)
12. Nowak, Manfred: UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
CCPR Commentary (N.P. Engel, 1993)
13. Tang Lay Lee: Refugees from Bhutan - Nationality, statelessness
and the right to return (IJRL Vol. 10, No. 1/2, January -
April 1998)
14. Tang Lay Lee: Stateless persons and the 1989 Comprehensive
Plan of Action (IJRL Vol 7 Nos 2&3)
15. UNHCR: Citizenship and Prevention of Statelessness linked
to the Disintegration of the SFRY (UNHCR European Series Vol.3
No.1 June 1997)
16. UN Sub-Commission: The right of everyone to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his own country
- final report prepared by C.L.C. Mubanga-Chipoya UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/35 (20 June 1988)
17. UNHCR: State of the World's Refugees 1997
18. US Committee for Refugees: World Refugee Survey (various
annual reports) 1993 - 1997
19. Zinser, Adolfo Aguilar: Repatriation of Guatemalan Refugees
in Mexico - Conditions and Prospects in Larkin, Cuny and Stein
(eds), Repatriation under conflict in Central America (1991)
****
1) The Human Rights Committee is the body of independent experts
elected by states parties to the ICCPR to monitor states'
compliance with that treaty. General Comments of the Human
Rights Committee represent the most authoritative interpretation
of the Covenant on the scope of state obligations under the
ICCPR available to State Parties.
2) See select bibliography in the appendix.
3) In this paper, the terms "citizenship" and "nationality"
are used interchangeably.
4) 2. Nottebohm was a German national by birth who had resided
in Guatemala since 1905; he maintained his German citizenship,
as well as business and other connections with Germany till
1939 when while still residing in Guatemala he naturalized
as a citizen of Liechtenstein. In 1943 he was removed from
Guatemala as a result of war measures. Liechtenstein took
the case to the ICJ, which ruled that Guatemala was not bound
to recognize his acquisition of Liechtenstein nationality
because of the absence of any genuine and effective link with
that country, and for that reason the Court ruled that Liechtenstein
was not entitled to extend its protection to Nottebohm vis-à-vis
Guatemala, and the claim was inadmissible.
5) The discriminatory provisions of Bhutan legislation, and
their effect on children, are in probable breach of CRC and
CEDAW. They are discussed in Tang Lay Lee, "Refugees
from Bhutan" (see select bibliography in appendix).
6) On 1 January 1995, the CSCE became the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
7) The UN Centre for Human Rights was consolidated into the
office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in September
1997.
8) The 1980 Constitution of Chile revoked this provision.
The nationality of Orlando Letelier, former Minister of Foreign
Affairs who was killed by a bomb placed in his car in Washington
in 1976, was posthumously restored very shortly after the
restoration of the civilian government in 1990. Subsequently
the nationality of others whose nationality had been withdrawn
around the same time was also restored.
9) See AI report Bhutan: Forcible Exile of August 1994 (AI
Index: ASA 14/04/94)
10) However, Article 12 as a whole can, in principle, be derogated
from under the extreme circumstances provided for in Article
4 of the ICCPR, namely "in time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which
officially proclaimed.
11) The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's programme
(UNHCR ExCom) is an intergovernmental body, currently comprising
around 50 states, which makes decisions (Conclusions) on specific
aspects of refugee protection which are intended to guide
UNHCR and states in protecting refugees. While the Conclusions
are not binding on states in the same way as treaties, they
represent the view of the international community and carry
persuasive authority.
12) This should be seen against the context of the fluidity
of the population in southeast Asian countries, arising from
traditional migration patterns and, particularly, the displacement
caused by the war and other upheavals of the 1960s to 1980s.
Many people in the region had been on the move for many years
and may have resided in two or three countries at different
times in their lives.
Amnesty International AI Index: ASA 14/01/00
URL:
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/ASA140012000?
OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\BHUTAN
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