After tactics have been mastered, the urban guerrilla in Brazil operates within the following strategic framework:

1. to threaten the triangle within which the Brazilian state system and North American domination are centered. The angles of this triangle are fixed in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Belo Horizante. Its base is the angle Rio-São Paulo, where the giant industrial-financial-economic-political-cultural-military-police complex that holds the decisive power of the nation is located;
2. to weaken the local links in the dictatorship's security system by means of our attacks against his "gorillas" defenses, by forcing the entire enemy complex onto the defensive so that it fears attacks everywhere on its nerve centers, not knowing where, how, or when we will attack,
3. to attack everywhere with all sorts of numerically small, self -contained, independent armed teams so that government forces are dispersed and fragmented. Never allowing the dictatorship to concentrate its forces of repression against us;
4. to encourage recruiting and mass support by our example of aggressive combat, decisiveness, firmness, determination, and persistence so that all oppressed can follow our example and enter into active urban guerrilla operations. By so doing, the government will be less and less able to deal with urban guerrilla attacks, eventually pulling back in order to guard banks, factories, armories, military barracks, prisons, public offices, radio and television stations, North American businesses, gas storage tanks, oil refineries, ships, airplanes, ports, airports, hospitals, health centers, blood banks, retail stores, garages, embassies, the mansions of the rich and influential members of the regime -- such as cabinet officers and generals -- police stations, and official organizations;
5. to gradually increase urban guerrilla operations in an endless ascendancy of surprise actions so that government troops dare not leave the cities to pursue the guerrillas into the backlands without running the risk of abandoning their control over the cities. This adds to the potential for revolution along the seacoast as well as in the interior of the nation;
6. to force the senior officers and their troops, both police and military, to leave their plush barracks. To force them to go without rest in the tense expectation of sudden attack, or in an endless search for the urban guerrilla who disappears without a trace;
7. to avoid open battle and full-scale combat with the government, limiting the struggle to brief, rapid attacks, accomplishing lightning results; and,
8. to maintain a level of maximum freedom of action yet not relinquishing the tactics of armed violence, with the initiation of rural guerrilla warfare as our goal, as well as supporting the building of a revolutionary army for ultimate national liberation.