Now we must not glorify Caesar's conquest of Gaul too much. In the latter half of the conquest the Roman policy was basically genocide! In the end Caesar imposed a tribute of only 40,000,000 Sesterces on all of Gaul. This shows that Gaul was starved and pillaged to almost bare soil. In fact the army of Caesar was almost never supplied for more than a few weeks or so. So the Romans pillaged as they moved simply for food to keep marching. So those that weren't killed or enslaved by the Romans (1 million+) were likely to starve for a couple of years. There would be no problems in Gaul until 46. So we must also tact onto Caesar the epitaph as on of history's greatest killers. But, he was a Roman.
Well, now we have to deal with the political chaos that had developed from all the back stabbing and political double dealing that allowed Caesar to conquer Gaul in the first place. Caesar's conquests were not popular with the optimates in Rome, but they were with the regular people. Forced year after year to celebrate Caesar's victories, they must have wanted some way to get rid of him before he could return in Triumph and claim eternal glory (and power) So we look at what happened. Of course in 59 during Caesar's consulship, the Lex Vatinia secured his Proconsulship, his official position in the state, until March 1, 54 BC. This laws passage is pointlessly debated on when it went through. It was certainly passed in March of 59. Caesar received Cisalpine Gaul in April, since Cicero says in a contemporary letter that the Governor was dead. Forgetting this, we look at the Lex Pompeia Licinia of 55 BC. This law gave Pompey and Crassus proconsular commands for 5 years. Part of it gave Caesar a command extension, but for how long and when did it begin? Therefore, when did it end? The big problem for us is that the written letters of Cicero, consuls, Pompey, and others, avoid the big issue, they beat around the bush. What it seems to boil down to is that the optimates, who Pompey was now leaning towards, believed that Caesar's term ended in 50 BC, on March 1, and the Caesar camp, the Populares, said 49 BC. If the Lex Pompeia Licinia gave Caesar a 5-year extension from the Lex Vatinia's date of March 1, 54, he would be out on March 1, 49 BC. But the Optimates seem to say that the term ends in 50 BC. If the law said 5 years starting in 55, when it was passed, 50 BC makes sense. Basically the whole problem is, did the two laws have an overlapping period of one year. A smart man like Caesar wouldn't have been so fooled at the Luca conference. But why would this bother Caesar now?
Well, by now in Rome the optimates wanted Caesar's head on a platter. The city was in political chaos. Caesar's capture of so much gold lowered the price of gold by 1/4, so what they owned was of less value. So they wanted any chance to strip Caesar of all he had. To do this they had to get Caesar in the city out of office. Caesar had, as we have seen, been given the right to run for a second consulship in "absentia", or away from the city. This happened in 52 when Pompey held his unusual "consul without a colleague" term. Caesar seems to have liked that instead of returning from Gaul to join Pompey in the other consulship. Although this was technically illegal due to Sulla' old laws, it could have been done. Caesar had also been sending portions of his armies back to Rome every year to vote on matters in his favor. But in late 52, Pompey passed his "Lex Pompeia De Magistratibus". This important law said that Caesar was now unable to run for office outside the city. Pompey seems to have forgotten about Caesar, turning his back. The reconquest of Gaul by the fall of 52 at Alesia must have made Pompey realized that Caesar was no ordinary Roman. Why he decided not to support Caesar against the oligarchs is a pure sign of being simply jealous. But Pompey said he just made a mistake not addressing Caesar's exemption. What more could Caesar's friends do for him? Pompey was the consul after all. Another problem was a rearrangement of how former magistrates could assume provincial commands. What this did was that Caesar would lose imperium in 49, on March 1, and would have to enter the city to make his personal announcement to run for office. Even if he won the election, he would be liable for prosecution until January 1, 48 BC. You can see the problem. In 51, Marcus Claudius Marcellus was consul and illegally tried to have Caesar recalled. It seems that Pompey had helped anti-Caesar men gain certain positions. In this year, the Tribunes of the people were able to legally oppose Marcellus. All he managed to get was a guarantee that the issue of the consular provinces would be discussed the next year on or after March 1. And just who was one of the consuls for that year, 50 BC, his cousin Gaius Claudius Marcellus.
Now in 50 BC, the year in which Lucius Aemilius Lepidus Paullus and Gaius Claudius Marcellus were consuls, Caesar had real trouble. Marcellus was married to Caesar's grandniece Octavia. He was also pure anti-Caesar. He was determined to do what his cousin couldn't do last year; force Caesar out of his command before he could assume another office (the Consulship). The other consul was the son of Caesar's old friend Marcus Amelius Lepidus, the consul in 78 BC. Caesar used a portion of his plunder, 36,000,000 sesterces (1500 talents) to buy Lepidus' loyalty. This money was of course spent for the public benefit. The Basillica Aemilia was being restored and this money completed it. Caesar also paid off the debts of Gaius Scribonius Curio, a most reckless Tribune. His father was consul in 76, who had mocked about Caesar's alleged homosexuality in Bithynia. This tribune would veto the measures of Marcellus on March 1. He would help out in other ways later. In the spring Cicero, who was still in Cilicia, got word that Pompey was not going to try to remove Caesar from Gaul until after November 15. This let Caesar do his little tour, which I'll relate later. Pompey earlier had given up his command in Spain and was given a new command by the Senate. That summer Caesar's man Sergius Sulpcius Galba lost the consular election for 49. Caesar says that this election was stolen. One can appreciate the irony of that statement! The winners were the unbuyable Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Crus and Gaius Claudius Marcellus. The latter had the same name as the current consul but was his other cousin, Marcus' brother. But Caesar did get word that Marcus Antonius was to be Tribune for 49.
Now this situation could only lead to war. Pompey must have known that he would sooner or later, probably sooner, be asked to defend the state against Caesar. It was clear that Caesar was forced to surrender by March 1, 49. But what if he didn't? On November 24 Cicero arrived in Brundisium. He knew that January 1, 49 could rip the state apart. He didn't know who to side with. Of course the Optimates tried to eliminate Caesar's tribune Curio. On December 1, Marcellus tried to get the Senate to censure him, with the help of the Censor Appius Claudius Pulcher. But Curio ingeniously managed to turn this into having the Senate vote on whether Caesar "and" Pompey should lay down their commands simultaneously. The motion was passed overwhelmingly, 370 votes to 22. Clearly, no one really wanted war, but the various political groups had maneuvered themselves into positions that could have only 2 realistic outcomes: Caesar give up and beg for mercy, or Caesar try to save himself by fighting for control of the state itself. The latter is more likely. And this problem is what gave Caesar the undeserved reputation of a power-hungry, dictatorship-seeking warlord. Actually he was forced into doing that. He didn't want to kill any Roman if he didn't have to. Remember he wanted no execution for the Catilinian conspirators. So what was Caesar doing in 50 BC?
Caesar left winter quarters for a long tour of the free towns and colonies of Gaul. He was traveling towards Italy but in no hurry. He was thanking the people for supporting Antonius, who was made an auger. Caesar himself was seeking support for his run for the consulship. But unfortunately he learned his former lieutenant had lost the election in Rome. The people of Cisalpine Gaul gave Caesar a hero's welcome. Caesar made Titus Labienus governor of Cisalpine Gaul. Then Caesar went back to Gaul, (Nemetocenna) and reviewed all his men in the lands of the Treviri. He put them on a healthy march to keep them fit. They had a whole summer of garrison duty. In the autumn the Senate passed a resolution that both Caesar and Pompey give a legion of their choice, for an army to fight the Parthians. Pompey of course chose the legion he gave Caesar several years back. This legion was sent back to Pompey, although it was from Cisalpine Gaul. Caesar gave his own legion, the 13th for his contribution. But Caesar gave these 10,000 legionaries 250 Drachmas each (1000 Sesterces). But these soldiers were to stay in Italy. Caesar stationed his other 8 legions among the more powerful tribes of Gaul. Caesar headed towards Italy. In November Caesar was forced by law to give up his command on the legal date. Pompey didn't have to do the same at the same time. On Caesar's trip towards Italy he learns that the consul Marcellus gave the 2 legions to Pompey. Caesar knew that war was coming but wanted to try anything to avoid it. On December 1, Curio got the simultaneous lay down command resolution passed.
On December 2, 50 BC, on of the world's greatest choices was made. Realizing that Caesar's tribunes would cause further obstruction of his recall, the Consul Gaius Claudius Marcellus and Consul-designate Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Crus went to Pompey. Marcellus spoke: "I hereby give you orders Pompey, to defend your country, to employ the troops you now command, and to levy more." They offered Pompey a symbolic sword, he accepted. This act was completely illegal. The Senate and more importantly, the People of Rome, never were consulted. On December 10 Cicero met Pompey to try to reach some sort of non-violent compromise. Pompey told him there would be none. War was assured!
But who would make the first move? All the accounts say that Pompey, although understanding his position in things, seemed set on letting Caesar make the first move. Pompey realized that war could only solve the problem but would be the last resort. Remember that Caesar only wanted a grace period where he could be elected and hold command until 48 BC. Caesar offered 2 compromises. First that he be allowed to hold Cisalpine Gaul and 2 legions or Illyricum and 1 legion until he could enter office. The fact that the Senate did not act on this must have convinced Caesar that war could only get what he wanted. But still Caesar, obviously hearing that the Senate on December 1, had voted for he and Pompey to lay down their commands jointly, decided to offer this idea himself. He sent out the Tribune Curio to deliver this message. He rode 160 miles and reached Rome on December 28. The new consuls couldn't discuss Caesar for 2 days (until January 1). Cicero writes on the 27th, that the government was divided on what to do. Clearly war was opposed in the mind. Reality proved different.
On January 1, 49 BC, a full Senate met in Rome. During the time from that day to January 7, various decrees were forced through that practically called Caesar a public enemy. The Senate basically declared a civil war without saying it. Caesar had to give up his command on a "date to be fixed" which was probably earlier than March 1. Caesar was in trouble now since his command would legally expire on that date before any election. But if the Senate could just give him a command extension now he could run for office in "absentia" under the law of the 10 Tribunes of 52, then he'd be OK. But the city was filled with any person who had a grudge against Caesar to vote against him. The manner of the speeches was to convince the people that Caesar, not having done anything yet, would do something illegal to save himself therefore be an enemy of the state. Caesar had two Tribunes on his side; Marcus Antonius and Quintus Cassius Longinus. On January 6 the senate passed the following "That the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people, and proconsuls in the city, should take care that the state received no injury." Proconsuls in the city was Pompey in all but name. Caesar's two Tribunes tried to "Veto" the senate decrees, but the consuls refused them. That was completely unconstitutional. Realizing that they could do nothing to help Caesar, they fled to Caesar who was at Ravenna, about to move south with only 5000 foot and 300 cavalry in Cisalpine Gaul. Caesar had taken the earlier advice of Gaius Curio and called on his other 8 legions in Transalpine Gaul to join him. Caesar had the 13th Legion with him. Moving south from Ravenna he reached the legal limit of his command. Before him, on probably the 11th of January, flowed the Rubicon.
As Caesar's forces reached the Rubicon, which by the way hardly rates as a river, he must have thought of the future. Caesar would have known that the aristocrats in Rome would never try to attack him first. Also he could never hope to make the new territories he'd won his own apart from the state. If Caesar wanted to survive he'd have to move forward. Caesar had conquered Gaul by his own military genius. Although he doesn't say so directly in his writings, no defeat in Gaul was thought by him to be his own fault. His personal confidence must have been strong, but his honor as a citizen would likely try him. That Pompey would be the enemy, he had no doubt. That would make the conflict a world wide one. Anyone looking at a map of Italy would see that Caesar had the advantage of position. So Caesar knew that the fight to win would be a fight for not only Italy, but also all of the pro-Pompey territories. These lands were basically all of the Roman territory outside Italy and Greece. Pompey would have the whole east on his side. So Caesar had to decide on how to attack, since that would be his only choice to simply survive. Since Pompey was making no move north immediately, Caesar could make the first move. If he could take Italy quickly, he could either force a surrender of the opposition, or drive them out in a haphazard fashion that would make them weaker in the future. Plus Caesar could win the support of the local Italians if he could win a quick fight in Italy that didn't get them too involved. Although the civil war would involve many Italians, the destruction of life and property was much less than if the two sides used only Italy as a theatre of war. That horror would given to the Greeks and Spanish. So for Caesar to cross the Rubicon, it was his only real choice for survival. Pompey's choices of battlefields and strategy would decide the length and locations of war.