The Australians rarely received due official direct credit for their pivotal role in turning the tide of against the Turks and liberating Damascus. When they performed heroic deeds, if noted at all, they suddenly became British troops (and many of the Australians were of non-English descent, Irish, etc.).
This became so blatant, even during the campaign itself, that the Australians tired of the credit and citations going to the English officers (through an official complaint by the Australian Government) forced a major reorganization to reflect battlefield reality. In August 1918 the name of the ‘Imperial Mounted Division’ was changed to the ‘Australian Mounted Division’; and the entire Allied force was now called the Desert Mounted Corps, comprised of the following numbers of regiments:
Allied Cavalry Composition (No. Regts.)
Australian Light-horsemen 15
English Yeomanry 5
New Zealanders 3
[So with 5 times more regiments, it’s really a misnomer to use Anzac troops, which implies a 50/50 contribution.]
Indian 12
[The Indians were rather green, arriving only for last couple of months of the campaign]
French 1
[Seem to have been attached to watch over proceedings and make sure the French end up with Syria.]
In support were the infantry, which towards the end of the campaign, was comprised of mostly Indians. In addition there were battalions of English, Scots, Welsh, Irish, West Indian, and even one of Jews.
Massey, official British correspondent in the Middle East Campaign – on the importance of the cavalry:
• “Palestine was essentially a field for the leadership of great cavalryman, this fact was realized by even the infantry divisions. So all or nearly all the successful work had been done by the mounted arms, and the foot soldiers had an admiration amounting to worship for the hardy mounted troops. (Massey, Allenby’s Final Triumph, 1920, 356)
• “No honest man can deny us [referring to the cavalry of the British Empire, but spearheaded by Australians] the glory of delivering the Holy Land and Syria from the corrupting, blighting influence of the Turk. Every Briton should know the story of what the Empire’s men did for him.” (Ibid., 20)
• It was the cavalry that was responsible for the complete overthrow of the Turk. (Ibid., 9)
• “The historic cavalry advance through 400 miles of enemy country in 6 weeks, made a great appeal to the American public.” (Ibid., 21)
• “The big results of the campaign were obtained by the mounted troops. They accomplished in 6 weeks what the infantry would have taken at least a year and perhaps 2 years to do. (Ibid., 10)
• “The advance up to Damascus was so rapid that the Turks had no time to destroy the [communication wires].”
• “Generally the permanent [Allied communication] line kept up with the advance. At least once it was abreast of the cavalry.” (Ibid., 335)
• The Turco-German force was outnumbered by Allied troops but the enemy had the advantage of being dug-in along the high ground defended with machine guns.
And to leave no doubt for future historians that the Australians were the keystone of the Middle East Campaign success, an Australian, Gen. Harry Chauvel, was placed in command of the greatest cavalry force of modern times. And it was Chauvel that led the parade of the Allied Forces through Damascus on October 2, the day after liberation – not Lawrence or an English general.
A brigadier reportedly scoffed “fancy giving the biggest mounted force in the world’s history, to an Australian.” (Jones, ALH, 90)
Further, the overall British commanders of the Allied Forces, initially Gen. Murray (who resided comfortably in his luxurious Cairo Hotel headquarters, until the Gaza battle fiasco – a mini Gallipoli), then Gen. Allenby from July 1917, confirmed that they were the ‘keystone’ of the campaign in dispatches to the London War Office and refused requests to transfer the Australians to the Western Front in France. (H.S. Gullet, Official War Records, 1923, pp. 191, 655)
The Turks basically had a formidable infantry (including a large number of Arab conscripts), commanded by German officers, that matched the calibre of the Allied infantry made up mainly of London Cockney and Scots (and later Indian reinforcements), who in contrast to the Yeomanry mounted division, were highly respected by the Light-horsemen (‘Billjims’ as they called themselves) for their performance where it counted – on the battlefield. (Gullett, 534)
However, what the Turks could not match was the Allied cavalry force – spearheaded by the Australians. And it was their added speed (covering incredible distances on their beloved Walers (their affectionate name for their horses – mostly bred in New South Wales) often without sleep for days at a time), which meant the Holy Land was liberated completely before the Armistice called a halt to proceedings.
• As the Australians forced their way through the Turkish defensive lines at the Battle of Beersheba (October 31, 1917) they just made it to the all important water wells in the rear, where a German officer was about to destroy them with demolition charges:
“For the next few moments the fate of Allenby’s campaign and the entire future of the Middle East campaign were in his hands... History’s last great cavalry charge had served an army and set it on its way...” (Jones, ALH, 104)
• Lawrence made several disparaging references to the Australians in his book, and successfully deflected attention away from the major contribution they made in the campaign. According to Lawrence they were only there for ‘sport’ – implying they were happy to get maimed and killed in order to free a region of tyranny, far away from Australia, just so Lawrence could take the credit.
“The sporting Australians saw the campaign as a point-to-point, with Damascus as the post.”
(T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom – A Triumph, 1926, p.664.)
• Quintessentially, Damascus was the key objective, the symbolic prize of the whole saga:
“For Lawrence such an audacious coup [the occupation of Damascus by the Arab army] was the only possible consummation of the Arab movement... the Arab national renaissance could be proclaimed to the world with a flourish...
Just how deep Lawrence’s feelings were on this matter was revealed in the Seven Pillars. Its sub-title ‘A Triumph’ could only be justified in terms of the final chapters in which the Arabs advance on and capture Damascus unaided. From the start, Lawrence had presented Damascus as the only goal worthy of the Arabs, for the liberation of the city would symbolise the release of the entire Arab world from Ottoman bondage... the entry into Damascus represents the end of Lawrence’s personal quest... All the major and minor themes introduced in the narrative are drawn together in the Damascus chapters to give the work an artistic completeness... [but in doing so] Lawrence was forced to jettison historical authenticity.”
(Lawrence James, The Golden Warrior – The Life & Legend of Lawrence of Arabia, 1995, 293-4)
“[Lawrence’s] account of much that occurred before and after the capture of [Damascus] was a fabrication and demonstrably so. ‘I was on thin ice when I wrote the Damascus chapter,’ he later admitted, ‘and anyone who copies me will be through [the ice]... SP [Seven Pillars] is full of half-truths here.’” (James, Ibid., 294)
• “...Lawrence tinkering with historical truth...”
Exertions of Allied troops are scarcely mentioned [in SP], even in passing.
Lawrence turned “the Arabs into something they were not, the first emancipators of Damascus. The distortion was perpetuated in... David Lean’s film ‘Lawrence of Arabia’.”
When Lawrence made his dash on the morning of October 1, 1918, in a Rolls Royce in his Arab costume, he was picked up and delayed by an Indian patrol and didn’t arrive in Damascus until about 9:00am. (James, 295)
Note: Photo in Seven Pillars (p.668) made to look like the euphoria of Lawrence entering and liberating Damascus on horse-back, when in fact he was captured in a photograph unheroically arriving in the Rolls-Royce, after the Australians had secured the city.
“Lawrence’s version of events on 30 September-1 October is a mixture of fudge and fabrication concocted to give the impression that the Arabs and not the Australians liberated Damascus.” (James, 306)
“[Damascus] was first entered by the Australian cavalry and the Arab unit which followed them were a fragment of a larger Allied army which had borne the brunt of the fighting.” (James, 196)
• Even the London Daily Telegraph of 3 October, 1918 states:
“...news of the fall of Damascus ... On the last night of September a force of cavalry rode into the city and took possession of it: and the fact that its captors were all of the Australian division is not the least fantastic detail...”
So the UK Daily Telegraph got the story right, immediately after the achievement, with no mention of Lawrence; but the BBC 78 years later now uses the Lawrence / Lowell Thomas / David Lean version of history: “[Lawrence] entered Damascus before the rest of the British forces arrived.” (1914-18: The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century, BBC Books, 124.)
• Lawrence and others try to deflect the credit away from the Australians by saying that some (an absurd 4,000 according to Lawrence) of the Arab army had slipped into the city on the night of September 30. Even if they had entered Damascus days or weeks before, the point is, it did not constitute ‘capturing’ the city – they had no effect on the Turks. The fact is the Australians forced the Turks to surrender – the final straw being a decisive attack by the 3rd Light Horse Brigade on the Turks, in the Barada Gorge, north of the city on the evening of September 30.
• “As to the final campaign in Palestine and Syria, one fact is central. Final victory was gained by Allenby’s Allied army in a series of battles during the second part of September 1918 sometimes called ‘Armageddon’. These successes were the culmination of a process of piecemeal conquest ... the enemy’s forces were engaged in pitched battles where Allied forces bore the brunt of the fighting.” (James, 318)
The British Foreign Secretary at the Paris Conference in October 1919 reminded Faisal, who was trying gain greater control of Damascus / Syria, that “His Majesty’s Government cannot forget that infinitely the larger share of the burden of the defeat of Turkey was carried by the British Empire. (James, 362)
“Those who took their history from cinema will be completely taken aback since the film Lawrence of Arabia excludes any mention of non-Arab forces from its narrative.”
“As for the Arab forces, their contribution to the Allied war effort had been useful but marginal... [and required constant] injections of British gold, weaponry, ammunition and the loan of Allied specialist units. Allied officers ... learned to place little faith in the Beduin, who were primarily concerned with their wages and what they could steal.” (James, 319-20)
• “If there was one person who had no particular illusions about the military value of the Arabs it was, as Lawrence freely admits, Allenby. He took no account of them as tactical units... Again as Lawrence records, Allenby’s chief of staff repeatedly stated—so often that Lawrence got annoyed—that all GHQ wanted or expected of him and his Arabs was “three men and a boy with pistols” outside Deraa on a given date. And that was about what he got.” (Aldington, 232)
• Aldington had a “conviction that the British people had been betrayed by a portion of its leadership... our life as a nation must not be based on lies and liars.” (Charles Doyle, Richard Aldington, a Biography, 1989, 274)
“Lawrence came to epitomize all the self-serving hypocrisy which had so long permeated British society.” (Doyle Ibid., 325)
Note: Richard Aldington got the idea to do a biography on Lawrence during a conversation in 1946 (finally published in 1955) with Alister Kershaw, an Australian, to whom Doyle dedicated the biography, and was Aldington’s closest friend and personal assistant from that period on until his death in 1962.
“If [Aldington] was right, [Liddel Hart (Tiddle Fart, to RA!)*] had been an accomplice to fraud” by printing lies. (James, 439)
*Note: Hart was Lawrence’s most ardent biographer and supporter, who had the most to gain, and lose, over the issue of Lawrence’s legitimacy.
• Gen. Rankin of 4 ALH on Lawrence: “This little tinpot fake swaggering around taking whatever kudos is going...” (James, 441)
• General Allenby (the overall commander of Allied Forces in the Middle East) “asked for his view on Lawrence, replied ‘I had several officers who would have done as well, and some would have done better.” (James, 442)
Lawrence wasn’t the only Allied soldier to wear Arab garb. Nor was Lawrence the only one blowing up the railway, which, in any event, had little impact on the Turks. Col. Newcombe, Col. Dawnay, Major Joyce, Col. Meinertzhagen and Young are prominent examples, who crop up all over war records relating to the Arab guerilla campaign. Arguably, these quiet achievers, like the Australians, played a more effective role than Lawrence.
Lawrence’s Arab band actually included an Australian (Brooks) who managed the mortar. (James, 231)
And No. 1 Squadron of the Australian Flying Corps did a lot of Lawrence’s requested bombing raids which helped to puck up the tenuous support of the Arabs. One of the pilots being the famous Ross Smith, who like many others came from the ultimate background for this type of fighting – the Australian Light Horse. “Air Cav... you just couldn’t keep those boys down, they’d traded-in their horses for [fighter planes], and were tear-arsing around [Palestine] looking for the shit.” (Milius/Coppola, Apocalypse Now) So the Australians were causing the major havoc of the campaign, both on the ground, and in the air.
Indeed, Allenby personally went out of his way to praised their contribution after the liberation of the Holy Land: “This squadron played an important part in making it possible, you gained for us supremacy in the air, thereby allowing my cavalry, artillery, and infantry to carry out their work on the ground practically unmolested by hostile aircraft” (F. M. Cutlack, Official War Records, Vol. viii - Australian Flying Corps, p. 171).
• Although in shear numbers, there were more British in the Middle East theatre (which included Cairo) than Australian troops, most of the British were in non-infantry and support / administrative positions. Also, the Australian Mounted Division spearheading the attack, unlike the British, were more effective in the hot dry desert conditions of the Middle East, which were similar to Australia, especially as many of the Light-horsemen came from the Outback.
~
“...women authors were summarily dismissed in a letter of 1924 to Sydney Cockerell [mysteriously omitted from the published letters]:
‘All the women who ever wrote original stuff could have been strangled at birth and the history of English literature (and my book shelves) would be unchanged.’” (James, 408)
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Copyright © '1997 Peter Hogan
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