Saving the Sum of Things for Pay: Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone
Part 4
by Michael van Maanen
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The Strategic Impact of Executive Outcomes
By the end of 1996, EXO did indeed have something to boast about. The company had achieved its military objectives and had applied a degree of coercion which had compelled the RUF to negotiate with the Sierra Leone government. At the same time, the company had apparently exercised its influence in persuading Bio to adhere to the government's proposed program for democratic elections. EXO had also been instrumental in insulating many rural areas from the threat of RUF atrocities. As Jeremy Harding observes, "wherever EXO went, civilians stopped dying".
EXO's operations in Sierra Leone throw some light on potential agendas for conflict resolution in African states. More specifically, they exposed an unambiguous link between EXO's military successes and Foday Sankoh's willingness to negotiate. Many of the company's harshest critics acknowledge that had EXO not intervened, the likelihood of elections taking place or the Abidjan Accords being signed, was virtually non-existent. Of course, the Accords were not signed as a result of military successes alone. Rather, they progressed under the careful diplomatic stewardship of the governments of Great Britain and Côte d'Ivoire. However, as one diplomat remarked, "always military pressure was needed to be put on before negotiations could succeed".
What then does the May coup reveal about the limitations of private military intervention? Certainly, it illustrates that in the absence of post conflict peace building measures, any peace which is concluded will be a tenuous one indeed. EXO has rejected suggestions that they can only provide band-aid solutions to complex civil wars. Nic van den Berg argues that in Sierra Leone, "the company never had a chance to prove [the critics] wrong, [since] the contracts were always terminated before [EXO] had a chance to address the long term problem". This is wishful thinking on van den Berg's behalf. Seasoned jungle-warfare operators of the apartheid era lack the skills to successfully implement complex confidence building measures. EXO's mandate in Sierra Leone was always a military one and they fulfilled that mandate to the satisfaction of their client.
At the time when EXO's contract was terminated under pressure from the RUF, the IMF, the UN and various international financial donors, the company undoubtedly could have played a vital ongoing role in occupying the military vacuum until such time as Sierra Leone's security infrastructure became viable. In this respect, EXO was limited not by operational inadequacies but rather by its client's inability to continue payment to the company. The deployment of a United Nations observer mission in Sierra Leone was also undoubtedly a more favourable alternative to Kabbah, himself a former UNDP official. Yet the planned observer mission never graduated from the drawing board as a result of the fact that Sankoh refused to grant consent for the operation. The UN's requirement of dual-consent highlights one of the most fundamental limitations of its ability to deploy in situations where one or both belligerents have no genuine interest in pursuing a negotiated settlement.
"Business is Booming"
The continued economic and administrative decline of some African nations, their lack of effective governance and their inability to project power throughout their territory independently, suggests that the phenomenon of private militaries is not about to go away. Governments who find themselves powerless to arrest the spread of low intensity conflicts in rural and outlying areas will explore all available alternatives which may provide them with a strategic edge over insurgent groups and sustain the legitimacy of ruling cadres. Some governments will therefore continue to look towards private militaries of the EXO mould in order to fill the security vacuum.
The attractiveness of private militaries is also enhanced by the fact that the UN and key western states such as the United Kingdom, France and the United States have essentially declared themselves to be out of the business of military intervention in Africa. The disasters of Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Angola have thrown the political, military and financial costs of such interventions into sharp relief. With the end of the Cold War, Africa has lost almost all of its strategic significance. Against this backdrop, senior western policy makers are increasingly unable to justify potentially costly military involvement in Africa's 'dirty wars'. This is a view supported by a senior United States diplomat who acknowledged that "Africa is a sideshow as far as [the Clinton] administration is concerned…Ever since [the end of the Cold War] Africa has barely made it onto our radar screen".
Finally, the operations of EXO in Sierra Leone drew attention to the role which coercion and offensive deployment can play in conflict resolution. In view of the historical failure of negotiated settlements, the notion of 'resolution through force' is likely to gain increasing currency among some African governments. This is after all a notion which has been legitimised by the west in the Persian Gulf, Krajina and just recently in the Nato-led air campaign throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Empirical studies also expose the fragility of negotiated settlements. Charles King, drawing upon data since 1945, argues that while the UN has worked hard to resolve disputes through negotiation and diplomacy, the threat of force and its actual application against transgressors has proven to be the most effective deterrent against continued hostilities. King's conclusions are supported by Stephen John Steadman who points out that between 1900 and 1980, a mere 15 per cent of civil wars ended as a result of negotiations. The remaining 85 per cent were concluded through the outright victory of one side over the other. Particularly since, as Kofi Annan acknowledges, "the UN does not have the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter Seven", private militaries will seek to fill this gap in the market. Recent events have shown that desperate African governments are likely to continue to hire their services.
The Strategic Impact of Executive Outcomes
By the end of 1996, EXO did indeed have something to boast about. The company had achieved its military objectives and had applied a degree of coercion which had compelled the RUF to negotiate with the Sierra Leone government. At the same time, the company had apparently exercised its influence in persuading Bio to adhere to the government's proposed program for democratic elections. EXO had also been instrumental in insulating many rural areas from the threat of RUF atrocities. As Jeremy Harding observes, "wherever EXO went, civilians stopped dying".
EXO's operations in Sierra Leone throw some light on potential agendas for conflict resolution in African states. More specifically, they exposed an unambiguous link between EXO's military successes and Foday Sankoh's willingness to negotiate. Many of the company's harshest critics acknowledge that had EXO not intervened, the likelihood of elections taking place or the Abidjan Accords being signed, was virtually non-existent. Of course, the Accords were not signed as a result of military successes alone. Rather, they progressed under the careful diplomatic stewardship of the governments of Great Britain and Côte d'Ivoire. However, as one diplomat remarked, "always military pressure was needed to be put on before negotiations could succeed".
What then does the May coup reveal about the limitations of private military intervention? Certainly, it illustrates that in the absence of post conflict peace building measures, any peace which is concluded will be a tenuous one indeed. EXO has rejected suggestions that they can only provide band-aid solutions to complex civil wars. Nic van den Berg argues that in Sierra Leone, "the company never had a chance to prove [the critics] wrong, [since] the contracts were always terminated before [EXO] had a chance to address the long term problem". This is wishful thinking on van den Berg's behalf. Seasoned jungle-warfare operators of the apartheid era lack the skills to successfully implement complex confidence building measures. EXO's mandate in Sierra Leone was always a military one and they fulfilled that mandate to the satisfaction of their client.
At the time when EXO's contract was terminated under pressure from the RUF, the IMF, the UN and various international financial donors, the company undoubtedly could have played a vital ongoing role in occupying the military vacuum until such time as Sierra Leone's security infrastructure became viable. In this respect, EXO was limited not by operational inadequacies but rather by its client's inability to continue payment to the company. The deployment of a United Nations observer mission in Sierra Leone was also undoubtedly a more favourable alternative to Kabbah, himself a former UNDP official. Yet the planned observer mission never graduated from the drawing board as a result of the fact that Sankoh refused to grant consent for the operation. The UN's requirement of dual-consent highlights one of the most fundamental limitations of its ability to deploy in situations where one or both belligerents have no genuine interest in pursuing a negotiated settlement.
"Business is Booming"
The continued economic and administrative decline of some African nations, their lack of effective governance and their inability to project power throughout their territory independently, suggests that the phenomenon of private militaries is not about to go away. Governments who find themselves powerless to arrest the spread of low intensity conflicts in rural and outlying areas will explore all available alternatives which may provide them with a strategic edge over insurgent groups and sustain the legitimacy of ruling cadres. Some governments will therefore continue to look towards private militaries of the EXO mould in order to fill the security vacuum.
The attractiveness of private militaries is also enhanced by the fact that the UN and key western states such as the United Kingdom, France and the United States have essentially declared themselves to be out of the business of military intervention in Africa. The disasters of Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Angola have thrown the political, military and financial costs of such interventions into sharp relief. With the end of the Cold War, Africa has lost almost all of its strategic significance. Against this backdrop, senior western policy makers are increasingly unable to justify potentially costly military involvement in Africa's 'dirty wars'. This is a view supported by a senior United States diplomat who acknowledged that "Africa is a sideshow as far as [the Clinton] administration is concerned…Ever since [the end of the Cold War] Africa has barely made it onto our radar screen".
Finally, the operations of EXO in Sierra Leone drew attention to the role which coercion and offensive deployment can play in conflict resolution. In view of the historical failure of negotiated settlements, the notion of 'resolution through force' is likely to gain increasing currency among some African governments. This is after all a notion which has been legitimised by the west in the Persian Gulf, Krajina and just recently in the Nato-led air campaign throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Empirical studies also expose the fragility of negotiated settlements. Charles King, drawing upon data since 1945, argues that while the UN has worked hard to resolve disputes through negotiation and diplomacy, the threat of force and its actual application against transgressors has proven to be the most effective deterrent against continued hostilities. King's conclusions are supported by Stephen John Steadman who points out that between 1900 and 1980, a mere 15 per cent of civil wars ended as a result of negotiations. The remaining 85 per cent were concluded through the outright victory of one side over the other. Particularly since, as Kofi Annan acknowledges, "the UN does not have the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter Seven", private militaries will seek to fill this gap in the market. Recent events have shown that desperate African governments are likely to continue to hire their services.
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