While EXO was able to tip the strategic balance of the Sierra Leone conflict in the government's favour, the company's services came at a high price. Not surprisingly, Strasser was unable to meet EXO's initial fee of US1.8m per month. Nic van den Berg recalls that "[The NPRC] said they could not pay, so we negotiated a deference payment and a lower monthly fee to be paid in instalments". What was not widely known at the time, was the fact that in the absence of funding from the Sierra Leone government EXO had to rely on other sources in order to execute their contractual obligations. To this end, 'EXO Sierra Leone' was at least partly financed by the profits of 'EXO Angola'. The substantial backing however came from Branch Energy who were awarded a lucrative mining concession by Strasser's government in August 1995 - three months after EXO's arrival on the scene.
Quite apart from achieving the military objectives set by Strasser, EXO had an overriding commercial interest to protect Branch Energy's investment. This would guarantee profits for Branch Energy, allow EXO to remain operational, and also result in more monthly payments to the company from the Sierra Leone government. Anthony Buckingham, while maintaining the independence of military and mining concerns, argues that EXO's presence was unambiguously beneficial for the country to the extent that it helped create the stability necessary for investment. There is some truth to this claim.
EXO's hugely successful offensives against the RUF did help to attract foreign investors into the country. This new investor confidence convinced Sierra Leone's creditors to grant a 20 per cent reduction in the country's foreign debt between 1995 and 1996. Yet Buckigham overstates the correlation between stability, investment and security. Civilians did indeed stop dying in areas where EXO deployed and maintained a coercive presence. But the reality was that EXO devoted most of their energy to securing mineral rich enclaves in Kono and the Kangari Hills. Civilians unfortunate enough to be living outside of these enclaves or other key strategic points would have been foolish to count on EXO's protection.
William Reno, a leading critic of private interventions, has argued that PMC's "protect only those who have the money or the power to award mining concessions". A government lacking in both or even one of these areas may find that they quickly lose the protection of the hired help. At present there is little to stop PMC's from calculating when to 'cut and run', irrespective of the consequences for their client. Indeed, seven months into their Sierra Leone operation EXO threatened to withdraw in the continued absence of a firm payment plan. Yet, to be fair, when EXO wound up its operations in December last year the company was still owed US$19.5m (over half of the total bill) by the Sierra Leone government. Better to post a loss than appear too 'mercenary' it seems.
Regardless, the Sierra Leone case does illustrate the high costs of private security for cash-strapped administrations. Desperate governments are capable of mortgaging a nation's mineral wealth and economic future for what may only amount to a short term lull in a given conflict. The potential exists for governments to make decisions based above all upon the profitability of the corporation, such that foreign shareholders might ultimately replace private citizens as the audience of government. Clearly, the hiring of a private military force can be reduced to little more than a strategic and economic gamble in which the losses can be very great indeed.
Conclusion
In some cases though, the gamble pays off. The Sierra Leone experience reveals that EXO played a valuable role in creating a degree of stability which gave way to elections and negotiations. At the same time there is no evidence to suggest that EXO's presence eroded the state or that the company was guilty of committing human rights abuses. All available evidence suggests that EXO operated in accordance with internationally accepted human rights standards. However, certain aspects of the company's involvement in Sierra Leone, particularly their relationship to larger transcontinental mining concerns, give good reason to be cautious about the continued use of private militaries.
At the same time, condemnation of PMCs should take into account the highly idiosyncratic nature of African conflicts and the need to look toward unorthodox means of conflict resolution. Realistically, the use of private militaries is often the lesser of two evils. Private groups with a coercive disarmament capability have the capacity to terminate wars quickly and limit loss of life. Against a background of international indifference, the alternative is the total collapse of central authority and the dissolution of the state. In situations where individual states have no appetite for risky interventions and where multilateral groups such as the OAU, SADC or the UN lack the political consensus and military capacity to respond, some African governments will look toward private, non-state actors as their best hope for stability.
Since they are unlikely to prove a transient phenomenon, it is incumbent upon the international community to ensure that the unaccountable nature of PMCs is addressed. Criminalising their potentially useful skills is both unfair and pointless. Legislation which seeks to regulate private militaries and increase their operational transparency has already come into force in South Africa. Other countries which play host to PMCs might follow the ANC's lead in this respect. Only then can we begin to ensure that PMCs are usefully integrated into peace building efforts in Africa and that they do not become a law unto themselves and their corporate sponsors.
