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UNLIKE War Plan Orange, he wanted the entire archipelago defended with citizen-soldiers or reserve force supplementing a small professional army. The rather ambitious MacArthur asked for a P16-million annual budget for the next ten years for a regular force of some 11,000 troops. He required every able-bodied male aged 21 to undergo military training for his citizen-army to become a reality.
In the meantime, he had himself appointed as Field Marshal, demanding a salary of $ 18,000 a year, equivalent to that of the governor general, in addition to a yearly allowance of $ 15,000. To be a field marshall of a virtually non-existing army was ludicrous as his chief of staff Dwight Eisenhower pointed out to him, but big Mac had his dreams.
In six months, MacArthur declared:"In the world today, there is no other defensive system that provides an equal security at remotely comparable cost to the people maintaining it."
But Eisenhower was more realistic. "Actually, we had barely gotten started, and there was no Philippine army to speak of. Few of the camps had been built, and the system of registering the Filipinos for training had barely began functioning," disclosed Eisenhower.
Even the regular force of 11,000 was besieged with logistical and technical problems. Illiteracy and ignorance among trainees and recruits were rampant. Filipinos spoke a variety of dialects which made communication difficult if not impossible at times. They had no funds, weapons, shoes or tents, and those who were able to finish training acquired little firing experience.
Training was likewise inefficient, morale was low, food inadequate and discrepancies in pay was too obvious to miss. The American private was being paid $30 a month, while his Filipino counterpart P7.00. An American sergeant received $126 while the Filipino sarge only P22.50.
MacArthur's failure to build the country's defenses resulted in a rift with Quezon. Liaison with him was delegated by the President to Sergio Osmeņa, who had from the onset suspected that MacArthur's so-called defense program was giving the country a false sense of security.
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That was probably the reason why the US War Department was not convinced of MacArthur's plans. By 1938, the Joint Planning Committee was still for the complete withdrawal in the event of war. By August 1940, MacArthur had to admit that the Philippines had to rely on the US in the event of war rather than on his own defense plans. At that time, there was only enough ammunition for 3 or 4 days of fire per weapon.
By December that year, policy makers in Washington had a change of heart. Now they wanted to beef up the country's defenses, but that was too late. War had erupted. On July 27, 1941, US President Roosevelt ordered the integration of the Philippine Army into the US Army and appointed MacArthur, now recalled to active duty, commander of the US Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE).
On October that same year, MacArthur received a new war plan code named Rainbow-5, a different version of War Plan Orange. Rainbow-5 contemplated the defense of Manila and Subic Bays, but no reinforcements would be sent.
Once more MacArthur protested and somehow was able to convince the Joint Army and Navy Board back home to defend the entire archipelago. Big Mac envisioned a massive defense of the country by stopping the Japanese at the beaches, requiring a well-trained, well-supplied force. At that time, there were 25,000 army regulars and 10 divisions consisting of 76,000 men. But this reserve existed only in paper.
In the words of Maj. Gen. Jonathan Wainwright, one of the staff of MacArthur:" Few units of army force had been completely mobilized and all lacked training and equipment. No division or force had been assembled or trained in unit maneuvers. Staffs lacked organization and trained personnel."
It was indeed a pitiful army if one could call it that. Troops had no steel helmets, blankets or raincoats. Uniforms consisted mainly of shorts, a short-sleeved shirt and a pair of canvass shoes. There were no replacements once these were worn out. The so-called 10 divisions were made up of raw recruits trained for a month. No wonder the Philippine air force was completely decimated at Clark and Iba air fields on the first day of war.
Gen. George Marshall in one scathing remark shook his head saying: "I just don't know how MacArthur happened to let his planes get caught in the ground". In two days of fighting, the Philippine Army in Lingayen collapsed before Gen. Masaharu Homma's troops. Explaining himself, MacArthur reasoned out it was the superiority of Japanese troops that won the battle for them.
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