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| 2 Overview 2.1 Crime control versus arms control Approaches: A Complementary Framework 2.1.1 Two levels of action--crime control and arms control--can combine to form the basis for the complete overhaul of the international trade in small arms. Both are integral to the cooperative regulatory approach. A Small Arms Control Regime (SACR) will help provide the basis for reducing future supply. Underlying SACR is the basic idea of "cooperative disarmament." An emphasis on commercial activity to the exclusion of governmental action becomes unacceptable, because it perpetuates the pursuit of parochial interests by key supplier States, in many cases at the expense of recipient states. This process results in grievances and, in turn, political animosity and thus, ultimately, poses serious threat to collective action on small arms proliferation. SACR is a security concept that helps to overcome the division between crime control and arms control by putting in place stringent supplier restrictions and the duality of the interaction between nonproliferation, SACR, and control. 2.1.2 At a secondary level SACR incorporates small arms control as a political-military process, as both a cause for and consequence of organized multilateral diplomacy. Within this analytical framework, there are exchanges among the different elements of international relations, which reflect a hierarchical ranking of security. 2.2 Small Arms Control Regime 2.2.1 There is growing determination on national, regional, and international levels to curtail the proliferation of small arms, e.g. the EU-SADC working group on small arms. What these efforts lack, beyond i. a. vital information and coordination is, first and foremost, the political will to act decisively. SACR can provide common policy, implementation, and enforcement standards, as well as, a forum for accumulation and analysis of data. 2.2.2 SACR should be broad in scope and global in reach. In particular, it must be a joint enterprise between developed and developing countries. SACR provides an alternate venue between the "security first" and the integrated proportional approach. To delegate small arms control measures exclusively to a regional level negates the supply/demand relationship of the issue. Developing countries will be left without support, while developed countries determine how to solve its half of the problem. The full picture of the small arms issue will never be clarified. However, SACR should not be seen as a replacement for local, national, or regional efforts. Instead, it is a way to integrate all of these various approaches and ensure that they complement rather than conflict with each other. Initially, SACR could rely on NGO activity to provide a set of common standards around which these initiatives can be harnessed into the UN machinery. It could be the contact place where small arms regulatory organizations and efforts can find out what the others are doing, and thus have a more informed grasp of how and where initiatives should focus for optimum efficiency. 2.2.3 Given the fact that the right to bear arms is constitutionally guaranteed in several UN member States, the cornerstone of SACR is a set of principles, which with respect to small arms, define what States must do both internal and external to their borders. SACR, by its very nature, will also provide a meeting place for confidential information exchange. This section discusses some regulatory measures states within a Small Arms Regime can take to limit the supply of small arms and light weapons, with specific focus on how to prevent the future supply of such weapons. This task is undertaken using a realistic approach, advancing ideas that are feasible in terms of funding, timetables, and international support. 2.2.4 Functional and operational elements. SACR could consist of, on the preventive side, (1) an international transparency regime, (2) strengthened national export, import and production controls, and (3) an international code of conduct. These elements cut across several functional areas: licit and illicit supply, confidence-building and transparency measures, and post-conflict reconstruction, and finding ultimate expression in an international convention. On the reduction side, it shall consist of weapons collection programs as integral to peace agreements, disarmament and demobilization programs, and post-conflict reintegration. These measures should find ultimate expression in a global convention on trafficking in small arms and light weapons. Cooperative disarmament must address security and developmental concerns as functional corollaries and must be integrated into national programs as well as into international cooperation efforts. 3 A Small Arms Control Regime: Prevention 3.1 Addressing Licit Supply 3.1.1 SACR and Regional Initiatives. SACR will be complementary to regional approaches, enhancing regional initiatives based on confidence and security, practical measures and norms/ principles. Not meant to detract from regional efforts, SACR is consistent with the spirit of regional import/ export quotas. These regional initiatives will be incorporated and connected to global implementation through a combination of information and resource sharing. 3.1.1.1 SACR will provide a forum for notifying all participating countries of regional policy. Participating States will then be able to tailor their policy to best meet the goals of these regional efforts. For example, supplier states can ensure that licensing and end-use agreements match regional quotas, and that licenses are not granted to export arms or ammunition where there is a significant risk that they could be diverted and smuggled into the region. Increased transparency will help ensure that regional import/export quotas are respected. 3.1.1.2 Regional efforts on restricting flows of small arms into the area should be given full support. By clearly expressing what regional goals are being pursued, States will be able to see where international assistance would be most effective and possible courses of implementation. Efforts should include regional, joint-border controls and assistance and training for police and customs officials. Consideration should also be given to developing regional communications systems to help facilitate detection of illicit arms trade. For example, regional 'hotlines', coordination centers and data-bases could provide the vital information needed to combat the flow of illicit small arms. 3.1.1.3 Contribution for norms and principles in view of the UN conference. The principles and concepts provided within the SACR could be utilized by the UN conferees as they set an action agenda, providing a framework for follow-up work Continued |
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