Consciousness, A Short Course

32. MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS, IN SEARCH OF A THEORY

• As to ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS: I don't believe that most animals are conscious, although certain higher-level mammals probably do experience an abstracted version of what human beings experience during their waking hours. In my opinion, insects, most reptiles, and lower mammals are closer in nature to autonoma. Perhaps dolphins and chimps experience "qualia" and vivid awareness of emotional states. But the lower animals, even dogs, seem generally unemotional save for the raw emotions related to anger, fear and food. One writer wonders if what dogs and horses experience is something like human sleepwalking.

• I favor a "high" definition of consciousness, one that co-evolved with three other factors: 1.) language, both in terms of word formation (semantics) and rules for stringing words together to tell a story (syntax); 2.) an abstract concept of self (i.e. self-awareness); and 3.) an autobiographical memory (e.g., 'I was born a few bends down the river, and my father was the warrior leader of our group'). Admittedly, a dog is much more sentient than a rock. But a lot of sophisticated research robots today are becoming more like dogs than rocks. Neither the dog nor the robot stay up nights pondering their meaning in the Universe; nor do they occasionally commit suicide, as only humans do. This is something unique about being human.

• Certain higher primates and dolphins, probably whales also, appear to use a rudimentary language. Arguably, there is some abstracting, some "higher order thought" going on in their heads. They are also quite social. It could be that the notion of "me" versus "all the rest of you" occurs to these creatures (consider that chimps recognize themselves in a mirror; dogs and cats do not). It's not impossible that they could pass the above "high consciousness" test.

• Evolution and the ability to abstract: I believe that HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS has much to do with the minds' ability to abstract; but not in the way that Descartes explained it. CONSCIOUSNESS has much to do with the minds' ability to abstract; but not in the way that Descartes explained it.Abstraction is a key feature that separates us from other species. It enabled us to form a self-reflective concept, a way to reflect 'raw consciousness' in on itself. Through evolutionary processes, the ability to formulate concepts and abstractions through inductive logical mechanisms was selected for its survival value, as it helped those possessing it to understand and manipulate the environment. At some point, the growing ability of the human species to formulate concepts like weight, density, hardness, coldness, smoothness, etc. was turned inward, causing the human being to formulate the concept of "me, myself, I".

• However, there is no pure thinking versus pure emotion in the mind, as Descartes and the ancient Greek philosophers had imagined. Both occur simultaneously in the mind. What we feel as emotions are guided by logical processes, and our attempts at pure logic can never wring out our inner emotions, try as we may. Just as Einstein taught physics to see time and space as a unified concept, i.e. "timespace", psychology is now teaching us to see emotions and logic as aspects of a unified fabric.

• What the Bleep? Similarities to Quantum Physics. Dr. Daniel Dennett, the great materialist / reductionist, says in his "Multiple Drafts" theory that the manner in which consciousness is probed determines what is finally observed. I could not help but think of the similarities with quantum theory; specifically the idea that on the subatomic level, where you can only probe particles by using other similar particles, the act of measurement affects the reality being measured. Thus, it is not surprising that the act of probing consciousness with consciousness is an inherently uncertain process, as with quantum-level measurement. I'm not suggesting that quantum theory be expounded as the key to all mystery, as the movie "What the Bleep Do We Know" quite spuriously did.

• Also, I am not entirely impressed with Penrose's theory of quantum coherence as the source of consciousness. This theory could account for many problematic characteristics of consciousness, such as the binding of various sense data into a unified experience, and the transition from sub-conscious to conscious states. However, it is subject to various objections, basically questioning whether quantum-level events can effect the operation of a neuron, or do they instead drown each other out (like white noise) because of the relatively large size of a neuron compared to a quantum particle. Stuart Hameroff and others have developed rationales as to how quantum events could influence neural processes, e.g. through chaos processes in certain molecular structures. Still, even if true, Penrose's theory seems to push the ontological questions to another level without answering them or considering their implications. The nature of qualia and experience remain unaddressed by Penrose.

• The notions of quantum mechanics must be used reservedly outside of the micro world. However, with regard to what we can or cannot know (i.e., epistemology), there perhaps is an appropriate comparison between consciousness and quantum physics. With quantum particles, we can see evidence of the particle in a vapor chamber or on a piece of film, but nature just doesn't allow us to perceive "the thing itself". At lengths and times smaller than Planck's length and time limits, we cannot know what is happening. Likewise, we can analyze the ripples and shadows that other peoples' consciousness create out in the world, but ultimately we cannot directly observe any consciousness other than our own. Consciousness, like an electron or photon, is ultimately a "quanta", something that cannot be cut into smaller pieces or parsed into components.

• The Easy Problem: I had initially defined consciousness as the ability to hold in the light of attention a mixture of selected sensory inputs, memories, conclusions/beliefs, concepts/abstractions and emotions, so as to seek resolution of problems DEPRESSION is consciousness' antithesis: giving up on consciousness as a problem-solver, or a breakdown thereof as to calm fears, reduce anxiety, increase satisfaction, cause positive emotional responses (especially self-opinion emotions) and select advantageous behavioral patterns. Some nights I wake up and can't get back to sleep; I need heightened consciousness to work out anxiety. Depression is, in a way, consciousness' antithesis: giving up on consciousness as a problem-solver, or a breakdown thereof (which of course is driven by physical pathology; e.g., the overactivity in brain area 25 often associated with chronic depression inhibits activity in the pre-frontal cortex, a region that is highly important to sentient self-awareness). But this kind of consciousness is not "the hard problem" as Chalmers defines it; it is one of his "easy problems".

• Much of the time, consciousness (easy version) just assumes a monitoring role, and does that choppily. There is not one unified sensory input stream; there are various streams, some being raw sensory data, others being processed and interpreted to varying degrees. Consciousness is like a TV and Tivo (recording device) having its channels changed all the time, sometimes zooming back a few seconds on the channel being "probed" (via the Tivo). It may well that a variety of sensory input interpretations co-exist in the brain at any point in time, i.e. "Multiple Drafts". It would seem, metaphorically, as though there is a cable TV with Tivo and a remote in the Carthesian Theater; i.e., easy consciousness presents hard consciousness with a shaky, changeable picture -- one that not only varies in content, but also in "time reference", i.e. how much of a delay there is between "reality time" and "perception time".

• To be fair to Dennett, I must point out that he closes down the Cartesian Theater and evicts its audience in the "Multiple Drafts" model. Dennett forbids one to imagine, even in an allegorical sense, a "television remote" being controlled by some ghostly sentinent force that changes the channels and winds back and forth in time on the Tivo. According to Dennett, a "draft" is elevated to prominence by immediate environmental needs, as perceived; if you are driving and listening to music, you may be concentrating on the music until a car runs a stop sign right in front of you. At that point, your "consciousness probe" shifts from the music stream to the visual stream, and also to your muscles as you hit the brake and jam the wheel to avoid a crash. The streams and probing system "just is" consciousness, according to Dennett; there is no hard problem.

• And yet, it seems to me that there is something more to mental life than a jumble of shifting perceptions, emotions and thoughts. In my opinion, there is a continuous element in waking life (and in dreaming life), a bottom line to consciousness, even when it is distorted by brain injury or intoxication. Within my own consciousness, I sense the presence of a basic "feeling of being", something that is not simply a function of what I am presently perceiving, remembering, thinking or feeling. For a time in my life, I had experimented with disciplined meditation states. During meditation, I believe that I was able to isolate and concentrate on this "feeling of being". The fact that meditative states are being correlated with specific brain and neurochemical states by current research does not reduce the experience of them to physical principles, as the experiential effect is so different in nature from the physical causes (i.e., the same point made by Jackson in his Vision Scientist Mary and the Rose thought experiment).

• During transcendental meditation, I attempted to extinguish awareness of thoughts, memories, feelings, background noises, temperature, muscle and skin sensations, etc. Although it is doubtful that even the most experienced meditator can totally 'empty the mind', I had a fair amount of success in achieving a state of deep inner quiet. But in those moments, I still experienced a "background radiation", something that I can only describe as a "pure feeling of being". This seemingly pure state, I believe, is variously described as "inner peace" or "higher consciousness" or "great emptiness" by meditators.

• I propose that this 'pure state of being' identified in transcendental meditation is an inherent component of all consciousness, something that gives it continuity; something that allows us to have a sense of self and time, with corresponding self-history and self-narrative. (This background 'feeling of being' is probably diminished during certain brain patholigies, especially chronic depression and multiple-identity disorders. It is important to note, however, that I am not implying that these diseases are "spiritual conditions"; they certainly are physical pathologies and should be treated as such). The late neuroscientist and philosopher Francisco Varela said that meditative practice and the insights gained from it could significantly contribute to both cognitive science and philosophy (see Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1997. The Embodied Mind, Cambridge:MIT Press). As noted on Page 1, this feeling, and not qualia, is the ultimate grounding of subjective experience.

• Easy-Consciousness, Clearly Not Epiphenomenal: In times of challenge where time is not super-critical (in time-critical situations, admittedly, consciousness does NOT decide the behavioral response), where self-referencing emotional states are negative, consciousness (easy version) attempts to resolve these states; it helps to heal inwardly and helps to come up with insights. It acts like a jig where all the parts can be held together and worked on at once. Interestingly, this kind of situation includes intellectual consternation over abstract topics, such as 'what is consciousness'. These situations may occur less than 5% of the time. Thus, consciousness (or at least the easy version of it) doesn't influence behavior very often - it may well be mostly epiphenomenal. But in the rarer, more complex "slow crisis" situations more typically studied by traditional psychologists, consciousness reflects a process that influences behavior. But does the "hard problem" aspect of consciousness just watch, as a pure epiphenomenon? This is a much more difficult question.

• If There Is A Hard Problem, There May Be A Problem With Epiphenomenalism: If dualism is accepted but "hard-problem consciousness" is shuffled off to the end of an acausal one-way street (i.e., epiphenomenalism), then why does our "easy-problem consciousness" put so much energy into the consciousness question? Since the 'easy' form of consciousness is mechanistic, one wonders how it could even formulate this question? It appears that consciousness HAS had an effect on the physical world; think of all the books that have been written on the topic! Unless we are living in a Berkelean idea, then it appears that ethereal consciousness HAS had an effect on the physical world; think of all the books that have been written and all the class discussions held on the topic! There has been much more energy expended on it than on a clearly fanciful creation such as unicorns. If you accept dualism, this might make you question the viability of epiphenomenalism, unless you postulate that the concept of consciousness got into the world through inductive hunches caused by deep-level supervenience, and not via a free-will mechanism. Still, it seems awfully strange that our perception, in the supposedly epiphenomenal and acausal realm, watches our material brain and body act and react "as if" it did feel what we feel.

• Emotions: I believe that the evolution of consciousness was shaped and supported by the brain and mind's emotional processes. What are emotions? Does a person need to be conscious to have emotions, or are emotions more basic than consciousness? I suspect that emotions came first, emerging at an earlier stage of evolution than primates and hominoids. Many animals seem to experience crude forms of emotion, especially anger. There is a fairly simple evolutionary explanation for anger, in terms of self defense. Perhaps a crude form of love (certainly not everlasting love!) helps the mating and child-rearing process to continue after sexuality has died out. It's harder to say what function joy has, but some animals appear to experience it, e.g. playful dolphins. Perhaps it is a signal to take action so as to preserve a situation or resource having survival value.

• I believe that human consciousness -- at least "easy version consciousness" -- came into full flower when humans became able to apply their ability to abstract so as to form a concept of themselves (this is akin to "higher order thought" in the representatinalist approach). Once they had a concept of "me", they could direct emotions toward this concept (i.e., toward themselves). Most experiences ultimately break down to emotion. Let's go back to Mary and the first red rose that she sees. It's ultimately a question of emotions being triggered by that experience. Our self-emotions can be good (when we're happy) or not-good (when we're sad or depressed). Or they can be just about neutral -- when we feel "dead".

• Heightened consciousness obviously occurs during very positive and very threatening experiences. Let's think about the positive experiences, e.g. eating chocolate ice cream outdoors on a lovely day in late May. The heightened state of consciousness is arguably trying to protect, extend and maximize such an experience (decide to get another bowlful?). Perhaps it serves to record the experience in memory in maximum detail, as you would save a beautiful picture from your digital camera on your computer at the maximum pixel density and file size. Yes, I realize that endorphins and serotonin are a large part of the emotional process. But that's not to deny that the mind/brain process building up in response to a positive set of stimuli.

• Heightened cogitation in the service of problem-solving may itself cause peak consciousness, but only for certain people. Scientists and other thinkers occasionally have 'Eureka! moments' which are quite pleasurable, if not always significant. However, most peak experiences do not involve highly abstract thinking.

• BACK TO THE HARD PROBLEM The process of abstraction and the turning of abstraction towards one's body and mind, and then plugging emotions into the resulting concept of "me" seems to explain some of the vividness Why, for most people, is the most satisfying mental metaphor still the CARTESIAN THEATER? behind consciousness. Still, it doesn't fully answer the hard question of just what the nature of qualia is, just what is the fundamental reason for the vivid feeling of conscious being. All that we've done is bump the mystery down a notch to allow for brain processes. Emotions may be the root of all qualia, and are not all that mysterious (they are arguably "programmable" responses); but even so, then just what is experiencing these emotions? Just why is the most satisfying metaphor for most people still the Carthesian Theater?

• Most scientific and logical explanations require a "metastructure" to place an observed phenomenon into context; e.g. lightening or lightening bugs, both part of some bigger system and yet a consequence of more basic laws and forces. Idealist philosophers such as Hegel made the point that reality cannot meaningfully exist without the mind and its awareness (i.e. consciousness); perhaps consciousness is closely tied to the metastructure of reality. It is the one Kantian "thing-in-itself" that we know. The materialist / rationalists think that you can turn it around and make reality (as described by science) the metastructure for consciousness. But, if "reality" simultaneously requires consciousness as its metastructure, we appear to have a philosophical short-circuit here, something of a tautology.

• Another problem with physicalist approaches is that they fail to appreciate the importance of synergy and dynamics. Synergy is often summarized in the phrase "the whole is more than the sum of the parts". However, within the more expansive context of "emergence", synergy means that the whole often exhibits unique characteristics relative to the individual natures of its parts. Take the simple and frequently cited example of water, H2O, which is comprised of the atomic elements hydrogen and oxygen. The nature of water is distinct and distinguishable from both hydrogen and oxygen, e.g. non-flammable. Furthermore, the nature of water itself changes depending upon scale and circumstance. The sum of millions of H2O molecules in close proximity (say in a drop of water) certainly takes on different characteristics than a lone water molecule. A few trillion water molecules in a lake or a comet take on different characteristics yet.

• Dynamics focus on the fact that any particular set of components can radically change its characture depending upon the internal and external movements of that set of components. A mega-liter of water molecules can exist as a calm lake, or as a smoothly flowing stream, or as a set of waves, or as a swirling vortex, or as an iceberg, or as a cloud -- depending upon relative and overall movements of water molecules.

• Synergy and dynamics together determine the "state" of the water molecules in question. Given the brain's advanced development and complex nature, its "STATE" can manifest a unique, non-reducible ontology: consciousness. Consciousness certainly reflects a "state" achieved by the myriad components of the brain. "State" seems to influence an entity's "substance" to varying degrees. At some point of advanced complex development, shaped by and thoroughly encompasing the many physical forces and influences in the universe -- as with the highly perceptive human brain -- state manifests a unique, non-reducible ontology: consciousness.

• Just as the state of a billion water molecules will have physical effects on the environment surrounding them, the conscious state of the brain's components certainly affects the world around it (thus defeating the notion of epiphenomenalism). The holistic properties of a system can be causally efficacious, as research regarding emergence and self-organization increasingly shows. In this light, philosopher John Searle generally equates consciousness with unique brain states and denies epiphenomenalism. Although Searle also denies dualism, some analysts consider Searle's position to actually be dualistic. The functionalist view also appreciates the importance of "state", but seems afraid to take it to an ontological conclusion -- i.e. that consciousness is a unique, non-reducible entity.

• Consciousness is also a matter of perspective, similar to quantum physics, where you see waves or particles as you wish. Dennett says something like this in discussing Multiple Drafts; and William James spoke of the "psychologist's fallacy", the tendency to observe what you have already assumed about mental process in designing an experiment. The MONIST / PHYSICALIST VIEW is not innacurate per se, but is not complete. Perhaps we can analyze the ripples and shadows that consciousness creates out in the world, and see a machine; but that aspect of us which observes this machine seems to be something else entirely. Wave / particle. Machine / mind. Both perspectives are just as real as the other. Perhaps the ontological contradictions and logical challenges of quantum mechanics provide a hint, if not a roadmap, as to the nature of consciousness. The monist / physicalist view is not innacurate per se, but is not complete.

• As David Bohm pointed out with respect to quantum mechanics and also with respect to consciousness, deeper orders of reality may exist despite the extreme difficulty of detecting and understanding them with our current empirical techniques. Admittedly, Bohmian quantum mechanics remain a controversial and often disfavored interpretation of quantum physics, given their dependence upon generally unmeasurable "hidden variables" which are non-local in nature. However, the Bohm paradigm has not been ruled out by experiment or logic, and is still discussed as an alternative to the well-known Copenhagen interpretation.

33. A SUBSTANCE DUALISM INTERPRETATION

• Given the fore-mentioned problems with physicalism and epiphenomenalism, I will next engage in a metaphysical interpretation of consciousness using a substance dualism approach, or perhaps more accurately, an interactionist dualism approach. This is currently a very unpopular view within academia. It is certainly less "economical" than physicalism, as it requires many elaborate and speculative assumptions. However, it provides a better fit with the actual experience of conscious awareness as reported by most people. It doesn't need to expend great energies defending the difficult notion that our inherent understanding of experience and self is delusional, mere "folk psychology" akin to witches and ghosts. Because I am not an academian, I possess the luxury of open thinking; I need not fear the politics of funding and appointments, and I can mostly ignore the threat of seeming too sympathetic with unenlightened God-believers.

• I would envision a dualism based roughly on Popper's World 1 and World 2, with field-particle interaction between the two that is enfolded or shrouded within quantum mechanical 'orders of reality' (via Bohmian non-local hidden variables), similar to what Sir John Eccles was developing with his psychon theories, and which Benjamin Libet seems to ponder in developing his own "mental field" theory. This interaction need not be extensive, but it certainly would be two-way, thus precluding epiphenomenalism. It may be no more than a subtle influence toward certain high-level values and general notions regarding aesthetics, or perhaps an overall response to “the feeling of being” (which arguably enhances survival, perhaps thus having a natural selection effect). I would envision the physical, sub-conscious mind acting as a “projector” into World 2. Yes, the Cartesian theater would be open for business once again.

• World 2 would have a limited role in this ontology; we World 1 creatures would have no “bank account” there, no long-term memory or records accumulating there. When we are in deep sleep, World 2 would know not of us. Perhaps our brains “learned” through natural selection a certain complex physical order that allows information exchange with World 2. World 2 thus returns information through abstractly ordered patterns enfolded within quantum processes. Such information may amount to little more than “yes” or “no” to proposals from the World 1 mind machine, something of a metaphysical commentary. But perhaps World 1 is also primed through a supervenience to a yet-undetected Bohmian deep-order underlying our World 1 physics (perhaps this involves the "information order" and "computational universe" now being discussed by various physicists, e.g. Wheeler's "it from bit"), toward the values that World 2 would favor. As such, this deep “information order” beneath World 1 also knows of World 2, and to some degree already “knows” what World 2 "favors".

• Between this faint supervenience and the corroborating subtle guidance that World 2 provides to our mental lives, we would become something more than machines. Perhaps mammals can project into World 1 and receive some feedback, but do not have minds sophisticated enough to reflect on and focus this effect (as well as the supervenience effect) as the human brain can with its powers of abstraction. Perhaps the “thing that makes us conscious” is just some deep and yet unapparent order in our neurons and electroneural activity that somehow mimics a higher order existing in the universe, a la Bohm’s implicate orders; something like fractal or holonomic relationships manifested via "clouds" of quantum events. (NOTE: World 2 is not a tangible place within or outside the known universe; nor a ghost drifting in space and time. World 2, along with the information order to which it is tied, is better described as a "state space" or "phase space" of non-local character.)

• Those of us who remember the 1960’s might waggishly call this mega-order of micro-events the “OM factor”. It would have been subtly “taught” by natural selection over eons of trial and error, given that World 2 interaction would arguably have survival value. I.e., it would enhance the necessary will to live (recall the importance of "will" in Schopenhauer's philosophy), which may otherwise have been compromised as hard-wired instincts for survival were replaced by more flexible environmental analysis. (William James commented on the "imperative of survival" inherent to consciousness). The joy-of-being prejudice from World 2 arguably makes up for the “to be or not to be” ambiguity which enters as a side-effect of the otherwise survival-enhancing flexible brain. I believe this will-to-live and joy-of-being is directly related (and perhaps identical) to the "feeling of being" experienced most vividly in deep meditation, but generally present in the mental backdrop, as discussed above.

• Obviously, in some lives, these influences are drowned out by chronic environmental conditions, Humans seem to be unique amidst animals in their ability to commit SUICIDE because of mental conditions - perhaps owing to World 2 influence, or more accurately, the shielding from it. and thus cruelty and criminality reigns. But even criminals have occasional if short-lived twinges of noble sentiment. And perhaps World 2 “information” is choked off by the neural processes and pathologies underlying depression (corresponding to the general lack of “feeling” during depression, the diminishment of qualia), thus allowing suicidal notions to fester in those who otherwise experience productive lives. Humans seem to be unique amidst animals in their ability to voluntarily end their lives because of mental conditions - perhaps owing to World 2 influence, or more accurately, the shielding from it.

• Could a substance-interaction dualism theory ever be tested and proven? It would be extremely difficult, because the idea is so large and so difficult to break into practically testable components. Eccles was reported to be pessimistic that his psychon theory could ever be empirically verified. It's hard to find a relevant starting point, as compared with typical scientific challenges. However, this quandry currently applies to all of the other candidate theories that would explain the ontology of consciousness. The best hope, in my opinion, is a long-term one, based upon an approach that would "grasp the problem as a whole".

• As our computing capacity continues to expand, it might become more and more practicable to look for faint and currently undetectable patterns in natural phenomenon data, e.g. quantum phenomenon. Bigger and faster computers have allowed Bigger and faster computers have allowed the birth of chaos theory and complexity / emergence ... perhaps subtle, currently undetectable brain/mind patterns can eventually be realized. the birth of chaos theory and the study of complexity / emergence over the past two decades. At some point it might be possible to simulate an entire brain, with its billions of neurons and synaptic connections, using a computer. Perhaps subtle, currently undetectable brain/mind patterns can then be realized, and will point the way to practical research. The further development of "computational universe" concepts may also be relevant to dualist notions of consciousness, as philosopher David Chalmers contends with his dual aspect theory of information. Continuing research into the microworld of quantum mechanics (including its non-local nature) will also be relevant. Quantum physicist Henry Stapp has published interesting work on how consciousness may emerge via quantum "global" processes, i.e. wave-like processes influencing wide areas of the brain.

• In sum, I believe that substance-interactionist models can be intelligently developed. Such views are not immediately precluded by current scientific knowledge. I believe these models would make useful contributions to the ongoing debate regarding the ultimate nature of human consciousness. I find it regrettable that such thinking is so quickly rejected by the academic and scientific institutions, for reasons that ultimately conflict with their credo of open-mindedness.

• DUALISM AS ULTIMATE MONISM: I have declared my own viewpoint towards consciousness to be a dualistic one, for it posits ontological mechanisms beyond those known and accepted by modern science (although perhaps not as imaginative as some of the spiritual and "cosmic" interpretations). However, my beliefs reflect an ultimate acceptance of monism. I don't believe in a universe of multiple realities that are forever mutually exclusive, forces that somehow intertwine to create the world that we know. I realize that many dualistic explanations of natural phenomenon were eventually replaced by scientific concepts, e.g. caloric fluid being replaced by molecular thermodynamics, phlogiston replaced by oxidation and combustion, the aether superseeded by quantum photons, and vitalism being sidelined by blood and DNA. I posit that both consciousness and the physical world described by science ultimately reduce to some unified, monistic metaphysic. Both of these realities represent manifestations of a still-unknown core reality, just as ice and steam are manifestations of water, and just as light and magnetism are manifestations of electromagnetic energy. I disagree with those who think that consciousness can be reduced to or exclusively correlated with what is currently known of the physical world through science. That would be like trying to describe steam in terms of ice crystals.

• At present, our science is not big enough to fully encompass consciousness and subjective mental experience. Some thinkers (i.e. "mysterians" such as philosopher Colin McGinn) doubt that it ever will be. I am unsure about that, but I am convinced that despite the accelerating progress of science over the past century, consciousness is still a long way from its grasp. So, the "dual" in my version of dualism is mostly an acknowledgment of the unknown. My dualism is more of an epistemic dualism than an ontological dualism. (Philosopher and sociologist Jurgen Habermas held a position balancing epistemic dualism and ontological monism.) Admittedly, the interactionist paradigm that I discuss is no more than an educated guess on what the greater truth might be. In the end, my "interactionist-dualism" assumes an ultimate monism, and thus is not terribly far from non-reductive physicalism, and at a greater distance, from property dualism and philosopher Donald Davidson's anomalous physical monism. However, I disagree with the epiphenomenal (non-causal) implications of the latter two approaches.

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

William Shakespeare, Hamlet

• CAVEAT: About 3 years ago, I became interested in human consciousness, and have read a fair number of books and articles about it. I have also formulated some thoughts of my own. I've decided to write up a web page on Consciousness, digesting what I've read and intermixing some of my own conjectures. Let me admit that some of this will represent my own guesswork. I'm not a formal academic, just an informed layperson. As neuroscientists discover more about the workings of the brain, much of what I say here will probably change, and some if not all of my own conjectures will be proved wrong. But it still represents an interesting learning process for me.

• I hope that some of this will also be of help to someone else interested in the subject.

• P.S., this web page can provide an interesting optical effect, a small "bending" of consciousness for your entertainment. Take a look at this lettering and notice its color (technically it's #330000). Then move your cursor to the right and "grab" the vertical movement bar (with a left click), then rapidly move the bar up and down. Take another look at the color of the lettering as the page jumps up and down. Does it seem different? Does it vary with how fast you jink the bar?