Consciousness, A Short Course

19. THE LANGUAGE/MIND/CONSCIOUSNESS CONNECTION

• The evolution of the human brain, the conscious mind, and the ability of humans to use language are tightly linked. A wide variety of animals use sounds to communicate, but their abilities are strictly defined and limited by their genetics. Some higher primates (like chimps and dolphins) have the ability to use a variety of sounds or hand signals as "symbols", and flexibly assign specific meanings to them. As such, they have "semantic" capability; they can assign sounds or gestures as symbols for a specific thing, e.g. a tree, or even a more generic concept, e.g. "good to eat" or "not good to eat". However, the human brain and body evolved so as to allow an expanded semantic repertoire, one that includes more abstract concepts such as "hot" or "cold" or "hard" or slippery" (and eventually "moral" or "immoral", "just" or "unjust", etc.). And, the human brain gained the ability to combine symbols for richer, more dynamic communication ability. The ability and rules by which words are combined into sentences and paragraphs is called "syntax", and allows further use of abstract concepts in problem solving.

• I had an experience years ago with a pet dog that made me aware of humanity's ability to utilize abstract concepts in our minds. It was still in grad school, and was studying for an exam. The family dog was getting old, and couldn’t make it up the steps from the back yard any more. I put the books aside and gathered up some spare lumber, and after a few hours I had fabricated a rather rudimentary but workable ramp over the stairway. The dog was in the house, so I got him out on the landing and introduced him to the new ramp. I fully expected him to gratefully acknowledge the genius behind it. But to my surprise, the dog reacted with fear to my new ramp. He couldn't understand what I had built; to him it was a strange thing, a possible threat. I couldn’t get him to walk on to it, despite repeated demonstrations of it supporting me without danger.

• I then realized how our brains differed. My human brain had the power of abstraction; it could appreciate the concepts of thickness, weight, strength, sturdiness, equivalence, etc. My dog had no such tools to analyze a novel situation. Old Shep couldn’t entertain the thought that “if it holds him, it should hold me, as he is bigger than I am”. The dog eventually did learn to use the ramp, after being tricked onto it with some red meat. But it took human ingenuity, manifested in language and abstract thought, to save the day.

• Is human consciousness affected by the ability to talk and to think abstractly? Do we have a different type of consciousness than say a dog might have because of this? Neuroscientist Anthony Damasio feels that language is not a requirement for "core consciousness". However, Damasio's fellow neuroscientist, Gerald Edelman, says that semantic ability probably corresponds with higher-level consciousness where there is an on-going sense of self (i.e., self-consciousness, which is required in Damasio's core consciousness). Edelman indicates that the higher primates probably experience this form of consciousness, and likewise have semantic ability (the capacity to form symbols for basic entities, e.g. food, water, trees, etc.). Humans, with their expanded abilities to abstract and conceptualize, arguably then experience the highest level of conscious experience, as we can most fully integrate our sense of self, our understanding of our environment, and our continuous emotions and feelings, including an at-bottom feeling about being alive (which together determine our general moods and attitudes toward life; we are obviously much more prone to mood swings, including depression and elation, than a dog or even a chimp). Our ability to put our thoughts and feelings into words and share them with other humans heightens our self-conscious experience even further.

20. INTENTIONALITY and CONTENT: THE OLD SCHOOL APPROACH

• Over the past century, scientific studies of biology and human behavior have added greatly to human understanding of the brain and its workings. Within the past 50 years especially, the dynamics of brain / mind functions have been documented by the neuroscientific community. But up until the late 1800s, philosophers had the most to say about consciousness and the mind. Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume all had much to say on the nature of our minds and self-awareness. The dawn of mind science was hearlded by the psychological writings of William James (1842 - 1910). Unlike preceeding philosophers, James made use of systematic documentation regarding behavior, and had some access to anatomical studies of the body and the brain.

• Despite James, however, the study of the mind in the late 19th Century was done mostly through armchair observation and discussion / debate between philosophers. Perhaps the most significant philosophical approach to the mind was called "intentionality". Franz Brentano (1838-1917) was a dualist philosopher, who put forth the notion of mental "intentionality", as to challenge physicalist and reductionist views of consciousness. Brentano pondered the fact that our minds and mental states usually refer to something other than themselves. That "something other" is generally based on our sense perceptions, and thus "intends" toward "the environment", i.e. either some part of the body itself (e.g., aches and pains) or something in the world surrounding the body. However, those "intents" could also focus on dreams, imagination, mental apparitions, things that don't exist in the surrounding environment (unicorns, leprechauns, etc.). So, reasoned Brentano and his like, the mind must be inherently different than the physical environment that hosts it.

• Although the concept of "intentionality" was found lacking as an argument against materialist reductionism, philosophers turned the concept in on itself, pondering the implications of the relationship between mental activity (both conscious and subconscious) and the physical environment (including body and brain). The philosophical discussion wandered in various directions, such that the term "intentionality" took on subtle variations, depending on which "school" was discussing it. Under one development, the "intensional" means the essence of something, the idea or concept behind it, whereas the "extensional" refers to a real-world thing; e.g., a chair versus "chairness", ice versus coldness. There are other interpretations focusing on intentionality and its relationship to "representation" within the mind (i.e., "mental content"). The concept of "intentionality" has a long and varied history within academic philosophy.

• This writer feels that philosophical arguments regarding intentionality are often a time-consuming diversion that do not add much to the understanding of consciousness (although John Searle, a well-noted consciousness philosopher, does much useful work with intentionality). Philosophers still use the term and discuss it in great detail; but I believe that consciousness and "mental content" can be better understood using more precise scientific concepts such as evolutionary processes, emergent systems behavior, mathematics and physics, and cognitive psychological models. Most modern authors of popular works regarding consciousness don't broach the topic of intentionality. It has become an esoteric subject for academic philosophers, and may die off over time as younger philosophers increasingly focus on scientific studies of brain dynamics and physical correlates of subjective experience. However, the discussion of intentionality certainly did contribute many insights regarding the classic Socratic and Platonic inquiries as to how and what the mind knows. Further insights were contributed by philosophers in their discussion of "universals" and Jungian archetypes -- but again, empirical biology and language anthropology can now say more about those matters than most armchair philosophers can.

21. CONTENT and REPRESENTATION THEORIES,
"HIGHER ORDER" THEORIES

• There are instances where philosophical ruminations about the processing of mental information do serve to formulate hypotheses for later empirical investigation by cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists. (A number of modern philosophers are working closely with psychologists and neuroscientists in designing experiments and analyzing empirical results regarding consciousness and other workings of the mind, e.g. Daniel Dennett and Patricia Churchland). Furthermore, these hypothetical features of "mental content" can become building blocks for the still-theoretical and still inchoate definition of consciousness. As such, variations in beliefs regarding the nature of mental content underlie variations in belief regarding the nature of consciousness.

• For example, philosopher Fred Dretske feels that there is a significant difference between perceiving an event (e.g., watching or hearing someone play the piano) and believing in the event (having a belief that someone is currently playing a piano). Do conscious perceptions, including sensory experience and emotions, require underlying abstract thought to support them? The hearing and/or seeing of the piano being played is a raw, basic form of consciousness. The belief regarding the piano being played is a more abstract concept, also called a "tokening". Dretske believes that basic conscious experience does not require abstraction, although conceptual thinking, e.g. the belief regarding the piano music, obviously does. I can testify to having experienced instances where my mind was "on hold", so as to take in a scene without any mental analysis or conceptualization of it.

• Others feel that even basic forms of consciousness such as sensory perceptions require underlying abstract thought, i.e. "Higher Order Thought" (a.k.a. the "HOT" theory of consciousness). Such concepts would include "there is a me", "that me is hearing something like piano music or seeing something like a piano being played", "something is causing me to hear and/or see these things" [hopefully they are real, but it could be a dream or a hallucination]. These "higher order thoughts" supporting consciousness would usually be subconscious; they are also know as "transitive" forms of consciousness, i.e. mental states whose object is another mental state. Contra, some people feel that there are certain self-involved conscious experiences that are beyond words, beyond mental abstractions. Philosopher Alvin Goldman asks "how could possession of a meta-state confer subjectivity or feeling . . . why would being a referent of a meta-state confer consciousness on a first-order state?" H.O.T. seems to require a faith in the ontological strength of abstractions formed by and used within the mind, akin to Plato's faith in the reality of "the forms".

• One interesting implication of Dretske's paradigm would be that most human action follows from the "tokens" of perception, i.e. from the immediate beliefs that are formed from what we see, hear, smell and feel. In general, we don't react to base consciousness, which is pure perception. However, there may still be scenes that we react to without any "concepts" or "tokens", scenes that touch off an instinctual, hard-wired response. E.g., a rock seen in mid air, growing larger and larger quite quickly, indicates that we are soon going to be hit with it. Thanks to evolution and genetics, this input is quickly recognized and handled in an emergency manner, triggering evasive action before the 1/2 second delay involved in consciousness formation would pass.

• Some philosophers concerned with the question of consciousness have taken intentionality and content analysis to a somewhat extreme position, a position known as “representationalism” (see, e.g., M. Tye and W. Lycan). Under the representationalist view, phenomenal consciousness (i.e., sensory / perceptual experience; phenomenal consciousness does not include the more abstract mental states such as beliefs, concepts and motives) reduces to mental representation. All potentially conscious perceptual experience allegedly involves the representation of something. Generally speaking, that “something” is physical, external to the mind; it can include the body, and in instances of misperception and hallucination, environmental interactions and malfunctions of the brain. The ultimate truth of the phenomenal perception is not the issue here. If a perceptual experience involves representation, it can potentially enter the realm of consciousness (but won’t always; e.g. "blindsight"). Conversely, if we have a phenomenal conscious experience (generally the same as a “quale”, singular for “qualia”), it must represent something from “the real world”. Note: Representationalism as discussed with regard to consciousness can be somewhat different (although still related) to the philosophical concept of representative realism.

• Representationalists in the body-mind field see representation as the sine qua non for phenomenal consciousness; if not entirely sufficient, it is still held to be essential. The essence of qualia is held to be environmental representation. This viewpoint generally supports physicalism and externalism, but allows some meaning to the concept of “qualia” (albeit very limited meaning). Higher-order theories are closely related to representationalism, although they also tie trans-perceptual mental activity (such as beliefs and concepts) into the necessary conditions for consciousness (see e.g. D. Rosenthal, and Lycan’s “higher order representationalism”). The basic varieties of representationalism do not do this (see, e.g. F. Dretske). Also, certain versions of dualism and non-reductionism assume some of the basic tenants of representationalism (see, e.g., D. Chalmers). Also, there is a version called internalist representationalism, where the uniqueness and importance of the “self” is defended within the context of physicalism and material structures of the brain. (The concept of “self” and its importance to the human race is often denigrated by those favoring physicalist reductionism.)

• Representationalism is still a controversial notion; there are philosophers who vigorously argue against it (e.g. Ned Block ). One point they make is that different environmental situations can conceivably create the exact same perception in a person (think about the movie “The Matrix”). Furthermore, in deep meditation, when the “monkey mind” is finally calmed, something is still felt. But just what does that perception “refer” to? The essence of pure existence? Or just some chemical changes within the brain? The issue, as with most philosophical complexities, ultimately refers to something simple; in this case, whether trees falling in the forest are important events in and of themselves, or whether the true importance is what finally reaches the mind.

• A variety of thought experiments have been developed to refute or support the representationalist view. Ned Block put forth the "Inverted Earth" scenario, where residents use the same names that we use for colors, and those names apply to the same things; e.g. the Inverted people call the sky blue -- but if we went there, the sky would be pink to us. Their eyes and brains are a little different, so pink light waves look blue to them. Also, if an Earthling were taken to Twin Earth and brainwashed, eventually the pink sky would seem blue to that Earthling. As such, two different physical realities can cause the same mental content. The word "blue", as a mental concept, is thus internally determined by the brain and its workings (if not by any ethereal dualist factors). Contra this, Hilary Putnam proposed something called "Twin Earth", where people talk about water but actually refer to something else, something having a different chemistry than H2O, even though this "Twin Water" serves the exact same function on Twin Earth that H2O serves on our Earth. Putnam argued that water on Twin Earth was NOT Earth water, and as such, the concept of "water" (or any other word) is externally determined by the physical environment; as Putnam said, "meaning just ain't in the head".

• Higher order thought avoids some problems regarding the nature of consciousness, but creates others. It doesn't seem useful at first to say that "I am in pain because I am having a thought regarding my present experience of pain". However, studies of brain injuries do indicate that pain is as much a mental interpretation as it is a raw physical reality; there are numerous examples of people who feel and are aware of a serious body injury but do not find it painful; and likewise, people who feel pain where there is no injury. In my opinion, higher order thought doesn't go high enough. It tries to attribute qualia to one's subconscious linking of their own self-concept to the concept or concepts behind the qualia (e.g., sweet flavor, blue color, buzzing sound, square shape).

• I believe that there is a more generic background condition to consciousness, i.e. "the feeling of being". Either phenomenal sensory experience or pure abstract thought (i.e., "access consciousness", see below) can amplify this background "ontological sense of being", making us feel more stimulated, "more alive". Usually our mental states involve mixtures of raw sensory input and abstract thought, interacting with and altering each other on both conscious and subconscious levels. But ultimately, it is a generic "feeling of being" that distinguishes our wakened selves from deep sleep or anesthesia or zombie-hood. As to what exactly that "ontological feeling of being" is, admittedly I cannot say, other than that it is a reality that "emerges" from the complex system dynamics of the healthy brain interacting with the surrounding universe.

22. ARE THERE DEGREES OF CONSCIOUSNESS, OR IS IT "ON-AND-OFF"?

• Common sense indicates that consciousness does vary. Emotion and feeling seem to indicate a "higher level" of conscious experience. Also, memory is an important aspect -- you remember more about 'peak conscious' moments than boring, routine tasks, etc. Most of us hardly remember most of what we do during the course of a day. We are zombies, a large part of the time!

• As such, a key feature of consciousness is attention (and the closely related notion of "arousal"). This is a common-sense notion that was discussed very thoroughly by the philosopher-psychologist William James. Our minds work at varying levels of attention -- both overall, and with regard to certain things (things we see, feel, hear, smell, taste, or imagine). Something in our minds, perhaps at a subconscious level, Something in our minds makes quick decisions regarding what is highly important and what can be ignored. makes quick decisions regarding what is highly important and what can be ignored (and every level in between). We drive to work along a very familiar route, with our attention levels somewhere in the middle. On normal days, we hardly remember anything about that drive 30 minutes after it's over. But if we perceive something unusual, e.g. a car pulling out too close to us, or maybe a set of juggling clowns performing on a corner where we are stopped for a red light, then some control device in the brain (having to do with the thalamus) speeds up our neuronal processes, engages more of them, and sets more of the input to memory. This attention process is obviously partially "conscious", and partly sub-conscious in nature (see next section).

• Alertness and focus are similar to attention and arousal. Alertness usually implies some sort of "conscious" decision to increase attention in anticipation of something that we want to fully perceive. Focus refers to our mind's ability to select out just a part of the overall sensory (or imagined) inputs that we can perceive at any moment, and allowing them to gain most of our brain's "processing" capacity and memory buffer (working memory, and longer-term memory). An extreme example regards the mother who can hear her baby cry in the midst of a raging hurricane. But everyday, at just about every moment, something in our minds decides to give more emphasis to one portion of our visual field or our "body feel" or our hearing or our taste (or our imagination), to the detriment of other inputs. We seldom just "take it all in neutrally". Our minds are almost always looking for something special within the "big picture" presented by the senses, based upon our needs and our past experiences.

• A "peak experience" is a state of high arousal. It is usually associated with highly positive experiences, but can also relate to sudden, sever challenges. For example, when you are involved in an auto collision, the last second before the crash seems to go by slowly; your brain obviously goes into overdrive, as to search out any possible way to avoid or lessen the damage. Obviously, consciousness is not a plain-vanilla thing. It does vary in intensity and specificity, in response to environmental challenges and inner state changes.

• Dr. Susan Greenfield provides another perspective on degrees of consciousness [S. Greenfield, The Private Life of the Brain (New York: J.Wiley and Sons, 2000)]. According to Greenfield, a small child cannot experience the same depth of consciousness in response to most experiences as an adult, because they do not have as meny potential associations available. E.g., for an adult, the sound of an ocean wave on a beach brings to mind a variety of concepts, memories and emotions, more than are possible for a young child. The adult brain can thus assemble larger neuronal networks or loops for most stimuli than a child can; the adult has more pre-fabricated neural assemblies to work with. See Constellations section, below.

• However, a countervailing factor to Dr. Greenfield's model regards the child's higher level of attention and arousal due to the novelty of most experiences. Because everything seems new to a young child, their degree of "qualia vividness" might at times be higher than for adults, despite the relative simplicity of a child's mind.

23. ON STAGE: THE THEATER METAPHOR

• The topic of attention does not encompass the whole of conscious experience. The question regarding the ultimate nature of consciousness goes much deeper than how consciousness is used or focused. However, the effects of attention do lend themselves to objective observation and testing, and the field of cognitive psychology has taken advantage of that fact. Cognitive psychologist Bernard Baars has developed a metaphor for consciousness based around what is known about human reactions to controlled sensory inputs and variations. He calls this the theater metaphor, or the global workspace hypothesis.

• The theater / global workspace concept postulates that consciousness is a process whereby certain sensory information and mental states are widely broadcast throughout the working components of the mind, most of which are sub-conscious. E.g., we may be looking at a tree and ignoring everything else around it (especially if there is something different about it -- perhaps it's bark is an unusual shade of yellow). Or perhaps our emotional worries or our calculations of what to do next may distract us so much that we walk into a closed door. The spotlights on the theater stage can only show so much at a time. Consciousness is limited by attention, a process itself controlled sub-consciously.

• The theater metaphor, like every other metaphor, can be useful; but as with all metaphors, it is subject to limitations. As Baars himself warns, his theater is not to be confused with the "little man in the Cartesian theater" metaphor, the most radical form of dualism. On the other hand, the theater metaphor only tells us so much about what goes on in the dark area off-stage, and in the dark areas on the stage itself (i.e., sensory input not being focused upon, and short-term memories not presently being drawn upon). For example, sensory inputs that are not currently subject to our attention (e.g., the feel of our clothing) can be quickly brought to conscious attention, if a sub-conscious process (also in the "audience") suddenly detects something novel or strange or threatening about it (e.g., a bee goes up our sleeve).

• And finally, the theater metaphor remains agnostic as to just "who" is included in "the audience". Certainly that audience includes sub-conscious motor functions that arrange to carry out orders from the stage, e.g. move your arm to touch the green object in front of you. However, the cognitive psychologists do not say just how the mosaic experience of qualia and the feelings that they sum to (just as mosaic tiles sum up to an image) relate to the theater audience within this metaphor. Would qualia and feelings be an emergent effect of the audience's overall reactions? If so, then the most important aspect of consciousness occurs off-stage! The theater and its global workspace is a useful concept, but ultimately belongs to "the easy problem" of consciousness.

24. IS THINKING A CONSCIOUS PHENOMENON?

• "Phenomenal Consciousness" versus "Access Consciousness": According to philosopher Ned Block, phenomenal consciousness is our awareness of how our senses report what goes on in the outside world (and within our bodies, e.g. a headache or leg cramp). Phenomenal consciousness involves "qualia", as discussed above; our responses to basic distinguishable environmental features like color, pain, sound patterns, smells, tastes, etc. "Access consciousness" is the awareness and participation in thought and decision-making.

• The question arises, then, whether the act of planning, pondering and problem solving is a "conscious experience". I personally believe so, based on the involvement of emotion. We accept that phenomenal inputs easily trigger our emotions; The question arises as to whether the act of planning, pondering and problem solving is a "conscious experience". e.g. music that can make us cry or sing out with joy. But, more and more emphasis is now placed on the role of emotions in cogitation, in making decisions, in analyzing puzzles. I believe this connection is a two-way street; awareness and imagining of future consequences of an action or an anticipated event trigger positive or negative emotions, e.g. a good mood or fearful anxiety, which in turn feedback into the outcome of the analysis or decision process. But the thinking process itself also triggers a form of emotion, a subtle "background emotion".

• Some of us actually enjoy this feeling, especially when it yields an "ah-hah" experience, a breakthrough in understanding something. As such, the difference between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness starts to blur. Access to the mind is as much a phenomenon and an experience as is a chocolate-dipped ice cream cone.

25. THE IMPORTANCE OF EMOTIONS

• Consciousness has a lot to do with emotions; or more precisely, with the feeling of emotions. What are emotions? At their crudest, most fundamental level, they appear to be a short-cut between certain perceived situations and certain behavioral responses. Evolutionary processes gave even the earliest and simplest mammals a way to respond quickly to overwhelming danger (fear), or to a serious but evenly matched challenge (anger), or to an opportunity to gain something helpful (joy). They get the heart pumping and the lungs inhaling more deeply. The situations which trigger emotions can't wait for the usual perception and conscious decision-making delays in the mind, even when those decision processes are largely pre-programmed by genetics, as in simple animals. Emotions are highly coordinated with, and mediated by, chemical processes which act quickly throughout wide regions of the brain. These processes (the amine fountains) in effect spray neurochemicals (dopamine, serotonin, endorphins, etc.) from a net of hose-like filaments emanating from the thalamus, located deep beneath the cortex.

• As animals became more complex, fewer and fewer of their behaviors were guided by hard-wired genetic features of the brain. But the basic emotions remained as the great pre-programmed legacy, the "fast response" system. As the ability to appreciate "qualia" developed in the higher animals (culminating in human self-consciousness), the ability to "feel" the orchestrated effects that emotions cause within the body probably had a synergetic effect on the brain's ability to appreciate qualia. Emotions also became more varied and complex, more tied-in with the abstract mental processes that humans engage in, such as patriotism, heroism, and appreciation of virtue.

• As such, I believe that an expanding repertoire of emotion was the basic evolutionary framework that allowed the construction of higher and higher levels of consciousness. Together with the development of abstract thought capacity and language, emotions helped the "fire" of self- and social-centered consciousness to be ignited within our species. And as the mind and its emergent consciousness became more complex and abstract, emotions co-evolved into more complex and continuous forms. As the pharmacological neuroscientist Dr. Susan Greenfield states, emotions are constantly felt within the healthy, conscious human mind. The LACK of any felt emotion would be a sign of trouble for us, e.g. serious depression.

26. THE IMPORTANCE OF MEMORY

• Memory is crucial to the survival of all creatures whose behavior is guided mainly by "thinking", versus simple, genetically coded "instincts". "Sensory memory" acts as a buffer that accumulates sense inputs for a few microseconds, then passes them to "working memory". Working memory is a form of memory with a long-enough timeline to allow us to finish a sentence, complete a thought, accomplish a project, find our way to a desired location, etc. It allows continuity in our actions. We only notice working memory when it is disrupted. E.g., we are in the middle of a sentence, or out looking for something, or going somewhere, and get distracted by a sudden interruption. If the interruption is notable and important enough, we "lose our train of thought". Psychologist Bernard Baars has postulated that the working memory process has a key role in the formation of consciousness, e.g. the pulling together of various sensory perceptions, sub-conscious cognitive concepts, memories and emotional feelings.

• While sensory memory involves time spans of microseconds and working memory involves seconds and minutes, shorter-term/non-permanent memory is the accumulation of significant events that occurred over the past few days, weeks and months (and the corresponding exclusion of mundane events that need not be remembered). Memory is crucial to the survival of all creatures whose behavior is guided by "thinking", versus simple, genetically coded "instincts". Brain studies indicate that shorter-term/non-permanent memories do not cause large-scale re-arrangements of neuronal connection structures. They may be explained by the self-reinforcing nature of re-entrant looping underlying thought and experience; this looping process develops a momentum or sorts, and does not stop immediately after its triggering conditions cease. Such contingent memories may be looked at as "candidates" for long-term archiving, i.e. the establishment of more permanent neuron connection structures. If a particular memory is reinforced often during its non-permanent "consolidation period", i.e. if the memory is mentally referenced frequently, it has a good chance of being "inducted" into the long-term memory collection. If not, then it will likely fade away within 18 to 24 months.

• Non-permanent memory, at the neuron level, is possibly based around the mind's more permanent topic structures; the temporary memory for a recent Alaskan cruise might overarch a variety of relatively stable neuronal structures which represent "semantic memories", e.g. word concepts of "cold", "north", "sea", "nature", "adventure", etc.; plus the neuron memory structures representing people you were with, what you ate, what you did, etc. This temporary loop may change shape and shift so as to exclude certain neuron regions, and include other ones during the "consolidation" period. As such, the content of memory itself will subtly shift during the holding period, per Gerald Edelman.

• It is well known that the hippocampus, a deep-brain structure, is centrally involved in the memory-making process. The hippocampus intermediates the selection and development of short-term memories into more permanent long-term memory. Studies of people with significant damage to the hippocampus show them to be unable to remember things happening within 2 years of the injury, but with unimpeded memory of things before then. Access to the "holding tank" of short-term memories is cut off when the hippocampus "goes down", but long-term memories, and very-short term "sensory memory" remain.

• Long-term memory: If the short-term episodic memory pattern was kept alive by regular referral, the meta-processes of the brain in effect assume that it is important enough to be given the limited space available in the temporal lobes for long-term memory retention. For example, when you make a new friend, for the first year or two, the memory structure referring to him or her shifts and changes within the "short term memory" zones. However, after a few years, given that this friend is still very important to you, he or she then gets their own stable neuron relationships in your brain -- in the long-term memory zones of the temporal lobe.

• Long-term memory can be "episodic" (a memory of a personal event) or "semantic" (memory of a fact or concept, as discussed above). Procedural memory is the remembrance of motor skills, such as how to parallel park or ride a bike or field a ground ball. Studies of brain injury patients have established that the procedural memory process is mostly (but not completely) separate from the episodic and semantic memory processes.

• What does memory mean for consciousness? Both conscious and unconscious processes access the various forms of memory. Perhaps some memories exist exclusively within the sub-conscious realm. But in general, memory plays a key role in all aspects of conscious manifestation, including thinking and decision making, long-term emotions and mood, and the process by which "arousal" varies from zombie-like indifference to peak engagement, as discussed above. The more intense moments of conscious experience, where emotions are usually involved, are better remembered than the mundane tasks of daily life. Sleepwalkers and sufferers of absence seizures generally don't remember anything. Thus, memory acts as both a litmus test of consciousness, and as a major contributor to the formation and content of consciousness.

• The workings of the memory function within the brain are not well understood. One interesting but very speculative theory was put forth by neuroanatomist Karl Pribram, called the holographic model (more properly the holonomic model). This model postulates that memory information is not stored in the neurons in a digital fashion, as a computer stores a letter or a picture (i.e., each neuron involved has the potential to fire or not, like the 1 / 0 status of memory bits in a computer). Instead, a memory is stored in a "spectral" fashion, in terms of frequencies and wave interference patterns.

• Just what has a frequency and is acting like a wave? Arguably, the many neuron dendrites and the synapses that they tie into; they can be set for specific firing frequencies, i.e. so many times per second or minute. Somewhere in the meta-patterns between billions of neurons with their individual firing frequencies, somewhere in their "harmonics" and interferences, is an order, an abstract pattern that conveys data. This is the principle behind a hologram; information is stored at each point on the hologram plate so as to respond to laser light as a frequency, Experiments with animals show memory in the brain to have characteristics similar to holograms. and not as a series of designated light or dark spots placed in time and space, as with a TV screen or a digital file on a computer hard drive. With a hologram, it only takes a small area from anywhere on the plate to show the basic patterns of the image or information being stored. As such, a hologram can be cut up into bits, and will still show the same picture that the original hologram did, but with less resolution. Experiments with animals show memory in the brain to have similar characteristics; removing a part of an animal brain does not cause the loss of most memories. Almost every memory remains, but all are degraded to varying degrees depending on the amount of the brain removed.

• The transformation of data between wave / frequency information formats and time-space formats is accomplished by a type of mathematics called Fourier analysis. Certain perceptual experiments have shown that people are sensitive to light and pattern changes that reflect significant Fourier changes. So there is some evidence that the brain has "taught itself" how to do Fourier mathematics (of course, this "learning" probably occurred via trial-and-error evolutionary processes over millions of years). According to Pribram, memories are formed by physical changes to synapses and dendrites which "polarize" them, make them act in a certain way regarding when and how frequently they fire (i.e., what their frequency will be).

• The holonomic model is a memory theory set forth within a global theory about how the brain works. It helps to explain how the brain could store so many memories in such a small space. (Despite billions of neurons and orders of magnitude more dendrites and synaptic junctions, the information-richness of the average adult's memory banks would overwhelm a standard, computer-like digital information storage format within the brain). Since the bottom line is the relationship of synapse firing rates, each synaptic junction can participate in multiple memory details (unlike a computer memory where an individual bit contributes to just one file). However, the holonomic model is very complex, and it is not intuitively apparent just what in the brain monitors and interprets the "wave interference" for a multitude of "singing synapses", and how it performs a "reverse Fourier analysis" to convert that information into 3D space and time formats relevant to making behavioral decisions and to directing the motor neurons that will execute them. Ditto for the Fourier conversion from information arranged according to space and time coming in from the senses.

• This "conversion device" between frequency and space-time information mapping is conceptually termed a "lens", just as a real lens is needed to covert holographic light into a recognizable visual image on a screen. The brain is cyberneticly pictured as a massively parallel and highly-layered neural network. The question is whether and how such a network could detect and convert the frequency and interference effects from the network's input signals and process them into space-time arranged output signals. An even bigger question is how that frequency information can be converted to phenomenal experience, e.g. the "qualia" resulting from recall of an episodic memory (although most qualia from long-term memory are quite diminished in vividness compared with real-time experiences). The hologram mind analogy is quite innovative and it has caused much excitement from those interested in spiritual and metaphysically speculative interpretations of the mind's relation to the cosmos. But despite providing some trenchant scientific insights, it is still a long way from being a detailed and fruitful working theory.

• A final thought about consciousness and memory. When you go to sleep at night and reach "NREM Phase 4", or when you allow a For a short period of time while sleeping or under anesthesia, you basically do not exist. medical expert to administer general anesthesia, you in effect place your trust in your brain's various memory devices; i.e. that they will restore your sense of identity and your accustomed ways of looking at the world when you wake up. For a short period of time, you basically do not exist; but the physical structures and processes are in place to revive you, just as you last remembered. Ponder this, if you would; it's really quite amazing.

27. THE REMEMBERED PRESENT

• Given that our minds control our conscious perceptions, and that our past experiences shape our minds, phenomenal consciousness is sometimes called "the remembered present"; the exact same environment or scene will be experienced differently by any two people, because of their previous experiences. Consciousness is not a neutral, fungible experience. Cognitive psychology speaks of the sub-conscious "mental contexts" which influence how we interpret sensory inputs and how we later ponder our memories of them. Perhaps our own self-concept is the most important "context" within our mental lives.

• A related concept that exemplifies this is called "change blindness". Given that we shape our perceptions based on what we usually see, hear, feel and otherwise experience, we sometimes miss what should be an obvious (but unexpected) change. Or at best, it takes a few fractions of a second longer to perceive when something is very different from what we usually experience. Car accidents sometimes turn out worse than human reaction times would require, because an abnormal situation (like a car running a red light in front of you) takes a few parts of a second longer to comprehend -- your mind just doesn't believe it at first! Thus you don't step on the brake as quickly as you might have.

28. THE BRAIN: THE PARTS AND THE WHOLE

• The following is a list of brain structures and dynamic features that are especially important to the process of human consciousness (or the side-effect that human consciousness is, as the "epiphenomenalists" would have it). I am not qualified to give a thorough explanation of each brain structure or process and its effect on consciousness. But I will provide links for further study.

• The Pre-Frontal Cortex: belle of the cerebral ball? (Not to be confused with the Cerebellum, which coordinates motor activity). The pre-frontal cortex is located near the forehead. It is the area of the brain that expanded the most during the last phase of human evolution; it sets us apart from chimps and the early hominoids. It is a "well connected" area; neuronal connections emanate from it to all major regions and structures within the brain. Although it cannot be called the seat of consciousness (as there is no one central command area in the brain directing all phases of consciousness), it does participate in most of the signal circuits in the brain that effect consciousness, including the especially important "working memory" mechanism (see Memory section). The brain is broken up into numbered regions, and the core of the pre-frontal cortex is known as "area 64". Interestingly, a SPECT blood-flow scan of a sleepwalker found that area 64 and the angular gyrus (which serves as the "concept translator" between the sensory perception areas and the speech areas) were deactivated during the incident.

• The Thalamus (just above the brainstem) and the Reticular System (within the brainstem): These are the great regulators of our state of arousal, including sleep versus wakefulness (see "Degrees of Consciousness" above). The thalamus is also "well connected", having direct neuronal circuits to all regions of the brain, as well as the neurotransmitter system emanating from it. The later system (the amine fountains) is a series of spaghetti-like structures that permeate the brain, spraying various kinds of neurotransmitters (endorphins, serotonin, dopamine, acetylcholine, etc.) that variously bias our levels of arousal, emotional states, and cognitive decision making processes.

• The Amygdala and the Limbic System: These are deep-brain structures that, working with the thalamus, mediate our emotional responses, including both the "crude emotions" (like fear and anger), and the more subtle, developed emotions (anxiety, contentedness, pride, apathy, etc.). (See "Importance of Emotions" above.) The amygdala appears to modulate attraction behavior, while the pre-frontal cortex appears to modulate negative behavior. To oversimplify, the amygdala keeps you from loving too much, while the pre-frontal cortex keeps you from hating too much.

• The Entorhinal Cortex: This is a deep-brain structure located close to the limbic system and the hippocampus. It helps to process new episodic memories, preparing input from the cortex for use by the hippocampus. The hippocampus, in turn , mediates the formation of long-term memory structures from short-term memory content (see "Importance of Memory" above). The entorhinal cortex is likely influenced by the limbic system in determining whether and how to store new episodes within the short-term memory process, and whether to reinforce them or let them atrophy. As such, the degree of emotional arousal associated with a life event helps to determine if it will be remembered, and if so, for how long (and how vividly). Not surprisingly, the entorhinal structure is severely damaged during the course of Alzheimer's Disease.

• Neural Plasticity: This concept describes the process by which each person's individual environment and life experiences shapes and customizes the layout of the neurons and their interconnections. The brain of a newborn baby is still very unformed. In the first several years of life, many loose neurons start hooking up. Just how they link, and the strength of each link, is influenced by the infant's early life experiences. For example, if one of a newborn child's eyes were covered for several months, the child might go though life blind in that eye. The eye itself can be perfectly fine; but if the neuron hook-ups weren't completed soon after birth, they cannot later make up for this. Neural plasticity works through the strengthening of connections that are used a lot, and the weakening and possible abandonment of those that aren't. As such, genetics cannot completely determine any person's brain structure, nor their mind workings, personality, and consciousness. Even the slightest differences in experience between identical twins causes unique brain architecture, and thus different personalities and behavior.

• A Further Question: Is the brain composed of many specialty sub-devices (one for language, one for emotions, one for decision-making, one for abstract logic such as math, etc.), Is the brain composed of many specialty sub-devices or is it a very generalized machine that can solve anything? or is it a very generalized machine that can solve anything? The consensus is "some mixture of both"; psychologist Bernard Baars likens consciousness to a 'lighted stage', a 'shared workspace' area which the specialty areas observe, as if sitting in a darkened theater. (However, the analogy must be extended, as each member of the audience gets up and participates on the lighted stage at various times).

• Arguments continue over the relative degrees of specialization and generalization in the brain and the resulting dynamics of the mind. However, Gerald Edelman has gained a high degree of recognition for his "neural Darwinism" paradigms involving "mapping" and "degeneracy". The specialized areas in the brain, such as the various sight processing regions (for edge-formation, color, shape identification, movement perception, etc.) are sometimes known as "maps". These maps are linked together into processing loops, through which conscious perceptions are formed. However, the linking and looping process between maps is "degenerate"; the same conscious perception may be supported by more than one way of linking a group of brain maps together. Perhaps one or two maps that were part of the original coalition behind a particular perception (say a light blue triangle) can be substituted by other maps, and yet yield the same perception. The neuron-linking arrangements within maps and between maps which are highly used and useful are "rewarded" by being strengthened. Those that aren't used much are weakened, and eventually abandoned.

• If Edelman is right, the brain has a general "meta-structural process" akin to natural selection, which continually orchestrates the roles and performances of the many specialists. This might be similar, in some ways, to a symphony orchestra, with the conductor giving the trumpet section more prominence when the trumpeters are having a good night, and on other nights letting the cellos stand out if they are doing well -- even though the overall score is always the same.

29. NEURAL LOOPS and CONSTELLATIONS - How the brain might work

• A popular and well-regarded theory regarding the brain process underlying consciousness is the concept of "reentrant mapping" (Gerald Edelman, see The Brain, above). The brain may be composed of neurons groupings which work together for a particular purpose. These are the "maps". Each map is connected to many other maps; there are a lot of different routes for electrochemical signaling between maps. Each map may also have a "frequency" characteristic, something about how frequently the neurons in the map fire and rest. There is other evidence from Francis Crick that binding takes place (i.e., when color and shape and size and texture and other "conclusions" come together from different areas of the brain and form a unified mental image of a particular thing being looked at, e.g. a lemon - oval, bumpy texture, yellow, about 2 inches long) when various areas of the brain get their frequencies in synch. So perhaps the content of consciousness is a function of what set of maps are connected and in synch at any one time. Perhaps a re-entrant process occurs as the "jig" to bring neuron programs (sensory processing, facts from memory, concepts, beliefs, motor action preparation) from various parts of the brain into a temporary, ad hoc interacting processing loops, with chemical effects facilitating and reinforcing the emotional process (or perhaps retarding it, in the case of depression).

• Dr. Susan Greenfield provides an analysis regarding conscious states and neural networking in the brain that is generally consistent with Edelman's. According to Dr. Greenfield, conscious mind states are primarily shaped by the following factors. 1.) Connectivity conditions, which are determined by the actual neuronal density and architecture in various regions of the brain, and by the amine fountains, which distribute neurotransmitter chemicals throughout the brain so as to bolster or retard the ability of neurons to communicate with each other via the synapses. 2.) The background mental states that determine the level of attention and arousal given to a sensory input or to a thought or memory that would trigger or contribute to a conscious state. 3.) The degree of availability of pre-fabrictated, semi-permanent neuron structures where a conscious loop is being forming; e.g. a structure that might underly an emotional bias towards a particular recognized entity; 4.) the mental turnover rate, reflected by whether thoughts continually change and are fleeting (e.g., when you are worrying about your job), or are stable and can be held for a while. Body states, which influence the brain via hormones as well as nerve transmissions, are also very important.

• Greenfield has proposed a way of distinguishing several important mental states based on different combinations of these factors. These states include Dreaming, Pain, Abstract Thought, Thrill Seeking, Accidents, Depression, Sexual Arousal, Meditation, Childhood, Schizophrenia and Alzheimer's Disease. Sexuality, as a mental state, allows a very rapid succession of sensory and emotional states which reflect small and rapidly changing neural assemblies. For example, depression involves high levels of neuron connectivity, strong presence of pre-fabricated structures for integration into the "constellation", low states of arousal, and low rates of turnover of the assembly. This results in a very large and stable constellation controlling the frontal cortex, precluding sensory and emotional states, with their small size and rapid turnover, from occurring. Thus, the depressed person feels little emotion and takes little notice of his sensory inputs while under the weight of an overbearing neuron constellation. By contrast, sexuality involves low connectivity, strong presence of pre-fabricted components, high arousal and high assembly turnover. Sexuality, as a mental state, thus allows a very rapid succession of sensory and emotional states, which reflects small neural assemblies that rapidly "turnover", i.e. change.

• With regard to DEPRESSION, we need to note here that Dr. Greenfield's analysis is an overview and does not explain the mechanisms that lead to the neuron constellation states that she describes. Much exciting work is currently being done in this regard, including research on the importance of stress-induced cortisol levels; and also regarding overactivity in brain area 25, a tiny structure in the inner frontal brain that serves as a gateway between the emotion-driving limbic system and the frontal cortex, where higher thought and self-awareness generally reside. Overactivity in area 25 seems to inhibit activity in the pre-frontal cortex, perhaps thus fostering the low states of arousal and highly static cortical neuron structures that Greenfield postulates regarding depression.

• Dr. Greenfield's analysis shows just how closely tied our conscious experiences are to the physical processes in the brain. One minor criticism of Dr. Greenfield's paradigm might be that she equates "degree of consciousness" solely with the resulting size of the neuronal assembly (constellation). It might be argued that a person's final subjective impression of a conscious state or event is also very sensitive to the degree of attention and arousal afforded to it by lower conscious or sub-conscious processes. For example, pain, abstract thinking, meditation and depression all involve large neuron constellations. However, arousal levels vary greatly for these states, and the degree to which a person will remember any of these particular mental experiences (a rough measure of "vividness of experience") will vary. The relative size of the neuronal assembly would certainly be an important correlate and metric of consciousness, but there may be other factors that can contribute to an objective (albeit limited) description of subjective experience.

• Keep in mind too that although the brain and neuron characteristics that Dr. Greenfield considers could possibly identify what type of mental state a person is experiencing, they still could not give many details. Perhaps a future brain-scan technique could determine that a person is depressed or in pain; but it could not say much more. We are still a long way, thankfully, from being able to read and broadcast a person's exact thoughts and dreams and feelings. The realm of experience remains quite subjective [D.N. Robinson, Consciousness and Mental Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 46].

30. NEURAL NETWORKS - How the brain might work, contd.

• A neural network is a method of computing that is different from the standard “linear method” used by most computers to date. Linear programs make computers execute their steps in a fixed sequence. Depending on inputs, those steps can go up alternative branches; but the decision parameters are strictly fixed, and the consequences of following one programming path versus another because of input conditions are still entirely determined by the program. Neural networks are different; they are adaptive, changing their parameters based on the information that flows through the network. As such, they are more like “learners”; in a sense they are "self-programmed". They are felt to come closer in character to biological processes in the brain than a standard linear computer program can. Unlike linear programs, which were used unsuccessfully to study and simulate the brain (during the early phases of “artificial intelligence” research in the 1950s), neural networks have the ability to classify and categorize their inputs. As such, they exhibit rudimentary abilities to generalize and form abstractions, a critical trait of the human mind.

• A neural-networking computer program is designed around an interconnected group of artificial “neurons”, i.e. processing objects that are highly connected to each other, in a web-like arrangement. As such, neural networks reflect a “connectionist” approach. In a neural network simulation system each neuron monitors the "states" of its upstream neighbors to determine its own state. They have adjustable internal parameters that change over time, in response to feedback regarding the verity of the output after each data input iteration (neural networks are seldom one-shot processing arrangements; they process inputs on a continual basis, just as the brain does). These neuron-like processing objects are generally arranged in layers, and no one neuron-like object can act in isolation; the bottom line is the overall effect of all objects acting together.

• The original neural network simulation was based on a 1943 work by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts. Their networking concept was based around their simple mathematical model for the action of a neuron. They built up logical sequences of nerve-like connections based on the idea that a neuron fires in an all-or-none manner, depending on whether the (weighted) sum of firing inputs from all the other neurons connecting to it (or the inputs from outside the system, in the first row of the network) has exceeded that neuron's action threshold.

• Neural networks are generally quite robust - if some neuron-like elements malfunction, the overall functioning of the network can continue, although with some performance decay. However, when feedback connections (known as recurrant pathways) are inserted so as to provide feedback which helps correct errors and allow the system to have time-lag features, i.e. short-term memory, the improvements and increased realism come at a price. The recurrant system can become chaotic under certain input conditions; just as any real person with a real brain can "lose it" under the wrong circumstances!

• Philosopher Paul Churchland has done much work examining neural networks and their effectiveness in mimicking the workings of the brain. Churchland says that our understanding of how cognition arises in the brain has been advanced by computer simulations of neural networks. These simulations have been able to display: learning from experience; perceptual discrimination of features; development of a framework of concepts; short term memory; and variable focus of attention. According to Churchland, the representation of things in the brain is reflected in the patterns of activation in a neural network, and computation in the brain roughly equates with the transformation from one network pattern to another.

• But despite all of the amazing progress of neural network simulations and research, there remain significant differences between the neural networks in our brain and in our computers. For example, in real brains, quantitative sensory information seems to be coded in pulses, i.e. in frequency modulation form, rather than digital representations (i.e., like Morse Code). So somehow, natural neural networks process analog frequency inputs and not just digital codes. Also, our brains seem much more efficient; the number of layers of neurons between sensory input, decision processing and behavioral output is much less than what is needed for comparable functioning in computer-simulated neural nets. Another problem for neural nets regards pattern recognition, i.e. recognition on the basis of incomplete similarity. Human brains licked the similarity problem eons ago, but machine recognition simulations thus far remain slow and imperfect. They must go through a wide range of transformations and generalization steps where errors can multiply; whereas the brain seems to accomplish incomplete pattern recognition quite elegantly.

• And, although our computerized, neural net-driven robots can pick things up, can speak a rudimentary language, can move about and avoid obstructions, can remember where they put things, can tell an apple from an orange, and do many other amazing things, they still can't write a song or a poem, or decide what is just in a conflicting social situation. They don't commit suicide either -- something else that humans continue to do in spite of the self-preservation instincts instilled by the natural selection design process.

31. THE GOD QUESTION: EASY OR HARD PROBLEM?

• Yale Psychology Professor Paul Bloom cites infant development research regarding the separate development of a baby's understanding of physical forces and its understanding of human relationships to argue that we are natural born dualists. Various studies show that babies start to understand basic physical concepts like solidness and gravity and persistence (i.e., that stuff doesn't just disappear) at a different time than they pick up on emotions and facial expressions and other social capabilities. These phenomenon are mostly a matter of genetics (although as with everything genetic, they also need the right environment to manifest themselves). They also appear to be separate genetic systems, having evolved at different times and under different circumstances. Thus, according to Bloom, they make it easy for the brain / mind to conclude that the body belongs to one world (the physical system), and the self belongs to an ontologically different system (the social system). According to this view, Chalmer's hard problem / easy problem dichotomy is just a side-effect of evolutionary history. The mental world is ultimately an "easy" problem.

• But Bloom doesn't stop there. He says that this evolutionary dichotomy, along with our evolutionary ability to abstract and come up with explanatory concepts, is responsible for our belief in God. Our brain's ability to hypothesize the causes behind things seems to go into overdrive when we think about ourselves. We can see purpose, intention and design even when they are not really there. We are hypersensitive to signs of intentionality (that's why conspiracy theories will always be welcome). We believe that everything has a reason. And God becomes the reason, and our self-awareness becomes an eternal soul seeking its salvation from that God.

• So, according to Bloom, we first see ourselves as having an independent consciousness, having a being different from that of our bodies and everything else around us. The idea of God satisfies the itch for an expanation of everything - wrongly, Bloom implies. This is the "hard problem" version of consciousness, which should really be called "the soul". And we then keep right on going, projecting that if we can have a soul apart from the physical world, there must be a master soul out there somewhere -- i.e., God. This God also answers the frustrating question of "what caused it all". Our conspiracy-theory prone minds want an explanation for everything, but we come to a grand halt when we ask 'where did it all came from'. The idea of God finally satisfies the itch -- wrongly, Bloom implies.

• SIDENOTE: Bloom certainly isn't the only voice from the realms of brain science decrying humankind's propensity to believe in God. Recall geneticist Dean Hamer's "God Gene" theory, regarding correlation between the VMAT2 gene and a person's sense of self-transcendence. And of course, there are the recent works of Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins and Samuel Harris which espouse the benefits of godlessness versus the evil and backwardness of religion -- "the New Atheism", as it is called.

• And yet some -- including the respected scientist, writer and Anglican priest John Polkinghorne -- continue to hold that "consciousness is an intrinsic sign of a creator". A dualistic ontology of consciousness, If there is a hard problem of con- sciousness, then the even harder question of God remains in play. if it could be vindicated, would not necessarily prove the existence of God and an inner spirit within all of us given by God. But it would not preclude such a possibility, whereas most physicalist / reductionist interpretations make this seem unlikely. Perhaps we need a "gap" for there to be a "God"; if everything could be explained to everyone's satisfaction by unsentient forces, the idea of God would clearly violate Occam's razor. If there is a hard problem of consciousness, then the even harder question of God remains in play. However, Fr. Pierre Gassendi, a 17th Century priest and astronomer, seemed able to embrace Epicurian skepticism, empiricism, atomism and materialism, and yet still find room for God as creator and savior. Also, in modern times, Dr. Nancey Murphy defends a version of materialism consistent with belief in a Christian God.

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