May 5, 1999
What China Didn't Need to Steal
By GARY MILHOLLIN and JORDAN RICHIE
WASHINGTON -- Americans are right to be outraged that a suspected Chinese spy may
have stolen the computer codes for the
entire United States
nuclear arsenal. But the loss of this
data is only half the story. The other
half is about hardware.
Even after stealing the plan for an
advanced warhead, one would need
high-performance equipment to manufacture and test its precision parts.
Sadly, China is getting those machines from the United States -- and
it doesn't even have to steal them.
A study we recently completed
shows that the Commerce Department approved more than $15 billion
worth of strategically sensitive exports to China in the last decade.
Although supposedly intended for civilian purposes, the department's
records show that much of this "dual-use" equipment went directly to nuclear-missile and military sites, the
vertebrae of China's strategic backbone.
And unbeknownst to the American
suppliers, several of these Chinese
companies later sold nuclear and other military equipment to Iran and
Pakistan, according to American intelligence reports and news accounts.
More than half of the $15 billion in
exports consisted of computers. China had been denied access to high-performance computers until President Clinton loosened computer controls in 1996, after strenuous lobbying
by his political supporters in Silicon
Valley. Then a flood of computer exports began.
By now China has imported about
400 high-performance machines, just
what would be needed to process the
American nuclear codes and simulate the workings of our arsenal. Although China has insisted that these
computers were imported for civilian
uses, it has refused virtually all requests to let United States officials
see what the machines are really
doing.
In all, the military and strategic
value of what China got from the
Commerce Department was at least
as great as what it may have gotten
from spies. Consider the following:
The state-owned China National
Nuclear Corporation was allowed to
buy equipment useful for uranium
prospecting made by International
Imaging Systems, a California company. China National Nuclear then
helped Iran prospect for uranium
that American intelligence officials
believe will be used in making nuclear weapons.
The state-owned China Precision
Machinery Import-Export Corporation, which manufactures China's
newest anti-ship cruise missiles, was
allowed to buy a computer system
that is useful for simulating wind
effects. Not only did these missiles
strengthen the Chinese military, but
the company has also exported some
to Iran, where, according to the United States naval commander in the
Persian Gulf, they threaten our personnel.
The Chinese Academy of Sciences was allowed to buy equipment
from the Convex Computer Corporation (which has since been bought by
Hewlett-Packard) for processing
data from an experimental fusion
reactor. The academy then exported
the reactor to Iran, where it is used
for training nuclear scientists.
American equipment was approved for export to the National
University of Defense Technology,
which helps the People's Liberation
Army design advanced weapons; the
University of Electronic Science and
Technology, which helps develop
stealth aircraft and advanced military radar, and the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
which helps develop missiles and specializes in guidance, navigation and
flight dynamics. (The licensing
records do not reveal whether all the
items approved were actually
shipped, but there is no reason to
think they weren't.)
In the decade we studied, American companies were also licensed to
sell China a great deal of noncomputer equipment that could be used
for weaponry.
This included $241 million worth of
machinery for making special semiconductors that can go into missiles,
torpedoes, smart munitions, fuses
and secure communications equipment; $131 million worth of high-speed oscilloscopes, which can
record data from nuclear weapon
tests, help design nuclear weapon firing circuits and develop missile guidance systems; $111 million worth of
high-accuracy machine tools that can
produce the precision parts needed
for nuclear weapons and long-range
missiles, and $5.4 million worth of
vibration-testing equipment, which
can enable nuclear weapons and missiles to withstand shock, impact and
rapid acceleration.
Although China is not an enemy of the United
States, it is not an
ally. We disagree on
fundamental issues
like human rights,
trade and the spread of weapons of
mass destruction. "Engagement,"
the current policy toward China, is an
abstraction connoting cultural visits
and the opening of business ties. But
in reality, this policy includes a trade
in the means to make advanced
weaponry.
Are high-tech exports so vital that
we are willing to help China build a
potent nuclear arsenal and the modern missile force to deliver it?
Gary Milhollin is director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Jordan Richie is senior associate at the project.