Early medieval history

Here are maps to medieval history:
As usual Historical Atlas by William R. Shepherd plus a medieval supplement.
And Periodical Historical Atlas of Europe with maps in intervals of 100-years (good maps of Central and East Europe).  
And the collection of medieval maps at History Sourcebook

The History Of The Decline And Fall Of The Roman Empire
By Edward Gibbon - online Book or alternate Web site.

If you want some basic information about fact or term look at Wikipedia (Attila)

Basic introduction to barbarian tribes of Dark Ages.

Mechanisms of primitive feudal economy
Talking about the economy of feudal states we should remember that it was extremely primitive. Exchange method was often barter (goods for gods without money) or there was no noticeable trade exchange at all. Taxes were collected in goods, or in form of involuntary work (serfdom) for feudals or for state. There were no such tools and institutions of trade like credit, banks, etc.

But nature don’t like a vacuum, and thus there were some institutions and mechanisms that had the same economic effect like more advanced institutions. For example there was no such a thing like “virtual money” in times of barbarian migrations, but there were ideologies that had exactly the same function and worked the same way as “virtual money”:

A fortunate, brave and skillful barbarian leader (chieftain) attracted more and more followers hoping for successful war raids and many loots, stirred up with his fame (ideology of conquest). When the leader died or lost his war luck, value of ideology usually disappeared (the same way as the value of virtual money), and barbarian nation or primitive feudal state decomposed. It was one of the reasons for immediate fall of Hun Empire after the death of Attila.     

See Reign of Justinian at De Imperiatoribus Romanis.
See also Constantinople for short summary of Byzantine Empire history.     

Logistic cost of defending the empire
It is a quick and dirty summary of logistic conditions that influence historic processes - as books of Paul Kennedy or Zbigniew Brzezinski describe them.

New conquests and new gained lands lengthens supply lines between the core of the empire and new provinces. Long supply lines (here between Byzantium and for example Southern Spain) made the military operations very costly. Moreover such supply lines are vulnerable to attack, and very long borders are hard to defend, so costs of military expansion grows exponentially.

• => military faction grows in power because this is the only way to keep the conquered lands,
• => thus the empire introduces higher taxation to support bigger and bigger army,
• => what inevitable suffocates the economy of empire,
• => and is the reason for internal rebellions against oppressive government,
• => and empire’s enemies relatively (quoting Kennedy) grow in power,
• => finally empire collapses (or retreats as in case of Byzantium), defeated by citizens upheavals or the coalition of external enemies (or both).
  

Of course this schema is too simplified. Here are some weakness of this pattern:

1. Does not take into account diffusion powers, which decompose the political system and institutions of the empire: core lands adopt political customs and institutions of conquered lands (i.e. despotic methods of ruling), while conquered lands import political institutions of empire core => this cause them developing faster than core => and profitability of vertical trade between core and provinces (the glue of the empire) decreases.
2. Sometimes, especially in feudal empires, there is no one core, but armies are supported from the resources of “local cores”, which may have a great level of independence from the central government, and finally may evolve into independent states (resulting in feudal fragmentation - which happened a few times in 1000 years long history of Byzantium).
   
3. Country may do not need to expand when whole region is in phase of economic prosperity. Governments change from “peaceful and liberal” to “militaristic, and expansionistic” usually when prosperity ends, and thus relative profitability of military strategies increases.
4. Alliance of neighbouring states may “contain” the empire, limiting its possibility to expansion and forcing the modernization, which may prevent the decomposition of empire - as really happened a few times in Byzantine history.
5. Ironically, large size of empire not necessarily makes it vulnerable - if empire has many but small enemies, distant from each other, they may have problem with coordination of aggressive actions and logistic factors will be in favour for the empire.

As a conclusion, logistic factors may not be only one explanation of the history of empires. We should at least take into account diffusion processes between the core and provinces of the empire.     

Gregory of Tours The History of the Franks.

Dynasties of France.

Because of central location of France, reading the history of France is a quite good way to learn the history o Western Europe. Personally I prefer “The history of France”, Perroy, Doucet, Latreille. (But it sometimes lacks important information about institutional reforms and introduced laws.)

See also short History of France from Wikipedia.    

Advantage of middle-income and isoquant of production
In economics there is a curve called isoquant of production, which shows what combinations of means of production (ex. capital and labour) give us the same level of production.

Assuming for a moment that costs of capital and labour (prices of one unit) are the same, we can see that when the number of units of capital and labour (means of production) used for production is the same (ex. 20), then average combinations of capital and labour gives us bigger production than non-average combinations (i.e. we reach better isoquant of production). It means 10 peasants cultivating 10 fields are more effective than 1 peasant cultivating 19 fields or 19 peasants cultivating 1 field. In other words: average combinations of means of productions are usually most effective, so in normal conditions middle-income groups of people and middle-income countries are more effective than others (social groups, countries). For example middle-income country can produce army that the best way combines the number of warriors with the quality of their equipment.

Of course there are some assumptions here: similar technology level (the same price for one unit), no law regulations promoting some social groups, no strong protectionist policy in international trade, etc. - therefore some times exceptions from this rule are possible. However the shape of this curve is the consequence of decreasing returns on scale (at some point, further increasing of the number of peasants cultivating a field becomes less and less effective), which are generally the consequence of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, so the law presented here is quite universal.

The Church, which had educated personnel, developed more sophisticated system of such agreements called precarium (in three basic flavors: data, oblata and renumeratioria).
See also Wikipedia article about feudal system.

Pyramid-like feudal social hierarchy
Here are simplified feudal hierarchy in European states (I will try to show today’s functional equivalents for some elements of this hierarchy):

At the very top is monarch (and his court eventually). He is owner (early medieval) or hereditary “general manager” (late medieval) of the state.

Below are nobles, generally only one social class that had political privileges - like “stock owners” in great corporations.

Below are plebeians usually without political privileges: merchants, craftsmen, farmers (which had personal freedom), serfs (peasants bound to the land), other free non-noble people (bards, servants, beggars and many more) and sometimes slaves.

In late medieval when European cities grew in number and size (and when volume of trade increased), plebeians - actually communities of plebeians like cities, commons, guilds - also gained some political privileges.

Remember: this is the political hierarchy, not the income hierarchy. Some nobles may be richer than monarch, some merchant richer than nobles.     

Political pyramid and political system
Generally, in feudal states political games are played only inside feudal class. Plebeians come into the scene very rare in times of great economic prosperity or great crisis (a peasant rebellions are extremely rare, and happens once a century or two). Inferiors like serfs are economically very weak, and thus had no power to defend their rights. Nobles are like a stable monopoly, which has absolute control over the political market.

In populistic states the number of players increases. Lower-income people may be an important tool used by one of the players in the game. However they are usually political clients of higher-lever players, are brainwashed by populistic ideologies, and their economic and political interest are underrepresented. Political game resembles oligopoly market (two or three strong players) or unstable monopolistic market.

In democratic states, there are so many strong players with balanced power (GPI, groups of political interests) in political game that no one of them can win the monopolistic position. Therefore, they have to learn how to cooperate with each others, and to obey the honest (fair) game rules. Political game resembles a healthy free market (where power of monopolies is contained).

So the real difference here is not the “shape” of social structure but:

1. Laws and institutions that regulate political games, and methods of struggle used in  these games (bloody and dirty tricks or quite fair).
2. Percentage of people who are to poor and cannot represent their political interests at all, or only in very limited way (percentage of passive political clients).
3. Opportunities of social mobility inside the hierarchy (is the social advancement easy or prohibited). 

Plebeian opposition in feudal countries
Here are a few reasons explaining why plebeians (inferiors, serfs) had no chance to fight effective against the feudal system:

• Law system was constructed was against the plebeians (most penalties for crimes were higher for plebeians, and laws were written against plebeians).
• Courts were dominated by nobles, who usually believed that plebeians were a “worse kind of man” and had to be keep down with restrictive punishment.
• Taxation system were against plebeians - they had to pay higher taxes.
• All offices and administration were occupied by nobles, and may be used to haunt “enemies of the system”.
• There was one, dominant ideology (religion) which promoted the stable, hierarchical structure of society, and everybody was brainwashed by this ideology. Plebeians too - they did not protest against exploitation, because they believed this is natural order of the World. When a man from early days hears day, by day from everywhere the same ideology, he can not imagine any other point of view. Thus ideology was even more important for the system than brute military or administrative oppression. Therefore all social movements in medieval ages started as heresies to the official religion.
• There was no chance to promote a non-religious ideology of freedom and equality, because it was treated as heresy automatically (a kind of  medieval catch 22).
• Nobles had advantage of better military equipment (peasants have very limited contact with market, so had no money to buy weaponry), sometimes peasants were disallowed to had any weapon.
• Nobles had organizational advantage (may communicate and coordinate actions much easier than peasants), so local rebellions could be pacified with ease using reinforcements from other regions.

But again: in times of economic prosperity a lack of political representation was not so great problem for plebeians - nobles provide them the necessary military defense from external invasions and raids, and feudal system was a kind of symbiosis (where of course nobles had a privileged position).

Winning ideologies
It is useful to note that some times is hard to say which ideology (of many opposing doctrines) was actually a “heresy”. Winners usually try to prove that their ideology is only one legal interpretation of doctrine. If Mophysitism had won, we would learn that opposite doctrine was a heresy. Good analogy here may be a history of  communist doctrine in USSR and the “heresies” to this doctrine (ex. trockism). 

Arabs formed a great empire called “The Caliphate”, ruled by the religious and military leader called Caliph.

Tradition versus return to the roots
Very the same were the nature of most religious strives between the official Catholic Church and heresies in Europe. This kind of ideological conflict is typical in feudal societies. Original religion (very often a left-winged ideology) have to be modified or extended to support a feudal hierarchy and the laws and institutions of feudal state (so becomes a right-winged ideology). And these “upgrades” of religion were supported by feudal elities. The same time ideologies of poorer people who want to more honest redistribution of power and income were inevitable against these modifications (postulate “returning to roots” - to original left-winged version of religion).

Shi’itism was esspecially popular in countries like Iran which for a long time had the status of conquered province - religious opposition was ampliffied by national conflict here. But it is useful to note that later when Shi’ities came to power and started to rule some Muslim kingdoms (like Fatimids in Egypt), doctrine was usually modified, and the rulling practices of new elites were much or less the same as former Sunnis elites. As usual, economic conditions and needs of feudal state affected the evolution of ideology. There was no return to idealised times of first Caliphs.     

Short summary of Isaurian Dynasty.  

Mass political terror and war crimes
Mass political terror was not the invention of XXth century (and dictators like Hitler or Stalin). In many ancient or medieval populistic states terror against political opponents or inhabitants of rebelled provinces was a common practice. Even the army of ancient democratic Rome were responsible for systematic war crimes (ex. in Spain) in the middle of IInd  century B.C., when the democratic system were decomposing. The scale of political terror in feudal states was smaller, but only because the percentage of people involved in politics here was usually lower.    

Rulers of Bulgaria and short introduction to history of Bulgaria.
Basic introduction to Byzantine warfare.     

Short introduction to the history of silver and gold in Medieval Ages.
See also articles at MuslimHeritage.
Short summary of Arabic explorations.   

Arabic math.
Some economic and historic ideas of Ibn Khaldun. 

Reforms of Charlemagne
Quite good page about Charlemagne. Including a short descriptions of his reforms.

Although these reforms were effect of the personal decision of one man, Charlemagne, were also a symptom of an economic process going underneath - decreasing profitability of military conquests, and increasing profitability of non-military enterprises like trade. A careful analysis of economic reasons (and consequences) of new laws or institutional changes introduced let us to make some rationale guessing about economic and social processes that happen in the background, even when we do not have enough statistical data. 

One of the foundations of his power was scara, a standing army paid and equipped by Charlemagne where younger sons of nobles had a chance for a social advance. This kind of “private army” (also used as a police and tax collectors) was a common tool of great rulers in all early medieval countries. Of course a monarch need some stable source of income that allow him to overpower his external and internal opponents. Even genuine ruler like Charlemagne is nothing without resources.    

Solow Growth Model of growth and the trade balance
Below is a quick-and-dirty summary of Solow’s model - generally also derived from the second law of thermodynamics.

Blue curve represents output possible at given technology level when we invest disposed income (per capita).
Black line represents a percentage of income that have to be spent to renew the means of production. For example medieval peasant had to save about 1/5 of grain to sow the field next year.
Until both lines do not cross, new investments (more people, more land, more capital, greater army) will effect in economic growth. When they cross, economy reach the” steady state” (income per capita Y), and further economic growth is impossible (without inventing a new technologies).
Green line is a new output from investments at new, higher technology level.

Conclusion from this model are:

1. In the long run (long period of time) only way to achieve economic growth is to invent new technologies and made new discoveries (including geographic discoveries).
2. Countries with low technology level, face the final barrier of growth sooner.
   

Second picture adds an orange line representing the net trade balance modifying the black line (percentage of income that is lost). It is my personal modification (simplified here), but it comes from well known trade-balance macroeconomic models - poor people/countries tend to export more goods than they are importing and vice versa rich people/countries tend to import more goods than they are exporting.

As you can see, science development may have sometimes a negative economic effect. Outflow of money and wealth (segment between the red point and the yellow point) may be higher that the growth of income, thanks to implementation of a new technology - especially in rich countries with long open border, when the diffusion channels are wide (like Byzantine Empire). As you can see the protectionism could be (sometimes) a rational economic strategy, allowing the higher economic growth - or not so deep recession - in short run (short period of time).

Now should be clear, why the emperors of Byzantium introduced laws against scientific development and preferred state-regulated economy (which supports protectionism). Sometimes ideologies and policies (against science and free-thinkers) that may seem irrational, have important economic rationale (purpose).

Of course technology development rate will be higher in countries that will not introduce protectionism (because of economic pressure and competition). In the other words: life here is harder but development is faster in long run. However if the run is very long, people may not like to wait. So this is a trade-off as usual.

Basic introduction to the history and culture of Vikings.
The short introduction to Varangians in Russia.

And the encyclopedia-style sources for the history of medieval Germany:
Chronological overview of history of Germany at The Encyclopedia of World History at Bartelsby.com.
Rule of Otto I the Great at The Catholic Encyclopedia
And as usual, easiest way to get the basics will be History of Germany from Wikipedia. 

Trade route from the Varangians to the Greeks
Rurik Dynasty
Map of Europe 1000 AD