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[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Counterproductive, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/960409b.htm]



Counterproductive

by Hans O. Melberg


I recently read about a study demonstrating that the introduction of pedestrian crossings had increased the number of traffic accidents involving pedestrians i.e. not decreased the accidents as intended. The example is not isolated. We often read about plans which have the opposite of the intended result. Furthermore we often experience the problem on a personal level. For example, you may try to sleep but the very attempt to sleep leads you to stay awake.

The interesting question is whether there are systematic and avoidable causes behind these phenomena. If so we could maybe avoid some of the mistakes by studying the issue.

Unfortunately my idea is not too original. Jon Elster has written extensively on the issue of counterproductivity and its causes. For a short overview I would recommend his chapter "Why things don't happen as planned" in Nordal Åkerman's book The Necessity of Friction (Physica Verlag, Heidelberg, 1993).

Elster's paper identifies at least ten different systematic causes of why things turn out differently (which is not the same as opposite) as intended:

a) Individual mechanisms

1. Accidental mistakes
- Not too interesting, but important to consider the risk of such accidents when making plans.

2. Weakness of will
I plan to go to the dentist, but when the time comes I am not able to because my will is too weak

3. Excess of will
When I try to do something which cannot be done by my will, for example when I consciously try to fall sleep

4. Choice of inappropriate means
Such as trying to build a good society by violent means.

5. Hyperrationality
When we try to do what we think is rational even when there is no rational option. For example, it may be better simply to flip a coin to determine which of the parents should get custody of a child after a divorce instead of trying to find out which parent would be the best. The search for a rational solution may not exist and the process may be too costly (the child will suffer in the process.

6. Beliefs born by passion
Often the result of our actions are different from what we intended because we acted on beliefs that were wrong. For example beliefs may be formed by wishful thinking)

7. Inherent in preference formation
Instead of saying that our plans did not turn out the way we wanted, it may be that what we want is precisely what we cannot have. For example "the grass is greener on the other side" mechanism would mean that when we are in Paris we think London is better and when we are in London we think Paris is the best city to live in. If my preferences are formed in this way the outcome of my action (such as moving to the other city to become happy) will always be the opposite of what I intended

b) Frustrations caused by the structure of the interaction

8. Counterfinality
A single farmer may try to increase his harvest by cutting down trees to expand his farm. However, if all peasants do this, there may be more erosion which in turn may mean that the yield on the land decreases. Thus, the result of cutting down the trees is less products, not more as intended.

9. Cob-Web structures
Sometimes we fail because we do not consider the strategic nature of the situation we are operation within. For example, If prices are high I may believe I should increase my production. However, all the other producers may also think in this way (and I forget to consider that they think in this way). Thus, there may be a flood of goods which means that the prices will decrease. My intention of earning more by producing more may therefore not be fulfilled.

10. The existence of multiple equilibria and equilibria that cannot be reached
In the game of rock, paper and scissors there are multiple equilibria. If I believe and try to attain one, I may be disappointed since the other person may try to attain a different equilibrium. However, one need not be surprised in this structure (if one uses mixed strategies and probabilistic reasoning), only disappointed. Hence it may not count as a reason why plans do not work as intended.

These were some of the reasons for why things do no happen as planned. We also see how some of the problems may be avoided simply by more careful thought. For example we may try to avoid wishful thinking by listening to the opinions of unbiased friends or we may simply stop trying to be rational in those cases when there are no rational action.

In addition to this list I intend to explore two reasons why things do not happen as planned (this may overlap with some of the categories mentioned):

1. Because of the effects of a third variable
The mentioned example of traffic accidents increasing when they build pedestrian crossings can be explained by the fact that the planners did not account for a third variable: The degree of carefulness of the pedestrians when crossing a street. The pedestrian crossings gave the pedestrians a false sense of security which led them to run out without the same degree of carefulness as when there were no pedestrian crossings.

2. Because of prisoner dilemma structures
Some people would argue that the recent Chinese military manoeuvres outside Taiwan were counterproductive. It only strengthened the Taiwanese determination to be independent and the world's determination to prevent China from invading Taiwan. Why then did the Chinese do it? There is always the conspiratorial explanation that they were trying to deflect attention from some other issue, such as internal human rights violations. However, one possible explanation could be that individually it was most profitable for the Chinese leaders to press for a tough line (to get a reputation as a hard liner or to gain the support of the army in the leadership struggle). This individual profitability led China to actions that were collectively bad (and maybe unpredicted?).

A better example may be the big debate between the Republican presidential candidates at the beginning of the contest. Isolated they all thought they had to attack Steve Forbes since his support was growing. However, when they all did so the result was that Steve Forbes both got most attention and it appeared as if the contest was between S. Forbes against "the rest." In this way their attacks on S. Forbes unintentionally strengthened him instead of decreasing his support. (The structure of this problem is the same as the above mentioned "failure to consider the strategic nature of the situation")

In any case I think there is plenty material here worth considering for a decision theorists. To advance further I want to write an article which categorises (and sub-categorises) the causes more precisely. I also want to examine the possible strategies for avoiding the problems (and the problem that these strategies in turn may also have unintended results). In the meantime I recommend the interested reader to read some of the chapters in the mentioned book (The Necessity of Friction by Nordal Åkerman). For example the chapter by Chris Donnelly is interesting with respect to the practical implications of knowing that plans never work out as intended in a war.


[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Counterproductive, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/960409b.htm]