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[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Human Nature and 2500 years of accumulated wisdom (Review of Pipes, R. (1994): Communism: The Vanished Specter, Scandinavian University Press), http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/960422.htm]



Human Nature and 2500 years of accumulated wisdom

Review of Richard Pipes (1994, reprinted 1995), Communism: The Vanished Specter, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 84 pages, ISBN 82 00 21908 9


It is often said that provocative arguments are stimulating reading. If this is true the printed version of Pipes' Nobel Institute Lectures is a very stimulating book. Of the many controversial arguments, I have selected three for criticism. First, Pipes' explanation of why communism collapsed. Second, his remarks about the possibility of a scientific study of man. Third, the philosophical lessons he believes we should draw from the collapse.

The three parts can be read separately. I should also add that this is more than a short review. I have used Pipes' book as a springboard to clarify some of my own thoughts. The review is thus also partly an article on what I think.

1. Pipes' explanation of why communism collapsed
The problem with Pipes' explanation of the collapse of communism is the implicit belief that eventually the world which best satisfies human needs will prevail. As Pipes writes:

"How comforting to know that, the mightiest endeavors built on force and scham are doomed, that life manages to assert itself, sooner or later, even against the most ingenious schemes which violate human nature and ignore human desires." (p. 43)

This raises two questions. First, in what way did Communism violate human nature and ignore human desires? Second, how did this violation lead to the downfall of communism?

Pipes places much emphasis on three features of human nature: the desire to own property, the desire to practice a religion and the desire to express your opinions freely. According to Pipes' a system which violates these desires is doomed with "mathematical certainty" to fail. In fact the prediction is based on a social law - "the human equivalent of the physical law of gravity ..." (p. 54). How does Pipes' justify this claim?

The law of gravity is based on a correlation. Every time we drop something it falls to the ground. In the same way Pipes argues there is a correlation between stability and the satisfaction of human desires which makes us believe that the attempt to ignore the desires leads to instability. Thus, since it violated "2500 years of accumulated wisdom" (p. 61) we should have known that communism had to fail.

The problem with the above justification is that all historical systems, including non-oppressive systems, have eventually failed. Thus, while there is a correlation between oppressive regimes and failure, there is also a correlation between non-oppression and failure. The Weimar republic gave way to Hitler, The French Republic was followed by Napoleon, and Tsarism (which Pipes argues was not as oppressive as commonly thought) gave in for Communism. One might try to argue that the oppressive regimes are much more short lived than the non-oppressive. However, even a slight glance at the historical record shows that this is not true. Thus, the relationship between the satisfaction of human desires and stability is ambiguous and does not justify the social law as claimed by Pipes.

Pipes' mistake is not accidental. There are two approaches to justify a social law: By macro correlations or by providing the causal links between the variables. The difference can be illustrated with smoking. There is a correlation between smoking and lung-cancer, but we do not know the exact mechanism which links the two. One of the weaknesses of the first approach is the tendency to overlook the effects of other variables, thus making us believe that a spurious correlation is causally important. I would argue that Pipes' mistaken law stems from his choice of using correlations to justify his law instead of providing the causal connection. To illustrate this claim I would like to show how focusing on the causal connections could improve the analysis.

We are interested in the relationship between oppression and system stability. It is (almost) obviously true that oppression would create a desire in the individual to overthrow the regime. This is one causal link. However, there is a second causal link. Precisely because he is oppressed the individual might not be able to overthrow of the system. He risks stiff penalties, he does not have the freedom of organization necessary to create the overthrow and lacking freedom of speech he cannot know the level of support he has. Oppressive regimes thus increases the desire to revolt, but decreases the ability of individuals to do so. By relying on the correlation to justify his social law, Pipes ignores the second variable which suggest that the correlation is spurious and more justification is needed.

Assume that we agree with Pipes' social law. Even so we still do not have an explanation of the collapse of communism because we do not know what caused communism to violate the law. The communist system did not aim at suppressing these freedoms. On the contrary the aim was to increase the satisfaction of human desires. How then could it be that they achieved the opposite?

In a different review I have argued that the cause of the contradictory result can be traced to the mistaken belief that abolishing private ownership could lead to higher economic growth (see "Logical logic" - A review of M. Malia: The Soviet Tragedy). In short this belief is mistaken because economic theory tells us that a person who does not own his own means of production has no incentive to be efficient or innovative. Why should I be interested in trying or developing a new technology when I get the same salary regardless? Why should I be efficient with the use of raw materials when I do not gain from such efficiency? Unwilling - and psychologically unable - to admit that their belief was mistaken, the Communists used all possible means (including oppression) to make new attempts to create their Utopia. In this way I explain the gap between the communist aim and reality. The mistaken means destroyed the end.

The question is whether this was obvious from the outset. Pipes' phrase about the communists violating "2500 years of accumulated wisdom..." may seems to suggest that he thinks so. I would agree with Pipes' that already at the outset the probability of failure was high, but I will argue against the implications of his phrase about accumulated wisdom.

I have already stated my reasons for believing that communism was bound to fail. The reason for believing that this was predictable is that already at that time (1917) there was clear evidence for the relationship between ownership and efficiency. However, once again we must examine the causal links more closely. The above mentioned negative link between efficiency and ownership is only one possible linking mechanism. Among the other possible mechanism there could be positive effects of central planning which could potentially outweigh the mentioned negative effects. I shall give one concrete example of such a link.

Economists often talk about the problem of externalities in a market economy. For example, the effect on the total number of fish in the ocean when my boat catches a few tonnes is an externality in the sense that I do not care about it when I decide how much to fish. Externalities are problematic in the aggregate because - since nobody takes the externality into consideration - there will be over-fishing and quite possibly whole stocks will be depleted. In a system of world-wide central planning these externalities would not exist. The government could determine how much each boat can catch and thus avoid over-fishing. Of course, the same could be achieved by regulation in a market economy, but this only underlines the point that sometimes the market alone does not produce the most efficient result and that planning is a better alternative.

There are other examples in which planning is may be more efficient than markets: The provision of public goods, in industries of large economies of scale (natural monopolies), and the provision of goods which are non-existent in free markets (such as in insurance markets that fail because of adverse selection or moral hazard). The question is then whether some of these effects could outweigh the negative effects of central planning and whether we could say so with confidence in 1917. I believe we could be reasonably sure and I base this on the arguments of economists, such as von Mises who actually did consider these arguments long before the collapse of the USSR. Hence, I - like Pipes - believe that the USSR was doomed to fail. However my chain of causation starts further back and I have less confidence in my conclusions than Pipes. He starts with the violations of human nature; I start with the mistaken belief that caused these violations. He bases his claim on a social law derived from 2500 years of accumulated wisdom, I base my claim on economic theory.

The phrase '2500 years of accumulated wisdom' deserves some further comments. On one reading it seems to imply that society is evolving towards perfection (defined as the maximum satisfaction of human desires) by some kind of social selection. On this reading we would usually live in something close to the best of all possible worlds. The imperfections around us would be due to necessary circumstances (such as scarcity of resources) i.e. they are not avoidable. On this view social engineering based on 'bookish knowledge' is doomed to fail. I would like to present some counterarguments to this view.

It is certainly true, as Pipes emphasises, that intellectuals have an incentive to try to find new and surprising conclusions. This is indeed how intellectuals can make themselves famous and to justify the existence of their ever expanding universe of social sciences. I would also agree that this often leads the intellectual into absurdities. In the attempt to overturn old truths, we ignore the obvious core and focus on the fuzzy edges. An example of this may be the attempt to develop pluralistic theories of Soviet politics in the 1970s. However admitting this weakness does not mean that we are committed to the belief that all social science research is a waste of time. There are reasons to believe that the social sciences may come up with useful knowledge on which we may base real policies. As an example I would focus on the latest 'craze' in the social sciences: rational choice theory.

Using rational choice theory, we may understand the causes and solutions to the problem of collective action. The standard example is the provision of defence. It would be best for me if all others except for me paid for the defence of the society I live in (this is known as a Prisoners' Dilemma situation). As a result it is rational for a selfish individual not to contribute to the defence of the society. Bookish theory in this case leads to the recommendation that one needs to create an institution - a central authority like the state - to solve this problem of collective action.

One might argue that evolution would lead to the same result since a society without a central authority would be destroyed by other societies who - for some unknown reason - have a central authority. In this way one might try to rescue the 'evolutionary' argument and argue for the redundancy of bookish social knowledge. While agreeing that some social problems can be overcome in this way, it could also be true that some social problems - less vital and obvious than defence - are overlooked. For example, William Niskanene has argued that there is a tendency to overprovide public goods. This overprovision is the rational outcome of collusion between the bureaucracy (which wants to maximize their budgets) and politicians (who want to be reelected). The overprovision is the rational outcome given that politicians rely on the bureaucracy for information (and implementation) and the politicians also rely on the successful implementation of their policies to be reelected. To solve this problem of overprovision one could try some small scale social engineering, such as the British 'Next Step' policies in which one tries to decrease the power of the bureaucracy by privatising many of their functions (contracting out) and other means. Hence we have an example of how 'bookish knowledge' may have real and positive policy implications.

My belief that bookish knowledge may sometimes be useful, is also underlined by Jon Elster's discussion of the distinction between local and global equilibria. If societies evolve by some kind of selection mechanism (which I doubt), they are not capable of reaching global equilibria - that is state of affairs that require you to take one step back before you go two steps forward. A change which has negative consequences in the short run will be rejected by the selection mechanism. To overcome this, and to identify the global equilibria, we need bookish speculations.

2. The scientific study of man
Pipes' thinks it is an illusion to believe "that man can be studied scientifically and that the knowledge thus gained makes it possible to establish a rational society ..." (p. 64/65) This is not only proved by the collapse of communism, it is also a theoretically incoherent notion. A rational organization of society is that organization which uses the best means to achieve the aim of humans. However, as Pipes writes "who is to determine the objective of their [human beings] existence or the cost worth paying to attain it?" (p. 65) An engine can be constructed rationally because we know the purpose of the engine. But what is the purpose of man? One may try to discover the aims of humans by scientific study but - according to Pipes' - this is impossible since it implies going into other people's 'heads' to interpret their thoughts and desires. It is impossible to do this in a scientific manner. The only way we can try to find out what is going on in the head of another person is to imagine what we would have thought in his place i.e. the researcher must "must attribute to them his own personality" (p. 66). This is, as Pipes' writes not science but "the stuff of fiction and drama" (p. 66).

I find Pipes' discussion on this immensely fascinating, but also unclear and unsatisfying. It is unclear because it throws together many arguments against the scientific study of man without any clear separation (such as man's capacity for self-reflection, the practical problems of being impartial when studying man, and the practical problem of interpreting the desires and beliefs of fellow human beings). More seriously it is unsatisfying since it exaggerates the problem. It is true that there is no scientific way of establishing everything what humans want and hence no complete scientific criteria for judging a society. However, we may still advance two defences.

First, we may say that our knowledge is reliable enough to say some things about what humans want. For example, there is widespread agreement that we desire food or more generally that one major component of our happiness is simply material well being. As long as we agree on this we have a criteria for judging political systems. However, this is admittedly incomplete since there are many other factors such as freedom and spiritual activities which we also desire. Nevertheless it does provide a lower bound on acceptable political systems.

Second, we may agree that we do not agree on the aims of humans. This initial agreement may lead to another agreement: The best society is that society which leave it to the individuals themselves to choose their own aims.

These two defences do in no way represent a solution to the problem Pipes discusses. There are whole books (such as Rawls A Theory of Justice) which tries to discuss the question of what a rational human being would desire. The mere existence of these books, and the debates around them, demonstrates that we do not agree. However, as I have tried to point out, there are degrees of agreement on which we can build some criteria for a good society.

3. The implications of the collapse of communism
In the second section I dealt with one of Pipes' implications i.e. the failure of the idea that it is possible to rationalize society. In the following I would like to comment on some other implications he presents.

First, Pipes views the rise in income tax as an "assault on private property" and he argues that it "harbors several dangers". (p. 69) Of these he mentions that concentration of wealth as a threat to liberty , that it creates an increasing potential for corruption and that it stifles initiative and investment. One may agree with much of this, but one may say that at least some of this growth is due to the increased use of the state as a solution to collective action problems (for example in medical insurance, defence, and in the provision of public services). Hence it reflects voluntary choice rather than state force. Furthermore there may be bureaucratic waste, but I do not believe that the taxpayers are being exploited by a class of wealthy bureaucrats who do absolutely no useful work. If you want to cut taxes, you also have to say where to cut, not only the easy option of "bureaucratic waste."

As for the notion that tax is theft of legitimate private earnings, I have seen few discussions better than G. A. Cohen's comment on Nozick's "Wilt Chamberlain" (In J. Arthur and G. Shaw's Justice and Economic Distribution). In short what we produce, and how much it is worth, is the result of collective interaction, not the efforts of isolated individuals. Pipes' assertion that saying so is "reminiscent of communist jargon" (p. 71) is no real argument, but more a label he puts on an argument he does not like.

The distribution of wealth and income has two sides to it. One practical and another moral. The moral aspect is concerned with the justice of a distribution. On what criteria do we judge the justice of various distributions? There are many possible criteria (such as need and desert). From the academic discussions of justice, I fail to see how Pipes' can be so confident that tax is illegitimate theft of legitimate private property.

Maybe I am interpreting Pipes wrong. For example, his argument might be of a more practical nature. Regardless of the justice or injustice of taxes, he may simply be stating the danger of taxation based on historical precedence. I do not think Pipes' argument can be rescued in this way. Redistributive taxation can have both stabilising and destabilising effects. It can be stabilising by reducing the gap between rich and poor. It can be destabilising if it is perceived as too high a burden (and/or if the government becomes too powerful compared to civil society). Which effect is the strongest in the USA currently I am not the most competent to judge. My point is simply that the relationship is not obvious and the net effect is unclear.

A second theme in Pipes' discussion of the philosophical lessons from the collapse of communism is political correctness. On this topic Pipes' argues that the political correctness movement presents a real danger to free speech. On this issue I find myself in agreement with Pipes, though I am less certain about how large the threat is. True science should never confuse what we want to be true with what is true. It might be that men and women are biologically very different. Some questions, such as whether the intelligence of various ethnic groups is significantly different (for whatever reasons - including genetic and environmental) are not even perceived as discussible - the very pre-condition for finding out whether it is true or not. However to prove how serious this threat is it is not enough to mention a few examples. Reading the American press one would hardly be under the impression that it is all under the sway of liberal and political correct commentators. However, one should still take the problem seriously because there seems to be a dangerous and increasing failure - on both sides - to respect the opinions of the other side. Meeting Quale with laughter and simply labelling a person 'liberal' is no way to conduct a political debate.

As I wrote in the introduction Pipes' never ceases to be provocative. Judging from the length of this review article his provocations are very stimulating. I have focused on trying to criticise some of his arguments, thus maybe given the impression that I think this is a weak book. However, although I do not agree with everything I would recommend the book. It is clearly written and the provocatory style provides an excellent starting point for discussions.

[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Human Nature and 2500 years of accumulated wisdom (Review of Pipes, R. (1994): Communism: The Vanished Specter, Scandinavian University Press), http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/960422.htm]